

**Dancing Without Partners:
How Candidates, Parties and Interest Groups Interact in the
New Campaign Finance Environment**

Edited by

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Executive Summary

The 2004 election cycle was the first cycle conducted under rules instituted by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). The dynamics of the cycle showed similarities to past cycles. However, several new developments in the areas of fund-raising and electioneering practices also emerged. It will take at least one more cycle to determine whether or not these developments become enduring features of political campaigns.

Presidential

The 2004 presidential election was funded at record setting levels by disclosed and limited “hard” money contributions to candidates and party committees. In this cycle, the longstanding gap in individual contributions between the parties was reversed. In 2000 the Democratic National Committee (DNC) raised three-fifths of what the Republican National Committee (RNC) did, but in 2004 the DNC for the first time in decades outraised the RNC.¹ Furthermore, interest groups dramatically expanded their independent expenditures and electioneering communications through Section 527 and 501(c) organizations. Most of the early activity by these groups was on the Democratic side, but late-forming Republican-leaning groups were important to the outcome of the election because of the messages they disseminated. Overall, the 2004 election cycle was heavily focused on the presidential race, with some groups allocating unprecedented proportions of their electoral resources to this contest.

The 2004 election saw dramatic growth in individual contributions to candidates and political parties. From 2000 to 2004, the DNC increased its individual contribution revenue by 3.2 times, from \$111 million to \$356 million; the RNC increased by 1.8 times from \$186 million to \$344 million.² Presidential candidates raised a combined \$234 million in 2000³ and \$631 million in 2004.⁴ While some of the surge in individual contributions to candidates and parties was the result of the higher individual contribution limits enacted under BCRA, the surprises of 2004 are the dramatic growth in the number of individuals contributing and the surge in party and candidate receipts.

Prior to passage of BCRA, the national party committees had depended on the unlimited soft money which often came in large contributions or from sources otherwise prohibited from contributing to parties or candidates, like labor union and corporation general funds. In 2000, 40 percent⁵ and in 2002 44 percent⁶ of funds raised by the DNC, RNC, DSCC, NRSC, DCCC, and NRCC consisted of soft money. The increase in hard-money contributions from individual donors shows that the parties and candidates

¹ Federal Election Commission, “Sources of Receipts for National Party Committee Through 20 Days After the General Election,” (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20041214party/natsources.pdf [January 10, 2005]).

² Ibid.

³ Federal Election Commission, “Receipts of 1999-2000 Presidential Campaigns Through July 31, 2000,” (www.fec.gov/frinance/precm8.htm [January 10, 2005]).

⁴ PoliticalMoneyLine, “2004 Presidential Electronic Filing Summary,” (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/pml1_sql_PRESIDENTIAL.exe?DoFn=2004 [January 10, 2005]).

⁵ Federal Election Commission, “Party Fund-raising Escalates,” press release, January 12, 2001, (www.fec.gov/press/press2001/011201partyfunds.htm [January 26, 2005]).

⁶ Federal Election Commission, “Party Fund-raising Reaches \$1.1 Billion in 2002 Election Cycle,” (www.fec.gov/press/press2002/20021218party/20021218party.html [January 26, 2005]).

motivated people to give. Overall, the DNC and RNC were able to raise and spend more hard money in 2004 than they had in hard and soft money combined in 2000 or 2002.

Democratic-leaning 527 groups were more visible and active early in the cycle. They mounted an aggressive broadcast campaign and an unprecedented effort to register and mobilize voters. Prominent among these groups were America Coming Together, the Media Fund, America Votes, League of Conservation Voters, and MoveOn. By law, these groups could not coordinate with candidates or party committees, a restriction that some on the left felt was “a luxury.”⁷ When asked what was good about not working at the DSCC, Andy Grossman replied, “I don’t have to work with elected officials.”⁸ Most of them were also unable to make explicit “Vote Kerry” kinds of appeals. This inability to coordinate message and effort with the candidate and party put the overall Democratic ground effort at a disadvantage compared to the Republicans, who could communicate with the candidate and deliver a “Vote Bush” message because their ground operation was run almost entirely by the RNC.

Republican-leaning 527 and 501(c) interest groups formed much later in the cycle. “Why would Republicans want to jump through hoops when they have enough federal dollars to do what they want?” asked Laurie Moskowitz, a partner at the Democratic consulting firm FieldWorks.⁹ In aggregate Republican-leaning organizations spent less than the Democratic groups, but the “Republicans were more disciplined and signaled to investors that they should contribute to the right 527s, like Progress for America and Swift Boat Veterans for Truth.”¹⁰ They also did not engage in extensive voter registration and mobilization, directing almost all of their money to broadcast ads. Our research found these ads to be highly effective. The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth put the Kerry campaign on the defensive and took it off message for most of two weeks, making the “Veterans” the “most significant group in the election.”¹¹ The widely shared view of political professionals on both sides of the election is that the Swift Boat Veterans attack and the Kerry response was a critical moment in the campaign. One Democratic consultant who wished to remain anonymous summarized the Kerry response to the Swift Boat Veterans quite succinctly: “We underreacted early and overreacted late.” Progress for America advertising also played a significant role in the campaign, especially the “Ashley’s Story” ad which depicted Bush in positive terms. The success of these groups will likely encourage 527 groups in the future to mount even more vigorous attacks on some candidates and staunch defenses of others.

Congressional

While the soft-money ban did not adversely affect overall spending on the presidential race, there was less spending in dollars per voter in competitive U.S. Senate races in 2004 than in 1998 to 2002. This drop in party resources in 2004 occurred despite the fact that Senate Democrats had recruited strong candidates in such Republican states as Alaska, Oklahoma, Colorado, North Carolina and South Carolina. Senate Republicans had more contentious primaries in 2004 than in 2002, especially in Florida, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Candidates in the races we monitored on average spent less per voter in

⁷ Simon Rosenberg, president, New Democrat Network, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., December 15, 2004.

⁸ Andy Grossman, director of research and technology, America Coming Together, interview with David Magleby, Betsey Gimbel, and Joe Hadfield, Washington, D.C., June 24, 2004.

⁹ Laurie Moskowitz, partner, FieldWorks, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., June 2, 2004.

¹⁰ Mike Lux, co-founder and CEO, Progressive Strategies, L.L.C., interview by Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 12, 2004.

¹¹ Susan Hirshman, president, The Leadership Forum, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., November 18, 2004. Swift Boat Veterans for Truth merged with POWs for Truth on September 29, 2004, becoming Swift Vets and POWs for Truth. Throughout this publication, however, the group will be referred to by its original and more popular name, Swift Boat Veterans for Truth.

2004 than other competitive Senate races in 2002. Spending in dollars per voter in Florida (\$3.11), Oklahoma (\$6.26) and Colorado (\$8.05) lagged behind the 2002 Missouri (\$11.25) and South Dakota (\$37.37) races.¹² The South Dakota 2004 Senate race, however, was likely the most expensive per capita spending race in U.S. history, with spending reaching \$86.59 per South Dakota voter.¹³

Parties also adapted to the new campaign finance regulatory environment. Party committees dramatically increased their independent expenditures in 2004; however, this spending fell well short of what they had expended in soft money in 1998, 2000, and 2002. It is unlikely, given the wide margin of Bush victory in several of these states, that more spending by the DSCC would have changed the party's net loss of four seats.

Competitive U.S. House races were few and far between in 2004, due mostly to the partisan drawing of districts that took effect in 2002. The NRCC and to a lesser extent the DCCC spent heavily in several of these races. Some of the competitive races in 2004 were the result of the 2003 partisan gerrymandering in Texas. With the exception of the redistricted Texas contests, incumbents again were reelected in high proportions. There were also pockets of interest group activity spread across the House races. Yet the activity of Section 527 or 501(c) groups was lower in House than Senate races. Overall, very few national observers believed that the House would switch parties. Consequently, groups and parties had an even greater incentive to participate in the presidential race.

¹² Candidate spending per voter was calculated by dividing the sum of expenditures by the two candidates divided by the number of votes cast in the race as reported by the states election board. Adjusted for inflation (2004 dollars) at U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Consumer Price Index Home Page," (www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm [January 25, 2005]).

¹³ See chapter 13 in this volume; See also John Bart and James Meader, "The More You Spend, The Less They Listen," in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 159–160.

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Overview

Modern campaigns increasingly include a larger number of campaign participants and larger sums of money. The national political parties, interest groups, candidate campaigns all attempt to persuade and mobilize voters. While all of these groups pursue similar goals, the regulatory environment often prevents them from coordinating their efforts. We describe the resulting relationships as a dance. In some campaign situations, the groups connect and choreograph their efforts. In other situations, the participants can only eye each other across the dance floor. Interest groups can work together but cannot work with the candidates or the parties. Different levels of the party organization can coordinate on some activities but must sequester themselves on the far side of the dance hall for other activities. The result is a campaign where partners dance past each other, step on each other's toes, or watch attentively from the periphery. This overview describes and analyzes the relationships between the candidates, the political parties, and the interest groups in the 2004 election cycle. It assesses the activities of the various participants and their effectiveness. It documents the strategies of the different participants and seeks to understand the reasons for the steps they made. Like some modern dances, the final production seems unchoreographed, but there are reasons for the various movements.

The 2004 election cycle, even more than most presidential election years, was dominated by the contest for the White House. "The president," it became apparent early on, "was the biggest motivator in the campaign."¹⁴ Passion over defeating or reelecting George W. Bush, at least at the level of interest groups and individuals who contribute money to politics, was intense. The centrality of the presidential race encouraged high levels of individual and political action committee (PAC) contributions to candidates and parties. It also stimulated the formation of interest groups whose primary or exclusive focus was the presidential election. Examples of these kinds of groups include America Coming Together (ACT), Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, Progress for America, and the Media Fund. Other interest groups who had long emphasized congressional elections over presidential elections changed focus in 2004, giving much greater emphasis to the presidential contest. Groups fitting this description include the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), NARAL Pro-Choice America, the Sierra Club, and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. The Club for Growth, though still primarily campaigning in congressional battlegrounds, saw a marked increase in contributions earmarked for the presidential contest.¹⁵

Sensing the importance of the presidential election to the politics of 2004 and to understanding the impact of BCRA, we monitored five presidential battlegrounds: Florida, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, and New Mexico.¹⁶ Four of these states remained competitive, with Kerry abandoning Missouri shortly after the St. Louis Presidential Debate on October 8, 2004. The Missouri race remained interesting for our purposes, however, because interest groups like ACT, the Media Fund, and the United Seniors Association continued to campaign and mobilize in the state even after Kerry shifted his focus elsewhere.¹⁷ Iowa, Florida, New Mexico, and Ohio all remained highly competitive.

¹⁴ Terry Nelson, political director, Bush/Cheney '04, telephone interview by David Magleby, Quin Monson, and Kelly Patterson, January 5, 2005.

¹⁵ Stephen Moore, president, Club for Growth, interview by David Magleby and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004.

¹⁶ For case study selection methodology see appendix A.

¹⁷ See chapter 5 in this volume.

Control of the U.S. Senate has changed hands with some frequency in recent years. Going into the 2004 elections, the Democrats were only one seat away from control if they also controlled the vice presidency and two if they did not. With the exception of the open seat in Georgia, they recruited strong candidates who generally did not face serious opposition securing the nomination. For a time during the cycle, their chances of winning back the Senate were taken seriously. Republicans, on the other hand, had contentious Senate primaries in Oklahoma, Colorado, Florida, and Pennsylvania in 2004. This contrasted sharply with 2002 when the White House political team succeeded in clearing the field in states like Minnesota, South Dakota, Georgia, and North Carolina.¹⁸

The competitive 2004 U.S. Senate races rarely coincided with presidential battlegrounds and typically were in “red” states. In our sample of six U.S. Senate contests, only Florida and Colorado were in states where both major party presidential nominees mounted serious efforts. Our other four contests were in states Kerry readily conceded to Bush: Alaska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. Our Senate sample, like the presidential sample, was drawn using a method of extensive interviewing of Washington party and interest group elites and resulted in our monitoring six of the seven most competitive races in 2004.

In contrast to the presidential and senatorial elections of 2004, Republicans were widely seen as securely in control of the House of Representatives. As Carl Forti, the spokesman for the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) said, “It is going to be very difficult for them to win the House back outside of some national tidal wave that right now isn’t there.”¹⁹ One of the reasons for this was the redistricting following the 2000 Census, which left comparatively few competitive districts and therefore comparatively few opportunities for the Democrats to pick up seats. Democrats were further weakened by the Texas redistricting which occurred in September 2003. The new districts forced five Democrats to run against other incumbents either in the primary or general election. As we will discuss in some detail later in this overview and in chapter 21, this strategy worked for Majority Leader Tom DeLay and the Republicans, with the Texas delegation seeing a net gain of six in the 2004 elections from seventeen Democrats and fifteen Republicans to twenty-one Republicans and eleven Democrats.

The academics participating in our study carefully monitored the campaigns, collected information on all forms of electioneering, and interviewed participants and informed observers. At the same time, we interviewed in Washington, D.C. and occasionally elsewhere those mounting campaigns across multiple states. We coordinated our data collection and interviewing efforts. For a discussion of our methodology, see appendix A. This volume provides a detailed examination of how campaigns were financed in twenty competitive U.S. House, U.S. Senate, and presidential battlegrounds in 2004 using the same systematic method of monitoring campaigns and elections we have used since 1998. Participating scholars in 1998, 2000 and 2002 evaluated a cumulative total of fifty-eight competitive congressional races in addition to five presidential primaries in 2000. In 2002 we also examined the ways campaigns are financed and run in seventeen contests which we did not think would be competitive, providing a control group against which to compare our findings in the competitive races. The results of previous research have been published in monographs such as this one,²⁰ electronic symposia,²¹ and edited books.²² The work was also cited in

¹⁸ David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, eds., *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

¹⁹ Carl Hulse, “For House Democrats, a Whiff of Victory,” *New York Times*, May 28, 2004, p. A17.

²⁰ David B. Magleby and Marianne Holt, eds., *Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Ads in Competitive 1998 Congressional Elections*, A report of a grant funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts (Brigham Young University, Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, February 1, 1999); David B. Magleby, ed., *Getting Inside the Outside Campaign: Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Presidential Primaries*, A report of a grant funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts (Brigham Young University, Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, July 17, 2000);

McConnell v. FEC.²³ Whenever possible we seek to compare the events of 2004 to events in earlier campaign cycles.

The Dance Floor: BCRA and the New Campaign Finance Environment

The 2004 elections are the first conducted under BCRA. This legislation changed some of the campaign finance rules enacted in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and its later amendments. Reformers were concerned with the efforts of some elected officials to raise large amounts of money from corporations, labor unions, and wealthy individuals and the undue influence those donors exercised or appeared to exercise. Even some elected officials and donors expressed concern about how closely they seemed to be dancing and the unseemly appearance that resulted. Other reformers disliked the fact that some groups or individuals wanted to participate in the campaigns by running sham issue ads. Candidates often considered these groups to be uninvited guests. Therefore, BCRA dramatically modified the campaign finance environment by banning party soft money and redefining electioneering communications.

BCRA largely banned party soft money, the funds political parties could raise in unlimited amounts. Originally, soft money was intended to fund generic party activity and infrastructure, but the practice of raising soft money eventually became a way to channel more money to particular contests. The amount of soft money raised by the party committees in 2000 and 2002 was about \$500 million in each election cycle (see table 1-4). Most of this money was spent through the state parties. The large amounts of money raised and transferred thwarted the original intent of FECA, which included contribution limits intended to remove the ability of wealthy individuals or groups to exercise undue influence. More importantly, the practice of raising and spending soft money created an appearance of corruption as elected officials, including congressional leadership, the president, vice president and others directly solicited large soft-money contributions. The Supreme Court upheld the soft-money ban, holding that “the interests that underlie contribution limits are interests in preventing (1) the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions, and (2) the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.”²⁴ In the absence of soft money, BCRA doubled individual contribution limits

David B. Magleby, ed., *Election Advocacy: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections*, A report of a grant funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts (Brigham Young University, Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, February 5, 2001); David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, eds., *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, A report of a grant funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts (Brigham Young University, Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, February 3, 2003). All of the above studies are available on the web at Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, “Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy,” (csed.byu.edu [January 27, 2005]).

²¹ David B. Magleby, ed., “Outside Money in the 2000 Presidential Primaries and Congressional General Elections,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34 (No. 2): 267-275. Online version available at PS Online eSymposium, “Outside Money,” (www.apsanet.org/PS/june01/outsidemoney.cfm [January 27, 2005]); David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, eds., “The Noncandidate Campaign: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 36 (No. 3): 401-409. Online version available at PS Online eSymposium, “Outside Money,” (www.apsanet.org/PS/july03/ [January 27, 2005]).

²² David B. Magleby, ed., *Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in 1998 Congressional Elections* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); David B. Magleby, ed., *The Other Campaign: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); Magleby and Monson, *The Last Hurrah?*

²³ *McConnell v. FEC*, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). For portions of Magleby’s testimony in this case see: David B. Magleby, “Party and Interest Group Electioneering in Federal Elections,” in Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, and Trevor Potter, eds., *Inside the Campaign Finance Battle: Court Testimony on the New Reforms* (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 147-74.

²⁴ *McConnell v. FEC*, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).

from \$2,000 per election cycle per candidate in most cases to \$4,000; it also raised the aggregate individual contribution limit per election cycle to \$95,000.

The BCRA ban on soft money meant that the connection between large donors and party leaders was no longer direct. This is not to say that large donors do not influence federal elections. As we document in this report, large donors were important in funding Section 527 organizations in 2004. In addition, BCRA permits state and local parties to raise and spend limited amounts of money for voter registration and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts. These funds, sometimes called Levin funds after the sponsor of the amendment to BCRA, Michigan Senator Carl Levin (D), saw only limited use in 2004.²⁵

BCRA changed the definition of express advocacy or an electioneering communication from one that uses words like “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” “cast your ballot for,” “Smith for Congress,” “vote against,” “defeat,” or “reject”²⁶ to a “definition of electioneering communications [that only] covers broadcast, cable or satellite advertisements that refer to a clearly identified candidate within sixty days of a general and thirty days of a primary election and are targeted to a population of 50,000 or more people in a candidate’s district or state.”²⁷ Reformers intended the new definition to eliminate the influence organizations sought by advertising for or against political candidates using innocuous names such as “Citizens for Better Medicare.” The new law also required more complete and timely disclosure of electioneering communications. Nonparty entities are required to file a disclosure report within twenty-four hours of spending \$10,000 and must continue to file reports for each \$10,000 spent thereafter. BCRA also restored the longstanding ban on unions and corporations giving general or treasury funds as party soft money or in electioneering ads. Political analysts predicted that outside groups would “look for ways around the electioneering ban, perhaps by shifting to nonbroadcast communications.”²⁸

BCRA was not intended to overhaul completely the campaign finance system. The amount that PACs could contribute to candidates was not changed. Furthermore, the new law left in tact the organization of the Federal Election Commission (FEC), a development that produced serious consequences in the midst of the presidential election season. The bipartisan structure of the commission resulted in controversy when the FEC deadlocked on the rules defining electioneering. The FEC basically allowed the 527 groups to continue unimpeded by the new law. Advocates of BCRA vehemently contended that the lack of rulemaking by the FEC on electioneering activity circumvented the intent of the law and challenged the result in court.²⁹ Subsequent legislation has been introduced on these matters and is again before the Congress.

BCRA also did not alter the presidential public financing system, with its problematic state-by-state limits in the nomination phase. The problems with the presidential system became even more apparent in 2004

²⁵ Paul Turner, senior program manager, The Greenlining Institute, personal e-mail communication to Kristina Gale, November 11, 2004.

²⁶ David B. Magleby, “The Importance of Outside Money in the 2002 Congressional Elections,” in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 2; *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n. 52 (1976).

²⁷ David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, “The Consequences of Noncandidate Spending, with a Look to the Future,” in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 277.

²⁸ Michael Malbin, ed. “Thinking About Reform,” *Life After Reform: When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Meets Politics* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), p. 16.

²⁹ Campaign Legal Center, “Legal Center Press Release: McCain, Feingold to Support ‘527 Group’ Lawsuit,” press release, September 14, 2004, (www.campaignlegalcenter.org/cases-166.html [January 25, 2005]).

as candidates Bush, Kerry, and Dean all passed up the matching funds in the nomination phase of the election.³⁰

The Dancers: Candidates, Parties, and Interest Groups in 2004

The field of modern campaigns is increasingly crowded with a diverse set of actors. Like a major ball to which many people are invited, a presidential campaign attracts significant interest from candidates, the parties, and the interest groups. All have a stake in the outcome, and few desire to miss the biggest event on the social calendar.

The Candidates

John Kerry emerged from a crowded Democratic field to secure the nomination. Many had written off the four-term senator from Massachusetts, but surprisingly large victories in Iowa and New Hampshire gave him a decisive advantage. His credentials as a war hero during the Vietnam War seemed to appeal to a party that wanted to shore up its standing on national security issues. To do so he had to respond to the strong challenge from former Vermont governor Howard Dean. Dean's opposition to the war in Iraq and early success in fund-raising forced Kerry to move to the left, a shift that would later be used against him by Bush and his allies.³¹ Senator Kerry tried to inoculate himself on national security by making his heroism in Vietnam the centerpiece of his nominating convention and a reason he was fit to be commander-in-chief.

With the primary fight not extending beyond March, Kerry found himself in the same position Senator Robert Dole did in 1996, that is, running against a sitting president who had not been challenged for renomination. Bush, like Clinton, had ample resources to attack Kerry, while Kerry had little money to defend himself. The Bush campaign made no secret of its intention to define Kerry early with an \$80 million media blitz.³² It was at this same stage of the 1996 campaign that the Clinton-Gore campaign made widespread use of party soft money for candidate definition advertising. The only difference in the 2004 cycle is that the Bush campaign would attempt to define Kerry with hard money.

When challengers have resources and incumbents have controversial policies, campaigns become very competitive. George W. Bush and his administration helped unify and motivate the opposition, especially as the country went to war in Iraq. Yet, Chris LaCivita, a prominent Republican consultant believed that Bush held an advantage as the incumbent. "The difference in 2004 is that George Bush is not a candidate, he is the president. He is running for reelection from the White House."³³ When presidents stand for reelection, that contest is often a referendum on their first term. In this case Bush's first term was shaped by the war on terror and a desire for security. Departing from the model of his father, Bush secured a major tax cut, enacted not-fully-funded education reform, and enacted prescription drug benefits for seniors. However, these successes failed to win him support from liberals who had long sought a larger role for the federal government in education and prescription drug benefits. Democrats and progressives also remembered the 2000 election they thought they won. Motivation was not a problem for the opposition.

³⁰ Thomas B. Edsall and Dan Balz, "Kerry Says He Will Forgo Public Funding," *Washington Post*, November 15, 2003, p. A1.

³¹ Richard W. Stevenson, "Bush Hops Through Florida, Where a Slim Lead Is a Lot," *New York Times*, October 17, 2004, sec. 1, p. 30.

³² Glen Justice, "Bush Camp Cut Back On Spending Last Month," *New York Times*, June 19, 2004, p. A11.

³³ Chris LaCivita, senior advisor, Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., June 22, 2004.

Any dance involving two ambitious and well-funded candidates with the presidency at stake will be intense. The 2004 presidential election was no exception. The theme and message of the Bush reelection campaign was simple: security, dependability, and trust. The theme not only applied to Bush in the positive sense but even more so to Kerry in the negative sense: the Bush campaign characterized Kerry as unreliable and dangerous. These themes were reinforced by the outside group campaigns, especially ads from Swift Boat Veterans for Truth.

The Parties

The 2000 election was central to the planning and motivation of both sides in the 2004 election. Bush and his advisors were focused for the next four years on voter mobilization; wanting to avoid losing the popular vote to the Democrats because of their weaker ground game.³⁴ In 2000 Bush went into the election with a 2 percent lead in the polls on the day before the election only to lose the popular vote on Election Day.³⁵ Part of this loss was attributed to the success of Democratic voter mobilization efforts, but part of it was attributed to a perceived dip in support for Bush among religious conservatives.³⁶ “Mehlman noted that, after Bush’s near-defeat in 2000, the GOP recast its entire approach to targeting, voter registration, direct mail, telephone and personal contacts.”³⁷ The 72 Hour Task Force, as the GOP voter mobilization effort is named, was field tested in gubernatorial elections in Virginia and New Jersey in 2001, then expanded and further refined in 2002,³⁸ tested again in Mississippi and Kentucky gubernatorial elections in 2003, and then fully implemented in 2004. In 2004 the Bush campaign aggressively courted religious conservatives, building on the administration’s faith-based initiative, the success of the mobilization effort in the 2002 Georgia Senate race, and the president’s position on stem-cell research, abortion, and same-sex marriage. The campaign’s approach was highly “methodological with the plan.”³⁹

The Democrats and their interest group allies’ anger over the 2000 election lingered. Many of these groups and the Democratic electorate outwardly expressed the idea that the Republicans had stolen the election. By August of 2004, over 70 percent of registered Democrats still thought that George W. Bush did not win the 2000 election legitimately.⁴⁰ The Gore-Lieberman ticket had been successful in mobilizing key elements of the Democratic coalition and had won the popular vote. As the 2004 balloting took place, including early voting in Florida and elsewhere, the Democrats and their allies invested heavily in voter mobilization and in “voter protection.” Democrats worried over Republican threats to challenge many of the newly registered voters, particularly in the battleground state of Ohio. Consequently, the Democratic Party and its allies had people on the ground to respond to any Election

³⁴ David B. Magleby and Kelly D. Patterson, “Stepping Out of the Shadows: The Ground War Activity in 2004,” in *One Election Later*, edited by Michael Malbin (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming).

³⁵ The CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll on November 6, 2000.

³⁶ Richard L. Berke, “Aide Says Bush Will Do More to Marshal Religious Base,” *New York Times*, December 12, 2001, p. A22.

³⁷ Morton M. Kondracke, “Registration Wars In Ohio, Florida Produce a Draw,” *Roll Call*, October 28, 2004, (www.rollcall.com/issues/50_46/kondracke/7223-1.html [January 27, 2005]).

