

The Ups and Downs of Small and Large Donors

**An Analysis of Pre- and Post-BCRA
Contributions to Federal Candidates
and Parties, 1999-2006**

THE UPS AND DOWNS OF SMALL AND LARGE DONORS

A Campaign Finance Institute Analysis of
Pre- and Post-BCRA Contributions
to Federal Candidates and Parties, 1999-2006

A CFI Report By
Michael J. Malbin and Sean A. Cain

MAIN FINDINGS:

FOR PARTIES: SMALL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE WAY UP; LARGE ONES ARE DOWN
BUT FOR CONGRESS: THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE

POLICY IMPLICATION:

With Presidential Candidates Also Raising Record Amounts, Mostly from Large Donors
It's Time to Put Small Donors on the Agenda

This is the second in a series of papers to be published by the Campaign Finance Institute analyzing important developments in the role of money and politics in the 2006 midterm elections and their implications for 2008. Additional papers will include one on national party organizations and a recap of the "vital statistics" for candidates, parties and interest groups. An earlier paper in the series, *Soft Money in the 2006 Election and the Outlook for 2008*, is available at www.CFInst.org.

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For Additional Copies:



Campaign Finance Institute
1990 M Street NW, Suite 380
Washington, DC 20036
202-969-8890
www.CampaignFinanceInstitute.org

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INTRODUCTION AND MAIN FINDINGS


With political circles abuzz about the potential for a \$1 billion presidential election in 2008, one obvious question is: where will the money come from? Of course, the decision by so many presidential candidates to forego public funds in 2008 assures that the future will not simply repeat the past. Nevertheless, a recently completed Campaign Finance Institute analysis of federal campaign contributions in the elections of 2000 through 2006 is a good place to begin looking for clues.

When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA or McCain-Feingold) took effect in 2002, some of its supporters said that because the new law prohibited political parties from raising unlimited “soft money” contributions, it would force parties to look harder for *small* contributions. Meanwhile, critics said that a different provision (doubling how much an individual could give to a candidate) would mean *more* money in large contributions and not less.

Figure 1:

It turns out that both predictions seem so far to have been partly right. For the six major national **political party** committees over the past four years -- as well as for the two parties' presidential candidates after the nomination contest was settled -- the Internet helped fuel a major increase in the importance of small contributions. By ending unlimited soft money contributions to the parties that could exceed \$1 million per donor, BCRA shifted the parties' fundraising balance between small and large donors to favor small donors.

Percentage of Receipts from Small and Large Contributions, Before and After BCRA



Definition: For Parties Small = <\$200; Large = \$20,000 or more.
For Candidates Small = <\$200; Large = \$1,000 or more.

But for **congressional candidates** -- as well as most presidential candidates in 2003 and the first quarter of 2007 -- the story is very different. Before BCRA, contributions to candidates were limited to \$1,000 per election -- an amount that had not been indexed for inflation since it was originally enacted in 1974. BCRA increased the limit on contributions from individuals to candidates to \$2,000 per election, and then indexed the \$2,000 for inflation. (In 2007-08, an individual may contribute up to \$2,300 to any one

candidate in an election.) The new limit recaptured part (but not all) of the value that the original limit had lost to inflation over thirty years.

The higher ceiling meant that congressional candidates could raise more without scrambling to recruit new small donors into the system. A higher percentage of their money came in \$1,000+ amounts. As we shall see in tables later on in this paper, most of the money in dollars went to incumbents. (That was true about congressional money from all sources.) The proportional changes were about the same for all incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates, but there was no evidence that the higher limit particularly helped competitive challengers – whether for seed money or later.

Presidential candidates: So far we have said that the parties have increased their small donor fundraising while congressional candidates have raised more in large contributions. These results may seem inconsistent. They become easier to understand if we lay them next to the patterns for presidential candidates. During the "hidden primary" phase of a presidential contest, before the first caucuses and primaries, the candidates (other than incumbents and front-runners) have a hard time differentiating themselves in the eyes of the general public (or potential small donor) from their same-party opponents. Most of the candidates during this period depend financially on a thin layer of donors (and bundlers) who can supply them with checks of \$1,000 or more. The following information about first quarter fundraising in 2003 and 2007 is fairly typical.

Table 1: Large and Small Contributions to Presidential Candidates through March 31, 2003 & 2007

Year	Total Contributions (millions \$)	Contributions of \$1,000 or more (% of total)	Contributions of less than \$200 (% of total)
2003	25.6	81%	7%
2007	132.7	79%	14%

But eventually, the race narrows down to the presumptive nominees. In 2004, this happened in early March. After Super Tuesday – in part because the major party nominees in 2004 both refused public funds and were free of the pre-nomination spending limit – small contributions to George W. Bush and John Kerry moved sharply upward.

Table 2: Large and Small Contributions Before and After Super Tuesday in the 2004 Presidential Primaries

	Total Contributions (millions \$)	% from \$1,000 or more	% from less than \$200
Thru. Feb 29th 2004	316	62%	25%
March 1st on	292	36%	44%

EXPLANATION

These results -- based on an admittedly small number of election cycles -- suggest that the upsurge in small donors so far has been felt most powerfully where the choices are clear, the electorate is divided, and potential donors can be reached through a national fundraising campaign. Small donors are giving to the national parties -- including the congressional campaign committees -- to influence party control of the national government. Small donors are also giving to the presidential candidates late for much the same reason -- to influence control of the government -- when the race similarly has simplified into a choice among major party nominees.