³⁸ J. Quin Monson, “Get On Television vs. Get on the Van: GOTV and the Ground War in 2002,” in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 102.

³⁹ Sara Taylor and Michael Ellis, deputy to the chief strategist and research analyst, Bush/Cheney ‘04, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Arlington, Va., November 18, 2004.

⁴⁰ CBS/*New York Times* Poll available at CBSnews.com, “CBS News Polls,” (www.cbsnews.com/sections/opinion/polls/main500160.shtml [January 27, 2005]), courtesy of Gary C. Jacobson.

Day challenges that would prevent people from voting. In the end, the GOP did not challenge many voters, leading some to say the threat was more a bluff than reality.⁴¹

The Interest Groups

Interest groups exhibited an intense interest in the 2004 presidential election. Indeed, many of the groups that generally participate in congressional elections scaled back their activity to devote more resources to the presidential contest. Most groups did not abandon the congressional campaigns entirely, but they clearly believed that their focus should center on the presidential race.

As in recent elections, a full range of groups actively seeking to influence the outcome of the election emerged. While Section 527 organizations, those organizations organized specifically to affect the outcome of elections, received most of the media attention, a large number of 501(c) organizations also participated. Under the Internal Revenue Code, all section 501(c)(3) organizations are absolutely prohibited from directly or indirectly participating in, or intervening in, any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for elective public office. However, there were a large number of these groups that expended resources for nonpartisan voter education activities or nonpartisan GOTV drives. 501(c)(4), 501(c)(5), and 501(c)(6) organizations can also engage in political activities, so long as these activities are not the primary purpose of the organization. In the 2004 cycle, several organizations developed a full range of organizations (501(c), 527, and PAC) in order to take full advantage of the many ways in which to educate, mobilize, and persuade the public. Others like the Chamber of Commerce, however, preferred one tax-status to all the others. “We don’t feel a need to have a 527; we can do what we need with a 501(c)(6).”⁴²

In addition to a wide range of interest groups participating in 2004, groups engaged in a mix of campaign activities, including door-to-door, phone, newspaper ads, mail, and campaign rally contacts. Voices for Working Families, for example, developed “sustained relationships” by contacting each voter eight to ten times through local canvassers equipped with Palm Pilot devices.⁴³ The Media Fund, on the other hand, took a less intimate approach and did four weeks of full-page advertisements in African American newspapers in the nine states in addition to its broadcast media.⁴⁴ Nationally, the AFL-CIO distributed 25 million flyers, 31.4 million worksite flyers, and 25 million phone calls, 66 percent of which were done by live callers.⁴⁵ In Ohio, the AFL-CIO utilized phone and mail “sandwiching” with phone calls following or preceding mail, leaving voters up to ten or more contacts before Election Day.⁴⁶ Focus on the Family did six “arena rallies” in six different cities.⁴⁷

⁴¹ Blaise Hazelwood, political director, RNC, telephone interview by David Magleby, Quin Monson, Betsey Gimbel, Kristina Gale, and Richard Hawkins, December 20, 2004.

⁴² Bill Miller, vice president public affairs and national political director, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, interview by David Magleby, Betsey Gimbel, and Joe Hadfield, Washington, D.C., June 24, 2004.

⁴³ Arlene Holt Baker, Kenneth Diggs, and Kate Snyder; president, national field director, and women’s program director; Voices for Working Families; interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel; Washington, D.C.; November 18, 2004.

⁴⁴ Erik Smith, executive director, The Media Fund, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 10, 2004.

⁴⁵ Mike Podhorzer, David Boundy, and Keith Goodman; assistant director, deputy director, and research analyst; AFL-CIO; interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel; Washington, D.C.; December 16, 2004.

⁴⁶ Dave Kolbe, political director community services and legislation, Ohio AFL-CIO, interview by David Magleby and Stephen Mockabee, Columbus, Ohio, October 27, 2004.

⁴⁷ Tom Minnery, vice-president government and public policy, Focus on the Family, telephone interview by David Magleby, Quin Monson, and Betsey Gimbel, December 16, 2004.

The diversification of interest groups and the complexity of their legal status and prohibitions resulted in increased uncertainty and hesitation. “Lawyers scared people with threats of ‘you will go to jail if you support this’...This freaked out the entire donor community, except individual ideological Democratic donors.”⁴⁸ Dan Gurley, national field director for the RNC, joked, “You don’t go to the bathroom without talking to the lawyers.”⁴⁹ This fear subsided as understanding of the law grew. For example, ACT canvassers in Florida were initially told that “they could not mention Kerry, just concerns with Bush.” Eventually, the lawyers agreed that canvassers for the organization could legally compare and contrast the candidates in their campaigning efforts.⁵⁰

The activities of the 527 groups received most of the media attention for a good reason. Many of these groups boldly and aggressively signaled their intent to help determine the outcome of the presidential election (Media Fund, MoveOn) while others lingered in the background until they unleashed their advertising (Progress for America, Swift Boat Veterans for Truth). All of these groups, though, had some understanding of the importance of timing. Groups from the left stepped in to fill a void left when the Kerry campaign could not respond to the ad barrage unleashed by the Bush campaign between March and August.⁵¹ Knowing these attacks were coming, interest groups on the left responded. In the aggregate spending on media by the AFL-CIO, MoveOn, and the Media Fund in this period, when added to what Kerry spent, exceeded what the Bush campaign spent. The AFL-CIO, for example, spent \$9 million between March and August on TV ads, and the Media Fund “prevented Bush from having a sixty-day lead.”⁵² This well-timed strategy caused some Republicans to cry foul. “Kerry’s ads are down while ACT goes up. It’s amazing,” Dan Gurley wondered, “How could it not be coordinated?”⁵³ The DNC had some suspicion that the Media Fund would fill the void. “From gossip we knew that Media Fund would be up in August.”⁵⁴ Andy Grossman agreed with Gurley’s assessment that the timing by Democratic allies to Kerry worked well. “The Media Fund was near perfect, it did stymie the Bush campaign. It covered the month of April when Bush went on the air and the Kerry camp was broke.”⁵⁵ Groups on the right also waited to advertise until after the Democratic convention, a period of time in which the Kerry campaign was strapped for money. Figure 1-1 illustrates the dynamic of this spending.

The Music: Money as a Driving Force in the 2004 Election

At most dances, organizers need to pay the band because, as the adage says, “you can’t dance if you can’t pay the fiddler.” BCRA sought to alter the ways in which groups could raise the money to pay and the ways in which interested observers could learn who footed the bill. With the BCRA ban on soft money, observers wondered how groups and individuals would pipe interested money into the campaigns. As BCRA was signed into law, there was some speculation that the new law would lead to the development of more donations from individuals, a change that would benefit the Republican Party and its candidates because of a larger donor base and higher individual contribution limits. There was also speculation that its soft-money ban would seriously curtail the activity of political parties and their large individual and

⁴⁸ LaCivita interview, June 22, 2004.

⁴⁹ Dan Gurley, national field director and deputy political director, RNC, interview by David Magleby and Joe Hadfield, June 1, 2004.

⁵⁰ Karin Johanson and Tait Sye, Florida state director and Florida state communications director, America Coming Together, interview by David Magleby and Susan MacManus, Tampa, Fla., July 24, 2004.

⁵¹ Smith interview, November 10, 2004.

⁵² Erik Smith, executive director, The Media Fund, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., June 2, 2004; and Smith interview, November 10, 2004.

⁵³ Gurley interview, June 1, 2004.

⁵⁴ Ellen Moran, director independent expenditure unit, DNC, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004.

⁵⁵ Andy Grossman, director of research and technology, America Coming Together, interview by Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, Washington D.C., November 12, 2004.

interest group soft-money donors. Because most soft money was spent to defeat or elect particular candidates, usually late in the election, the ban on soft money was likely to affect candidate contests as well.⁵⁶ When the case went to the Supreme Court, “lawyers for statute’s opponents warn[ed] that it would weaken the national political parties.”⁵⁷ The fact that BCRA left largely open the option for groups and individuals to contribute to interest groups conducting electioneering “issue advocacy” meant many thought BCRA would foster more interest group participation. While 2004 is only one election cycle, BCRA does seem to have led to an increase in individual donations and spurred the proliferation of electioneering activity by interest groups. Due to the surge in hard-money contributions, the law did not adversely affect political parties at least at the level of the national party committees.

The Role of Individuals in Financing the 2004 Elections

The surge in individual contributions to candidates and political parties constitutes a major development in the 2004 election cycle. Reformers had hoped that the new law might break the connection between the large soft-money donors and party officials, spurring growth in individual contributions. Both this break and growth occurred.

The connection between donors and elected officials soliciting large contributions was a major justification for BCRA and frequently cited by the Supreme Court in upholding the legislation in *McConnell v. FEC*. During our interviews some former large soft-money donors expressed relief that they were no longer being asked for large soft-money contributions. For example, Bill Miller at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce speculated that corporations were happy not to have to donate as much.⁵⁸ The benefits of this break also affected interest group leaders. Erik Smith of the Media Fund revealed that working for interest groups was not as “cumbersome” as working for the “ball and chain” party committees.⁵⁹ Andrew Stern, president of the Service Employees International Union, expressed relief, stating the change was “good news because the politicians can’t call anymore” asking for large soft-money donations. “I’m not sure in the past whether I was a union leader or an ATM,” he commented.⁶⁰

Table 1-1 presents the overall receipts in the 2004 presidential election. The fact that individual contributions rose by more than \$1 billion between 2000 and 2004 is the most important finding in table 1-1. The growth in issue advocacy, independent expenditures, and individual contributions in the presidential race more than made up for the absence of soft money. It is also noteworthy that the use of public funds and candidate self-financing went down.

BCRA created an incentive for individuals to contribute to political parties by providing that part of the aggregate individual limit, \$20,000 of the \$95,000 total allowance, can only go to political parties. Both national party committees (DNC and RNC) experienced dramatic growth in individual contributions in the 2004 cycle, but the surge in individual contributions to the DNC is particularly remarkable. DNC Independent Expenditures Director Ellen Moran found that by a factor of “three to four times” the DNC had more money than she would have thought.⁶¹ Table 1-2 summarizes the sources of party committee money in 2004.

⁵⁶ Magleby, “The Importance of Outside Money in the 2002 Congressional Elections,” p. 13.

⁵⁷ Linda Greenhouse, “The Supreme Court: Arguments; Justices Hear Vigorous Attacks on New Campaign Finance Law,” *New York Times*, September 9, 2003, p. A1.

⁵⁸ Bill Miller, vice president public affairs and national political director, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, interview by Quin Monson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., February 12, 2004.

⁵⁹ Erik Smith, executive director, The Media Fund, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington D.C., June 2, 2004.

⁶⁰ Andrew Stern and Jack Polidori, president and political director, Service Employees International Union, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., June 6, 2004.

⁶¹ Moran interview, December 16, 2004.

In terms of total receipts, the 2004 cycle is the first time since the passage of the FECA and its more complete disclosure requirements in 1974 that the DNC has raised more money than the RNC.⁶² In the past the RNC often doubled the DNC in funds raised. Table 1-2 shows that much of the improvement made by the DNC in individual donations came in the form of both small (unitemized) contributions of \$200 or less as well as with larger contributions. The smaller unitemized contributions are significant because few thought that the Democratic base could be tapped for this kind of giving. Therefore, in the past the Democrats had not emphasized small donors as much as the RNC. However, in this cycle they raised more money from small individual donors than the RNC did, basically turning conventional wisdom on its head.

The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) also had noteworthy success raising money from individuals in 2004, though fund-raising was slow towards the beginning of the cycle.⁶³ The DSCC raised more money in 2004 than the NRSC. This has not happened since at least 1988. In the 2000 and 2002 cycles, the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) roughly doubled the money raised by the DSCC from individuals. In 2004 the DSCC rose to \$57.5 million from individuals compared to \$59 million for the NRSC. The DSCC, like the DNC, did much better than it had done in the past with small individual contributions but also raised about twice as much as the NRSC from individuals contributing at the maximum allowable amount. The DSCC raised \$12.6 million from people giving the maximum allowable amount compared to \$6.3 million for the NRSC.

The NRCC, alone among the Republican committees, continued its total receipts and individual contributions advantage over the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). The House Republicans' total receipts exceeded \$175 million compared to nearly \$92 million for the House Democratic committee. The DCCC more than doubled the funds raised from individuals in 2004 compared to 2000 or 2002 and, like the DSCC, did better than the Republicans in raising money from those who contributed the maximum possible amount.

What explains this surge in individual contributions, especially among Democrats? An early indicator of the willingness of more individuals to contribute to candidates or parties came in the Democratic campaign with the candidacy of Howard Dean. Using the internet to solicit small donations and generate enthusiasm for the campaign, Governor Dean turned the heads of pundits and rivals. The Democratic Party also reaped rewards. A large investment in lists and infrastructure by DNC chair Terrence McAuliffe paid huge dividends throughout the campaign cycle. Josh Wachs, COO of the DNC, summed it up by saying, "Terry McAuliffe's legacy is building the infrastructure of the DNC."⁶⁴ Online innovations, such as MoveOn's bundling online credit card donations, furthered this phenomenon. Concerning the rapid growth in small internet donations, Wes Boyd, founder of MoveOn said, "Even I was shocked at how fast it happened."⁶⁵ The tendency of individuals to be more inclined to give in 2003-04, however, was not limited to liberals or Democrats. Republican and conservative groups also enjoyed tremendous success at raising money from individuals. The Democrats, nevertheless, accomplished an amazing fund-raising feat, and at least one top Republican official admitted that "the way the Democrats raised money will be the model for both parties in 2008."⁶⁶

⁶² Thomas B. Edsell and Derek Willis, "Fund-raising Records Broken By Both Major Political Parties: Democrats Got More Money Than GOP for 1st Time Since '70s," *Washington Post*, December 3, 2004, p. A7.

⁶³ David Hamrick, national field director, DSCC, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., December 15, 2004.

⁶⁴ Josh Wachs, COO, DNC, telephone interview by Kelly Patterson and Quin Monson, January 11, 2005.

⁶⁵ Wes Boyd, co-founder, MoveOn.org, interview by David Magleby, Berkeley, Calif., September 10, 2004.

⁶⁶ Ben Ginsberg, election lawyer, Patton Boggs, interview by David Magleby, Washington, D.C., November 10, 2004.

BCRA, while banning large soft-money contributions, did not ban individuals from spending large sums to influence the outcome of an election beyond hard-money contributions. We know from our prior research that some individuals gave large contributions to interest groups doing issue advocacy. An undisclosed donor in 2000 gave the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Voter Fund more than \$10 million to fund election activities, including an ad that graphically reminded viewers of the dragging death of James Byrd, Jr. and attacked George W. Bush for not supporting hate crimes legislation in Texas.⁶⁷ Jane Fonda contributed \$11.7 million to a 527 organization in 2000, which in turn funded issue advocacy through several progressive groups.⁶⁸ The largest beneficiary of Fonda's donation was Planned Parenthood.⁶⁹ Under BCRA individuals could continue to make unlimited contributions to Section 527 or 501(c) organizations. In the case of 527 organizations, such contributions were disclosed whereas in the past contributions to issue advocacy groups were only voluntarily disclosed.

In 2004, over \$169.5 million was contributed to Section 527 organizations by individuals in aggregate amounts of \$250,000 or more. Examples of major individual donors on the left were George Soros, \$23,450,000; Peter Lewis, \$22,997,220; Steven Bing, \$13,852,031; and Herb and Marion Sandler, \$13,008,459.⁷⁰ These donors are noteworthy not only for the amounts they gave but for the visibility some sought while doing so. Thinking about the persistent media interest in his donations to Democratic organizations and the resultant Republican ire he generated, Soros quipped, "I think I may have ended up raising more money for the Republicans."⁷¹ Large individual contributions to Republican-leaning 527s came from Bob J. Perry, who gave \$8,095,000, including \$4,450,000 to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and \$3,000,000 to Progress for America. Alex Spanos gave \$5,000,000 to Progress for America, as did Dawn Arnall of Ameriquest.⁷²

In 2004 we also saw more individual independent expenditure activity than we have seen for some time, something predicted before the enactment of BCRA.⁷³ The most visible example was again George Soros, a founding investor in ACT and the Media Fund, who did \$3.5 million in independent expenditures as an individual in the presidential race. Soros was not the only individual to make independent expenditures. Many individuals across the country ran newspaper ads, produced flyers, and produced billboards as a way of communicating their opinion on the candidates. The expenditure by Soros was by far the largest, with \$50,000 as the next highest expenditure.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ David B. Magleby, "A High-Stakes Election," *Financing the 2000 Election* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), p. 9.

⁶⁸ "Déjà vu Soft Money: Outlawed Contributions Likely to Flow to Shadowy 527 Groups that Skirt Flawed Disclosure Law," (www.citizen.org/documents/ACF8D5.PDF [January 25, 2005]), p. ii.

⁶⁹ David Williams, director of Action Fund and PAC, Planned Parenthood, interview by David Magleby and Nicole Carlisle Squires, Washington, D.C., November 8, 2002.

⁷⁰ Center for Responsive Politics, "Top Individual Contributors to 527 Committees 2004 Election Cycle," (www.opensecrets.org/527s/527indivs.asp?cycle=2004 [January 5, 2004]).

⁷¹ Danna Harman, "Mr. Soros Goes to Washington," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 25, 2004, p. 11.

⁷² Center for Responsive Politics, "Top Individual Contributors to 527 Committees 2004 Election Cycle," (www.opensecrets.org/527s/527indivs.asp?cycle=2004 [January 5, 2004]).

⁷³ David B. Magleby and Nicole Carlisle Squires, "Party Money in the 2002 Congressional Elections" in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 36–62.

⁷⁴ Independent expenditure data obtained from Federal Election Commission records in Washington, D.C, January 26, 2004.

How Candidates Funded their 2004 Campaigns

BCRA, by doubling the individual contribution limit, provided an incentive for candidates for federal office to concentrate more effort on raising money from individuals. Much was made in the 2000 election cycle about individual contributions to the Bush-Cheney campaign. Its hierarchal fund-raising structure, which named fund-raisers who bundled \$100,000 in individual contributions “Pioneers,” “was not a new idea, [but] Bush used this method on an unprecedented scale.”⁷⁵ Table 1-3 provides the sources of funds for major party presidential candidates in 2000 and 2004.

Most of the surge in candidate receipts in 2004 came from individuals. President Bush raised over \$271 million from individuals, up from \$101 million in 2000. The more dramatic increase in individual contributions to a candidate came for John Kerry. Kerry more than doubled what Bush raised in 2000, raising \$224 million in 2004. The difference between Kerry and Gore is even more dramatic, in part because Gore accepted federal matching funds in the primary along with the spending limitations associated with them.

Candidates also benefited from a surge in individual giving in U.S. Senate races in 2004. Democratic U.S. Senate candidates in several of the most competitive races raised more money from individuals than their Republican opponents. Tom Daschle (D) raised \$16 million from individuals compared to John Thune’s \$14 million. Brad Carson (D) in Oklahoma raised \$4.6 million compared to \$3.4 million for Tom Coburn (R). Ken Salazar (D) in Colorado raised \$7.8 million compared to \$5 million for Pete Coors (R). Moreover, in the final weeks of the campaign, Salazar outspent Coors two-to-one.⁷⁶ In North Carolina Erskine Bowles (D) raised \$8.5 million from individuals compared to \$6.7 million for Richard Burr (R). Thus, the Democratic success in raising money from individuals was not an isolated phenomenon.

The U.S. Senate race in South Dakota for both parties saw fund-raising “with a national focus.”⁷⁷ Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, in an unusual move, actively campaigned against Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle.⁷⁸ GOP allied interest groups also pulled out all the stops, including the AMA, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the National Rifle Association.⁷⁹ Chuck Cunningham, federal affairs director of the NRA, saw the South Dakota senate race as his “number one priority.”⁸⁰ The Republican groups’ willingness to enter the race gave them an advantage, as “there were fifteen to twenty groups against Daschle while most Democratic groups stayed out.”⁸¹

PACs have long been an important component of how congressional candidates, especially incumbents, finance their campaigns. As a result of BCRA, unions and corporations were limited in what they could do with general treasury funds. With party soft money also banned, we speculated that PACs and Leadership PACs would become more active in 2004 than they had been since 1996, when party soft

⁷⁵ David B. Magleby, ed., “A High Stakes Election,” p. 11.

⁷⁶ See chapter 9 in this volume.

⁷⁷ See chapter 13 in this volume.

⁷⁸ Paul Kane, “Frist’s Travels Won’t Include Return to S.D.,” *Roll Call*, October 7, 2004, (www.rollcall.com/issues/50_41/news/7090-1.html [January 27, 2005]).

⁷⁹ Mike Cys and Jim Kwaka; director and regional political director, division of political and legislative grassroots, American Medical Association PAC, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., December 15, 2004; Bill Miller, vice president public affairs and national political director, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2004; and Chuck Cunningham, federal affairs director, NRA, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004.

⁸⁰ Cunningham interview, November 5, 2004.

⁸¹ Benjamin Jones, research director, NRSC, interview by David Magleby and Quin Monson, Washington, D.C., November 10, 2004.

money became more important. However, at the time of publication, figures describing PAC activity for the full 2004 cycle were not available. In 2004, members assisted other members by making PAC contributions to them from their leadership PACs. Another source of candidate receipts is congressional member-to-member giving. Members may contribute personally to the campaigns of other members, a phenomenon which has become more important in a hard-money world. Researchers predicted early on that these form of contribution would increase under the provisions of BCRA.⁸²

At a critical juncture in the 2004 presidential primaries, John Kerry loaned his campaign \$6.4 million dollars.⁸³ Overall, candidate self-financing in 2004 declined in the aggregate from previous years. Candidates in the Senate contributed or loaned their campaigns over \$13.3 million in 2004, down from \$23.3 million in 2002 and \$98.6 million in 2000. Candidates in the House also financed less of their campaigns, giving only \$24.8 million to their campaigns in 2004 compared with a high of \$49.8 million in 2002 and \$40.2 million in 2000.⁸⁴

In 2004, candidates were limited in what they could give or loan their own campaigns without penalty. BCRA requires candidates whose opponent “spends significant amounts of his or her own personal funds on the race” to be notified of that contribution or expenditure, automatically increasing their contribution limits between three and six times the normal amount, depending on a formula that varies from state to state. This “millionaire’s provision” became important in the Colorado Senate race where Republican Pete Coors lent his campaign over \$571,000 of his own money, saying that the loan was needed in order to counter negative advertising by the LCV and Citizens for a Strong Senate (CSS). His Democratic opponent, Ken Salazar, then raised an additional \$750,000 from people who had previously given the maximum amount to him. As the authors of our Colorado case study learned, Salazar used the money to buy additional radio and TV time.⁸⁵ The Millionaires’ Amendment also played a key role in the Pennsylvania Thirteenth Congressional District, wherein Melissa Schwartz developed an entire fund-raising campaign around the possibility that Allyson Brown would trigger the provision. Though Brown never exceeded the self-financing limit, Schwartz was prepared to both solicit new donors at the higher contribution limit and solicit contributions from those who had previously given the maximum amount.⁸⁶

How Parties Funded their 2004 Campaigns

The role of political parties in financing federal elections changed in the 1996 campaign when the Clinton-Gore campaign used party soft money to fund candidate specific promotion ads. Previously soft money had been used for generic party activity. It did not take the Republicans long to also begin expending soft money in candidate specific electioneering activities, playing an increasingly important role in the financing of competitive federal elections in subsequent years.⁸⁷ The Democrats came to especially rely on soft money.

One of the most recurrent themes of the debate over BCRA was its impact on political parties.⁸⁸ Academics Diana Dwyre and Robin Kolodny, evaluating the possible impact of BCRA, found that “...

⁸² Michael Malbin, ed. “Thinking About Reform,” p. 18.

⁸³ Glen Justice, “Kerry Has to Decide Soon On Repaying a Big Loan,” *New York Times*, June 30, 2004, p. A18.

⁸⁴ Federal Election Commission, “Congressional Campaigns Spend \$912 million through late November,” press release, January 5, 2005, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20050103canstat/20050103canstat.html [25 January 2005]). Adjusted for inflation (2004 dollars) at U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index Home Page,” (www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm [January 25, 2005]).

⁸⁵ See chapter 9 in this volume.

⁸⁶ See chapter 19 in this volume.

⁸⁷ Magleby and Squires, “Party Money in the 2002 Congressional Elections,” p. 57.

⁸⁸ Malbin, ed., *Life After Reform*; Magleby, ed., *The Last Hurrah?*; Corrado, Mann, and Potter, eds., *Inside the Campaign Finance Battle*.

the national party organizations surely will have less money in the near future, since soft money made up fully half of the six major national committee's total receipts in 2002. This will favor Republicans in the short term."⁸⁹ Interest groups also entered the 2004 cycle operating under the premises that "first, the party would not be able to raise as much money; second, the GOP would way out raise us; and third, people would want to give—soft money donors."⁹⁰ Table 1-4 provides the hard money, soft money and combined receipts for the party committees from 1994 to 2004.

The DNC closing the hard-money gap with the RNC is one of the major surprises of 2004 (see figure 1-2). The DSCC also raised more hard money than the NRSC in 2004 (see figure 1-3), but the DCCC lagged well behind the NRCC (see figure 1-4). The total GOP advantage in party committee hard money was nearly \$200 million in 2000 and 2002, representing a two-to-one advantage over Democrats that many believed would continue.⁹¹ In 2004 the aggregate Republican hard-money advantage dropped to about \$75 million.

Democrats, as shown in the soft money section of table 1-4 had been at or near parity with Republicans since 1994 in soft-money receipts, and the DSCC raised more soft money than the NRSC in 2000 and 2002. This meant the Democrats had a proportionately greater reliance on soft money than Republicans.