The technology of small donor fundraising tends to support these developments. Many of the small donors new to the system have been reached through a medium (the Internet) that does not typically target users geographically but does have the advantage of allowing low-cost donor outreach. National parties (including congressional campaign committees) can use national themes to raise money through the Internet and then redirect it toward key local races. But it is hard for local candidates to use similar fundraising techniques to raise money from small donors. To do so, the candidate would have to make a compelling case based on his or her campaign's national implications. That is a tough argument in most congressional races, which are safe for the incumbent. But the potential is present in battleground contests, and "Netroots" fundraising did play an important role in key races in the battle for party control of the House and Senate in 2006. Nevertheless, these battleground races remained a minority of all House and Senate elections. The contributions to most congressional candidates therefore still came from PACs and from large donors.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The explanation suggests that small donors are not likely in the foreseeable future to become major forces in congressional fundraising. Nor is this likely (for most candidates) in the financially crucial "invisible primary" stage of a presidential nomination contest. Major donors and PACs will dominate congressional fundraising; major donors and bundlers (but not PACs) will dominate the fundraising for presidential nomination contests.

Does any of this matter? We do know that large donors are not the same demographically as small donors, let alone the general public. For example, almost all of the \$1,000+ donors in 2000 had household incomes above \$100,000 per year and one-third had incomes above \$500,000 per year. By comparison, only 31% of the small donors and 10% of the general population had household incomes above \$100,000 and less than 1% went above \$500,000 (see Table 3.)

Table 3: Incomes of Presidential Donors, Large and Small (2000)

Income	Large Donors (\$1,000 & up)	Small Donors (Less Than \$200)	All US Households
Less than \$100K	5%	68%	89%
\$100K - \$500K	60%	31%	10%
More than \$500K	35%	1%	<1%

We have reason to believe (and are currently researching whether) large donors, small donors and non-donors have differing issue agendas. It has been argued that increasing the pool of small donors would help to diversify the voices heard by office holders when agendas are set. It has also been argued that increasing small donor participation would be good in itself, as a stimulant to civic and political participation. We suspect that some of these propositions might be true and that if so, this will have potentially important policy implications. But while we suspect this to be true, we do not yet know. For that reason, the Campaign Finance Institute has embarked on a major multi-year, multi-jurisdictional research project to understand the differences among donors and what stimulates them to act. We are particularly interested to see whether programs that specifically aim to increase small donor participation in fact do so. The programs in existence at the state and local level include ones that offer tax credits or rebates to small donors, matching fund systems that provide up to a four-for-one public funding match for small contributions¹, and full public funding or "clean money" systems. CFI also expects to be probing, in depth, the relationships between giving and other forms of political and civic participation. It will be publishing reports on its findings in 2008.

¹ In 2003 and 2005, the [Campaign Finance Institute's Task Force on Presidential Nomination Financing](#) proposed that the matching funds formula be changed for presidential candidates who participate in the public funding system for presidential nominations. The present formula uses federal fund to match a donor's first \$250 on a one-for-one basis. The CFI Task Force proposed a 3-for-1 match for first \$100. A presidential public funding bill introduced in 2006 by Sen. Russ Feingold, Rep. Christopher Shays and Rep. Marty Meehan included a 4-1 match for the first \$200. For reports of the CFI Task Force see <http://www.cfinst.org/president/VotersChoose.aspx>. Most presidential candidates have said they would not participate in the matching fund system in 2008 because doing so would force them to adhere to spending limits that are generally perceived to be unrealistically low. The CFI proposal and Feingold-Shays-Meehan bills both would have changed the spending limit.

DETAILED FINDINGS

The detailed information supporting the above conclusions may be found in the set of tables accompanying this report. To summarize the key points in these tables:


POLITICAL PARTIES:

Large contributions:

- Large contributions to the parties (\$20,000+) went down by more than 50% in the elections post-BCRA.
- In the final two election cycles before BCRA, the six major national political party committees raised more than \$2 billion in hard and soft money combined (see Appendix 1). Nearly half of that money (46%) came in contributions of \$20,000 or more.
- After BCRA, the parties raised almost as much in hard money as they once raised in hard and soft money combined.
- Less than 18% of the parties' money in 2003-04 and 20% in 2005-06 came in amounts of \$20,000 or more (compared to 46% in 1999-2003).
- In sum, the raw dollar amount that came to the parties in checks of \$20,000 or more was less than half after BCRA than before.

Figure 2:

Percent of Contributions \$20,000 or more to National Party Committees - Before and After BCRA




Small contributions:

- Small contributions to the parties (less than \$200) nearly doubled post-BCRA. The percentage of money the parties took in from the small contributions went from 22% of the parties' receipts in 1999-2000 and 24% in 2001-02 to 46% in 2003-04 and 39% in 2005-06.
- The four *congressional* campaign committees raised about 1.5 times as much in unitemized funds in 2003-2006 as in 1999-2002, while the two *national* committees more than doubled their under-\$200 contributions over the same period.

Figure 3:

**Percent of Contributions of Less Than \$200 to
National Party Committees - Before and After BCRA**



CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES:

As noted earlier, the large-and-small donor story for congressional candidates was quite different from the one for the parties. The following tables show that House and Senate candidates became *more* dependent on large contributions over the past four years, at the same time as the parties were becoming less so.

Table 4: Percentage Change in the Amount House and Senate General Election Candidates Raised From Various Sources between 1999-2002 and 2003-2006

Sources of funds:	Percentage Change in Amounts Raised	
	Senate Candidates	House Candidates
Large Contributions from Individuals (\$1000+)	Up 80%	Up 85%
Mid-range contributions (\$200-999)	Up 17%	Up 14%
Small Contributions (Unitemized, under \$200)	Down 24%	Down 5%
PACs	Up 13%	Up 27%
Other (inc. self-financing)	Up 24%	Down 12%
Total Receipts	Up 24%	Up 26%

As Table 4 shows, House candidates raised 85% more from major donors (increments of \$1,000 or more) in 2003-2006 after BCRA than in 1999-2002. Senate candidates raised 80% more money in these \$1000+ increments over the same period. PAC money and mid-sized contributions also went up modestly in both chambers, while the amount in small contributions actually declined.