An important strategic element of soft money had been the ability to target it to competitive races or battleground states. Soft money with a hard-money match was typically transferred to state parties and then spent on the election through TV ads, mail, phone banks, and GOTV activities. Total soft-money transfers in competitive U.S. Senate and House races in the 1998 to 2002 period soared: DSCC, NRSC, DCCC, and NRCC transfers grew from \$41.8 million in 1998 to \$159.5 million in 2002. This infusion of party soft money was important to the outcome of several competitive races like Michigan Senate in 2000, where Deborah Stabenow won by 1 percent of the vote after the DSCC transferred \$4.7 million to the race compared to the NRSC's \$3.1 million transfer. In 2002, John Sununu won New Hampshire's Senate contest by 4 percent despite raising \$2.1 million less than his opponent. The NRSC more than compensated for this gap by transferring \$3,413,273 to the state compared to \$809,174 from the DSCC.⁹²

The bottom section of table 1-4 presents combined hard and soft-money receipts for party committees between 1994 and 2002 and hard-money receipts in 2004. This portion of the table shows that the expected negative impact of BCRA on the DNC did not occur. The DNC raised more than \$100 million

⁸⁹ Malbin, "Thinking About Reform," p. 17.

⁹⁰ Harold Ickes, president, The Media Fund, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., September 16, 2004.

⁹¹ Magleby, "The Importance of Outside Money in the 2002 Congressional Elections," p. 4; Magleby and Squires, "Party Money in the 2002 Congressional Elections," p. 39.

⁹² Data from 1998 are available at Federal Election Commission, "National Party Transfers to State," (www.fec.gov/press/congst98.htm [January 15, 2005]). Data from 2002 are available at Federal Election Commission, "National Party Transfers to State/Local Party Committees," (www.fec.gov/press/press2003/20030320party/congtostatesye02.xls [January 25, 2005]). See also Michael W. Traugott, "The 2000 Michigan Senate Race," in *The Other Campaign: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 97–110; J. Mark Wrighton, "The New Hampshire Senate and 1st Congressional District Races," in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2003). Adjusted for inflation (2004 dollars) at U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Consumer Price Index Home Page," (www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm [25 January 2005]).

⁹² Moore interview, November 5, 2004.

more in hard money in 2004 than it had raised in hard and soft combined in any previous cycle. The RNC in hard money alone in 2004 fell about \$16 million below their hard and soft money combined in 2000. Clearly both national party committees found new ways to raise hard money in the 2004 election cycle.

Another notable item for the RNC and DNC sources of receipts is the growth in money given the party committees by federal candidates. Democrats received nearly \$28 million (up from \$1.5 million in 2000) and Republicans received \$24 million (up from \$21,200 in 2000).

Their ability to raise hard money in this volume and on par with the Republicans surprised even the Democrats. DNC Chairman Terrence McAuliffe said, "Even though the pundits called the DNC 'dead' after McCain-Feingold, the American people said otherwise. Thanks to our strong grassroots support, the Democratic Party surpassed every fund-raising goal by a factor of three."⁹³ The fact that the parties had funds in excess of what they had in 2000 and 2002 without soft money demonstrates that the parties can raise funds from individuals. What explains this surge in party fund-raising? Clearly part of the answer is the passion the electorate felt about the 2004 election. Another part of the answer is greater use of the internet in party fund-raising. As people have gained more confidence in using credit cards over the internet, this has opened up a means for the parties and candidates to tap individual donors in ways that are less expensive than the old fund-raising efforts and with the money available to the parties immediately. Not only did the Internet provide less expensive ways of fund-raising, it also tapped into small donors who contributed \$200 or less. The Internet was especially important among this group of donors.⁹⁴

The DSCC and NRSC were not able to make up for the soft-money ban with increased hard-money fund-raising. Total funds available (hard money) to both senatorial campaign committees dropped about 40 percent in 2004 compared with their hard and soft-money receipts in 2000 and 2002. The difference was substantial for the DSCC, with a drop in 2004 of \$64,433,865, compared to the aggregate hard and soft dollars in 2002. For the NRSC the drop between 2002 and 2004 was \$57,215,348. The DSCC made up for some of this drop with a large infusion of money from its federal candidates.

Both the DCCC and NRCC saw a net reduction in funds available to the party committee in 2004, but in proportional terms not as much as the senatorial campaign committees. House Democrats lagged well behind House Republicans and also their fellow Democrats in the Senate and DNC in matching or exceeding Republicans in individual contributions. The NRCC raised nearly double the dollars (\$175 million) from individuals as the DCCC did (\$92 million). However, that is only part of the story. The DCCC, like the DSCC, doubled its individual contributions in 2004 over 2000. The question for Democratic committees is will they be able to continue their growth into 2006 and beyond? In addition, the NRCC spent at least \$55 million conducting new donor prospecting with InfoCision, an Ohio-based telemarketing firm. This work reportedly produced 500,000 new donors for the NRCC in the 2004 cycle, donors who the company guaranteed would contribute enough money to fund the project. Because a significant portion of the NRCC fund-raising advantage was spent doing additional fund-raising, the actual difference in dollars available for electioneering was much less than the totals make them appear. The prospecting work may aid the NRCC in achieving a long-term hard-money advantage in fund-raising over the DCCC, but at least in the short term, the gulf is not as large as it seems.⁹⁵

⁹³ Thomas B. Edsall and Derek Willis, "Fund-raising Records Broken By Both Major Political Parties: Democrats Got More Money Than GOP for 1st Time Since '70s," *Washington Post*, December 3, 2004, p. 27.

⁹⁴ Ken Belson, "G.O.P. Hopes Web Sites Will Be a Link to the Small Donor," *New York Times*, July 12, 2004, p. C3.

⁹⁵ Chris Cillizza and Ethan Wallison, "NRCC Touts Alliance with InfoCision," *Roll Call*, November 29, 2004, (www.rollcall.com/issues/50_55/politics/7525-1.html [January 27, 2005]).

The timing of fund-raising was uneven for the RNC, DNC, and NRSC compared to the other party committees in 2003-04. Figure 1-5 plots the proportion of total cycle receipts per party committees for each of the party committees over time for the cycle. The RNC and the NRCC began the cycle ahead of the other party committees in money raised. The DNC shows the most dramatic surge in receipts between June 30, 2004 and mid-October 2004. That growth continued with them surpassing the RNC by November. The NRCC did not experience the surge the RNC and DNC did, but the NRCC did maintain its supremacy over the other congressional campaign committees throughout the cycle. Late in the cycle, both the DSCC and DCCC took out loans of about \$10 million and \$5 million, respectively.⁹⁶

Party committees during the peak of soft-money spending targeted these resources to a relatively small number of competitive contests and maximized the impact of their hard money by transferring hard money along with soft money to state party committees. As a result, congressional campaign committees used their hard money less and less for contributions to candidates or in hard-money expenditures they coordinated with the candidates.⁹⁷ Tables 1-5 and 1-5A provide the party committee contributions and coordinated expenditures between 1994 and 2004.

With party committees no longer able to spend hard money to match soft money, they returned to their prior patterns in 2004 of contributing more hard money directly to candidates, even to candidates not in competitive races. The NRSC, for example, contributed more to candidates in 2004 than it had since 1996 and for the DSCC the 2004 amount contributed to candidates exceeded anything they had done since 1994. The House committees were actually down in total contributed to candidates compared to 2002.

A national party committee and state party committees may make joint expenditures to federal candidates for the general election campaign. These expenditures, called coordinated expenditures, occur when the party committees pay for goods or services to benefit the candidate but do not give the money directly to the candidate or candidate's committee. Coordinated party expenditures count against special limits and are not reported by the candidate.⁹⁸ Table 1-5A shows party coordinated expenditures. As with contributions, the DSCC and NRSC had essentially gotten out of the coordinated expenditure game, dropping from more than \$10 million in coordinated expenditures early in the 1990s to under \$10,000 in the 1998 to 2000 period. In 2004, the committees "invested a lot of money in coordinated campaigns," with coordinated expenditures growing to over \$4 million at the DSCC and \$8.5 million at the NRSC.⁹⁹ The same trend is evident at the NRCC and DCCC, but the extent of expansion is less. Coordinated expenditures in 2004 grew to \$16 million at the DNC. The RNC also spent over \$16 million on coordinated expenditures, mostly on direct mail.¹⁰⁰ These coordinated expenditure figures were up substantially for the Democrats and down somewhat for the Republicans.

Political parties have long used independent expenditures, or "an expenditure for a communication, such as a web site, newspaper, TV or direct-mail advertisement, that: expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and is not coordinated with a candidate, candidate's committee, party

⁹⁶ Chris Cillizza, "Democrats Millions in Debt," *Roll Call*, November 8, 2004 (www.rollcall.com/issues/50_49/news/7318-1.html [January 27, 2005]).

⁹⁷ Marianne Holt, "The Surge in Party Money in Competitive 1998 Congressional Elections," in *Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 1998 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p. 18.

⁹⁸ Federal Election Commission, "Campaign Guide for Political Party Committees August 2004 addition Chapter 7," (www.fec.gov/info/PartyGuide/Chapter7.htm [January 26, 2005]).

⁹⁹ Hamrick interview, December 15, 2004.

¹⁰⁰ Terry Nelson, political director, Bush/Cheney '04, telephone interview by David Magleby and Quin Monson, January 5, 2005.

committee or their agents.”¹⁰¹ In 1996 the ability of party committees to make unlimited independent expenditures for and against candidates was upheld by the Supreme Court.¹⁰² Under BCRA, the rules limiting coordination and more stringent penalties for crossing the line meant that in order to conduct independent expenditure campaigns, the party committees typically set up a separate organization within the party structure, but physically and organizationally apart to comply with the more strict guidelines. For example, the independent expenditure group at the DNC had office space located across the street in a separate building from the DNC headquarters.

Table 1-6 provides the party independent expenditures by committee for the 2004 election cycle. Overall, the party committees made \$260,605,102 in independent expenditures in 2004. At nearly \$120.5 million, the DNC spent the most in independent expenditures in 2004. The person responsible for independent expenditures at the DNC described them as oddly detached from the race. “On any given day, we felt how peripheral we were despite spending vast sums of money.”¹⁰³ The RNC independent expenditures were about one-fifth the size of the DNC. Independent expenditures by the party committees were more evenly matched, with the NRSC and DSCC at near parity and the NRCC spending about \$10 million more than the DCCC through independent expenditures.

Party independent expenditure funded activity in 2004 closely resembled soft-money activity from 1998 to 2002. The party committees ran their own TV and radio commercials, sent out direct mail, mounted phone banks. They retained their own pollsters, consultants, and attorneys. They also mounted their own voter mobilization efforts. While much of this ground-war activity was aimed at presidential battleground states, both parties worked at voter mobilization in the largely “Red” state U.S. Senate contests. Mobilizing Native Americans in South Dakota was a priority in 2004, for example.¹⁰⁴

How Interest Groups Funded their 2004 Campaigns

In the 1998 to 2002 election cycles, interest groups and individuals campaigned aggressively through issue advocacy. Under FECA the practice developed that communications that did not include such words as “vote for,” “vote against,” or “Smith for Congress” were treated as issue advocacy and not subject to disclosure or limitation.¹⁰⁵ Groups would often campaign under an innocuous name like the United Seniors Association, Foundation for Responsible Government, or Coalition to Make Our Voices Heard. Groups could also make campaign contributions to candidates through PACs, through independent expenditures, or by orchestrating individual contributions to candidates in a process called “bundling.” In addition, groups can communicate to their members through what we call internal communications. They can establish 527 organizations and, depending on what type of group or association they are, set up some form of a Section 501(c) organization. They can also contribute to other Section 527 or 501(c) organizations.

For several groups BCRA meant they diversified their range of political organizations. Some groups that had not previously had 527 organizations formed them in 2003-04. Examples of this development include the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s November Fund and Progress for America Voter Fund. Other groups that had previously not utilized a 501(c) organization or used independent expenditures did so this cycle. The Sierra Club is a good example of this type of diversification. The Club’s 501(c)(4) organization actively registered voters and expressly advocated candidates to members who were occasional voters in

¹⁰¹ Federal Election Commission, “Campaign Guide for Political Party Committees August 2004 addition Chapter 9,” (www.fec.gov/info/PartyGuide/Chapter7.htm [January 26, 2005]).

¹⁰² *Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC*, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).

¹⁰³ Moran interview, December 15, 2004.

¹⁰⁴ See chapter 13 in this volume.

¹⁰⁵ Magleby, “The Importance of Outside Money in the 2002 Congressional Elections,” p. 2.

twenty-two states. The Sierra Club also formed a 527 organization called the Environmental Voter Education Campaign (EVAC). This 527 organization employed volunteers and paid staff to target 420,000 voters in nine states. The voters that were singled out had the following characteristics: first, they were occasional or infrequent voters, voting in at most two of the last four general elections; second, they were either a member of the Sierra Club or self-identified themselves in a survey as a strong environmentalist or someone who considered environmental issues in choosing a candidate. The 420,000 targeted voters received eight to twelve contacts between August 1 and the close of polls on November 2. The Sierra Club did this through phone, mail, and door contacts. The eight to twelve contacts did not include e-mail communications.

The 2004 cycle saw tremendous growth in interest group activity through 527 and 501(c) organizations. Some have estimated that nonparty and noncandidate electioneering activities in 2004 reached \$511 million, up from \$200 million in 2000.¹⁰⁶ (See table 1-7.) The most visible and well funded of these, ACT, Media Fund, America Votes, Progress for America, and Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, operated nearly exclusively in presidential battlegrounds. With the exception of ACT and the members of the America Votes coalition, they also were primarily communicating through broadcast ads. In some states like Missouri, interest groups like ACT and the AFL-CIO continued to campaign aggressively for the John Kerry even after he had ceased to run ads in the state. Terry Jones and Martha Kropf estimate interest groups spent \$2 million against Bush and for Kerry after Kerry quit advertising in the state.¹⁰⁷

A second major difference was their greater emphasis on the ground war.¹⁰⁸ Issue advocacy in the past had been more about persuasion than about voter registration and mobilization. A third major difference was their heavy concentration on the presidential race. A fourth major difference was their diverse communication strategies. Groups in some states used every means available to try and persuade voters. For example, Rednecks for a Better America put up billboards attacking Bush¹⁰⁹ and the NRA advertised on the outside of the plastic bags in which newspapers are delivered. The NRA's combination of standard practices (GOTV postcards) and creative innovations were deemed "extremely effective" by Republican insiders.¹¹⁰

Interest groups exploited the "magic words" definition of communications or expenditures subject to disclosure and limitation by avoiding those words while clearly conveying an electioneering message.¹¹¹ BCRA redefined electioneering communications as "broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refer to a clearly identifiable candidate, publicly distributed within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days before a general election, and targeted to the relevant electorate."¹¹² Did the BCRA definitions and prohibitions of electioneering work in practice in 2003-04?

Some of these elements included the ban on corporate and union treasury funds for broadcast electioneering communications in the last sixty days before a general election and thirty days before a

¹⁰⁶ From CQ Weekly, October 30, 2004, p. 2547, Center for Responsive Politics, and correspondence with Sheila Krumholz, January 3, 2005.

¹⁰⁷ See chapter 5 in this volume.

¹⁰⁸ Magleby and Patterson, "Stepping Out of the Shadows."

¹⁰⁹ Mr. Charles B. Wessler is not only the founder of this group, but a movie producer of such film as *Dumb and Dumber*; *Me, Myself, and Irene*; and *Stuck on You*.

¹¹⁰ Ginsberg interview, November 10, 2004.

¹¹¹ David B. Magleby, *Dictum Without Data: The Myth of Issue Advocacy and Party Building*, A report of a grant funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts (Brigham Young University, Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, November 13, 2000). David B. Magleby, ed., *Outside Money*; Magleby, ed., *The Other Campaign*; Magleby and Monson, eds., *The Last Hurrah?*.

¹¹² Federal Election Commission, "11 CFP Parts 100 and 114 FCC Database on Electioneering Communications; Final Report," *Federal Register*, vol. 67, no. 205, October 23, 2002, p. 65190.

primary election, a period that came to be called the “window.” Groups were careful to not spend prohibited money within the window. The Media Fund, for example, spent union funds outside the window, and individual contributions within the window. A surplus of union funds resulted in their doing mailers in five states within the window, namely Pennsylvania, Iowa, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Florida, because they had money that they “could not otherwise use.” The Media Fund also did two phone calls in Missouri regarding their ad highlighting the Saudi-Bush family connection, as phone calls were a medium of communication not affected by BCRA restrictions on union treasury funds.¹¹³ Attention to the time restriction extended to fund-raising as well. The Club for Growth divided its accounts for funds raised before the window and those raised after. Contributions received inside the electioneering window were channeled into the “Club for Growth.net,” a 527 committee that accepted large donations (mostly of \$100,000) amounting to \$4.5 million that could be spent with fewer restrictions within the window.¹¹⁴

Another element of the new electioneering communication definition included messages targeted to audiences of 50,000 or more for congressional districts or Senate/presidential targeting purposes. The FCC released its information on media markets with targetable populations organized by media markets and congressional districts/states in a timely manner that did not appear to create problems. One concern of BCRA opponents was that the legislation would ban advertising that needed to mention the name of a legislative sponsor because the legislation was pending before Congress. There appeared to be no examples of groups wanting to run ads mentioning a politician because of pending legislation rather than an election context.

In part because of the new BCRA definitions and in part because of the surge in independent expenditure activity, there was more concern with avoiding coordination between candidates or parties and interest group allies, and even within political parties themselves, than we saw in recent election cycles. Firewalls were regularly built within organizations to comply in 2004. Patrick Davis, political director of the NRSC commented, “In some cases with independent expenditures, I didn’t know about our ad until it went up and I saw it on the opposing candidate’s web site.”¹¹⁵ Gordon Fisher, chair of the Iowa Democratic Party lived four houses away from the Jeff Link, who ran the ACT campaign in Iowa. Fisher said that he went to great lengths to avoid the appearance of coordination, including crossing the street when walking to avoid contact on several occasions. He said that one good thing about the end of the campaign was that he and Link could resume neighborly contact.¹¹⁶ The most visible controversy regarding coordination involved Ben Ginsberg, the Bush/Cheney ’04 general counsel who also provided legal advice to Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. When this dual role became a media story, Ginsberg resigned his post with the Bush campaign.¹¹⁷ Republicans claimed a media double standard because of similar staff overlaps with pollster Stanley Greenberg, who worked for MoveOn and later the DNC, and attorney Robert Bauer, who represented the Kerry campaign and ACT.¹¹⁸

While consultants did occasionally bridge the divide between candidates/parties and 527 organizations, as a rule the two sides of this divide did not coordinate or communicate directly to each other. Even within the party operations, pains were taken to separate those doing independent expenditures from the rest of

¹¹³ Smith interview, November 10, 2004.

¹¹⁴ Moore interview, November 5, 2004.

¹¹⁵ Patrick Davis, political director, NRSC, interview by Quin Monson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., August 19, 2004.

¹¹⁶ Gordon Fisher, chair, Iowa Democratic Party, interview with Arthur Sanders, Des Moines, Iowa, November 9, 2004.

¹¹⁷ Glen Justice and Eric Lichtblau, “Windfall for Anti-Kerry Veterans’ Group, With Texans Among Those Giving Most,” *New York Times*, September 10, 2004, p. A4.

¹¹⁸ Glen Justice and Jim Rutenberg, “Advocacy Groups and Campaigns: An Uneasy Shuttle,” *New York Times*, September 8, 2004, p. A1.

the operation.¹¹⁹ The largest challenge in coordination came in deploying ground forces and not in theme and message. Both candidates effectively communicated through public mechanisms what they were going to emphasize in their campaigns. By and large, the Republican 527s did a better job of staying “on message.” We discuss this in greater detail below.

BCRA mandated enhanced disclosure of activity by Section 527 groups. Any person or organization, regardless of their classification by the FEC or IRS, that makes an electioneering communication in the aggregate of \$10,000 must file a “Form 9” with the FEC within twenty-four hours of the date the communication is distributed. The form discloses where the money was spent, the name of the candidate being supported or criticized in the ad, and the donors for that expenditure. 527s are only required by the IRS to file quarterly. In addition, they do not have to disclose where the expenditure was made. The Form 9s offered an immediate look at the activities of the 527 organizations in 2004.¹²⁰ Compared to the absence of any disclosure about issue activity prior to BCRA, the enhanced disclosure under BCRA was a large improvement. In addition, some early problems with the IRS in providing data were improved, but these disclosure requirements do not apply to non-broadcast electioneering. As our past research has shown, this has been an increasingly important part of competitive federal elections.¹²¹ Exempting ground activity from BCRA limitations provided an important added incentive for groups to invest in voter registration and mobilization, targeted mail and phone calls, and internal communications. BCRA disclosure also did not reach in any meaningful way to the 501(c) organizations who report annually and in ways rarely helpful to voters or scholars.

Some groups have long enhanced their influence by bundling contributions to candidates. EMILY’s List is one of the groups most identified with this process. The organization bundled contributions of \$10.2 million in 2000 and 2002, and that number grew to \$10.6 million in 2004.¹²² The Club for Growth has also become an active bundler for fiscally conservative candidates, bundling approximately \$7.5 million in 2004.¹²³

Independent expenditures by individuals and groups are constitutionally protected and have been a central part of funding federal elections. Some groups like the NRA, National Right to Life, and the National Education Association (NEA) have long preferred independent expenditures to issue advocacy or to setting up a 527 organization. Membership groups like NEA and NRA often see express endorsements and involvement in campaigns as important to their membership. Table 1-8 provides a listing of the largest aggregate independent expenditures by interest groups in 2004. We discuss the substantial independent expenditures actively by political party committees earlier in this overview.

Among interest groups, MoveOn PAC spent the most in 2004 in independent expenditures. MoveOn’s \$10 million far exceeded what the LCV or NARAL Pro-Choice America each spent independently in 2002 at \$2.4 million. MoveOn’s expenditures also far surpassed the notable independent expenditures of

¹¹⁹ Dennis Friel, east field manager campaign 2004, NEA, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., June 2, 2004.

¹²⁰ Federal Election Commission, “Electioneering Communications,” (www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/electioneering.shtml [January 16, 2005]).

¹²¹ David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, “The Consequences of Noncandidate Spending, with a Look to the Future,” in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 277; See also Magleby and Patterson, “Stepping Out of the Shadows.”

¹²² Karen White, president, EMILY’s List, interview by David Magleby and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004. Adjusted for inflation (2004 dollars) at U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index Home Page,” (www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm [25 January 2005]).

¹²³ Moore interview, November 5, 2004.

2000, when the LCV spent \$2.3 million and the NRA spent nearly \$7.1 million.¹²⁴ Some political party committees in 2004 expended as much or more independently as did MoveOn.

Groups making independent expenditures were more likely to favor Democratic candidates. Prominent Democratic-leaning groups included MoveOn, unions, pro-choice groups, and environmental groups. Prominent Republican-leaning groups included the NRA, the Club for Growth, and medical, pro-life, and business organizations. Major and minor groups participated on a larger scale than ever before. The business community, for example, had “never seen more mobilization and effort” than in the 2004 election.¹²⁵ The American Medical Association increased its partisan communication dramatically in 2004 to \$500,000 in key Senate and House races. This is up from approximately \$40,000 in 2000 and \$250,000 in 2002.¹²⁶ The Club for Growth saw contributions climb from \$4.4 million in 2000 to \$8.4 or \$10.5 million in 2002, reaching \$23 million in 2004.¹²⁷ Stephen Moore, president of the Club for Growth, believed that the elimination of party soft money directly benefited his organization’s activities. “Truth is, BCRA benefited us,” he claimed.¹²⁸

For groups making independent expenditures, as with campaign investments generally in 2004, the race of greatest interest was the presidential race. Some groups making independent expenditures were active in only one or a few races. For example, You’re Fired spent all its \$550,500 in independent expenditures in the South Dakota U.S. Senate race.¹²⁹ Other examples of groups spending independently in congressional races included CSS and the Main Street Individual Fund.¹³⁰

Corporations, unions, trade associations, and membership organizations all communicate with their members and employees about politics. The AFL-CIO, for example, found in 2000 that internal communications with members were more effective than issue advocacy.¹³¹ When the “primary focus” of the communication is about the election, the group reports that expenditure to the FEC.¹³² Membership groups like the NEA, National Association of Realtors (NAR), and Service Employees International Union (SEIU) still engage in internal communications, but their spending figures reported to the FEC are down from 2002. This does not mean the amount spent on internal communications has declined, as some of their activities may not be considered primarily focused on the election and therefore require no disclosure. In 2004 the FEC reports again greatly underestimate what groups spent on this activity. (See table 1-9.)

Groups that do a lot of internal communication include labor unions, teachers associations, businesses, NAR, the NRA, and the Sierra Club. The Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC) made a

¹²⁴ Allan J. Cigler, “Interest Groups and Financing the 2000 Elections,” *Financing the 2000 Election*, edited by David B. Magleby (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), p. 175

¹²⁵ Tiffany Adams, vice president of public affairs, National Association of Manufacturers, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004.

¹²⁶ Cys and Kwaka interview, December 15, 2004.

¹²⁷ Moore interview, November 5, 2004.

¹²⁸ Ibid. Adjusted for inflation (2004 dollars) at U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index Home Page,” (www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm [January 25, 2005]).

¹²⁹ Internal Revenue Service, “Political Organization Disclosure,” (forms.irs.gov/politicalOrgsSearch/search/submitBasicSearch.action [January 26, 2005]).

¹³⁰ Federal Election Commission, “Electioneering Communication,” (www.fec.gov/financegov/finance/disclosure/electioneering.shtml [January 26, 2005]).

¹³¹ Allan J. Cigler, “Interest Groups and Financing the 2000 Elections,” in *Financing the 2000 Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), p. 177–178.

¹³² David B. Magleby and Jason Richard Beal, “Independent Expenditures and Internal Communications in the 2000 Congressional Elections,” in *The Other Campaign*, edited by David B. Magleby, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield) p. 80.

conscientious decision to turn to internal communications in light of the new campaign finance restrictions. ABC used coordinators in its 23,000 member companies to contact employees approximately twelve times between Labor Day and Election Day via phone, e-mail, and mailers. In addition, 890,000 voter guides were distributed in both English and Spanish through the coordinators. These were distributed in all presidential battlegrounds and Senate contests in Alaska, Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Washington. Even with this substantial activity, the expenditure reported to the FEC was not sufficient to show up in table 1-9. The expenditures that the association made on internal communications likely dwarf the association's \$50,000 independent expenditure made South Dakota comparing Daschle's D.C. values with South Dakota values.¹³³

Internal communications are increasingly electronic, with groups or employers linking their members or employees to a web site. These sites have downloadable voter registration forms, absentee ballot request forms, and other information on the mechanics of voting. On November 2, BIPAC reported that it sent 30 million electronic messages through their "Prosperity Project" web site and had 812,000 registration forms, 789,000 early voting forms, and 16,000 ExPat voting forms downloaded from their web site. In 2002, BIPAC sent 11 million electronic messages and had 348,000 registration sheets downloaded from their web site.¹³⁴ The web sites utilized by organizations like these also have information that can readily be incorporated into a voter guide with key legislative votes or other information on the candidates.

The Senior Prom: The Dynamics of the Presidential Campaign

With the participants playing by the new rules outlined above, the 2004 election cycle included previously-unseen configurations and alliances. It is as if dance partners who had been dancing with the same partner for several cycles were abruptly denied the opportunity to dance with the old partner or were told to dance another kind of step. Sometimes the group or entity simply decided not to dance (in the case of some soft-money donors) or found new partners (in the case of the progressive groups). In some instances the entity simply resolved to dance as vigorously and audaciously as possible, even if alone (in the case of Swift Boat Veterans). In the section that follows, we describe how the different entities allocated their resources in this new campaign environment and document some of the important developments that emerged. It is in the allocation strategies that we begin to understand the nature of the dance and how well it was received by the audience. We first begin with a discussion of the presidential campaign and the different strategies seemingly pursued by parties and groups on both the right and the left. We then analyze the congressional elections.

Overview of Spending

When assessing the strategies of the participants in the presidential contest, it is instructive to start with the different areas to which they allocated their resources. *The Washington Post* has published a study that draws from reports filed with the FEC, IRS, as well as by entities like the CPI and CRP. The results of their study are detailed in table 1-10. Noteworthy in this table is the similar emphasis on grassroots campaigning by the RNC and DNC as well as by the two candidates. Democratic 527s made this a much higher priority than Republican 527s. By the same token, Democratic 527s devoted proportionately less to media than Republican 527s, which focused almost exclusively on media. Republicans spent a much higher proportion of their money on fund-raising, with two-fifths of their money going to this activity. Democrats raised their money apparently with much lower fund-raising costs. The Democratic Party attributes the lower proportion of money devoted to fund-raising to the lower costs of Internet fund-

¹³³ Ned Monroe, director of political affairs, Associated Builders and Contractors, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Arlington, Va., November 8, 2004.

¹³⁴ BIPAC, "Post Election Press Briefing," Washinton, D.C., November 3, 2004.

raising. “The DNC changed the way they raise money,” she said.¹³⁵ Finally, we suspect that the higher administrative costs for the Kerry campaign and Democratic 527s may be explained by some of these staff actually involved in the grassroots campaigning as paid canvassers or staff.

While differences in allocation point to important strategic considerations, a more complete understanding of the different campaign strategies rests in the details. Clearly, the candidate campaigns, the parties, and the interest groups took different approaches to the air and ground war. Some of these differences can be explained by the comparative advantage these entities had. Other differences can be explained by their ideological or issue preferences. For example, some of the groups participated simply to put their issue on the agenda. Other differences can be explained by longer term trends in the practice of campaigns. For example, over the past several election cycles, competitive federal elections have given greater emphasis to the ground game of personal contact, mail, phone calls, e-mail, flyers at the work place, and GOTV. All of these considerations combined to produce a highly competitive and well-funded presidential election. However, these trends were not the same in congressional elections.

Presidential Left

The sheer number of groups participating and the amount of money they spent illustrate the importance that the Democratic Party and progressive groups placed on the presidential election. Tables 1-11 and 1-12 show that dozens of groups participated in the presidential election through either ground-war or air-war activities. These groups ranged from the well known (ACT, LCV, and NARAL Pro-Choice America) to the more obscure but charming (Rednecks for a Better America). Many of these groups participated in both the ground and the air war, but most contented themselves with TV advertisements and spent a combined total of \$34,119,645. As the table also shows, the Democratic Party chipped in with its own aggressive independent expenditure campaign. Smaller groups supplemented the spending of the larger groups and the party. For example, in Ohio local 527 organizations funded by wealthy individuals or by labor unions ran TV ads designed to help Senator Kerry. When the spending on the air war by the parties and groups is combined with Senator Kerry’s spending, the Democratic nominee and its allies actually outspent the Republicans over the course of the campaign, an advantage that was virtually unthinkable during the months when President Bush set new records for fund-raising. Perhaps most impressively was the fact that the commitment of these groups would not diminish over the course of the campaign.

The tremendous amount of money spent on the air war is only part of the story in 2004. Indeed, the unprecedented amounts of money spent by progressive groups on the ground war dwarfed previous efforts to register and mobilize voters. Table 1-12 shows the total number of groups and the number of unique pieces of mail and other forms of media they distributed.

The data we and our collaborators collected on campaign communications in the 2004 election cycle demonstrate the different approaches the two sides took to electioneering in the 2004 presidential election. The Democratic side saw much greater interest group activity on the ground, most notably from ACT. ACT was not alone in making extensive use of mail to attack Bush and promote Kerry. We retrieved forty-six unique mailers from the Sierra Club, thirty-seven from the AFL-CIO, and twenty-two from Working America. Additional groups sending out a dozen or more unique mailers on the progressive side included NARAL Pro-Choice America, League of Conservation Voters, NEA, AFSCME, and Planned Parenthood. Of Republican leaning groups, on the other hand, only the National Right to Life sent out more than a dozen unique mailers, with the second most active GOP group being the NRA with ten unique mailers in the presidential race. Democratic leaning interest groups also made much more extensive use of the Internet. We detected 122 unique MoveOn e-mail electioneering messages, with ACT

¹³⁵ Amy Pritchard, political director, DNC, telephone interview by David Magleby, Quin Monson, and Kelly Patterson, January 13, 2004.

doing fifty-three and NARAL Pro-Choice America doing forty. In contrast no Republican-leaning interest group did much on the internet, with the NRA most active at seven unique internet electioneering messages. There was less of a disparity in interest groups using phone banks in the presidential race.

In broadcast communications in our sample races, the Bush-Cheney campaign put up more unique radio ads than did Kerry-Edwards, consistent with the Rove strategy. We detected four times as many unique Bush radio ads as Kerry ads, with the RNC also doing more unique radio ads in the presidential race at twenty for Bush and ten for Kerry. When the Bush/Cheney ads are combined with the ads their campaign ran out of the RNC the two sides are at near parity: 175 for Kerry and 173 for Bush. Kerry allies especially active on TV in our sample states were the Media Fund, MoveOn, LCV, and SEIU. Republican groups active in our sample races were Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, Progress For America, and the NRA.

Table 1-12 is consistent with our past research in demonstrating that it is essential to look at the activities of candidates, party committees, and interest groups and not candidates alone to understand campaign communications.

The Kerry campaign and the DNC organized and mounted an aggressive ground-war effort. With the Kerry campaign committee at the head, the state committees and candidates frequently combined to create a “coordinated campaign.” A Democratic coordinated campaign, for example, is essentially “an organization that coordinates the various campaign activities of the State Democratic Party and all the major Democratic candidates in that area.”¹³⁶ Coordinated campaigns organize campaign activities that are of benefit to the entire state party, such as direct mail, message development, and GOTV efforts. This reduces duplication of efforts by candidates. In Ohio this “coordinated campaign” worked almost entirely on GOTV.¹³⁷ However, the party and candidate also seemed to be counting on outside groups for GOTV and other ground-war activities.

The most prominent group in the constellation on the left was ACT. ACT primarily received its large amount of funds from a small number of wealthy donors that some believe were solely intent on defeating Bush, but Jim Jordan bristles at the thought of his organization “being characterized by the press as a temporary organization only interested in the presidential race.”¹³⁸ ACT received money early in the campaign cycle and began its efforts very early on as well. It had tested many of the tactics in previous campaigns and relished the opportunity to put them to the test in the presidential campaign. Because the funding was both early and plentiful, ACT believed that it had the perfect occasion to create a large and successful ground-war operation that would affect the outcome. In fact, the director of ACT’s efforts, Steve Rosenthal, argued that blame for the final outcome in the presidential election could not be laid at the feet of his mobilization efforts because his group had met all of its mobilization goals in the decisive state of Ohio. ACT opened fifteen offices in Ohio alone, employing paid and volunteer canvassers who knocked on 3.7 million doors, had 1.1 million conversations, and registered 85,000 new voters.¹³⁹ This was not only the case in Ohio, but in Florida as well.¹⁴⁰ ACT opened seven offices in Florida, and its fifty-two full-time staff and eighty-five to 100 canvassers registered 20,000 new voters by July. That number

¹³⁶ College Democrats of America, “16 Ways to Get Involved” (www.collegedems.com/involved/campaign/16.php [January 26, 2005]).

¹³⁷ See chapters 7 and 17 in this volume.

¹³⁸ Jim Jordan, communications consultant, America Votes, interview by Kelly Patterson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., July 6, 2004.

¹³⁹ Jess Goode, Ohio state communications director, America Coming Together, interview by David Magleby and Steve Mockabee, Columbus, Ohio, October 27, 2004.

¹⁴⁰ See chapter 2 in this volume.

exceeded the statewide goal of 12,000 new registrations by nearly 67 percent.¹⁴¹ Republican Party operations during the same period had only reached 11,000.¹⁴²

While the efforts of ACT received a great deal of positive publicity for its size and organization, some of its practices generated some controversy. First, ACT relied on “paid volunteers” to implement its strategies in the states it targeted. Its reliance on paid volunteers made it difficult for other groups to recruit volunteers. Essentially, volunteers in some states expected some sort of financial remuneration and drove up the costs for other groups to implement their strategies. Claude Foster, the national field director for the NAACP Voter Fund, reflected that “lots of groups were out there in 2004 that weren’t there in 2000. These start-up groups that are willing to pay workers impacted the traditional role of the NAACP.”¹⁴³ Second, it was said that “paid volunteers” did not have the same motivation as uncompensated volunteers. As a consequence, MoveOn began its own voter mobilization effort to energize turnout in “more or less ten states,” involving between 50,000 and 70,000 volunteers.¹⁴⁴

ACT was part of the larger effort coordinated by the America Votes (AV) coalition, a 527 organization established specifically to coordinate various groups on the left and to reduce redundancies and inefficiencies at contacting and mobilizing voters. The coalition’s creation and operation generated a great deal of excitement in the progressive community. For the first time any political operative could recall, various groups came together to coordinate efforts, to pool resources, and to share information in a “shockingly disciplined” manner.¹⁴⁵ “I have never seen a time when people were more focused and dedicated to working for social change,” said independent consultant Heather Booth.¹⁴⁶ Groups who participated in AV paid \$50,000 to belong. The creators of AV expected that the \$50,000 would “weed out the unserious.”¹⁴⁷ In return, members of AV received a place at the America Votes table.¹⁴⁸ This place provided the members with access to a data base that would allow them to more efficiently contact and mobilize voters. Members also received strategic information on message delivery and access to polling data. AV in effect became a shadow party, with huge numbers of members in the affiliated groups and coverage virtually in every battleground state, though the organization did not “want to be a Democrat Party substitute.”¹⁴⁹ AV also had the means to generate a significant ground-war effort. AV realized success in the concept. “ACT, America Votes, and the Media Fund were totally seamless.”¹⁵⁰

¹⁴¹ Johansen and Sye interview, July 24, 2004.

¹⁴² April Schiff and Nathan Hollifield; president, Strategic Solutions; and Tampa Bay Field Director, Bush/Cheney ‘04, interview by David Magleby and Susan MacManus, Tampa, Fla., July 24, 2004.

¹⁴³ Claude Foster, national field director, NAACP Voter Fund, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington D.C., December 14, 2004.

¹⁴⁴ Wes Boyd, co-founder, MoveOn.org, telephone interview by Kelly Patterson, Quin Monson, Kristina Gale, and Richard Hawkins, December 14, 2004.

¹⁴⁵ Linda Lipson, legislative liaison, Association of Trial Lawyers of America, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, June 3, 2004.

¹⁴⁶ Heather Booth, independent consultant, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington D.C., June 23, 2004.

¹⁴⁷ Jordan interview, July 6, 2004.

¹⁴⁸ Participating members included: ACORN, AFL-CIO, AFSCME, America Coming Together (ACT), American Federation of Teachers, Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence United With the Million Mom March, Clean Water Action, Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund, Democracy for America, EMILY’s List, Environment2004, The Human Rights Campaign, League of Conservation Voters, The Media Fund, MoveOn.org Voter Fund, Moving America Forward, Music for America, NAACP National Voter Fund, NARAL Pro-Choice America, National Education Association, National Jewish Democratic Council, National Treasury Employees Union, Partnership for America’s Families, Planned Parenthood Action Fund, SEIU, Sierra Club, USAction, Voices for Working Families, Young Voter Alliance, and 21st Century Democrats.

¹⁴⁹ Parag Mehta, deputy political director, America Votes, interview by Kelly Patterson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., July 6, 2004.

¹⁵⁰ Ickes interview, September 16, 2004.

The AV coalition explicitly sought to capitalize on the strengths of its members. It did not want to become the face for the mobilization efforts. Rather, it hoped that coalition members would be able to take the lead in mobilizing their own members. Groups such as the LCV would contact their own members and enlist them as volunteers. When planning a large canvas, groups would share membership lists and volunteers to reduce overlap and to produce a more systematic effort. Regions and states would be divided up, depending on the strength of the AV members in those areas. In Florida, for example, the Sierra Club concentrated its canvassing in Tampa, the LCV canvassed Orlando, and EMILY's List focused on Miami-Dade and Broward counties. The coordination also helped to ensure that no important activity fell through the cracks. No member of AV originally took responsibility for outreach to Latino voters. The New Democrat Network saw the need and took on this responsibility, because "it was in Spanish language that we could really make a difference."¹⁵¹ The coordination also allowed the groups to tailor their messages to the particular states that they targeted.

Although the AV approach to campaigning was designed to reduce some inefficiencies, the efforts resulted in "a lot" of other inefficiencies. The data base used by the AV coalition had "all kinds of glitches," causing some within the organization to feel that they had been "too hopeful." "We built the political will, now we need to build the technological will."¹⁵² In addition, while using the database to target voters with specially designed messages, some participating groups had a tendency to "try and make [their] issue the most important to voters rather than listen to what voters perceive the most important issues are."¹⁵³ In addition, the lack of communication and coordination with candidates and parties mean that all overlap in campaigning could not be avoided. ACT found that towards the end of the campaign, their organization was "bumping into people from the candidate or party."¹⁵⁴ Electioneering restrictions also presented some problems. Though the interest groups felt that they did not need to say "vote for" or "vote against" to be effective,¹⁵⁵ party officials felt that "to be more effective, you need to be able to say the candidate's name at the door."¹⁵⁶ Finally, many believe that AV initially erred in setting its goals too low and erred again by not adjusting those goals more frequently. In Florida, for example, Kerry got 500,000 more votes than Gore did in 2000, yet the organization's goal was for Kerry to only get 200,000 more votes than Gore.¹⁵⁷

The massive efforts of ACT and AV contrasted sharply with the Republican Party. The Republicans essentially centralized control of the ground-war operation under the Bush campaign and the RNC. The DNC also conducted an extensive ground-war operation, but it also seemed to welcome the massive efforts on the ground by the AV coalition. In some respects this strategy makes sense.¹⁵⁸ The AV coalition consisted of labor groups and other organizations with significant experience at mobilizing voters. The duplication also meant that the AV coalition did not have the burden of coordinating with the campaign

¹⁵¹ Simon Rosenberg, president, New Democrat Network, interview by Kelly Patterson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., July 6, 2004.

¹⁵² Cecile Richards, president, America Votes, telephone interview by David Magleby, Kelly Patterson, and Quin Monson, December 28, 2004.

¹⁵³ Richards interview, December 28, 2004.

¹⁵⁴ Steve Rosenthal and Larry Gold, CEO and legal counsel, America Coming Together, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., December 17, 2004.

¹⁵⁵ Rosenthal and Gold interview, December 17, 2004.

¹⁵⁶ Marie Therese Dominguez, independent consultant on Hispanic outreach, DNC, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., December 17, 2004. Terry Nelson, political director of Bush/Cheney '04, agreed in a telephone interview on January 5, 2004. "People care about candidates," he said. "Being able to talk about the candidate is helpful."

¹⁵⁷ Karin Johanson, Florida state director, America Coming Together, telephone interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, November 19, 2004.

¹⁵⁸ See chapter 6 in this volume.

and could allocate its resources without interference from the Kerry campaign. However, it also meant that the campaign and the party could not tell exactly how effective the entire operation would be in the final analysis because any kind of coordination is explicitly prohibited by law.

Presidential Right

President Bush and his political advisors began working on detailed plans for the 2004 election shortly after the inauguration in 2001 and largely stuck with a detailed plan for identifying and mobilizing voters critical to Bush's reelection effort.¹⁵⁹ The extensive planning was especially critical as the Republicans tested a variety of techniques in off-year and special elections to assist their efforts with improving their GOTV operation and voter mobilization techniques.¹⁶⁰ This planning and testing paid off in a number of ways in 2004 for the Republicans and President Bush, including record-setting fund-raising, strong discipline on message, and an unprecedented voter mobilization effort. In addition to the efforts of the RNC and the Bush campaign, Republican-allied 527 groups formed relatively late in the cycle and were far outspent by their counterparts on the left. "In March," Deputy Strategist Sara Taylor said, "Republicans did not have a 527 strategy" and were still fighting the Democratic 527s in court.¹⁶¹ After the FEC decided not to rule on 527s in the 2004 election cycle, the former political director of the NRSC, Chris LaCivita lamented, "The Republicans' biggest mistake was the decision to fight this legally rather than politically."¹⁶² However, the most prominent Republican-allied groups such as Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and Progress for America achieved a tremendous level of visibility despite initially limited funding and a late start in their advertising. Significantly, the two most important campaign tasks on the Republican side, voter mobilization and TV advertising, were handled most effectively by the RNC with its expanded 72 Hour Task Force and the Republican-allied 527s with hard-hitting ads from Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and emotional appeals from Progress for America leading the way.

One of the most striking aspects of President Bush's reelection campaign was the disciplined message control of the candidate and his surrogates. Bush focused his message on his role fighting the war on terror after 9/11 and usually avoided discussing the war in Iraq except when it was linked to fighting terrorism. This focus extended to the Bush campaign's broadcast messages. "Wolves" was an ad that coupled images of predatory wolves with accusations that Kerry's defense tax cuts would leave America vulnerable to attack. This message discipline was rewarded in the end, as voters had a much easier time perceiving themes from the Bush campaign compared to the Kerry campaign. In our three-wave panel survey, we asked respondents to tell us what each candidate "is talking about the most during the campaign." Respondents more easily perceived a central message from President Bush, with 49.5 percent citing either "the war in Iraq" or "national security and terrorism" in wave one as topics Bush was talking about most compared to only 16.3 percent for Senator Kerry. The proportion grew to 55.9 percent for Bush in wave 3 while Kerry's reached 31.1 percent. In contrast, the proportion of voters naming the economy as the topic Kerry talked about most reached only 12.9 percent in wave three.¹⁶³

Another notable characteristic of the Bush campaign was the ample supply of hard money early in the election cycle. Given his fund-raising success in 2000 and the increased hard-money limits afforded by BCRA, Bush was widely expected to succeed at hard-money fund-raising. His early success was driven

¹⁵⁹ Thomas B. Edsall and James V. Grimaldi, "On Nov. 2, GOP Got More Bang for Its Billion, Analysis Shows" *Washington Post* December 30, 2001, p. A1.

¹⁶⁰ Monson, "Get On TeleVision vs. Get On The Van."

¹⁶¹ Taylor and Ellis interview, November 18, 2004.

¹⁶² LaCivita interview, June 22, 2004.

¹⁶³ We thank Jeremy Pope for pointing this out to us. For more discussion see Jeremy C. Pope, "Variations on Retrospective Voting: Credibility in the 2004 Election." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, January 6-8, 2005, New Orleans, La.

in-part by the power of incumbency together with a refined bundling program recruiting “Pioneers” to raise \$100,000 and “Rangers” to raise \$200,000 in bundled individual contributions. The bundling strategy is built on fostering competition and accountability among fund-raisers, both facilitated by a tracking system for incoming donations that link individual checks with the Pioneer or Ranger who solicited the contribution.¹⁶⁴

Bush’s early fund-raising success enabled a barrage of advertising from the Bush campaign in the spring of 2004 as soon as Senator Kerry’s nomination was assured. Although the advertising blitz did not dramatically affect the horse race, it did effectively define Kerry in the minds of voters and drove down his favorability rating.

The Bush campaign worked hand-in-hand with the RNC and White House personnel early in the administration to craft a detailed campaign plan that included a focus on mobilizing likely Republican voters instead of persuading swing voters.¹⁶⁵ This included an unprecedented registration and mobilization effort with a heavy focus on mobilizing “lazy” or “soft” Republicans, defined as voters sympathetic to President Bush but not reliable in terms of turning out to vote. Raul Damas, the RNC’s field director of grassroots efforts, described the early mobilization activities. “We were doing phone calls in January (2003), asking people where they stood on issues.”¹⁶⁶ Although the RNC’s ground-war efforts did not garner the same attention as those on the left before Election Day, one of the few press accounts to cover the GOP plans indicated that the plans were on an unprecedented scale.¹⁶⁷ The Bush campaign and the RNC set out to register 3 million new voters and have a leadership structure in place in every county in each battleground state as well as precinct captains in many targeted areas within battleground states. The efforts of the RNC were goal oriented and evaluated frequently. The Election Day GOTV plan was tested “constantly.” Two GOTV simulations called “W Rocks” and “4 W Test Drive” were performed well in advance of the election with the intent of reaching one-tenth of the Election Day goal. Organizers used these test runs to work out glitches in their plan before Election Day.¹⁶⁸

The close coordination of the RNC with the Bush campaign fostered a unity and consistency of messages from both. As noted earlier, the RNC spent much less than the DNC through independent expenditures (\$120.5 million by the DNC and \$18 million by the RNC). However, in the RNC’s case, even the independent expenditure broadcast advertising had a consistent message with the advertising conducted by the Bush campaign or coordinated between the Bush campaign and the RNC. As Curt Anderson, the consultant that handled the independent expenditure effort for the RNC explained, although he could not communicate with the RNC about his plans, it was simply a matter of watching what the Bush campaign was doing and mimicking their message. Anderson realized that the presidential campaign does a tremendous amount of research, allowing him to “take what [he] knew was out there and work to amplify it.”¹⁶⁹

The RNC’s independent expenditures were less than the DNC in part because the RNC employed a loophole in BCRA that allows the RNC to spend money on advertising that is coordinated with the Bush

¹⁶⁴ Thomas B. Edsall and James Grimaldi “Pioneers Fill War Chest, Then Capitalize” *Washington Post*, May 16, 2004, p. A1.

¹⁶⁵ Edsall and Grimaldi, “On Nov. 2, GOP Got More Bang for Its Billion, Analysis Shows,” p. A1.

¹⁶⁶ Raul Damas, field director, grassroots efforts, RNC, interview by Quin Monson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., December 13, 2004.

¹⁶⁷ Dan Balz and Mike Allen, “Election is Now for Bush Campaign” *Washington Post* November 30, 2003, p. A1. See also Richard W. Stevenson, “G.O.P. Building Army of Volunteers to Get Out the Vote” *New York Times* December 20, 2003, p. A14.

¹⁶⁸ Damas interview, December 13, 2004.

¹⁶⁹ Curt Anderson, political consultant, The Anderson Group, interview by Quin Monson, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2004.

campaign but does not count against the coordinated expenditure limits.¹⁷⁰ The RNC capitalized on an advisory opinion issued by the FEC in early 2004 about coordinated expenditures.¹⁷¹ The advisory opinion was interpreted by the Bush campaign and the RNC to mean that the Bush campaign could coordinate advertising and divide the costs evenly between the two committees if certain language was included in the ad that broadened the focus beyond the presidential campaign. The concept is that by talking about an issue, the advertising needs to make the position of the federal candidates and party clear, thus allowing cost to be shared but without counting against the limits for coordinated activity because the advertising goes beyond a single candidate.¹⁷² For the RNC and Bush campaign, broadening the scope of the ads beyond the presidential campaign involved simply inserting the words “our leaders in Congress” when discussing an issue. These ads have been called “50/50 ads” by some because the party and the campaign generally split the cost, although the FEC has not made a statement about the required allocation split. They were first noticed relatively late in the campaign and took the media and the DNC by surprise. Josh Wachs, COO of the DNC, commented, “It was a surprise to us...no question...we quickly adapted. At the end of the day, it wasn’t as important to us.”¹⁷³

The RNC’s most important role in the 2004 election was its continued development of voter mobilization techniques as part of the 72 Hour Task Force. The idea behind this program is to build a large network of loyal volunteers who can perform critical voter identification and mobilization tasks which then culminate with an all out push in the final 72 hours to get voters to the polls. In 2004, the Republicans dedicated more resources “than ever before” to this effort.¹⁷⁴ The RNC’s plans were made earlier, their goals were more adaptable, and their GOTV campaign was more narrowly targeted than ever before.¹⁷⁵ Conventional wisdom suggested that a large turnout would benefit the Democrats, but on November 2 “the GOP did better in a high turnout environment.”¹⁷⁶

One significant part of the 72 Hour Task Force involved recruiting volunteers to work as “team leaders.” These are volunteers recruited to perform tasks such as voter registration, neighborhood walks, and telephone banks. This effort was extremely goal oriented. The party set a goal to register 3 million new voters and then created a system to achieve that goal that included frequent accountability checks with party officials.¹⁷⁷ The team leader program also functioned much like traditional multi-level marketing where team leaders were strongly encouraged to recruit other like-minded individuals to volunteer in a similar capacity.¹⁷⁸ Points were awarded for a variety of actions taken by team leaders, and those who earned the most points were rewarded with campaign or party paraphernalia or with tickets to a campaign event.¹⁷⁹ One strength of the team leader program is that it relied on a neighbor-to-neighbor philosophy. Team leaders were encouraged to reach out to others acquaintances instead of strangers. This meant that much of the mobilization effort was based on relationships between acquaintances instead of interactions between strangers. Blaise Hazelwood, political director at the RNC, said that it was hard to quantify the

¹⁷⁰ Associated Press, “Bush Capitalizes on Huge Funding Loophole,” September 22, 2004, (www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6073233/ [January 24, 2005]).