Another way to look at the information is to consider how important the funds from various sources were to candidates' campaigns. This information is presented in Table 5:

Table 5: Percentage of Candidates' Total Receipts Coming from Various Sources, 1999-2002 and 2003-2006

Sources of funds:	Percentage of Total Receipts			
	Senate Candidates		House Candidates	
	1999-02	2003-06	1999-02	2003-06
Large Contributions from Individuals (\$1000+)	27% →	39%	20% →	30%
Unitemized Contributions (Under \$200)	27% →	16%	15% →	12%
PACs	14% →	13%	33% →	34%

As Table 5 shows, House and Senate candidates have been relying more on large contributions in the past two elections than before. In 2003-2006, House candidates were raising nearly two-thirds of their money either from political action committees or from people who wrote checks of \$1,000 or

more, an increase of nine percentage points from 1999-2003. Senate candidates were raising more than half of their money from these same kinds of sources, an increase of eleven percentage points. In both cases, the change came almost entirely from \$1000+ contributions. Meanwhile, the percentage coming in from small contributions declined in both chambers. (For more detailed tables of congressional candidate fundraising, 1999-2006, see Table A7 in the Appendix for the House and Table A8 for the Senate.

BIG AND SMALL DOLLAR CHAMPIONS:

Also available in the Appendix are lists of the top 25 House and Senate Candidates in 2006 who raised the most money from small and large donors, as well as separate tables showing the ones who raised the greatest percentage of their funds from these sources. Some highlights:

- Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton raised more money in large gifts (\$21.9 million) AND more in unitemized contributions (\$10.6 million) than anyone else in the House or Senate in 2005-2006.
- Sixteen Senate candidates (including eight incumbents) and 47 House candidates (including 20 incumbents) raised at least half of their money in individual contributions of \$1,000 or more.
- The balance between large and small donors is not only shown by looking at individual contributions. While political action committees (PACs) do not typically give much to candidates in presidential primaries, they do give in races for Congress. These contributions tend to be even more skewed toward incumbents than individual contributions. Eighty-one percent of all PAC contributions in 2006 went to congressional incumbents, 10% to challengers and 9% to open seat candidates.
 - When the two sources of large contributions are taken together: four Senate incumbents and 28 House incumbents raised at least nine of every ten dollars they raised (90%) from PACs and \$1,000+ contributions combined.

INCUMBENTS, CHALLENGERS AND COMPETITION:

While more of the new \$1,000+ contributions went to incumbents than challengers in absolute dollars, it does seem as if *House* candidates benefited more or less proportionally from the new contribution limit. Each group of candidates – incumbents, challenger and open seat, went from raising about 20% of all funds in large contributions to about 30%. Among *Senate* candidates, however, the new contribution limit disproportionately helped incumbents.

Table 6: Percentage of Funds Raised in Large and Small Contributions by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat Candidates

	Percentage \$1000+		Percentage less than \$200	
	1999-2002	2003-2006	1999-2002	2003-2006
HOUSE				
Incumbents	20% →	30%	15% →	9%
Challengers	19% →	29%	19% →	19%
Open Seats	21% →	30%	14% →	13%
Total	20% →	30%	15% →	12%
SENATE				
Incumbents	29% →	44%	23% →	16%
Challengers	25% →	31%	17% →	21%
Open Seats	26% →	38%	33% →	13%
Total	27% →	39%	27% →	16%

Seed money for challengers: During the Senate debate over BCRA, it was claimed that higher contribution limits would be particularly important for seed money for challengers. Over the full two year cycle, competitive challengers raised roughly the same percentage of \$1,000+ money as incumbents over the full two year cycle, as the next table shows (22% in 1999-2002 and 32% in 2003-2006). Large contributions have played a *modestly* more important role for competitive challengers (see Table 7), but not one that could comfortably be ascribed to BCRA.

Table 7: Funds Raised by Competitive and Non-Competitive Challengers in House Elections, 1999-2002 and 2003-2006

	Average Receipts from All Sources		Percentage of Receipts from \$1000+	
	1999-2002	2003-2006	1999-2002	2003-2006
COMPETITIVE				
End of Year 1	\$193,908 →	\$ 203,385	34% →	39%
Full two years	\$950,037 →	\$1,095,833	22% →	29%
NON-COMPETITIVE				
End of Year 1	\$ 49,807 →	\$ 60,411	24% →	32%
Full two years	\$168,383 →	\$182,476	16% →	24%

NOTE: A competitive challenger is one who either won or was defeated by fewer than twenty percentage points in the top two candidate vote. The table includes general election candidates only. Data for the end of the first year include all candidates who eventually were competitive (or non-competitive) and who had filed financial reports with the FEC by this time.

The numbers of candidates were as follows:

In 1999-2002:

Competitive End of First Year: 84; Full two years 120.

Non-competitive End of First Year: 132; Full two years 374.

In 2003-2006:

Competitive End of First Year: 101; Full two years 154.

Non-competitive End of First Year: 145; Full two years 422.

Comparing 1999-2002 to 2003-2006 in the above table, it does turn out that:

- (1) A larger number of challengers ran competitive races in 2003-2006 than in 1999-2002;
- (2) More of the off-year seed money – 39% compared to 34% – came in amounts of \$1,000 or more.

It is hard from these numbers to conclude that BCRA itself was responsible for an increase in seed money that was particularly helpful for challengers. The average competitive challenger raised \$80,086 in \$1000+ amounts in 2003 and 2005, compared to \$66,660 for their smaller number of counterparts in 1999 and 2001 – an increase of about 20 percent. By comparison, incumbents increased the total amount that they raised in \$1,000+ increments by more than 80% after BCRA.