¹⁷¹ Federal Election Commission, “Advisory Opinion Number 2004-1,” (ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/040001.html [January 24, 2005]).

¹⁷² Charles Spies, deputy counsel, RNC, interview by Quin Monson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2004.

¹⁷³ Josh Wachs, COO, DNC, telephone interview by Kelly Patterson and Quin Monson, January 11, 2005.

¹⁷⁴ Taylor and Ellis interview, November 18, 2004.

¹⁷⁵ Hazelwood interview, December 20, 2004.

¹⁷⁶ Robert Bennett, senator, U.S. Senate, interview by David Magleby and Kelly Patterson, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004.

¹⁷⁷ Nelson interview, January 5, 2005.

¹⁷⁸ Matt Bai, “The Multilevel Marketing of the President” *New York Times Magazine* April 25, 2004, p. 43.

¹⁷⁹ See chapter 4 in this volume.

number of contacts voters received in 2004, because a lot of these were “personal touches” from within the communities.¹⁸⁰

In addition to the team leader volunteers, the RNC also deployed about 5,000 volunteers from non-battleground states to battleground states to work on the 72 Hour Task Force during the final weekend before Election Day.¹⁸¹ For example, several bus loads of college students and other volunteers traveled from Utah to New Mexico or Nevada for the final days.¹⁸² One volunteer we spoke with estimated working a total of forty-four hours over a period of four days beginning the Saturday before Election Day. If his experience is typical, the RNC supplied transportation, hotel rooms, and food for volunteers who were given walk lists that identified houses they were to visit. The walk lists included names of likely Republicans and the voter ID efforts had already been going on for many weeks. The groups of volunteers were simply instructed to attempt face-to-face contact with a brief script and had literature or door hangers to leave when a voter was not home.¹⁸³

The RNC’s detailed walk lists were part of an effort to narrow the targeting efforts of the ground-war communications that the RNC has worked closely with consultants to develop. This is called “microtargeting.” It fits in the broader 72 Hour Task Force mobilization plan that calls for delivering customized messages to voters based on what is most important to them.¹⁸⁴ In 2004 this targeting was taken to a whole new level by merging numerous pieces of consumer information to voter records and mining that information so that it could be used for voter communications. Improved technology, enhanced computer storage capacity, and improved information on individuals’ consumer preferences make this possible.¹⁸⁵ Alex Gage, a consultant with TargetPoint Communications and one of the architects of the new system, divided the process up into four steps:

1. Obtain a voter file from the state with whatever information that file includes (such as date of birth, vote history, or party registration).
2. Append any proprietary data available from the party. This might include donor histories or voter identification from a previous election.
3. Append consumer data to the file. This might include purchasing information, consumer lists, mortgage information, or magazine subscriptions.¹⁸⁶
4. From this list, a large random sample is drawn (from 5,000 to 10,000 respondents) and this subset of the greater list is asked a variety of questions about political attitudes and behavior.¹⁸⁷

Once the political information is appended to the file, it is used to model likely political behavior using the consumer data as predictors. Thus the oft-cited maxim that Democrats are more likely to drive Volvos while Republicans are more likely to drive Lincolns.¹⁸⁸ Typologies of voters are developed using combinations of the consumer data into categories that allow them to be readily identified and segmented into groups as well as list the type of issues that are likely to drive them to vote for Bush. The typologies

¹⁸⁰ Hazelwood interview, December 20, 2004.

¹⁸¹ Damas interview, December 13, 2004.

¹⁸² See chapter 6 in this volume.

¹⁸³ Ryan Hatch, Republican National Committee volunteer canvasser in Farmington, New Mexico, interview by Quin Monson, Provo, Utah, November 8, 2004.

¹⁸⁴ Republican National Committee, “72 Hour Task Force,” Preelection 2002 version, PowerPoint presentation, obtained from James Dyke, RNC press secretary, January 23, 2003.

¹⁸⁵ Bennett interview, November 5, 2004.

¹⁸⁶ Vendors that collect and supply this sort of data include Acxiom, Equifax, Experian, and Donnelly Marketing.

¹⁸⁷ Alexander Gage, Brent Seaborn, and Michael Myers; president, vice president, and vice president; TargetPoint Consulting; interview by David Magleby and Quin Monson; Alexandria, Va.; December 15, 2004.

¹⁸⁸ Adam Nagourney, “Bush Campaign Manager Views the Electoral Divide,” *New York Times*, November 19, 2004, p. 23.

include groups called “Chamber of Commerce Republicans” or “Religious Conservatives.” For example, they found that religious conservatives with a very high probability of voting for Bush could be identified in consumer databases as those who subscribe to religious periodicals. And, not surprisingly, that this group was strongly motivated by issues such as gay marriage and abortion. One of the strongest advantages offered by this kind of targeting is that it allows mobilization to be done in areas that traditionally vote Democratic. This is because likely Republicans can be identified on an individual level and contacted with information that is most likely to motivate them.¹⁸⁹ After the election, Democrats admitted that the RNC’s superior data base resulted in better targeting, modeling, and profiling.¹⁹⁰

Evangelical Christians were one among several groups that the RNC targeted for increased mobilization efforts. On the national level, “Nobody courted the Religious Right more than Karl Rove,”¹⁹¹ and this was true on the local level as well. In the Tampa Bay area, Bush campaign officials considered churches to be “the largest component of the voter registration program.”¹⁹² According to Bush campaign Deputy Strategist Sara Taylor, “Our union is the Christian Evangelical vote.”¹⁹³ Increasing the motivation of conservative Christians to vote was accomplished through a variety of means, including the microtargeting efforts discussed above, but they also included the direct acquisition of church directories that were entered into the data base.¹⁹⁴ Efforts were also made to court nontraditionally Republican constituencies. Other groups that received increased emphasis from the RNC included Hispanics, African Americans, women, Jews, and Catholics.¹⁹⁵ Most agree that the GOP did a “better job of turning out their base.”¹⁹⁶

In contrast to the mobilization efforts undertaken by AV and ACT on the left, the Republican-allied groups concentrated almost entirely on broadcast media, and whereas the “blue team” relied on membership organizations, the “red team” relied on earned media.¹⁹⁷ This was partly a function of the fact that Republican 527s were much slower to organize, but when they did they also made a substantial difference in the 2004 presidential campaign air war. Both Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and Progress for America helped reinforce key Bush messages and effectively raised serious doubts about a centerpiece of the Kerry message, his war record.

The Swift Boat ads tended to reinforce Bush voters in their support of Bush and had less impact on Kerry voters. Overall, about one-in-four undecided voter said they were less likely to vote for Kerry as a result of the ads, one-in-five said they were more likely to support him. Looking at the total sample, 37 percent of our panel said they were less likely to support Kerry compared to 25 percent who said the ads made them more likely to support Kerry. In a contest as closely contested as this, however, such an impact can be important. It is important to note that the news coverage of the Bush record in the National Guard was also important and had the same reinforcing tendencies.

¹⁸⁹ Gage, Seaborn, Myers interview, December 15, 2004.

¹⁹⁰ Mark Longabaugh, political affairs senior vice president, League of Conservation Voters, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, November 10, 2004.

¹⁹¹ Whit Ayers, president, Ayres, McHenry, and Associates, Inc., interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, September 16, 2004.

¹⁹² Schiff and Hollifield interview, July 24, 2004.

¹⁹³ Sara Taylor and Michael Ellis, deputy to the chief strategist and research analyst, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Arlington, Va., June 3, 2004.

¹⁹⁴ Nelson interview, January 5, 2005.

¹⁹⁵ Ed Gillespie, chairman, Republican National Committee, speech given at the National Press Club, November 4, 2004.

¹⁹⁶ Kimberly Robson, deputy field director for legislative election program, People for the American Way, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004.

¹⁹⁷ Friel interview, June 2, 2004.

Using open-ended questions, we asked 1523 registered voters between September 12 and 30 what they knew about Bush and Kerry's military service. Evidence of the fact that Swift Boat Veteran ads had an impact is found in the responses expressed by voters, who, according to Steve Rosenthal, "could quote chapter and verse from the ads."¹⁹⁸ When asked what they had heard recently about Kerry's military service, 76 percent of respondents mentioned the issues or concerns advanced by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. In addition, 33 percent of respondents mentioned the controversy surrounding Kerry's metals while 19 percent made reference to his participation in Vietnam War protests, two themes that figured prominently into the Swift Boat Veterans' advertising campaign. While 30 percent of respondents made mention of the swift boat veterans criticizing Kerry, only 5 percent mentioned the swift boat veterans who came to Kerry's defense, showing both the salience of the Swift Boat Veterans' attack mechanisms and the shortcomings of the Democrats' defense tactics.¹⁹⁹

The Swift Boat Veterans attack was "absolutely critical" and had a "decisive impact" in that it was able to take Kerry off message.²⁰⁰ Any time a candidate is forced to talk about different issues than he wants to address, it is an advantage to their opponent. The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth delivered a message that the Bush campaign and the RNC could not. Bush got the best of both worlds because he could decry 527 grounds and benefit from their activities at the same time. The second ad on Kerry's war protests and how those impacted POWs was especially powerful. Whit Ayers, a Republican consultant, described it as "one of the most negative ads I have ever seen."²⁰¹

The Kerry response was muted, delayed, and did not effectively counter the attack. Harold Ickes "deeply regrets" not rising to the forefront in defending Kerry from the attack, but he "thought that such a highly personal attack would merit a response from the Kerry campaign."²⁰² Andy Grossman of ACT felt somewhat dismayed by the lack of a Kerry response. "The response to Swift Boat Veterans for Truth had to come from Kerry," he felt, continuing, "Who are we going to attack, a bunch of Vietnam vets who felt harmed?" Part of the impact of the ads was the free media coverage they generated on cable stations, especially FOX. Democratic pollster Fred Yang said, "This group was driving the free press stories. It sucked the oxygen out of the campaign."²⁰³ Former U.S. Senator Robert Dole's statements that "there's got to be some truth to the charges" gave gravitas to the Swift Boat attack and extended the news coverage of the ad. Dole's sympathy for the veterans "knocked [Democrats] for a loop."²⁰⁴

The Swift Boat Veteran ads had traction in part because Kerry had made his war record such a centerpiece of his campaign, but they also reinforced a broad attack from the Bush campaign that Kerry could not be trusted. Erik Smith of the Media Fund said, "They were using bullets and we were using rubber bands. Our party forgot that this race was about character."²⁰⁵ Harold Ickes, president of the Media Fund, claimed "it was Willie Horton all over again."²⁰⁶ Democrats and Republicans alike concur that the

¹⁹⁸ Rosenthal and Gold interview, December 17, 2004.

¹⁹⁹ Data from the second wave of a joint study by the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy and the Wisconsin Advertising Project. For more information, see "2004 Election Panel Study," (csp.polisci.wisc.edu/BYU_UW/[January 29, 2005]).

²⁰⁰ Whit Ayers, president, Ayres, McHenry, and Associates, Inc., interview by David Magleby and Quin Monson, Alexandria, Va., December 2, 2004.

²⁰¹ Ayers interview, September 15, 2004.

²⁰² Harold Ickes, president, The Media Fund, interview by Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 11, 2004.

²⁰³ Fred Yang, partner, Garin-Hart-Yang Research Group, interview by Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 10, 2004.

²⁰⁴ Ickes interview, September 16, 2004.

²⁰⁵ Smith interview, November 10, 2004.

²⁰⁶ Ickes interview, September 16, 2004.

approach proved damaging. “The damage it did in the end was to the people who said, ‘if Kerry can’t fight for his honor, how will he fight for security?’”²⁰⁷

The timing of the Swift Boat attack was also smart, coming as it did soon after the Democratic convention. During this news window, the media was looking to expand on Kerry from a more critical perspective than the standard convention coverage.

Progress for America Voter Fund (the 527 arm of the 501(c)(4) Progress for America) came even later in the cycle and was funded in rapid order because of the established donor base of the organization’s 501(c)(4) arm. Its air-war salvo was an ad on Bush as a compassionate and caring leader through the eyes of a young woman who had lost her mother in the September 11, 2001 attacks. This positive and promotional ad also played in key battleground states, supplementing the Bush message “effectively” in concert with the Swift Boat campaign.²⁰⁸

Both sides in 2004 benefited from the presence of ballot initiatives. For example, progressives helped place minimum wage initiatives on the ballot in Nevada and Florida. In these efforts they were aided by the Ballot Initiative Strategy Center, an organization founded in 1998 to counter the steady stream of conservative initiatives which had emerged over the past three decades. Of greater consequence in November 2004 were the eleven statewide same-sex marriage ballot initiatives. While these measures benefited Republicans and President Bush, they were more a reaction to the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision on same-sex marriage and San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom’s granting of marriage licenses in the wake of that decision. Many interest groups found that same-sex marriage had “a real impact with evangelicals and Catholics.”²⁰⁹ Focus on the Family, for example, involved pastors in delivering their pro-traditional family message by distributing materials at the Southern Baptist Convention.²¹⁰ While there would be much debate in the wake of the election on the role of “moral values” in the contest, it is clear that this issue did not help Kerry and probably hurt him.

The Junior Prom: The Dynamics of the 2004 Congressional Campaigns

Even more than is normally the case, the 2004 presidential election overshadowed the other contests on the ballot, including contests for the U.S. Senate and U.S. House. “The senate is important,” said Harold Ickes, “but taking down a sitting president is a monumental task.”²¹¹ This was true not only in media attention but also in terms of candidate, party, and interest group expenditures. The NRA, for example, decided to not invest in the Oklahoma Senate race, a race towards which the organization would have allocated resources in previous years.²¹² There were several highly contested Senate races in 2004, but as was stated earlier, these were typically not in presidential battleground states, with Florida, Pennsylvania, and Colorado being the exceptions.

Competitive U.S. Senate races in 2004 were either in states that had gone heavily to Bush in 2000 and were seen as safe for Bush in 2004, or in states that had been competitive in 2000. None of the competitive U.S. Senate races in 2004 were in states that had gone substantially to Gore in 2000 or were seen as safe for Kerry in 2004. The “red state” nature of most competitive U.S. Senate races in 2004 had important implications. Bush carried Oklahoma by 32 percent, Alaska by 27 percent, South Dakota by 21

²⁰⁷ David Williams, political director, Planned Parenthood Action Fund, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 8, 2004.

²⁰⁸ Ginsberg interview, November 10, 2004.

²⁰⁹ Rosenberg interview, December 15, 2004.

²¹⁰ Minnery interview, December 16, 2004.

²¹¹ Ickes interview, September 16, 2004.

²¹² Cunningham interview, November 5, 2004.

percent, South Carolina by 17 percent, and North Carolina by 12 percent. Political professionals from both parties commented to us often on how difficult it is for a senate candidate to overcome that kind of advantage at the top of the ticket. Benjamin Jones, speaking of the “red state” nature of the map said, “at some point you can build the best team in the world but you can’t make up that margin.”²¹³

While there were several competitive Senate races, the number of competitive U.S. House races in 2004 dwindled to historical lows. Figure 1-6 plots the number of competitive contests for the U.S. House over the last seven elections.

The final number would have been even smaller without the unusual redistricting of Texas congressional districts enacted by the Texas legislature in 2003. This partisan gerrymandering forced five incumbent Democrats to run against Republican incumbents or to run against another Democrat in a primary election.²¹⁴ Roughly 12 percent of competitive House races in 2004 were the result of this single act of redistricting. In our sample of races monitored, Texas 32 is such a contest. In that contest Texas Democrat Martin Frost lost a difficult campaign to Republican incumbent Pete Sessions. Nick Lampson, Max Sandlin, and Charles Stenholm were also casualties of redistricting:²¹⁵ Max Sandlin (D-TX-1) lost to judge Louie Gohmert (R); Nick Lampson (D-TX-2), after avoiding a primary because Jim Turner (D-TX-2) retired, lost to judge Ted Poe (R); and Randy Neugebauer (R-TX-19) beat Charles Stenholm (D-TX-19).

The small number of competitive races in both the House and the Senate meant that groups and parties would concentrate their efforts and spending on a relatively small number of races. This concentration of efforts continues a trend of the groups and the parties seeking to maximize their impact by spending on those races where the resources have the best chance of swinging the race their way. It also meant that safe-seat incumbents were pressed to contribute excess funds in their campaign accounts to their respective party congressional campaign committees. The South Dakota At-large district had the candidate who received the most (\$176,500) from other candidate committees of all races for Congress, Stephanie Herseth (D), and her opponent Larry Deidrich received the seventh most (\$104,500) from other candidate committees, as well as receiving the fourth most \$345,586 from leadership PACs.²¹⁶

Another factor that reinforced the president-centered nature of 2004 is the relatively small number of gubernatorial contests on the 2004 ballot. Over time states have shifted gubernatorial elections to mid-term or off years. Only eleven states elected governors in 2004.²¹⁷ Of these, only six were toss ups, and of these only New Hampshire was considered a true presidential battleground state in the end.

Several patterns emerge from our data collection on the modes of communication used by congressional candidates, party committees, and interest groups in competitive 2004 elections. We were able to gather an average of about ten candidate generated pieces of general election mail for each U.S. House candidate and for Democratic U.S. Senate candidates. (See table 1-15.) The number for Republican U.S. Senate candidates was about six per contest. In addition the parties and interest groups did extensive mail campaigns, with the NRSC doing more Senate mail than the DSCC. Groups for which we gathered at least ten unique pieces of mail across our sample of contests included, on the Democratic side, CSS, the

²¹³ Jones interview, November 10, 2004.

²¹⁴ “Scandal in the House,” *Washington Post*, November 4, 2004, p. A24.

²¹⁵ “Redistricting Pays Off for GOP,” *Houston Chronicle*, November 3, 2004, p. 5.

²¹⁶ For PAC citation, see Center for Responsive Politics, “Candidate to Candidate Giving: Leadership PACs,” (www.opensecrets.org/overview/cand2cand.asp?Cycle=2004&Display=leadpacs [January 27, 2005]).

For candidate committee data, see Center for Responsive Politics, “Candidate to Candidate Giving: Candidate Committees,” (www.opensecrets.org/overview/cand2cand.asp?Cycle=2004&Display=cmtes [January 27, 2005]).

²¹⁷ CNN.com, “Election Results,” (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/governor/ [January 27, 2005]).

AFL-CIO, Sierra Club, LCV, and the NEA. Similarly visible Republican-leaning direct-mail campaigns came from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, NRA, NAR, National Right to Life, United Seniors Association, National Federation of Independent Business, and the Seniors Coalition. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce had the most aggressive mail campaign in our contests in 2004 with fifty-six unique mail pieces. Democratic candidates in our sample races had more active phone contacting, but candidates in both parties made extensive use of the phone as did the state parties. Consistent with the Bush campaign's greater use of radio in 2004, Republican Senate candidates ran more unique radio ads than did Democratic Senate candidates. Democratic Senate and House candidates had more unique TV ads than their Republican opponents, but the NRCC and NRSC produced more ads than the DCCC and DSCC.

Comparing the ground war across cycles in congressional elections is subject to the vagaries of sampling, size of state, etc., but there appears to have been substantially less mail or phone bank activity from the state party committees in 2004 than in 2000 or 2002. This is not surprising given the loss of soft money which was largely used to fund such mail and phone banks previously. Interest groups that also appeared to scale back their direct-mail operation in congressional races included the AFL-CIO, Sierra Club, NEA, and NARAL Pro-Choice America. As noted, many of these organizations consciously decided to give less emphasis to congressional races in 2004. On the Republican side we see evidence of more mail in congressional races in 2004 than previously by the Chamber of Commerce and National Association of Realtors. Other major Republican allies were near parity with past cycles.²¹⁸

Party independent expenditure funded activity in 2004 closely resembled soft-money activity between 1998 and 2002. The party committees ran their own TV and radio commercials, sent out direct mail, mounted phone banks. Party independent expenditure spending in our sample of contested U.S. Senate and U.S. House races was substantial. For example, in Senate races the DSCC spent between \$2.3 and \$3.7 million on the Alaska, Colorado, Florida, North Carolina and Oklahoma Senate races. Only in South Dakota of our sample races did the Democrats independent expenditures fall below \$1 million at \$938,098. The NRSC generally spent less, ranging from \$4,168,203 in Florida to as little as \$254,121 in Oklahoma.

Competitive U.S. House races in our sample saw party independent expenditure activity achieve large differentials between the NRCC and DCCC in several cases. In the South Dakota At-large race, the NRCC outspent the DCCC by nearly a million dollars. As noted in table 1-6, in terms of independent expenditures for all races, the NRCC outspent the DCCC by more than \$10 million. However, in our sample races, the difference between the two committees is much smaller. Table 1-13 summarizes independent expenditure activity in our sample of races.

In several of our races, the groups and parties did more mail and phone than the candidates. Clive Thomas and Carl Shepro who closely monitored the Alaska U.S. Senate race in 2004 concluded that Democratic Party money kept Tony Knowles (D) competitive.²¹⁹ In the Colorado Senate race, the Democrats outperformed the Republicans. The opposite was the case in North Carolina.²²⁰ Both party committees retained their own pollsters, consultants, and attorneys.

The 2004 cycle saw growth in interest group activity through 527 and 501(c) organizations. The most visible and well funded of these operated nearly exclusively in presidential battlegrounds. With the exception of ACT and the members of the AV coalition, they also were primarily communicating through broadcast ads. For congressional elections like the Florida and Colorado Senate races and competitive house races in Pennsylvania, these presidential 527s and 501(c) organizations therefore had only a

²¹⁸ See Magleby, *Election Advocacy*, p. 37; See also Magleby, *The Last Hurrah?* (monograph version), pp. 41–42.

²¹⁹ See chapter 8 in this volume.

²²⁰ See chapter 11 in this volume.

secondary impact. This is not to say interest groups were unimportant to U.S. Senate races. In South Dakota an array of interest groups were important to the defeat of Tom Daschle. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce mailed fourteen different mailers in that race.²²¹ In Ken Salazar's (D) victory in Colorado, interest groups were important on the air and on the ground. Kyle Saunders and Robert Duffy found "liberal interest groups were considerably more active on the ground than conservative groups."²²² In North Carolina, Americans for Job Security, the NAR, and the NRA were important to the Burr victory.²²³ One group, the Club for Growth, boasted that "we carried Tom Coburn on our back" in the Oklahoma Senate race.²²⁴

Early in the cycle some 527 organizations were formed with an exclusive emphasis on congressional elections. Such 527s included The New House PAC and the Democratic Senate Majority Fund on the Democratic side and the National Committee for a Responsible Senate and the Leadership Forum on the Republican side. Congressional 527 committees, however, were initially deemed a failure for many reasons. The concept behind congressional 527s was hard to explain to donors, and there was little initial excitement over the House and Senate contests. "The polarization of this race is so high," claimed one pollster, "but it just isn't moving over to the Congress."²²⁵ The congressional 527 organizations also proved to be "bureaucratically unmanageable."²²⁶ In addition, prolonged uncertainty regarding the outcome of *McConnell v. FEC* and the consistent flow of funds towards the presidential contest crippled the fund-raising efforts of these more localized 527 organizations.²²⁷ Finally, corporations did not play a significant role in financing 527 organizations. Instead, corporate money flowed to business trade organizations, also known as 501(c)(6) organizations.²²⁸ A second generation of congressional 527s emerged later in the summer and thrived, having resolved many of the problems that plagued its predecessors.

Many interest groups that had previously concentrated their resources on congressional races devoted most of their resources to the presidential race in 2004. The LCV and NARAL Pro-Choice America both saw their presidential expenditures grow to unprecedented levels. Mark Longabaugh, senior vice president of political affairs at LCV, called his organization's focus on the presidential election a "historic shift."²²⁹ One major exception to the LCV focus on the presidential races was its heavy investment in the Colorado U.S. Senate race. As summarized in the Colorado Senate case study, the LCV spent \$1.1 million on mail, GOTV, and TV ads, trying to speak to voters who were concerned about the environment.²³⁰ The LCV branded Coors "Polluter Pete" in their mail and TV campaign, garnishing national attention for these ads. Kyle Saunders and Robert Duffy closely monitored this race and found that LCV's work resonated with voters.²³¹

Some groups have long bundled individual contributions. ALIGNPAC collected \$250,000 from insurance agents and in 1986 presented the donation to Senator Robert Packwood, then chair of the Senate Finance

²²¹ See chapter 13 in this volume.

²²² See chapter 9 in this volume.

²²³ See chapter 11 in this volume.

²²⁴ Moore interview, November 5, 2004.

²²⁵ Ed Goeas, president, The Tarrance Group, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Arlington, Va., June 3, 2004.

²²⁶ Grossman interview, June 24, 2004.

²²⁷ Chris Cillizza, "Congressional 527s Are a Flop," *Roll Call*, April 26, 2004, pp. 1, 3.

²²⁸ Kent Cooper, vice president, www.politicalmoneyline.com, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2004.

²²⁹ Mark Longabaugh, political affairs senior vice president, League of Conservation Voters, interview by David Magleby, Betsey Gimbel, and Joe Hadfield, Washington, D.C., July 24, 2004.

²³⁰ *Ibid*

²³¹ See chapter 9 in this volume.

Committee.²³² The most important interest groups in terms of bundling in 2004 were EMILY's List and the Club for Growth, and MoveOn.

A possible harbinger of 527 and 501(c) group activity in 2006 and beyond is the formation of groups operating in only one contest. For example, in the Colorado Republican primary, one 527 group, Colorado Conservative Voters, spent nearly \$1 million against Coors and for Bob Schafer.²³³ Another contest 527 was "You're Fired," a group founded by Robin Arkley which ran ads in the South Dakota Senate race against Tom Daschle.²³⁴ The LCV made the Colorado Senate race a major priority, spending nearly \$500,000.²³⁵ Citizens for a Strong Senate, which spent \$1.2 million favoring Democrat Bowles in North Carolina, spent nearly \$750,000 for Democrat Ken Salazar in Colorado, over \$400,000 for Democrat Brad Carson in Oklahoma, and over \$300,000 for Democrat Tony Knowles in Alaska. The Club for Growth spent nearly \$2 million against Arlen Specter in the Pennsylvania primary²³⁶ and almost \$900,000 for Tom Coburn in the Oklahoma Senate race.²³⁷

Electioneering by parties and interest groups in 2004 again included a mix of TV and radio but an even greater emphasis on mail, phone calls, personal contact and GOTV, or what we have called the ground war. (See tables 1-14 and 1-15.) Table 1-15 illustrates the number of unique pieces of mail our academics detected in competitive House and Senate races.