CONCLUSION

The surge in small contributions to the national political parties has been a notable and positive outgrowth of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. But the vast majority of Americans still do not give anything at all to candidates or parties. We have been therefore been led to wonder about the possibilities for pursuing greater equality by focusing on the role of small donors. Yet the numbers for candidates show that the fundraising balance is not so easy to change. The tables in the Appendix provide detailed information in support of these claims.

Looking forward to 2008, we expect that large donors, PACs, and bundlers will continue to dominate the financial picture for congressional candidates and for presidential candidates before the early primaries. The initial results about party money have looked promising, as do the early reports about Internet fundraising. Nevertheless, the role of small donors more broadly remains a concern and will be a priority on CFI's agenda for 2008.

Appendix 1: Party Data

Table A1 National Party Committees' Total Receipts, 2002-2006 (\$ million)

	2006		2004		2002	
	Receipts	Cash on Hand	Receipts	Cash on Hand	Receipts	Cash on Hand
DNC	130.8	3.7	394.4	6.1	162.1	1.6
DSCC	121.4	0.1	88.7	0.4	143.4	0.0
DCCC	139.9	0.8	93.2	1.6	102.9	1.2
Democrats	392.1	4.6	576.2	8.0	408.4	2.8
RNC	243.0	3.1	392.4	14.7	284.0	4.9
NRSC	88.8	0.1	79.0	1.0	125.6	0.8
NRCC	179.5	1.4	185.7	3.2	193.3	1.6
Republicans	511.3	4.6	657.1	18.8	602.9	7.2
Total	903.4	9.2	1,233.3	26.9	1,011.3	10.0

Note: 2002 totals include soft money contributions and cash on hand.

Table A2 National Party Committees: Contributions of \$20,000 or more, 2002-2006 (\$ million)

Committee	2006		2004		2002 - Hard and Soft \$		2000 - Hard and Soft \$	
	\$20K or more	% of Total Rec.	\$20K or more	% of Total Rec.	\$20K or more	% of Total Rec.	\$20K or more	% of Total Rec.
DNC	9.1	6.9%	57.3	14.5%	94.0	58.0%	127.4	48.9%
DSCC	46.5	38.3%	31.0	34.9%	94.6	65.9%	69.2	66.4%
DCCC	37.1	26.5%	23.8	25.6%	57.6	55.9%	56.0	53.2%
Democrats	92.7	23.6%	112.1	19.5%	246.1	60.3%	252.5	55.1%
RNC	36.3	14.9%	69.1	17.6%	88.8	31.3%	149.6	39.5%
NRSC	35.8	40.3%	12.3	15.6%	69.4	55.2%	43.1	44.8%
NRCC	19.5	10.9%	23.0	12.4%	56.7	29.3%	43.9	30.3%
Republicans	91.6	17.9%	104.3	15.9%	214.9	35.6%	236.5	38.7%
Total	184.3	20.4%	216.4	17.5%	461.0	45.6%	489.1	45.7%

Source: CFI analysis of FEC data.

Table A3 Unitemized Individual Contributions to Party Committees, 2002-2006 (\$ million)

Committee	2006		2004		2002		2002	
	Unitemized	% Total Individual	Unitemized	% Total Individual	Unitemized	% Hard Individual \$	Unitemized	% Hard & Soft \$
DNC	73.2	62.1%	165.5	49.5%	37.8	68.0%	37.8	25.2%
DSCC	24.5	28.1%	19.3	33.4%	9.4	49.1%	9.4	8.2%
DCCC	32.0	38.5%	25.2	49.7%	11.2	57.7%	11.2	14.8%
Democrats	129.8	45.0%	210.0	47.4%	58.4	62.0%	58.4	17.2%
RNC	112.8	52.9%	157.1	44.8%	102.9	65.2%	102.9	37.9%
NRSC	24.6	37.5%	25.5	41.9%	18.0	43.4%	18.0	16.7%
NRCC	42.4	37.8%	49.8	34.1%	39.7	50.1%	39.7	26.7%
Republicans	179.8	46.0%	232.4	41.7%	160.6	57.7%	160.6	30.4%
Total	309.5	45.6%	442.4	44.2%	219.0	58.8%	219.0	25.2%

Source: CFI analysis of FEC data.

Appendix 2

Senate and House Candidates -- Top 25 Lists

Table A4

Top 25 Recipients of Contributions of \$1,000 or More (2006)

House		Senate	
Candidate	Amount	Candidate	Amount
Shaw, Clay (R-FL)	2,502,072	Clinton, Hillary (D-NY)	21,857,802
Klein, Ron (D-FL)	2,414,521	Lieberman, Joseph (I-CT)	13,915,853
Buchanan, Vernon (R-FL)	1,911,822	Santorum, Richard (R-PA)	10,128,168
Kirk, Mark Steven (R-IL)	1,910,800	Ford, Harold E Jr (D-TN)	8,740,975
Hastert, Dennis J. (R-IL)	1,877,800	Kyl, Jon (R-AZ)	7,788,084
Pombo, Richard (R-CA)	1,795,273	Corker, Robert (R-TN)	7,778,212
Reynolds, Thomas M (R-NY)	1,789,759	Casey, Robert P Jr (D-PA)	7,638,165
Shays, Christopher (R-CT)	1,723,091	Nelson, Bill (D-FL)	7,523,590
O'Donnell, Richard F (R-CO)	1,684,948	Menendez, Robert (D-NJ)	7,207,572
Northup, Anne M. (R-KY)	1,684,490	Allen, George (R-VA)	6,844,932
Murtha, John P (D-PA)	1,574,382	Talent, James (R-MO)	6,427,327
Lampson, Nicolas (D-TX)	1,528,825	Dewine, Michael (R-OH)	5,831,670
Bonilla, Henry (R-TX)	1,515,249	Cantwell, Maria (D-WA)	5,575,237
Romero, Craig F (R-LA)	1,503,707	McCaskill, Claire (D-MO)	4,885,262
Duckworth, L Tammy (D-IL)	1,496,212	Cardin, Benjamin L (D-MD)	4,399,395
Farrell, Diane Goss (D-CT)	1,389,898	Bouchard, Michael J (R-MI)	4,382,458
McSweeney, David (R-IL)	1,357,190	Kean, Thomas H Jr (R-NJ)	3,970,166
Davis, Thomas M Iii (R-VA)	1,317,311	Brown, Sherrod (D-OH)	3,860,686
Madrid, Patricia A (D-NM)	1,313,625	McGavick, Michael S. (R-WA)	3,745,744
Porter, Jon C Sr (R-NV)	1,303,971	Steele, Michael (R-MD)	3,743,595
Wilson, Heather A. (R-NM)	1,297,677	Whitehouse, Sheldon II (D-RI)	3,658,915
Bilirakis, Gus Michael (R-FL)	1,297,444	Hutchison, Kay (R-TX)	3,636,326
Jindal, Bobby (R-LA)	1,291,451	Kennedy, Edward M. (D-MA)	3,461,170
Bean, Melissa L (D-IL)	1,289,424	Kennedy, Mark (R-MN)	3,221,388
Pryce, Deborah D (R-OH)	1,258,286	Feinstein, Dianne (D-CA)	3,163,687

House		Senate	
Candidate	Percent	Candidate	Percent
Romero, Craig F (R-LA)	78%	Lieberman, Joseph (I-CT)	73%
Heller, Dean (R-NV)	66%	Bouchard, Michael J (R-MI)	73%
Bhakta, Raj Peter (R-PA)	66%	Ford, Harold E Jr (D-TN)	61%
Platts, Todd R (R-PA)	65%	Menendez, Robert (D-NJ)	60%
Mccaul, Michael (R-TX)	63%	Hutchison, Kay (R-TX)	57%
Ortiz, Solomon P (D-TX)	61%	Whitehouse, Sheldon II (D-RI)	56%
Kirk, Mark Steven (R-IL)	60%	Kyl, Jon (R-AZ)	55%
O'Donnell, Richard F (R-CO)	60%	Ensign, John Eric (R-NV)	55%
Visclosky, Peter John (D-IN)	59%	Clinton, Hillary (D-NY)	55%
Flake, Jeff (R-AZ)	59%	Hatch, Orrin G (R-UT)	54%
Lowey, Nita M (D-NY)	59%	Radnofsky, Barbara Ann (D-TX)	52%
Klein, Ron (D-FL)	58%	Kean, Thomas H Jr (R-NJ)	51%
Fattah, Chaka (D-PA)	57%	Nelson, Bill (D-FL)	50%
Murtha, John P (D-PA)	57%	Cardin, Benjamin L (D-MD)	50%
Zanji, Italo Andres (R-NY)	57%	Carter, John William (D-NV)	49%
Moran, James P Jr (D-VA)	57%	Dewine, Michael (R-OH)	48%
Jindal, Bobby (R-LA)	57%	Corker, Robert (R-TN)	46%
Harman, Jane (D-CA)	55%	Allen, George (R-VA)	46%
Sires, Albio (D-NJ)	55%	Talent, James (R-MO)	46%
Berman, Howard L (D-CA)	54%	Steele, Michael (R-MD)	44%
Fallin, Mary C (R-OK)	53%	Brown, Sherrod (D-OH)	43%
Rogers, Harold Dallas (R-KY)	53%	Casey, Robert P Jr (D-PA)	43%
Shaw, Clay (R-FL)	53%	Akaka, Daniel K (D-HI)	42%
McCarthy, Kevin Mr (R-CA)	53%	McCaskill, Claire (D-MO)	41%
Brady, Robert A (D-PA)	53%	Santorum, Richard (R-PA)	41%

Note: Includes Senate candidates who raised \$1 million or more; House candidates who raised \$250,000 or more.

Table A5

Top 25 Recipients of Unitemized Contributions Less Than \$200 (2006)

House		Senate	
Candidate	Amount	Candidate	Amount
Robinson, Vernon Lucius (R-NC)	1,396,095	Clinton, Hillary (D-NY)	10,561,731
Duckworth, L Tammy (D-IL)	1,329,371	Santorum, Richard (R-PA)	5,792,728
Murphy, Lois (D-PA)	1,257,154	Casey, Robert P Jr (D-PA)	4,943,741
Wetterling, Patty (D-MN)	1,196,900	Spencer, John D (R-NY)	4,875,734
Tancredo, Thomas Gerard (R-CO)	1,147,801	Cantwell, Maria (D-WA)	4,421,077
Honeycutt, Deborah Travis (R-GA)	1,116,061	Sanders, Bernard (I-VT)	3,202,756
Musgrave, Marilyn N (R-CO)	1,032,341	Webb, James H Jr Mr (D-VA)	2,800,618
Kilroy, Mary Jo (D-OH)	900,834	McCaskill, Claire (D-MO)	2,779,926
Paul, Ronald E. (R-TX)	895,554	Harris, Katherine (R-FL)	2,750,029
Burner, Darcy (D-WA)	829,148	Kennedy, Mark (R-MN)	2,591,690
Baldwin, Tammy (D-WI)	785,461	Allen, George (R-VA)	2,555,504
McNerney, Gerald Mark (D-CA)	782,283	Klobuchar, Amy (D-MN)	2,538,921
Sestak, Joseph A Jr. (D-PA)	745,372	Kennedy, Edward M. (D-MA)	2,459,384
Davis, Geoffrey C (R-KY)	713,667	Feinstein, Dianne (D-CA)	2,380,548
Paccione, Angela Veronica (D-CO)	698,401	Byrd, Robert C (D-WV)	2,193,331
Madrid, Patricia A (D-NM)	682,452	Nelson, Bill (D-FL)	2,100,033
Wilson, Heather A. (R-NM)	674,379	Stabenow, Debbie (D-MI)	1,989,362
Bean, Melissa L (D-IL)	671,556	Steele, Michael (R-MD)	1,869,569
Jennings, Christine (D-FL)	657,817	McGavick, Michael S (R-WA)	1,722,322
Murphy, Patrick J (D-PA)	647,012	Tester, Jon (D-MT)	1,710,240
Graf, Randy (R-AZ)	622,264	Brown, Sherrod (D-OH)	1,666,262
Lampson, Nicolas (D-TX)	584,730	Ford, Harold E Jr (D-TN)	1,542,956
Brown, Charles D (D-CA)	573,780	Lamont, Edward M (D-CT)	1,518,700
Courtney, Joseph D (D-CT)	528,602	Talent, James (R-MO)	936,846
Farrell, Diane Goss (D-CT)	510,213	Cardin, Benjamin L (D-MD)	882,483