Competitive congressional elections in 2004, as has been the case in recent election cycles, saw a major infusion of "outside money." In 2004 that money came into the race via party and other independent expenditures and spending by Section 527 organizations. As with the expenditure of soft money in the recent past, much of this money was spent on candidate-specific advertising, and much of that was negative in tone. The success of Swift Boat Veterans for Truth in the presidential race will likely reinforce the sense that attacks by 527 organizations can be consequential. Noncandidate activity was important to several of the races we monitored.

As a harbinger for the future, the 2004 elections introduced contest specific section 527 organizations, including heavy activity in primary elections. The nature of House elections is now such that there are very few arenas in which groups and party committees compete. That, plus the gradually expanding GOP majority in the House, probably means the focus in 2006 will remain more on the House than the Senate.

The Next Dance

Throughout this overview we have compared the various relationships between candidates, parties, and interest groups in the 2004 cycle to an elaborate dance. We have noted how many of the partners that used to dance together now dance alone or have switched partners. We have also documented the increase in the number of individuals who participate in the dance. This finding alone is worth highlighting again. The number of individual financial contributions to the candidates and the parties seem to signal an enlargement of the dance venue and the number of guests it can accommodate. Parties and candidates now vigorously reach out to previously uninvited guests, namely, the regular citizens. We will probably need to wait for a definitive answer to the question of whether they were invited because of changes in the

²³² David B. Magleby and Candice J. Nelson, *The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1990), p. 20.

²³³ See chapter 9 in this volume.

²³⁴ See chapter 13 in this volume.

²³⁵ See chapter 9 in this volume.

²³⁶ Pamela M. Prah, "Anti-tax Groups Post Mixed Record in Nov. 2 Elections," Stateline.org, December 22, 2004, (www.stateline.org/stateline/?pa=story&sa=showStoryInfo&id=420507 [January 26, 2005]).

²³⁷ See chapter 12 in this volume.

campaign finance law or they invited themselves because of their passion for the campaign itself. Either way, more citizens participated in this grand social event than ever before.

There are other highlights from the 2004 dance as well. First, the ground war continues to grow in size and sophistication. Parties and groups on both the right and the left invested heavily in ground-war operations and in the technologies that allow them to target voters more efficiently. We expect this trend to continue.

Like a dancer who moves seamlessly from a mosh pit to a ballroom, the political parties seem to have adapted well to the new campaign environment. Parties shed their old soft-money ways and achieved substantial success in raising hard money. Individual donors have truly become the life of the party. Furthermore, the parties have invested in the technologies that will enable them to continue their success in this endeavor.

Third, parties and candidates must maneuver on a more crowded dance floor. The proliferation of 527 groups will in all likelihood continue. These groups showed that they could be successful at mobilizing voters or making candidates deal with new issues and charges. The lessons learned in 2004 will certainly be applied to future cycles.

The type of dance in the future will be determined by both lawmakers and private citizens. Any future changes in campaign finance law will certainly alter the list of invitees to the dance and restructure yet again the ways in which they might move on the dance floor. Citizens, such as large and small donors, may decide not to attend the dance even if given the opportunity. For example, it remains to be seen whether the large donors to 527 groups will continue to bankroll certain organizations or whether the small donors will find the same reason to participate. The democratic nature of the dance means that future iterations are difficult to script.

Table 1-1
Overall Presidential Receipts, 2000 and 2004

	2000	2004
Individual contributions	\$1.46 billion	\$2.5 billion
Soft money	496 million	--
Issue advocacy/Independent Exp.	200 million	511 million
PAC contributions	288 million	453 million
Public funds	238 million	207 million
Candidate Self-financing	205 million	122 million
Convention	96 million	139 million
Other (loans, interest, etc.)*	57 million	273 million
TOTAL	\$3 billion	\$4.2 billion

*Also includes Levin funds, and independent expenditures.

Source: Center for Responsive Politics, from Federal Election Commission and IRS records. From *CQ Weekly*, October 30, 2004, p. 2547; 2004 data updated by Center for Responsive Politics, Sheila Krumholz, January 3, 2005.

**Table 1-2
Sources of Receipts for National Party Committees**

	DNC			RNC		
	2000	2002	2004	2000	2002	2004
Total Receipts	\$122,482,228	\$66,876,940	\$391,197,124	\$205,332,462	\$163,921,250	\$384,308,768
Total Contributions from Individuals	\$110,884,142	\$55,276,516	\$355,563,060	\$186,137,653	\$151,760,336	\$344,314,110
Unitemized*	\$58,872,696	\$37,586,867	\$165,239,792	\$88,195,047	\$99,682,917	\$153,937,161
Unitemized as % of Total from Individuals	53.09%	68.00%	46.47%	47.38%	65.68%	44.71%
Contributions at the maximum permitted	\$10,980,000	\$680,000	\$43,475,000	\$12,660,000	\$2,980,000	\$60,825,000
Maximum as % of Individual Total	9.90%	1.23%	12.23%	6.80%	1.96%	17.67%
Contributions from Federal Candidates	\$1,478,662	\$21,172	\$27,978,293	\$21,200	\$450	\$24,038,568
	1.21%	0.03%	7.15%	0.01%	0.00%	6.26%
Contributions from other Committees	\$2,598,061	\$1,121,514	\$2,994,736	\$1,630,105	\$703,084	\$2,781,815
	2.12%	1.68%	0.77%	0.79%	0.43%	0.72%
Transfers from State or other National Parties	\$2,046,409	\$6,560,050	\$299,764	\$11,237,797	\$3,522,399	\$4,625,827
	1.67%	9.81%	0.08%	5.47%	2.15%	1.20%

	DSCC			NRSC		
	2000	2002	2004	2000	2002	2004
Total Receipts	\$40,185,874	\$48,057,848	\$86,502,289	\$49,361,505	\$58,142,326	\$74,934,260
Total Contributions from Individuals	\$17,447,949	\$20,052,428	\$57,455,879	\$32,868,164	\$40,846,898	\$59,036,309
Unitemized*	\$7,893,154	\$9,611,894	\$19,333,785	\$16,959,087	\$17,591,328	\$24,739,104
Unitemized as % of Total from Individuals	45.24%	47.93%	33.65%	51.60%	43.07%	41.90%
Contributions at the maximum permitted	\$2,800,000	\$2,900,000	\$12,600,000	\$640,000	\$760,000	\$6,250,000
Maximum as % of Individual Total	16.05%	14.46%	21.93%	1.95%	1.86%	10.59%
Contributions from Federal Candidates	\$1,133,100	\$1,821,625	\$7,737,308	\$2,960,305	\$1,621,321	\$1,877,619
Contributions from other Committees	\$4,264,860	\$4,712,156	\$6,174,971	\$4,007,375	\$4,205,108	\$7,886,946
Transfers from State or other National Parties	\$4,042,276	\$7,100,082	\$4,625,827	\$2,623,620	\$6,580,615	\$501,961

	DCCC			NRCC		
	2000	2002	2004	2000	2002	2004
Total Receipts	\$44,253,868	\$48,024,511	\$91,885,941	\$90,393,036	\$109,935,592	\$175,072,042
Total Contributions from Individuals	\$21,794,071	\$19,152,203	\$50,153,913	\$67,010,001	\$73,278,578	\$135,352,300
Unitemized*	\$9,937,474	\$11,043,440	\$24,873,474	\$34,703,962	\$37,415,436	\$48,021,394
Unitemized as % of Total from Individuals	45.60%	57.66%	49.59%	51.79%	51.06%	35.48%
Contributions at the maximum permitted	\$1,140,000	\$800,000	\$6,675,000	\$480,000	\$180,000	\$3,800,000
Maximum as % of Individual Total	5.23%	4.18%	13.31%	0.72%	0.25%	2.81%
Contributions from Federal Candidates	\$11,036,046	\$12,079,777	\$23,907,760	\$14,664,152	\$14,035,180	\$18,576,771
Contributions from other Committees	\$4,751,371	\$4,051,585	\$6,302,094	\$4,607,917	\$4,185,549	\$8,067,368
Transfers from State or other National Parties	\$968,807	\$3,764,636	\$447,638	\$4,705,713	\$2,873,229	\$1,157,620

*Contributions from individuals may be unitemized if they sum to \$200 or less for a person in a year.

Source: Federal Election Commission, "Party Financial Activity Summarized," press release, December 14, 2004, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20041214party/20041214party.html [December 30, 2004]).

Note: Data from January 1, 2003 to November 22, 2004.

**Table 1-3
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Presidential Race, 2000 and 2004**

	2000		2004	
	Al Gore (D)	George W. Bush (R)	John Kerry (D)	George W. Bush (R)
From PACs	\$0	\$2,229,056	\$141,918	\$2,983,767
From individuals	\$45,612,601	\$101,520,773	\$224,350,405	\$271,634,244
From party	\$0	\$28,728	\$967	\$28,017
From candidate	\$0	\$13,810	\$6,387,965	\$0
Other contributions	\$87,495,436	\$90,073,886	\$111,525,301	\$98,729,341
Total receipts	\$133,108,037	\$193,866,253	\$342,406,556	\$373,295,369
Total expenditures	\$120,335,203	\$186,699,458	\$322,744,470	\$352,521,452
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$12,772,827	\$7,201,734	\$22,722,961	\$24,595,515

Source: Federal Election Commission, “US Presidential Candidate Committees With 1999-00 Activity,” (fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_racepg.exe?DoFn=00002000P [January 11, 2005]). Federal Election Commission, “2004 Presidential Race Summary,” (fecinfo.com/cgi-win/pml1_sql_PRESIDENTIAL.exe?DoFn=2004 [December 29, 2004]).

**Table 1-4
Hard Money, Soft Money, and Combined Receipts, 1994-2004**

Hard-money Receipts

	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004
DNC	\$50,883,808	\$130,466,016	\$71,306,813	\$134,645,097	\$70,371,344	\$391,197,124
DSCC	\$33,535,777	\$36,825,446	\$40,815,477	\$44,176,457	\$50,568,931	\$86,502,289
DCCC	\$24,332,917	\$31,727,265	\$28,793,161	\$48,648,416	\$50,533,852	\$91,885,941
RNC	\$104,611,407	\$225,849,538	\$116,021,976	\$225,722,619	\$172,486,340	\$384,308,768
NRSC	\$81,918,586	\$75,250,587	\$60,061,819	\$54,263,257	\$61,180,335	\$74,934,260
NRCC	\$32,225,977	\$86,365,016	\$80,986,953	\$99,369,348	\$115,679,864	\$175,072,842
Total D	\$154,701,550	\$253,367,179	\$178,139,950	\$296,739,734	\$231,752,597	\$683,646,699
Total R	\$285,728,788	\$491,624,526	\$317,697,010	\$491,788,588	\$423,073,812	\$755,348,466

Soft Money Receipts

	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002
DNC	\$56,104,734	\$119,956,787	\$65,652,401	\$150,141,916	\$99,377,954
DSCC	\$475,738	\$16,975,968	\$29,995,951	\$69,347,175	\$100,015,137
DCCC	\$6,531,416	\$13,166,854	\$19,328,845	\$62,173,621	\$59,303,627
RNC	\$57,314,673	\$133,120,331	\$85,944,445	\$174,694,115	\$119,881,930
NRSC	\$7,130,061	\$32,214,634	\$43,100,213	\$47,778,732	\$69,896,965
NRCC	\$9,415,308	\$22,035,496	\$32,250,069	\$55,598,860	\$73,318,243
Total D	\$62,772,314	\$147,611,916	\$106,272,446	\$267,267,857	\$258,696,718
Total R	\$67,088,792	\$170,317,356	\$152,153,658	\$268,713,828	\$263,097,137

Soft and Hard-money Receipts

	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004 (Hard only)
DNC	\$109,552,950	\$253,700,304	\$141,389,802	\$286,435,445	\$170,530,031	\$391,197,124
DSCC	\$34,235,360	\$54,262,159	\$71,452,883	\$114,554,695	\$150,936,154	\$86,502,289
DCCC	\$31,342,862	\$47,010,486	\$48,829,756	\$115,532,911	\$108,265,112	\$91,885,941
RNC	\$168,943,784	\$369,377,674	\$207,712,009	\$416,643,148	\$298,868,914	\$384,308,768
NRSC	\$90,571,938	\$113,334,647	\$106,019,884	\$105,673,663	\$132,149,608	\$74,934,260
NRCC	\$43,516,069	\$111,909,783	\$115,696,409	\$158,970,500	\$221,779,583	\$175,072,842
Total D	\$232,384,721	\$416,835,164	\$293,558,770	\$572,113,848	\$487,521,126	\$683,646,699
Total R	\$378,886,049	\$669,261,711	\$483,844,162	\$786,773,216	\$727,786,287	\$755,348,466

Notes: The totals for each party do not equal the sum of the party committee receipts because the numbers provided by the FEC have been adjusted to account for transfers between party committees so as not to double count money in the total receipts. The total also includes state and local hard-money receipts which are not shown. Data from January 1, 2003 to November 22, 2004.

**Table 1-5
Hard-money Contributions to Candidates by Party Committee**

	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004
DNC	\$104,201	\$27,961	\$8,006	\$11,606	\$10,523	\$7,000
DSCC	\$728,077	\$651,511	\$357,115	\$361,154	\$431,318	\$694,500
DCCC	\$1,268,490	\$945,642	\$539,121	\$639,449	\$673,573	\$438,053
RNC	\$711,521	\$593,017	\$516,784	\$453,463	\$372,324	\$242,992
NRSC	\$864,608	\$1,164,334	\$531,717	\$473,617	\$479,802	\$812,897
NRCC	\$1,021,684	\$1,527,545	\$913,648	\$783,544	\$796,719	\$534,268

Source: Federal Election Commission, "Party Financial Activity Summarized," press release, December 14, 2004, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20041214party/20041214party.html [January 3, 2005]). Adjusted for inflation (2004 dollars) at Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Consumer Price Index Home Page," (www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm [January 3, 2005]).

**Table 1-5A
Coordinated Expenditures by Party Committee**

	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004
DNC	\$312,959	\$7,115,886	\$6,793,224	\$13,833,566	\$364,306	\$16,017,785
DSCC	\$16,031,076	\$10,226,613	\$9,783	\$139,784	\$191,288	\$4,380,996
DCCC	\$9,857,106	\$7,229,147	\$3,442,234	\$2,855,264	\$1,809,432	\$2,423,002
RNC	\$6,353,939	\$28,317,412	\$4,501,451	\$25,277,856	\$14,864,395	\$16,146,972
NRSC	\$10,791,040	\$707,247	\$33,114	\$189	\$582,112	\$8,449,049
NRCC	\$5,055,456	\$8,926,650	\$6,015,676	\$4,047,464	\$462,181	\$3,144,016

Source: Federal Election Commission, "Party Financial Activity Summarized," press release, December 14, 2004, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20041214party/20041214party.html [January 3, 2005]). Adjusted for inflation (2004 dollars) at Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Consumer Price Index Home Page," (www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm [January 3, 2005]).

**Table 1-6
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, 1994-2004**

	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004
DNC	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$120,449,777
DSCC	\$0	\$1,672,237	\$1,578,274	\$146,207	\$0	\$18,694,679
DCCC	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$2,106,802	\$1,163,909	\$36,126,345
RNC	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$526,126	\$18,253,659
NRSC	\$0	\$11,914,354	\$225,967	\$294,174	\$0	\$20,179,155
NRCC	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$603,298	\$1,266,757	\$46,901,487
Total	\$0	\$13,586,591	\$1,804,241	\$3,150,481	\$2,956,792	\$260,605,102

Source: Federal Election Commission, “Party Financial Activity Summarized,” press release, December 14, 2004, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20041214party/20041214party.html [January 3, 2005]). Adjusted for inflation (2004 dollars) at Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index Home Page,” (www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm [January 3, 2005]).

**Table 1-7
Top Section 527 Committee Activity, 2003–2004**

Type and Organization	Total Receipts	Total Expenditures
Democratic allies		
America Coming Together - Nonfederal Account	\$78,652,163	\$76,270,931
Joint Victory Campaign 2004	\$71,809,666	\$72,347,983
Media Fund	\$59,394,183	\$54,429,053
SEIU Political Education and Action Local Fund	\$40,995,542	\$43,681,298
Democratic Governors’ Association	\$23,509,791	\$23,637,018
AFSCME Special Account	\$22,135,127	\$22,112,744
MoveOn.org Voter Fund	\$12,517,365	\$21,205,288
New Democrat Network - Non-Federal	\$12,221,608	\$12,194,451
Citizens for a Strong Senate	\$10,848,730	\$10,143,121
Sierra Club Voter Education Fund	\$8,727,127	\$6,147,176
EMILY’s List	\$7,684,046	\$8,100,752
1199 SEIU NonFederal Committee	\$7,477,295	\$7,445,101
Voices For Working Families	\$7,466,056	\$6,827,164
League of Conservation Voters, Inc.	\$6,552,500	\$5,621,288
AFL-CIO COPE - Treasury Fund	\$6,336,464	\$6,332,448
Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee	\$5,779,917	\$6,720,814
Hotel/Restaurant Employees International Union TIP Education Fund	\$3,831,057	\$3,901,434
Democratic Victory 2004	\$3,824,969	\$2,603,654
Laborers’ Political League - Education Fund	\$3,294,410	\$3,274,785
The Partnership for America’s Families	\$3,071,211	\$2,880,906
Republican allies		
Progress For America Voter Fund	\$44,929,174	\$35,437,204
Republican Governors Association	\$33,010,989	\$33,646,204
Swift Boat Vets and POWs for Truth	\$17,068,390	\$22,424,420
Republican State Leadership Committee - RSLC	\$10,556,944	\$10,320,290
Club for Growth Inc.	\$7,593,817	\$9,189,867

Source: Center for Public Integrity, “2003-04 527 Activity” (www.publicintegrity.org/527/db.aspx?act=activity2003 [January 27, 2005]).

**Table 1-8
Independent Expenditures by Top Groups, 2004**

Committee Name	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL
MoveOn PAC	\$10,805,897	...	\$10,805,897
United Auto Workers - VCAP	\$5,156,529	...	\$5,156,529
AFSCME - P E O P L E, Qualified	\$3,458,525	...	\$3,458,525
SEIU COPE	\$3,248,529	...	\$3,248,529
NRA Political Victory Fund	\$1,416,268	\$1,640,732	\$3,057,000
Planned Parenthood	\$2,325,229	...	\$2,325,229
American Medical Association PAC	\$999,591	...	\$999,591
National Air Traffic Controllers Association PAC	\$951,838	...	\$951,838
National Association of Realtors PAC	\$657,868	...	\$657,868
National Right to Life PAC	\$612,592	\$5,047	\$617,639
Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund	\$540,268	\$12,059	\$552,327
Sierra Club Political Committee	\$243,438	\$159,605	\$403,043
American Neurological Surgery PAC	\$61,491	\$323,982	\$385,473
Club for Growth Inc PAC	\$370,085	...	\$370,085
EMILY's List	\$305,358	...	\$305,358
International Association of Firefighters Interested in Registration and Education PAC	\$264,456	...	\$264,456
Communication Workers of America-COPE Political Contributions Committee	\$262,125	...	\$262,125
League of Conservation Voters Action Fund	\$239,520	\$15,516	\$255,036
You're Fired	...	\$250,500	\$250,500
Human Rights Campaign PAC	...	\$245,975	\$245,975
NEA Fund for Children and Public Education	\$235,749	...	\$235,749
International Union of Painters and Allied Trades PAC	\$184,258	...	\$184,258
Focus on the Family Action	\$155,044	...	\$155,044
National Beer Wholesalers Association PAC	\$134,726	...	\$134,726
American PAC	...	\$120,327	\$120,327
American Association of Orthopedic Surgeons PAC	\$120,000	...	\$120,000
Cooperative of American Physicians Federal Action Committee	\$116,496	...	\$116,496
AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee	\$104,686	...	\$104,686
Other Groups	\$1,780,431	\$1,038,944	\$2,819,375
TOTAL FOR ALL GROUPS	\$34,750,997	\$3,812,687	\$38,563,684

Source: Federal Election Commission, (<ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/> (January 5, 2005)).

Note: We combined expenditures for all national affiliates of an organization but excluded expenditures for the state affiliates.

**Table 1-9
Internal Communications by Top Groups**

Committee Name	Internal Communications FOR	Internal Communications AGAINST	TOTAL
AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee	\$2,194,423	...	\$2,194,423
National Education Association	\$1,670,535	...	\$1,670,535
AFSCME	\$1,399,622	...	\$1,399,622
SEIU	\$1,090,704	...	\$1,090,704
American Federation of Teachers	\$671,023	...	\$671,023
International Association of Firefighters	\$538,010	...	\$538,010
International Brotherhood of Teamsters	\$294,907	...	\$294,907
National Association of Realtors	\$272,903	...	\$272,903
Laborers' International Union of North America	\$244,942	...	\$244,942
Sierra Club	\$124,926	...	\$124,926
National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action	\$117,590	...	\$117,590
United Food & Commercial Workers International Union	\$72,556	...	\$72,556
Other Groups	\$1,003,773	\$19,474	\$1,023,247
TOTAL FOR ALL GROUPS	\$9,695,914	\$19,474	\$9,715,388

Source: Federal Election Commission, (<ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/> [January 5, 2005]).

Note: We combined expenditures for all national affiliates of an organization but excluded expenditures for the state affiliates.

**Table 1-10
Proportion of Spending by Party,
Candidate or 527 Groups on Various Campaign Activities in 2004**

	RNC	DNC	Bush	Kerry	R-527	D-527
Fund-raising	40	14	17	8	12	10
Administrative Costs	21	18	13	27	2	38
Media	20	45	54	45	81	27
Grassroots Campaigning	18	20	7	7	5	21
Other*	1	3	9	13	--	4

Source: *The Washington Post* and Dwight Morris & Associates. See Thomas B. Edsall and James V. Grimaldi, "On November 2, GOP Got More Bang for its Billion, Analysis Shows." *Washington Post* December 30, 2004, p. A1.

*Polling, donations to other committees and candidates, unitemized expenses.

Table 1-11
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures, Sample Presidential Races, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc.	\$28,725,249	\$395,923	\$29,121,172	\$71,438,767
John Kerry / DNC	\$2,956,924	\$117,354	\$3,074,278	\$11,937,072
<i>Political parties</i>				
DNC	\$24,722,955	\$1,258,489	\$25,981,444	\$49,393,011
State Democratic Parties	...	\$7,175	\$7,175	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
The Media Fund	\$9,103,357	\$476,507	\$9,579,864	\$23,014,465
MoveOn.org	\$3,401,884	\$33,955	\$3,435,839	\$13,949,506
AFL-CIO	\$2,108,320	...	\$2,108,320	\$4,336,161
United Automobile Workers Union	\$481,200	\$141,495	\$622,695	\$117,561
League of Conservation Voters	\$599,310	...	\$599,310	\$2,339,632
SEIU	\$492,250	\$73,078	\$565,328	\$507,495
Florida Women Vote	\$383,450	\$13,800	\$397,250	...
Communities for Quality Education	\$396,780	...	\$396,780	\$1,889,816
New Democrat Network	\$386,690	\$8,670	\$395,360	\$1,134,097
EMILY's List	\$318,780	\$60,250	\$379,030	\$1,224,338
National Air Traffic Controllers Union	\$370,770	...	\$370,770	\$518,260
AFSCME	\$219,120	...	\$219,120	\$15,286
American Federation of Teachers	...	\$169,040	\$169,040	...
Coalition to Defend the American Dream	...	\$164,936	\$164,936	...
Bring Ohio Back	\$60,955	\$96,830	\$157,785	\$96,050
Human Rights Campaign	\$27,575	\$122,500	\$150,075	\$59,606
Real Economy Group	\$106,625	...	\$106,625	\$253,406
American Family Voices	\$99,330	...	\$99,330	\$32,438
This Vote Counts	\$36,605	...	\$36,605	\$11,892
Save Our Environment	\$15,700	\$18,700	\$34,400	\$48,656
Running for Change	\$27,300	...	\$27,300	\$12,489
American Federation of Gov't Employees	...	\$20,987	\$20,987	...
National Resource Defense Council	\$20,650	...	\$20,650	\$81,864
National Education Association	...	\$20,000	\$20,000	\$44,641
Campaign for America's Future	\$189,400
Coalition for the Future American Worker	\$77,436
Republican allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Bush/Cheney '04	\$27,695,792	\$1,606,069	\$29,301,861	\$59,068,836
Bush/Cheney '04 / RNC	\$14,057,264	\$266,863	\$14,324,127	\$45,029,780
<i>Political parties</i>				
RNC	\$6,316,528	\$402,176	\$6,718,704	\$6,450,523

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
State Republican Parties	\$83,270	\$58,000	\$141,270	\$330,708
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Progress for America	\$6,220,058	\$214,675	\$6,434,733	\$8,924,076
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth	\$4,879,930	...	\$4,879,930	\$7,614,191
United Seniors Association	\$1,019,778	\$49,490	\$1,069,268	\$2,205,626
November Fund	\$555,180	\$15,600	\$570,780	...
Citizens for a Fair Share	\$469,490	...	\$469,490	...
Citizens for Strong Ohio	\$214,951	\$156,040	\$370,991	...
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$300,588	\$8,448	\$309,036	\$998,456
National Rifle Association	\$150,750	\$129,032	\$279,782	\$150,493
Club for Growth	\$256,670	...	\$256,670	\$402,223
All Children Matter	\$84,140	\$48,254	\$132,394	...
People of Color United	...	\$77,120	\$77,120	...
America's PAC	...	\$74,400	\$74,400	...
National Right to Life	...	\$69,714	\$69,714	...
American Defense Council	...	\$46,450	\$46,450	...
Let Freedom Ring	\$12,450	...	\$12,450	\$66,498
Priests for Life	...	\$9,800	\$9,800	...
National Right to Work Committee	\$5,810	\$1,940	\$7,750	\$6,428
Softer Voices	\$63,264
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Citizens for Community Values	\$500,100	...	\$500,100	...
JustGoVote.org	\$9,628	\$285,450	\$295,078	...
Your Vote Counts In Ohio	\$294,510	...	\$294,510	...
AARP	\$200,015	\$14,400	\$214,415	\$1,318,601
The Spot Buy	\$11,338	\$152,429	\$163,767	...
Citizens to Restore Fairness	\$160,870	...	\$160,870	...
Get Out to Vote	...	\$145,190	\$145,190	...
BL Media Services	...	\$109,700	\$109,700	...
Mi Familia Vota	\$72,500	...	\$72,500	...
American Civil Liberties Union	...	\$56,100	\$56,100	...
Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration	...	\$53,030	\$53,030	...
Ohioans for a Strong Economy	\$44,238	...	\$44,238	...
Prescription Drug Reform	...	\$40,028	\$40,028	...