by Percentage of Total Receipts

House		Senate	
Candidate	Percent	Candidate	Percent
Honeycutt, Deborah Travis (R-GA)	83%	Spencer, John D (R-NY)	83%
Fisher, Ada M Md (R-NC)	81%	Sanders, Bernard (I-VT)	52%
Robinson, Vernon Lucius (R-NC)	68%	Byrd, Robert C (D-WV)	43%
Tancredo, Thomas Gerard (R-CO)	64%	Webb, James H Jr Mr (D-VA)	33%
Laesch, Jonathan "John" (D-IL)	60%	Cantwell, Maria (D-WA)	32%
Paul, Ronald E. (R-TX)	59%	Tester, Jon (D-MT)	31%
Baldwin, Tammy (D-WI)	50%	Harris, Katherine (R-FL)	29%
Courage, John Kenneth (D-TX)	48%	Feinstein, Dianne (D-CA)	29%
Rowley, Coleen Marie (D-MN)	47%	Klobuchar, Amy (D-MN)	28%
Gilcrest, Wayne T (R-MD)	47%	Casey, Robert P Jr (D-PA)	28%
Irey, Diana Lynn (R-PA)	46%	Kennedy, Edward M. (D-MA)	28%
Kissell, Larry (D-NC)	46%	Kennedy, Mark (R-MN)	27%
Graf, Randy (R-AZ)	45%	Clinton, Hillary (D-NY)	27%
Mcdermott, James A (D-WA)	45%	Radnofsky, Barbara Ann (D-TX)	25%
Kucinich, Dennis J (D-OH)	41%	Mccaskill, Claire (D-MO)	24%
Kennedy, Bryan L (D-WI)	41%	Santorum, Richard (R-PA)	23%
Rodriguez, Ciro D (D-TX)	41%	Steele, Michael (R-MD)	22%
Marcinkowski, James (D-MI)	40%	Stabenow, Debbie (D-MI)	22%
Lindeen, Monica J (D-MT)	40%	Brown, Sherrod (D-OH)	19%
Wetterling, Patty (D-MN)	38%	Allen, George (R-VA)	17%
Shea-Porter, Carol (D-NH)	37%	McGavick, Michael Sean (R-WA)	16%
Skinner, Nancy Ann (D-MI)	37%	Nelson, Bill (D-FL)	14%
Winter, William Gardner (D-CO)	36%	Akaka, Daniel K (D-HI)	13%
Paccione, Angela Veronica (D-CO)	35%	Lugar, Richard G (R-IN)	11%
Mccarthy, Carolyn (D-NY)	35%	Ford, Harold E Jr (D-TN)	11%

Note: Includes Senate candidates who raised \$1 million or more; House candidates who raised \$250,000 or more.

Table A6

Top 25 Recipients of Contributions of \$1,000 or More Combined With PAC Dollars (2006)

House		Senate	
Candidate	Amount	Candidate	Amount
Hastert, Dennis J. (R-IL)	4,248,278	Clinton, Hillary (D-NY)	23,151,580
Shaw, Clay (R-FL)	4,207,089	Lieberman, Joseph (I-CT)	16,198,641
Pryce, Deborah D (R-OH)	3,699,395	Santorum, Richard (R-PA)	13,896,464
Bonilla, Henry (R-TX)	3,646,635	Kyl, Jon (R-AZ)	10,594,517
Reynolds, Thomas M (R-NY)	3,529,327	Ford, Harold E Jr (D-TN)	10,121,499
Pombo, Richard (R-CA)	3,490,510	Talent, James (R-MO)	9,984,516
Johnson, Nancy L. (R-CT)	3,184,845	Allen, George (R-VA)	9,757,997
Wilson, Heather A. (R-NM)	3,132,021	Corker, Robert (R-TN)	9,287,826
Klein, Ron (D-FL)	2,984,611	Nelson, Bill (D-FL)	9,265,605
Blunt, Roy (R-MO)	2,939,593	Menendez, Robert (D-NJ)	9,223,912
Cantor, Eric (R-VA)	2,854,098	Casey, Robert P Jr (D-PA)	8,701,568
Boehner, John A (R-OH)	2,821,923	Dewine, Michael (R-OH)	8,632,129
Shays, Christopher (R-CT)	2,770,921	McCaskill, Claire (D-MO)	5,890,856
Northup, Anne M. (R-KY)	2,767,032	Cantwell, Maria (D-WA)	5,601,044
Barton, Joe L (R-TX)	2,670,280	Cardin, Benjamin L (D-MD)	5,594,421
Bean, Melissa L (D-IL)	2,656,883	Burns, Conrad (R-MT)	5,583,883
Kirk, Mark Steven (R-IL)	2,544,581	Brown, Sherrod (D-OH)	5,180,266
Porter, Jon C Sr (R-NV)	2,475,585	Kean, Thomas H Jr (R-NJ)	5,154,702
Davis, Geoffrey C (R-KY)	2,463,950	Nelson, E Benjamin (D-NE)	5,012,775
McCrery, James O III (R-LA)	2,444,782	Steele, Michael (R-MD)	4,956,718
Gerlach, Jim (R-PA)	2,411,973	Bouchard, Michael J (R-MI)	4,915,637
Edwards, Chet (D-TX)	2,376,924	Kennedy, Mark (R-MN)	4,915,151
Murtha, John P (D-PA)	2,343,307	Ensign, John Eric (R-NV)	4,805,452
Ferguson, Mike (R-NJ)	2,319,763	McGavick, Michael Sean (R-WA)	4,753,261
O'Donnell, Richard F (R-CO)	2,298,832	Hutchison, Kay (R-TX)	4,716,928

by Percentage of Total Receipts

House		Senate	
Candidate	Percent	Candidate	Percent
Bonilla, Henry (R-TX)	99%	Lott, Trent (R-MS)	92%
Green, Alexander (D-TX)	98%	Hatch, Orrin G (R-UT)	91%
Watt, Melvin L (D-NC)	98%	Thomas, Craig (R-WY)	91%
Mccaul, Michael (R-TX)	97%	Ensign, John Eric (R-NV)	91%
Tanner, John S (D-TN)	96%	Lieberman, Joseph (I-CT)	85%
Pelosi, Nancy (D-CA)	96%	Bouchard, Michael J (R-MI)	82%
McCrery, James O III (R-LA)	94%	Carper, Thomas R (D-DE)	79%
Visclosky, Peter John (D-IN)	93%	Nelson, E Benjamin (D-NE)	78%
McCarthy, Kevin Mr (R-CA)	93%	Menendez, Robert (D-NJ)	77%
Blunt, Roy (R-MO)	93%	Conrad, Kent (D-ND)	76%
Emanuel, Rahm (D-IL)	93%	Akaka, Daniel K (D-HI)	76%
Rangel, Charles B (D-NY)	92%	Bingaman, Jeff (D-NM)	76%
Dingell, John D (D-MI)	92%	Kyl, Jon (R-AZ)	75%
Brady, Kevin (R-TX)	92%	Hutchison, Kay (R-TX)	75%
Waxman, Henry A. (D-CA)	91%	Snowe, Olympia J (R-ME)	73%
Millender-McDonald, Juanita (D-CA)	91%	Dewine, Michael (R-OH)	71%
Kilpatrick, Carolyn Cheeks (D-MI)	91%	Talent, James (R-MO)	71%
Green, Raymond E. 'Gene' (D-TX)	91%	Ford, Harold E Jr (D-TN)	70%
Moran, James P Jr (D-VA)	91%	Burns, Conrad (R-MT)	69%
Heller, Dean (R-NV)	91%	Whitehouse, Sheldon II (D-RI)	66%
Lewis, Jerry (R-CA)	91%	Kean, Thomas H Jr (R-NJ)	66%
Wynn, Albert (D-MD)	90%	Allen, George (R-VA)	65%
Deal, Nathan (R-GA)	90%	Cardin, Benjamin L (D-MD)	64%
Gillmor, Paul E (R-OH)	90%	Nelson, Bill (D-FL)	62%
Baker, Richard Hugh (R-LA)	90%	Steele, Michael (R-MD)	59%

Note: Includes Senate candidates who raised \$1 million or more; House candidates who raised \$250,000 or more.

Appendix 3: House and Senate Historical Summary Tables

Table A7 House Candidates' Receipts from Small, Medium and Large Contributions and from PACs, Mean Percentage by Type of Candidate, 1999-2006

Party/Status	Total Receipts	Total Indiv. Contrib.	Indiv. Contrib. as % of Total Receipts	Below \$200 as % of Total Receipts	\$200-999 as % of Total Receipts	\$1,000 and Above as % of Total Receipts	PAC Contrib. As % of Total Receipts	Other as % of Total Receipts
2005-2006								
Dem	\$410.2	\$240.7	59%	13%	16%	29%	32%	9%
<i>Challenger</i>	\$129.5	\$89.0	69%	19%	19%	31%	17%	14%
<i>Incumbent</i>	\$206.1	\$101.8	49%	8%	13%	28%	46%	4%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	\$74.5	\$49.9	67%	17%	19%	31%	19%	14%
Rep	\$447.1	\$227.9	51%	8%	12%	31%	36%	13%
<i>Challenger</i>	\$46.2	\$26.3	57%	17%	10%	30%	10%	34%
<i>Incumbent</i>	\$324.2	\$163.2	50%	7%	12%	31%	44%	5%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	\$76.7	\$38.5	50%	8%	11%	32%	17%	33%
Dem & Rep	\$857.3	\$468.6	55%	10%	14%	30%	34%	11%
2003-2004								
Dem	\$305.4	\$176.5	58%	14%	15%	29%	34%	8%
<i>Challenger</i>	\$57.9	\$34.7	60%	21%	15%	23%	16%	24%
<i>Incumbent</i>	\$201.4	\$111.0	55%	11%	14%	30%	42%	3%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	\$46.1	\$30.8	67%	16%	18%	33%	22%	12%
Rep	\$395.1	\$214.7	54%	12%	13%	29%	33%	13%
<i>Challenger</i>	\$57.4	\$37.2	65%	20%	14%	31%	13%	22%
<i>Incumbent</i>	\$254.2	\$135.5	53%	10%	13%	30%	43%	4%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	\$83.5	\$42.0	50%	12%	11%	27%	17%	33%
Dem & Rep	\$700.5	\$391.2	56%	13%	14%	29%	33%	11%
2001-2002								
Dem	\$313.4	\$150.9	48%	15%	14%	19%	34%	18%
<i>Challenger</i>	\$58.7	\$25.8	44%	16%	12%	16%	15%	40%
<i>Incumbent</i>	\$179.4	\$87.6	49%	14%	15%	20%	46%	6%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	\$75.2	\$37.4	50%	14%	16%	20%	22%	28%
Rep	\$325.9	\$169.1	52%	16%	14%	22%	33%	15%
<i>Challenger</i>	\$40.7	\$22.6	56%	23%	13%	20%	10%	34%
<i>Incumbent</i>	\$199.1	\$102.0	51%	15%	15%	21%	43%	6%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	\$86.1	\$44.5	52%	15%	13%	24%	21%	27%
Dem & Rep	\$639.3	\$320.0	50%	15%	14%	20%	34%	16%
1999-2000								
Dem	\$284.9	\$144.6	51%	14%	16%	20%	36%	14%
<i>Challenger</i>	\$69.0	\$39.3	57%	19%	18%	20%	19%	24%
<i>Incumbent</i>	\$171.0	\$82.4	48%	12%	15%	21%	46%	6%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	\$45.0	\$23.0	51%	17%	17%	17%	24%	25%
Rep	\$313.5	\$164.7	53%	16%	16%	20%	31%	17%
<i>Challenger</i>	\$50.3	\$29.9	59%	19%	18%	23%	14%	27%
<i>Incumbent</i>	\$191.3	\$103.1	54%	18%	16%	20%	39%	7%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	\$71.8	\$31.8	44%	11%	14%	20%	21%	35%
Dem & Rep	\$598.3	\$309.4	52%	15%	16%	20%	33%	15%