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study's sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study's relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races.

For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the sample states. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample states. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in the sample states are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 1-12.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals and Progress for America Voter Fund have been included in the Progressfor America totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, "... " only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 1-12
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization, Sample Presidential Races, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc.	161	8	4	2	30	6	175	386
John Kerry / DNC	2	28	30
<i>Political parties</i>								
DNC	99	60	4	5	12	10	119	309
State Democratic Parties	15	126	...	5	13	3	1	163
Local Democratic Parties	23	5	1	1	2	32
<i>Interest groups</i>								
America Coming Together	53	89	1	13	6	162
MoveOn.org	122	5	4	1	2	3	24	161
AFL-CIO	17	37	2	12	1	1	...	70
Sierra Club	8	46	3	1	4	1	1	64
NARAL Pro-Choice America	40	17	57
The Media Fund	...	8	3	...	1	11	30	53
League of Conservation Voters	14	15	...	8	1	...	9	47
Working America	...	22	...	1	2	...	1	26
United Automobile Workers Union	...	11	3	2	7	23
National Education Association	...	18	1	...	1	20
AFSCME	...	19	19
Individual Donors	...	6	10	16
SEIU	...	6	1	9	16
Human Rights Campaign	1	11	1	...	2	15
Environment 2004	10	4	14
Planned Parenthood Action Fund	...	12	2	14
People for the American Way	5	6	1	1	13
American Federation of Teachers	...	9	2	...	11
Campaign For America's Future	7	1	8
EMILY's List	7	1	8
National Organization for Women	7	1	8
Teamsters Union	...	7	1	8
Iowa Citizen Action Network	7	7
Iowa Federation of Labor	...	7	7
Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund	...	6	6
Democracy for America	5	1	6
Music For America	...	6	6
New Democrat Network	6	6
This Vote Counts	6	6
Alliance for Retired Americans	...	5	5
American Family Voices	...	2	3	5
Communications Workers of America	...	3	...	1	...	1	...	5
Moving America Forward	...	4	1	...	5
National Air Traffic Controllers	5	5
Ohio Young Democrats	5	5
Stronger America Now	5	5
United Food & Commercial Workers	...	5	5

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Republican allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Bush/Cheney '04	114	22	1	...	46	25	109	317
Bush/Cheney '04 / RNC	1	1	3	64	69
<i>Political parties</i>								
RNC	22	160	...	2	19	20	28	251
State Republican Parties	13	76	1	8	8	2	2	110
Local Republican Parties	2	3	2	7
<i>Interest groups</i>								
National Rifle Association	7	10	5	1	13	36
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth	...	9	2	19	30
National Right to Life	...	17	6	6	...	29
Progress for America	4	7	15	26
Republican Jewish Coalition	...	8	11	19
All Children Matter	...	8	8
Club for Growth	3	5	8
November Fund	1	6	1	8
United Seniors Association	...	2	1	5	8
Agenda for America	1	6	7
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	1	3	1	5
America's PAC	1	3	...	4
Associated Builders and Contractors	...	4	4
Citizen Leader Coalition	1	3	4
Focus on the Family Action	...	3	3
Individual Donors	3	3
Let Freedom Ring	3	3
People of Color United	2	1	3
American Conservative Union	...	2	2
Americans for Job Security	...	2	2
Americans United to Preserve Marriage	2	2
Christian Coalition of America	...	2	2
College Republicans	1	1	2
Human Events	...	2	2
Softer Voices	2	2
Thanksgiving 2004 Committee	2	2
Vote Your Sport	2	2
Nonpartisan								
<i>Interest groups</i>								
AARP	4	3	3	10
American Civil Liberties Union	...	3	1	1	5
Individual Donors	3	2	...	5
JustGoVote.org	...	3	1	4
Southwest Voter Registration Education Project	...	1	2	3
Women's Voices. Women Vote.	...	3	3

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 1-11.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Institute for

Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals and Progress for America Voter Fund have been included in the Progress for America totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 1-13
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee for Our House and Senate Races, 2003-2004

Race	DCCC	NRCC	TOTAL
AZ 1	\$1,132,525	\$1,604,272	\$2,736,797
CO 7	\$61,850	\$535,864	\$597,714
GA 12	\$1,143,289	\$680,347	\$1,823,636
KS 3	\$694,017	\$608,959	\$1,302,976
NM 1	\$1,250,111	\$1,012,390	\$2,262,501
PA 13	\$795,643	\$793,956	\$1,589,599
SD AL	\$3,451,277	\$4,357,407	\$7,808,684
TX 32	\$1,114,511	\$747,483	\$1,861,994
UT 2	\$661,236	\$1,002,823	\$1,664,059

Race	DSCC	NRSC	TOTAL
AK Sen	\$2,954,847	\$500,145	\$2,454,992
CO Sen	\$2,301,264	\$1,139,946	\$3,441,210
FL Sen	\$3,726,182	\$4,168,203	\$7,894,385
NC Sen	\$2,529,622	\$1,853,330	\$4,382,952
OK Sen	\$2,301,293	\$254,121	\$2,555,414
SD Sen	\$938,098	\$334,864	\$1,272,962

Source: Federal Election Commission, (<http://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/> [January 5, 2005]).

Table 1-14
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures, Sample Congressional Races, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Democratic Senatorial Candidates	\$13,039,571	\$800,003	\$13,839,573	\$22,205,070
Democratic Congressional Candidates	\$6,041,113	\$262,289	\$6,303,402	\$9,827,682
<i>Political parties</i>				
DSCC	\$8,345,555	\$47,698	\$8,393,252	\$9,563,398
DCCC	\$6,217,847	\$115,919	\$6,333,766	\$3,804,985
State Democratic Parties	\$246,517	\$58,147	\$304,663	\$6,220
<i>Interest groups</i>				
The Media Fund	\$2,837,889	\$341,581	\$3,179,470	\$10,945,130
Citizens for a Strong Senate	\$2,238,081	...	\$2,238,081	\$1,766,312
New Democrat Network	\$1,160,867	\$8,670	\$1,169,537	\$1,932,736
League of Conservation Voters	\$665,265	\$14,750	\$680,015	\$3,004,719
American Family Voices	\$409,759	...	\$409,759	\$357,245
Florida Women Vote	\$383,450	\$13,800	\$397,250	...
EMILY's List	\$318,780	\$40,800	\$359,580	\$1,224,338
AFL-CIO	\$350,010	...	\$350,010	\$927,123
Communities for Quality Education	\$247,970	...	\$247,970	...
AFSCME	\$215,895	...	\$215,895	...
Stronger America Now	\$212,105	...	\$212,105	\$402,750
SEIU	\$113,320	\$73,078	\$186,398	\$403,843
Human Rights Campaign	...	\$122,500	\$122,500	\$48,595
Coalition to Defend the American Dream	...	\$116,836	\$116,836	...
Coalition For Future American Workers	\$40,750	\$48,000	\$88,750	\$299,043
American Federation of Teachers	...	\$73,490	\$73,490	...
Save Our Environment	\$15,700	\$35,500	\$51,200	\$115,846
National Air Traffic Controllers	\$36,620	...	\$36,620	\$89,816
National Resource Defense Council	\$14,650	\$18,000	\$32,650	\$127,806
American Federation of Gov't Employees	...	\$22,432	\$22,432	\$29,098
This Vote Counts	\$10,155	...	\$10,155	\$14,626
NARAL Pro-Choice America	...	\$9,600	\$9,600	\$6,652
Communications Workers of America	\$6,000	...	\$6,000	\$24,339
United Auto Workers Union	\$974,234
Take Back America	\$189,400
Quality Healthcare for Citizens	\$146,961

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Republican allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Republican Senatorial Candidates	\$14,094,867	\$1,060,471	\$15,155,338	\$20,918,077
Republican Congressional Candidates	\$7,359,753	\$479,939	\$7,839,691	\$9,637,139
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRSC	\$8,836,231	\$367,591	\$9,203,822	\$9,593,621
NRCC	\$6,083,631	\$12,416	\$6,096,046	\$4,156,822
State Republican Parties	\$60,100	\$58,000	\$118,100	\$330,708
Local Republican Parties	...	\$4,305	\$4,305	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Progress for America	\$1,726,201	\$214,675	\$1,940,876	\$4,464,328
Club for Growth	\$846,114	...	\$846,114	\$873,609
United Seniors Association	\$791,786	\$18,700	\$810,486	\$4,070,959
Americans for Job Security	\$786,390	\$2,972	\$789,362	\$1,151,004
Citizens for a Fair Share	\$469,490	...	\$469,490	...
American Medical Association	\$297,662	\$44,933	\$342,595	\$287,347
National Rifle Association	\$182,522	\$117,590	\$300,112	\$57,958
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$230,553	\$17,545	\$248,098	\$1,176,522
You're Fired	\$188,362	\$39,564	\$227,926	...
November Fund	\$206,290	...	\$206,290	...
National Association of Realtors	\$156,250	...	\$156,250	\$718,161
National Right to Life	...	\$86,329	\$86,329	\$228,720
All Children Matter	\$84,140	...	\$84,140	...
Small Business Survival Committee	...	\$45,828	\$45,828	...
Ave Maria List	...	\$29,081	\$29,081	...
National Right to Work Committee	\$10,120	...	\$10,120	\$13,596
Alliance for Quality Nursing Home Care	\$173,506
Let Freedom Ring	\$127,832
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
JustGoVote.org	\$41,903	\$294,800	\$336,703	...
Families for a Secure America	\$183,876	\$29,700	\$213,576	...
AARP	\$143,770	\$14,400	\$158,170	\$1,789,739
Get Out to Vote	...	\$145,190	\$145,190	...
Mi Familia Vota	\$72,500	...	\$72,500	...
American Civil Liberties Union	...	\$56,100	\$56,100	...
Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration	...	\$53,030	\$53,030	...
Hispanics Together	...	\$41,440	\$41,440	...
The Latino Coalition	...	\$29,200	\$29,200	...
Compare Decide Vote	\$28,825	...	\$28,825	...

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study's sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study's relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the sample states. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in the sample states are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 1-15.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals and Progress for America Voter Fund have been included in the Progressfor America totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "... " only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 1-15
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Sample Congressional Races, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Democratic Senatorial Candidates	105	51	27	5	29	37	151	405
Democratic Congressional Candidates	29	86	7	14	28	20	78	262
<i>Political parties</i>								
State Democratic Parties	2	57	...	4	14	...	4	81
DCCC	...	47	1	3	29	80
DSCC	...	18	2	33	53
Local Democratic Parties	...	4	1	...	1	6
<i>Interest groups</i>								
Citizens for a Strong Senate	...	13	1	...	9	23
AFL-CIO	4	13	2	19
Sierra Club	2	10	7	19
League of Conservation Voters	...	10	1	1	1	1	3	17
National Education Association	...	13	3	16
EMILY's List	8	5	...	1	1	15
America Coming Together	4	7	1	1	13
Focus South Dakota	...	5	8	13
NARAL Pro-Choice America	4	8	12
New House PAC	9	9
We the People	7	7
New Democrat Network	6	6
American Federation of Teachers	...	5	5
Issues Matter	2	2	1	5
AFSCME	...	4	4
Human Rights Campaign	1	3	4
Association of Trial Lawyers of America	...	2	1	3
Credit Union Legislative Action Council of CUNA	...	3	3
Florida Women Vote	...	3	3
ITC Research	3	3
Moving America Forward	...	3	3
NC Association of Educators	...	2	1	3
Oklahomans for Sound Leadership	...	3	3
Planned Parenthood Action Fund	...	3	3
Alaska State Employees Assoc.	...	1	1	2
American Family Voices	2	2
Clean Water Action	...	2	2
Democracy for America	2	2
Individual Donors	2	...	2
NM Federation of Education Employees	...	2	2
People for the American Way	1	1	2
USA Public Opinion Group	2	2
Republican allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Republican Senatorial Candidates	59	30	37	3	10	53	123	315
Republican Congressional Candidates	23	99	6	8	18	21	69	244

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Political parties</i>								
State Republican Parties	21	158	...	5	17	1	2	204
NRCC	1	51	13	...	38	103
NRSC	...	29	1	...	7	5	52	94
Local Republican Parties	1	2	1	4
<i>Interest groups</i>								
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	56	2	12	1	...	1	72
National Rifle Association	...	17	6	3	7	33
National Association of Realtors	...	25	1	1	27
National Right to Life	...	16	2	4	...	22
United Seniors Association	...	13	2	1	5	21
Americans for Job Security	...	6	2	...	2	1	7	18
American Medical Association	10	2	5	17
NFIB	...	12	2	...	14
The Seniors Coalition	...	12	1	13
Club for Growth	1	...	2	7	10
Focus on the Family Action	...	6	1	7
Associated Builders and Contractors	...	6	6
National Association of Home Builders	...	6	6
National Right to Work Committee	...	6	6
Susan B. Anthony List	...	1	4	5
Individual Donors	4	4
You're Fired	2	2	4
American Democracy Project	...	3	3
Council For Government Reform	...	3	3
Freedom Works	1	1	1	3
Hispanos Unidos	...	3	3
Kansans for Life	...	2	1	3
Thanksgiving 2004 Committee	3	3
60 Plus	...	2	2
Americans for Tax Reform	...	1	1	2
Americans United to Preserve Marriage	2	2
Ave Maria List	...	1	1	2
National Pro-Life Alliance	...	2	2
Nonpartisan								
<i>Interest groups</i>								
JustGoVote.org	...	14	4	18
AARP	1	7	1	9
True Majority.org	4	4
Southwest Voter Registration Education Project	...	1	2	3
Americans for Better Government	...	1	1	2
Mainsteam PAC	...	1	1	2
Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Admin.	...	2	2
Rock the Vote	1	1	2
Women's Voices. Women Vote.	...	2	2

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).


^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to

portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 1-14.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals.


^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "... " only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Figure 1-1
Month-by-month Spending of Campaigns, Parties, and 527s, 2004




Source: *The Washington Post* and Dwight Morris & Associates. See Thomas B. Edsall and James V. Grimaldi, "On Nov. 2, GOP Got More Bang for Its Billion, Analysis Shows" *Washington Post*, December 30, 2005, p. A1.

Figure 1-2
DNC and RNC Total Receipts, 1988-2004




Source: Federal Election Commission, “Party Financial Activity Summarized,” press release, December 14, 2004, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20041214party/20041214party.html [January 15, 2005]). Adjusted for inflation (2004 dollars) at U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index Home Page,” (www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm [January 25, 2005]).

Figure 1-3
DSCC and NRSC Total Receipts, 1988-2004




Source: Federal Election Commission, “Party Financial Activity Summarized,” press release, December 14, 2004, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20041214party/20041214party.html [January 15, 2005]). Adjusted for inflation (2004 dollars) at U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index Home Page,” (www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm [January 25, 2005]).

Figure 1-4
DSCC and NRSC Total Receipts, 1988-2004




Source: Federal Election Commission, “Party Financial Activity Summarized,” press release, December 14, 2004, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20041214party/20041214party.html [January 15, 2005]). Adjusted for inflation (2004 dollars) at U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index Home Page,” (www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm [January 25, 2005]).

**Figure 1-5
Hard-money (Federal) Receipts Throughout the 2004 Election Cycle**



Source: Federal Election Commission, "Party Financial Activity Summarized," press release, December 14, 2004, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20041214party/20041214party.html [January 22, 2005]). FEC, "Party Fund-raising Continues to Grow," press release, October 25, 2004, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20041025party/20041025party.htm [January 22, 2005]). FEC, "Party Fund-raising Continues to Grow," press release, August 6, 2004, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/NewsReleaseMajorPartiesFund-raisingThroughJune200420040806ptystat.html [January 22, 2005]). FEC, "Major Parties? Fund-raising Summarized," press release, March 25, 2004, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20040325party/20040325ptystat.html [January 22, 2005]). FEC, "FEC Releases 6-Month Fund-raising Figures for Parties," press release, August 28, 2003, (www.fec.gov/press/press2003/20030828party/20030828party.html [January 22, 2005]).

Figure 1-6
Competitive House Races Over Time



Source: Charlie Cook, "National Overview." *The Cook Political Report*, 4 October 2002, p. 6; "2004 Races at a Glance," *The Cook Political Report*, July 22, 2004. www.cookpolitical.com.

Note: Competitive races are those classified by Cook as "toss ups" or leaning toward one party.

2000 Presidential Election Revisited....Not Quite!

Robert E. Crew, Terri Susan Fine, and Susan A. MacManus
Florida State University, University of Central Florida, University of South Florida

With the assistance of
Amber Davis, University of South Florida;
Rebecca Young and Elise Heffner, Florida State University;
and Adrienne Matthews, University of Central Florida.

The 2000 presidential election in Florida was arguably the most dramatic in American history. It was decided by only 527 votes, and the outcome was not declared official until a U.S. Supreme Court ruling three weeks after Election Day. In the ensuing four years, controversy has raged over the results. Disappointed Gore supporters have blamed electoral fraud, poor ballot design, faulty voting equipment, and arcane ballot counting rules for his razor-thin loss in Florida. Still others fault Ralph Nader for siphoning votes away from the Democratic ticket.

The closeness of the vote and the attendant controversies created a highly charged context for the 2004 contest. Meanwhile, the partisan divide continued to narrow and Florida gained two more seats in the Electoral College (from twenty-five to twenty-seven). Therefore, both the Democrats and the Republicans saw Florida as winnable in 2004 and a “must have” state. Each party also had something else to prove in 2004—that it really won Florida in 2000.

Political Environment

Florida is the southern state that has made the most complete transformation from a solidly Democratic to a Republican stronghold. Heading into the 2004 election, Republicans controlled the Office of Governor, all three of the state’s elected executive offices, 67 percent of the state house of representatives, 65 percent of the state senate, and 72 percent of its congressional delegation. Only the U.S. Senate seats remained in Democratic hands, and one of them was contested in 2004.

Despite Republican gains, the state’s electorate remains closely divided. Final registration figures for the November 2 election showed the breakdown to be: 41 percent Democrat, 38 percent Republican, 18 percent no party affiliation, and 3 percent minor parties. Democrats outnumbered Republican registrants by a mere 368,757 out of 10,381,246 registered voters. Registration aside, more Floridians identify themselves as independents (32 percent) than Democrats (31 percent) or Republicans (29 percent).¹ Independents are the fastest growing group of voters.

Support for both the Democrats and the Republicans is geographically dispersed. The Democratic Party’s greatest electoral strength lies in the southern counties of Broward and Miami/Dade and in the northern university communities in Leon and Alachua counties. In addition, Democratic strongholds can be found in the rural northern Jefferson, Jackson, Gadsden and Dixie counties, home to sizable African American populations.

Florida’s Democrats are essentially two parties-in-one. The Broward/Miami/Dade/Palm Beach, Alachua, and Leon counties faction (the urbanites) is the more liberal wing of the party. The conservative wing is made up of Old South Democrats in the small, more agriculturally-based counties in the panhandle (the ruralites). The latter faction often votes Republican, especially in presidential elections. Republicans and Democrats both targeted this segment of the party in 2004, with the Republicans eventually winning.

¹ 2003–2004 Florida Annual Policy Survey, Social Science Survey Research Laboratory, Florida State University.

Suburbia holds the key to Republican success. The fast-growing affluent southwest counties of Charlotte, Lee and Collier, the western Everglades, and the far western portions of the panhandle near Pensacola (Escambia County) contain the greatest concentration of Republican support. Like the Democrats, the Republicans are also ideologically split. One segment is composed of pro-business conservatives who are moderate on many social issues. The other is made up of moral and religious conservatives with strong ties to the organized Christian right (family values voters) and defense hawks (the pro-military, pro-gun voters). The moral values component of the second faction was the target of especially aggressive get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts on the part of the Bush campaign and was listed as a primary constituency in the party's 72 Hour Task Force.

Independents hold the balance of power in the state. Independent voters tend to be young (under age forty) newcomers to Florida who have been drawn to the state by jobs. The state's independent swing vote is concentrated along the I-4 Corridor.² The ten-county Tampa Bay media market, the state's largest, holds the highest share of the state's independent voters, which is why Bush, Kerry, Cheney, and Edwards frequently held rallies in the area.

Florida's diverse racial and ethnic mix mirrors that of the U.S. better than any other large battleground state. African Americans, who make up 15 percent of the total population and 12 percent of registered voters, are overwhelmingly Democratic. A key part of the Kerry campaign's strategy was to mobilize this important constituency group by constantly raising reminders of the 2000 election. African Americans in Florida were the most likely to have had their votes disqualified or been kept from voting by an error-ridden felon purge of voter rolls in both 2000 and 2004. The 2004 presidential exit poll showed that blacks made up 12 percent of those who voted, about the same percentage as in 2000.

Hispanics, who are of many races, make up 17 percent of the population and about 11 percent of the registered voters. This group is more heterogeneous in partisan attachment than African Americans. The Cubans, who constitute 8 percent of voters, are solidly Republican and provide that party both financial and electoral support.³ In an effort to generate a reverse coattails effect in this community in 2004, the Bush Administration in Washington pressured Cuban-born Mel Martinez to resign his position as secretary of Housing and Urban Development in order to seek the U.S. Senate seat being vacated by Democratic U.S. Senator Bob Graham. Martinez was chosen, in part, because Republicans feared that the Bush administration's policy limiting travel to Cuba was eroding Cuban support. The non-Cuban Hispanics, especially Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, are somewhat more likely than are Cuban Hispanics to be Democrats, but are considered a key swing group of voters. This group did, however, gravitate towards Republican Jeb Bush in the 2002 governor's race. In 2004, the parties considered the non-Cuban Hispanics, especially the large Puerto Rican community in the Orlando-Kissimmee area, Martinez's "backyard," to be another key group of swing voters and heavily targeted the population. The presidential exit poll showed that 54 percent of the Hispanic vote went to George W. Bush. While the poll did not distinguish between Cuban and non-Cuban Hispanics, most analysts have concluded the non-Cuban vote was again splintered but leaned slightly toward Senator John Kerry.

² Interstate Highway 4 runs from Daytona Beach west to the Tampa area.

³ Cuban Americans constitute 5.2 percent of the state's voting age population but make up 8 percent of the state's electorate. See Dario Moreno, "Florida's Hispanic Voters: Growth, Immigration, and Political Clout," in Kevin A. Hill, Susan A. MacManus, and Dario Moreno, eds. *Florida's Politics: Ten Media Markets, One Powerful State*. Tallahassee, FL: Florida Institute of Government, Florida State University, 2004, p. 84.

Campaign Strategy and Timing

The 2004 presidential campaign in Florida began almost immediately after George W. Bush was declared the winner in the 2000 election. The president made at least twenty-three trips to the state during his first term. His brother, Governor Jeb Bush, took every opportunity to bolster the president's candidacy. The 2004 hurdle would be even more difficult for Democrats because they faced an incumbent president who could lavish attention and resources on the state.

All participants assumed that the 2004 election would be close. This perception meant that participants from both sides strongly contested any move they perceived to create an advantage for the opposition. These moves included political and legal maneuvering. For example, the state Division of Elections hired a private firm to compile a list of felons whose rights had not been restored by the state's Clemency Board. County supervisors of elections were then asked to use the list to purge ineligible voters from their registration rolls. The project came under criticism when the secretary of state, a Governor Bush appointee, refused to release the list to the public, the Republicans in the state legislature refused to pass a law automatically restoring voting rights to felons who had completed the terms of their sentencing, and when the list proved to include unusually large percentages of African American voters who traditionally vote Democratic and very few Hispanic voters who are, especially if Cubans, more likely to vote Republican.⁴ The decision by state Republicans was vehemently attacked in the press by Democrats and civil rights advocacy groups and was subsequently abandoned.

Another type of storm, hurricanes, devastated the state in successive weeks in late summer just as the campaign began in earnest. Although the four storms afforded Bush additional opportunities to visit the state and to look presidential, they also knocked both campaigns off stride and deflated Floridians interest in the race for over a month. Polls released after the hurricanes showed that Bush's hurricane-related visits may have had a positive effect, boosting him from a six-point deficit in August to an eight-point lead in the third week of September.

The general strategy adopted by the Bush campaign for the nation as a whole—to capitalize on fears regarding terrorism—was perfect for Florida for a number of reasons. First, Florida's tourism economy suffered directly and substantially when visitors avoided travel after the 9/11 attacks. Second, South Florida was one of the scenes of the anthrax scare that followed in the aftermath of the September attacks. Third, several of the terrorists involved received their flight training in Florida, and fourth, the state is quite vulnerable from an infrastructure perspective, with twenty-one military installations, fourteen deep water ports, twenty commercial airports, and more than seven hundred private airports.

The Kerry message consisted of a combination of attacks on the president interwoven with efforts to present John Kerry as a person with "better" ideas about how to deal with a variety of problems facing America. However, the message lacked the strategic focus that characterized that of the Bush campaign and simply failed to resonate with most Florida voters, particularly with the more conservative Democrats in northern Florida who are essential to a Democratic victory. Exit polls showed that Kerry got a smaller percentage of votes in this region than in any other in the state.⁵ Indeed, the Democratic candidate for the U.S. Senate, Betty Castor, outpolled Kerry in Florida and has reported that his poor performance in this

⁴ Secretary of State Glenda Hood succeeded Katherine Harris. While Harris was elected statewide, Hood was appointed by the Governor. Florida voters amended the state constitution to make the position appointive rather than elective.