Table A8 Senate Candidates' Receipts from Small, Medium and Large Contributions and from PACs, Mean Percentage by Type of Candidate 1999-2006

Party / Status	Total Receipts	Total Indiv. Contrib.	Indiv. Contrib. as % of Total Receipts	Below \$200 as % of Total Receipts	\$200-999 as % Total Receipts	\$1,000 and Above as % of Total Receipts	PAC Contrib. As % of Total Receipts	Other as % of Total Receipts
2005-2006								
Democrat	317.6	228.3	72%	18%	13%	41%	10%	18%
<i>Challenger</i>	108.2	66.7	62%	17%	13%	32%	6%	33%
<i>Incumbent</i>	157.5	123.4	78%	18%	13%	47%	13%	8%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	51.8	38.1	73%	18%	15%	40%	8%	19%
Republican	244.7	155.6	64%	15%	11%	38%	15%	21%
<i>Challenger</i>	74.2	42.8	58%	21%	8%	29%	5%	38%
<i>Incumbent</i>	120.1	81.1	67%	11%	12%	45%	24%	8%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	50.4	31.8	63%	14%	11%	38%	9%	28%
Dem & Rep	562.3	383.9	68%	16%	12%	40%	12%	20%
2003-2004								
Democrat	249.9	168.1	67%	17%	12%	38%	12%	21%
<i>Challenger</i>	23.6	16.2	69%	20%	17%	32%	10%	21%
<i>Incumbent</i>	104.3	79.3	76%	23%	11%	41%	19%	5%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	22.1	72.6	59%	12%	11%	37%	7%	34%
Republican	245.2	154.4	63%	15%	10%	38%	15%	22%
<i>Challenger</i>	56.6	39.5	70%	28%	10%	31%	7%	23%
<i>Incumbent</i>	66.9	43.4	65%	8%	13%	43%	29%	6%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	121.7	71.5	59%	13%	8%	38%	11%	30%
Dem & Rep	495.1	322.4	65%	16%	11%	38%	14%	21%
2001-2002								
Democrat	148.4	107.9	73%	27%	17%	29%	17%	10%
<i>Challenger</i>	27.3	18.3	67%	21%	20%	27%	12%	21%
<i>Incumbent</i>	91.6	68.3	75%	30%	16%	28%	20%	5%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	29.5	21.3	72%	21%	17%	34%	14%	14%
Republican	154.2	92.0	60%	20%	11%	28%	22%	19%
<i>Challenger</i>	46.7	30.2	65%	25%	15%	25%	14%	21%
<i>Incumbent</i>	56.5	33.3	59%	21%	11%	26%	33%	9%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	50.9	28.5	56%	15%	9%	32%	17%	27%
Dem & Rep	302.5	199.9	66%	23%	14%	29%	20%	14%
1999-2000								
Democrat	232.4	100.0	43%	12%	10%	22%	9%	48%
<i>Challenger</i>	75.8	34.8	46%	12%	14%	21%	8%	46%
<i>Incumbent</i>	47.4	28.7	61%	16%	12%	32%	22%	17%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	109.2	36.5	33%	10%	6%	18%	4%	63%
Republican	320.2	261.0	82%	41%	12%	29%	13%	6%
<i>Challenger</i>	21.9	15.8	72%	18%	16%	38%	9%	19%
<i>Incumbent</i>	86.2	55.3	64%	19%	17%	29%	27%	9%
<i>Open-Seat</i>	212.0	189.9	90%	52%	10%	28%	7%	3%
Dem & Rep	552.5	361.0	65%	28%	11%	26%	11%	24%

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Michael J. Malbin is Executive Director of the Campaign Finance Institute and a Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Albany. His recent books include: *The Election After Reform: Money, Politics and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2006)*; *Life After Reform: When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Meets Politics (2003)*; *The Day After Reform: Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons from the American States*; and *Vital Statistics on Congress 2007-2008* (forthcoming).

Sean A. Cain is a research assistant at the Campaign Finance Institute and an instructor of political science at the University of Maryland and the University of California Washington Center. In the fall of 2007, he will be a visiting assistant professor in the School of Public Affairs at American University. He received his doctorate in political science from the University of California, San Diego in 2006.



Campaign Finance Institute

1990 M Street NW, Suite 380

Washington, DC 20036

202-969-8890

202-969-5612 (FAX)

www.CampaignFinanceInstitute.org

info@CFInst.org