⁵ References to exit polls throughout the chapter are from CNN Exit Poll, Florida, found at (www.CNN.com/Election/2004 [January 30, 2005]).

region hurt her own chances for victory.⁶ In the end, Kerry was not able to provide a suitable rationale for unseating George Bush, and exit polls showed that most people who voted for the Democratic candidate in Florida (69 percent) did so not because of his own appeal but for reasons of opposition to President Bush. Although he was able to win the majority of independent voters, he had a net loss of 8 percent in crossover votes, losing 15 percent of Democrats and picking up only 7 percent among Republicans.

The Role of Money

Given the size of Florida and its importance to the national electoral outcome, both candidates and their respective parties were expected to raise and spend huge sums in the state. Both of these expectations were met.

Florida has long been a big donor state, with its plethora of wealthy retired executives and union leaders, and the two campaigns took advantage of this to raise substantial sums in the state. President Bush, in particular, profited from his and his brother's ties in Florida and raised over \$16 million in individual contributions, about 6 percent of his national total. Kerry raised \$7.2 million in Florida, 3.2 percent of his total.⁷

Air War

Huge amounts of money also were spent in the state and neither party showed signs that a lack of money was a problem. We estimate that between \$115 and \$120 million was expended in this race. The data we collected from radio and TV stations from around the state and those collected by the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG) show that the candidate and party committees spent about \$90 million and outside groups spent at least \$22 million on TV and radio alone. The data on these expenditures is shown in table 2-1. Republican Party officials estimated that the Bush campaign, the Republican National Committee (RNC), and the Republican Party of Florida combined to spend between \$45 and \$50 million dollars on TV, radio, direct mail, GOTV, and other activities in the state.⁸ Democratic Party officials place their estimates in excess of \$50 million.⁹

Candidates. The Bush presidential campaign outspent that of John Kerry in TV and radio advertising. Ad-buy data collected from TV and radio stations throughout Florida by our reconnaissance group indicate that Bush spent about 43 percent more on these two media than did Kerry. Data collected by CMAG show that Kerry spent approximately \$31 million on TV advertising alone while the Bush campaign spent about \$40 million. The Bush campaign mounted forty-two unique TV ads and twenty radio ads. The Kerry campaign produced twenty-three TV ads and five unique radio ads. The data on TV and radio expenditures are listed in table 2-1, and the unique ad data are reported in table 2-2.

The data we collected from radio stations throughout the state show that the Bush campaign spent proportionately more of its media money on radio than did the Kerry campaign, about 2 times the amount spent by Kerry. Bush strategists learned after the 2000 campaign that Democrats watch more TV than Republicans. Consequently, the campaign revamped its media strategy in 2004. "They cut the proportion

⁶ Betty Castor, Democratic candidate for U.S. Senate, interview by Susan MacManus, Tampa, Fla., December 10, 2004.

⁷ Political Money Line, "State Break Out of Itemized Contributions from Individuals," (www.politicalmoneyline.com [December 8, 2004]).

⁸ Jamie Wilson, former executive director, Republican Party of Florida, telephone interview by Robert Crew, December 13, 2004.

⁹ Scriven Watson, former executive director, Democratic Party of Florida, telephone interview by Robert Crew, December 13, 2004.

of money they put into broadcast TV and diverted more to niche cable channels and radio, where it could more precisely reach its target audience.”¹⁰ By our count, Bush ran 18 unique radio ads, many of which were targeted to listeners in the key rural parts of the state. The content of these ads included attacks on Kerry’s position on either the war in Iraq or the war on terrorism and his support for increased taxes and other liberal issues while in the U.S. Senate.¹¹ In contrast, the Kerry campaign ran only five unique radio ads.

In general, the Bush TV ads were considerably more focused than were those of the Kerry campaign. Bush attacked Kerry relentlessly, attempting to portray him as a flip-flopper and a weak-kneed northeastern liberal who could not be trusted to defend the nation against terrorism. Kerry’s ads lacked the Bush thematic consistency. Some, like his “Optimists” ad contained a series of generalities about his plans for America. Others were issue-oriented and focused on a variety of domestic problems; the economic plight of middle-class Americans, the high cost of prescription medicines, the failure of the Bush Administration to provide flu vaccines, Vice President Cheney’s ties to Halliburton, the Bush threat to Medicare, and the condition of the nation’s economy. He also utilized air time to defend himself against the Bush attacks on his commitment to the defense of the nation and on the “waffling” charges leveled against him. Interspersed with issue-specific ads, Kerry ran biographical-oriented spots, trying to “define himself” as polls continued to show that the public did not know or understand him well.

Parties. Both the Democratic and the Republican parties were heavily involved in supporting the activities of their respective candidates—not surprising in a pivotal battleground state. Data we collected from radio and TV stations show that the Democratic National Committee (DNC) considerably outspent the RNC on TV and radio advertising, nearly matching Kerry’s own candidate campaign activities. When combined with the expenditures of the candidate committees, this influx of dollars from the DNC pushed Kerry ahead of Bush in total expenditures on TV and radio in the state. The bulk of the Democratic Party dollars, as was the case with the Kerry presidential campaign expenditures, went to buy TV rather than radio time. In fact, the DNC mounted more unique TV ads than did the Kerry presidential campaign, twenty-nine as opposed to twenty-three.

In contrast to the Republican candidate committees which spent proportionately more on radio, RNC contributions to the presidential air-war campaign was equally split between TV ads and radio ads. The RNC ran nine unique radio and nine unique TV ads. The Republican Party of Florida also ran two unique radio and two TV ads on behalf of the president.

Interest Groups. Interest groups identifying with the two candidates spent more than \$20 million on TV and radio advertising in Florida in 2004. Nearly 40 percent of this total was spent by two groups, the Media Fund on behalf of John Kerry and Progress for America on behalf of the Bush campaign. The Media Fund spent over \$6 million and Progress for American spent \$2.5 million.

Overall, nearly 75 percent of all partisan-affiliated interest group money spent on TV and radio advertising (approximately \$16 million) was spent on behalf of the Democratic ticket. Twenty-one separate groups ran radio and TV ads against the president. The largest amounts expended, aside from the \$6 million by the Media Fund, were \$3.6 million by MoveOn.org, \$2.2 million by League of Conservation Voters, and \$1.2 million by EMILY’s List. These groups utilized their air time primarily to attack the president on a variety of issues, namely, his associations with the Saudi royal family and his position on women’s rights, the environment, and the plight of the working class. Others, like the New

¹⁰ Katharine Seelye, “U.S. Political Parties re-Evaluate Their Media Campaigns,” *New York Times News Service*, December 9, 2004, p. 9.

¹¹ Joseph Agostini, communications director, Republican Party of Florida, telephone interview with Robert Crew, December 14, 2004.

Democrat Network, appealed to specific groups, in this case South Florida Hispanics and Puerto Ricans in Orlando. The Media Fund was particularly helpful to Democrats in launching air attacks on the president during March and April of 2004 before the party had a nominee. They also made major local cable and radio buys targeting eighteen to thirty-five-year-old African Americans, urging them to register to vote.

Like their Democratically-oriented counterparts, the Republican-leaning interest groups primarily used their resources to attack John Kerry's record. Six groups were active on behalf of the president in Florida: Swift Boats Veterans for Truth, Progress for America, United Seniors Association, National Rifle Association (NRA), All Children Matter, National Right to Life, and the U.S Chamber of Commerce. The three largest contributors were Progress for America (\$2.5 million), Swift Boats Veterans for Truth (\$1.8 million), and United Seniors Association (over \$800,000)

The Swift Boats group focused entirely on Kerry's Vietnam War record and spent their funds on six separate TV ads critical of his service in this war. The group also ran at least one radio ad. By all accounts these ads were very effective in Florida, a state that has large numbers of military bases and veterans.

Ground War

The presidential race in Florida was a targeting and turnout war. Both campaigns expended enormous amounts of energy and money to identify potential supporters, get them registered, and make sure they voted. In some cases their targets were the same; in others they were different. Both parties sought the support of seniors, veterans and non-Cuban Hispanics. Democrats focused on young voters, African Americans, working women, and environmentalists. Republicans looked to sportsmen, social conservatives and Cuban-Americans for high levels of support. The party also made a special appeal to the Jewish community, especially seeking support from staunchly pro-Israel hawkish Jews through the Republican Jewish Coalition.

In meeting GOTV goals, party and outside 527 group resources were combined, but in somewhat different ways. Democratic Party efforts were heavily reinforced by a loosely coordinated coalition of external groups who directed aggressive outreach activities to a wide range of potential voters. Indeed, such was their visibility that casual observers might easily have concluded that it was these groups who were conducting the party's GOTV campaign. The Republican Party, on the other hand, clearly controlled voter contact efforts and was supported by allied groups who focused primarily on their own memberships.

In pursuing their targets, the candidate committees, the political parties, and the interest groups (the 527s) made use of e-mail, direct mail, telephone and personal contacts. Our reconnaissance network counted 294 separate e-mail messages, 236 unique mail pieces, and twenty-five unique telephone contacts on behalf of one or the other of the two candidates. The organizations involved also took out twenty-one separate ads in newspapers and magazines. The vast majority of these were supported by the 527s as opposed to the candidate or party organizations. The largest number of e-mails came from the Kerry (sixty) and the Bush presidential campaigns (seventy-seven). Most direct mail came from the party organizations. Our network collected forty-five separate mail pieces from the RNC, thirty-five from the Republican Party of Florida, twenty-eight from the Democratic Party of Florida, and ten from the DNC. Among interest groups, America Coming Together (ACT) was the overwhelming leader, with twenty-five on behalf of John Kerry. The data on these activities are shown in table 2-2.

Much of the e-mail and direct mail was carefully targeted. For example the Republican Jewish Coalition sent three separate mail pieces to its targeted community, the NRA e-mailed its membership list at least seven times and sent two direct-mail pieces, and All Children Matter sent at least four unique direct mailers. On the Democratic side, the AFL-CIO, Working America and AFSCME sent a total of sixteen

unique mail pieces to union members, and the League of Conservation Voters and Environment 2004 sent four each to voters they identified as being undecided and environmentally sensitive.

Both parties were successful in their ground-war efforts. Although not all of the increase in voter registration and turnout that was evident in this election can be attributed to their GOTV efforts, both campaigns exceeded their stated voter mobilization goals. Official results from the Florida Department of State showed that total voter registration in the state increased from 8,752,717 in 2000 to 10,301,290 in 2004. Democratic registration moved from 3,803,081 to 4,261,249 and Republican registration from 3,430,238 to 3,892,492. Overall turnout also increased, from 70.1 percent in 2000 to 74.2 percent in 2004.¹²

Both parties found support within the demographic constituencies they targeted. Exit polls showed that Kerry won among Florida voters age eighteen to twenty-nine (60 percent) whose share of the electorate actually increased by 2 percent over 2000 (17 percent v. 15 percent). Kerry also won an overwhelming majority of the African American vote (87 percent) and the Jewish vote (81 percent). While Kerry won a majority of the women's vote (52 percent), it was less than Gore had won in 2000 (53 percent). Kerry did best among non-white women (64 percent) but lost the white female vote (46 percent). He barely carried the sixty-five and older vote (51 percent). The Bush campaign was also successful in reaching its targeted demographic constituencies. Voters who attended church weekly voted overwhelmingly for the president (61 percent). A majority of Latino voters (54 percent), including Cuban-Americans, white women (53 percent), and middle-age adults (forty-five to fifty-nine-year-olds, 55 percent; thirty to forty-four-year-olds, 51 percent), voted for Bush. It is likely that Florida's NRA members heavily supported the president. Bush also made slight inroads into the African American and Jewish vote, with an increase of 3 percent among African American voters and 2 percent among Jewish voters.

Candidates. Candidate committees in both parties utilized the full range of personal contact mechanisms available in modern political campaigning: e-mail, direct mail, personal contacts through telephone, and appearances at highly publicized campaign rallies.

In Florida, the Republican candidate committees utilized these mechanisms at a higher level than did Democrats. The Bush committee sent seventy-seven separate e-mails, seven unique mail pieces and nine separate phone calls to its targeted voters. The Kerry campaign sent at least sixty e-mails, three unique mailers, and four separate phone messages.

Parties. Both the Democratic and Republican national committees mounted aggressive, even unprecedented, efforts to mobilize their base voters. Exit polls in the state revealed that over one-third of Florida voters were contacted by the Kerry and Bush campaigns, with Kerry contacting 35 percent and Bush 34 percent of voters. These figures are about 10 percent higher than those for the nation as a whole.

The RNC led the ground war for the Bush campaign in Florida. It developed a 72 Hour Task Force that outlined volunteer recruitment, voter registration and coalition-building goals for each county in the state. These goals were then pursued through the on-the-ground efforts of the Republican Party of Florida's Victory 2004 program. The party employed e-mail and direct mail and utilized party volunteers (some "volunteers" were paid) for telephoning and for door-to-door canvassing in order to reach targeted voters.

¹² See Florida Division of Elections web site: (election.dos.state.fl.us/online/voterpercent.shtml [January 24, 2005]) for 2000 turnout; (election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/2/04&DATAMODE= [January 24, 2005]) for 2004 turnout.

The Republican Party of Florida says that 109,000 volunteers were engaged in the Florida effort. This program exceeded all expectations and Matthew Dowd, a Bush campaign strategist, credited it as *the* most important factor in the Republican victory.¹³ The state party's efforts in 2004 vastly surpassed party efforts in the 2000 election. In that campaign, the Republican Party of Florida made 77,000 personal contacts between the Republican convention and Election Day. In the four days before the 2004 election, it made three million personal contacts. Over one million of these were made through telephone or face-to-face contacts, with the remainder coming in the form of mail.¹⁴ Overall, the RNC and the Republican Party of Florida combined to send seventeen separate e-mail messages, eighty unique pieces of direct mail, and five separate phone messages to its voters. The party's stated turnout goal of 3,465,177 votes for the president was exceeded by nearly 500,000 votes.

The Democratic Party developed a similar plan with county-level targets and goals. It recruited over 120,000 volunteers in Florida whose names were entered into a computer system titled "Bottled Lightning." This system was used to manage and track volunteer activities on a daily basis. To augment these volunteers in the last two weeks of the campaign, the party also hired 1,500 canvassers, some of whom were recruited from out-of-state.¹⁵ These canvassers were the subject of some criticism and comments from the field suggested that they were redundant and poorly assigned.¹⁶ The DNC and the Florida Democratic Party also sent twenty-one separate e-mails, thirty-eight unique pieces of direct mail, and two separate phone messages to its supporters. Exit polls in the state showed that these contacts appeared to be slightly more effective than Bush contacts. Sixty-five percent of those who were contacted by the Kerry campaign claimed to have voted for him while 63 percent of those contacted by the Bush campaign voted for the president.

Like those of the Republicans, the Democratic mobilization goals were also exceeded. Democrats had set a goal of turning out 150,000 more voters than the number who voted for Al Gore in 2000. Official election returns showed that actual Democratic turnout in 2004 was in excess of 500,000 over the 2000 numbers.

In the end, both party mobilization campaigns could claim success. However, "while Democrats bragged about their Florida 'ground game,' President Bush's Republicans quietly went out and won it."¹⁷ Bush carried seven counties that Gore had won in 2000 and got higher percentages of the vote in three critical, heavily Democratic South Florida counties (Broward, Palm Beach and Miami/Dade) than he did in 2000. The Republicans simply set and achieved higher turnout goals than did the Democrats.

Interest Groups. Interest group ground activity on behalf of the two presidential candidates was heavily skewed toward the Kerry campaign. A loose coalition of groups including Planned Parenthood, the LCV, the AFL-CIO, ACT, MoveOn, the Sierra Club, EMILY's List and others combined to mount massive door-to-door voter registration and GOTV programs on behalf of the Kerry campaign and some other Democratic candidates, most notably Betty Castor, the party's nominee for the U.S. Senate. Although this coalition met often to discuss their targets and progress, there was substantial duplication and overlap in their activities.¹⁸ Furthermore, despite Republican concerns that these groups were coordinating with the

¹³ Ken Thomas, Associated Press, "Bush Defeats Kerry in Florida," *Palm Beach Post*, November 3, 2004, (www.palmbeachpost.com/politics/content/gen/ap/FL_ELN_Presidential_Race_Florida [November 3, 2004]).

¹⁴ Augustini interview, December 12, 2004.

¹⁵ Chris Petley, political director, Democratic Party of Florida, telephone interview by Robert Crew, December 15, 2004.

¹⁶ Victor Hull, "Turning Out Voters Locked Up a Victory," *Sarasota Herald Tribune*, November 4, 2004, (www.newscoast.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?Date=20041104&Category+NEWS&ArNo=411 [November 4, 2004]).

¹⁷ S.V. Date, "President Won Florida with Better Ground Game," *Palm Beach Post*, November 4, 2004, p. 1AA.

¹⁸ Jon Garfunkel, "Is an Uncoordinated Presidential Campaign in Our Best Interest," *Civilities*, Nov 3, 2004 (civilities.net/coordinatedcampaigns [Jan 5, 2005]).

Kerry campaign, reports from the field suggest instead that they were often competitors. Orange County Democratic Party Chairman Doug Head was quoted as saying that the 527 groups “sucked up” volunteers from the local Democratic Party. “An awful lot of volunteers got sucked into being paid volunteers....They were all redundant and poorly assigned. It was disconnected and obviously ineffective.”¹⁹

The primary focus of the Democratically-oriented 527 group coalition was Dade County in South Florida and the I-4 corridor, especially in the Orlando and Tampa areas. Their targets were the environmentally concerned, young voters, African American and Hispanic voters and undecided or infrequent voters, especially working women. ACT alone had seven offices in Florida—in Tampa, Orlando, Jacksonville, Miami and Palm Beach. ACT’s director of communications in Florida claimed that his organization registered more than 50,000 new voters in the state.²⁰

Interest groups involved in the Republican ground war played a supportive role to the activities of the Republican Party. Those that were involved, the NRA, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, socially conservative groups (evangelical churches, school choice/home school groups and pro-life groups), and Cuban-Americans were utilized to prod their own constituents. Nevertheless, the NRA integrated their GOTV training into Bush-Cheney activities and the 72 Hour Task Force, and Chuck Cunningham, federal affairs director of the NRA, sat on the Board of the Task Force.

All of the activities described above were influenced by early voting. The 2004 election was the first presidential election in which Floridians were able to cast their votes on days other than November 2, but the procedure had been in place for other elections and parties and interest groups alike had experience pushing their supporters to vote early or absentee. Thus the mobilization campaigns of the two parties and the interest groups were bifurcated, two-stage efforts. They focused first on the early voters, then on the traditional Election Day voter. Prior to October 18 (the first day of early voting), communications focused on informing voters of this opportunity and stressing its advantages, namely, the convenience involved. Subsequently, their messages shifted to more traditional get-to-the-poll themes. In both periods, the groups utilized similar tactics: e-mail to their membership lists, door-to-door canvassing, direct mail, and telephone campaigns. Democratically oriented groups sent 106 e-mails and eighty-four separate direct-mail pieces to their targeted voters. They also made four unique telephone contacts and ran eleven separate ads in magazines or newspapers. The corresponding numbers for Republican groups were thirteen e-mail messages, twenty-three separate mail pieces, and seven separate ads in newspapers and magazines.

Groups that were officially nonpartisan, but perceived to be Democratic-leaning, used entertainment luminaries to encourage young voters to vote. For example, the Citizen Change organization, created by rap star Sean “P. Diddy” Combs, conducted a three-day GOTV campaign called “Vote or Die” in the Miami area which was geared towards minority voters. ACT sponsored “Vote for Change” concerts featuring Bruce Springsteen, the Dave Mathews Band, REM and Pearl Jam. Exit polls conducted on a national sample suggested that these efforts were successful, especially with first-time voters. Compared to repeat voters, these first-time voters were more likely to attribute their participation to the efforts of “so many celebrities encouraging people to vote.”²¹

¹⁹ Hull, “Turning Out Voters Locked Up a Victory,” (www.newscoast.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?Date=20041104&Category+NEWS&ArNo=411 [November 4, 2004]).

²⁰ Tait Sye, communications director, Florida America Coming Together, telephone interview by Robert Crew, November 5, 2004.

²¹ Shorenstein Center, Harvard University, “Vanishing Voter Survey,” (vanishingvoter@ksg.harvard.edu [November 10, 2004]).

Celebrity phone calls were commonplace and still popular with the voting public. Bush-supporting celebrities making recorded phone calls in Florida included Barbara, Laura, Jeb, and George P. Bush, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Rudy Giuliani, Sean Hannity, John McCain, Franklin Graham, and the president himself. Celebrities calling for Kerry included Al Gore, Barbara Streisand, Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton, Jack Nicholson, Jesse Jackson, Sean “P. Diddy” Combs, Vanessa Williams, Spike Lee, Martina Navratilova, Michael J. Fox, and Mary J. Blige. The calls’ primary purpose was to support GOTV efforts.

Conclusion

In a sense, the 2004 presidential campaign in Florida was anticlimactic. In spite of polls showing a dead heat right up until Election Day, George Bush won Florida by 5 percentage points (52 percent to 47 percent). There was no hair-breadth margin, no long wait for an outcome, and no voting irregularity scandal. Indeed, there were media accounts of disappointed foreign journalists dejectedly returning to their homes without a “big story.”

Furthermore, the state’s electoral machinery performed well. The early voting period allowed election supervisors to smooth out early wrinkles in the voting process like poll worker shortages, inoperable equipment, and other technical and logistical problems. In spite of intense critiques of the electronic touch screen voting machines used in the state’s fifteen largest counties, the new equipment, which had been used in the 2002 gubernatorial election, functioned properly in the vast majority of cases. Lawsuits filed prior to the election were resolved before Election Day, bringing more clarity to the election administration process, thereby reducing controversy.²² Both parties sent hoards of lawyers into precincts as poll watchers to make sure that poll workers and election officials did their jobs in a nonpartisan manner. Few complaints were filed by these observers. In fact, more voters complained about the observers than vice versa.

In general, the success of political campaigns is determined by three factors: money, message, and mechanics. In the Florida presidential campaign of 2004, the Bush campaign was superior in all of these. The campaign’s focus on the war on terrorism turned out to be prescient since exit polls indicated that it was the single most important issue in the campaign for Floridians. Bush had the financial resources to get his carefully crafted message out to his precisely targeted voters, and the GOP’s highly successful 72-hour campaign won the mobilization war.

Kerry’s loss was not for lack of resources. Furthermore, his campaign ran efficiently, and he enjoyed success in getting his supporters to the polls. The central factor in Kerry’s loss was his inability to give Florida voters a coherent rationale for discarding an incumbent and electing someone new. Exit polls in the state showed that most voters selected Kerry because of their opposition to Bush and not because of their support for him. These same polls showed that Bush made gains over his 2000 figures in many important constituencies, women, African-Americans, Hispanics, all age groups and Democrats. He also captured about 5 percent more voters in rural Florida than he had in 2000. Although Kerry won moderates by 13 percent, this was not enough to offset Bush gains among both liberals and conservatives. These data suggest that in the future it will not suffice for Democrats to attempt to win elections in Florida simply by mobilizing their base. They will also need persuasion to win.

²² Lawsuits challenging the absence of a paper trail for electronic touch screen machines were dismissed. The courts also ruled valid the state’s requirement that provisional ballots had to be cast in the precinct in which a voter is registered to be counted. Plaintiffs had sued to have them counted regardless of where cast.

Table 2-1
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Florida Presidential Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc.	\$10,795,720	\$240,663	\$11,036,383	\$26,112,559
John Kerry / DNC	\$1,333,860	\$90,631	\$1,424,491	\$5,148,887
<i>Political parties</i>				
DNC	\$9,963,290	\$428,630	\$10,391,920	\$17,453,686
<i>Interest groups</i>				
The Media Fund	\$2,359,023	\$260,825	\$2,619,848	\$6,007,579
League of Conservation Voters	\$582,720	...	\$582,720	\$2,290,042
MoveOn.org	\$403,752	\$14,475	\$418,227	\$3,693,450
Florida Women Vote	\$383,450	\$13,800	\$397,250	...
EMILY's List	\$318,780	\$40,800	\$359,580	\$1,224,338
AFL-CIO	\$350,010	...	\$350,010	\$754,032
New Democrat Network	\$320,190	\$8,670	\$328,860	\$1,045,294
Communities for Quality Education	\$247,970	...	\$247,970	\$48,398
SEIU	\$113,320	\$73,078	\$186,398	\$403,843
Human Rights Campaign	...	\$122,500	\$122,500	...
Coalition to Defend the American Dream	...	\$116,836	\$116,836	...
Save Our Environment	...	\$18,700	\$18,700	...
This Vote Counts	\$10,155	...	\$10,155	...
People for the American Way	...	\$2,340	\$2,340	\$2,351
American Family Voices	\$1,300	...	\$1,300	...
Sierra Club	\$204,641
The Nature Conservancy	\$95,737
Natural Resource Defense Council	\$42,845
Communication Workers of America	\$6,553
National Right to Work Committee	\$6,428
Stronger America Now	\$6,406
Republican allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Bush/Cheney '04	\$10,197,965	\$475,704	\$10,673,669	\$18,560,233
Bush/Cheney '04 / RNC	\$6,907,509	\$221,482	\$7,128,990	\$18,233,588
<i>Political parties</i>				
RNC	\$2,110,590	\$147,675	\$2,258,265	\$2,987,319
Republican Party of Florida	\$60,100	\$21,700	\$81,800	\$330,708
Republican Party of South Florida	...	\$36,300	\$36,300	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth	\$1,101,255	...	\$1,101,255	\$1,841,741
Progress for America	\$876,360	\$198,460	\$1,074,820	\$2,585,767
Citizens for a Fair Share	\$469,490	...	\$469,490	...
United Seniors Association	\$378,880	\$11,500	\$390,380	\$812,871
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$86,480	...	\$86,480	\$335,585
National Rifle Association	\$17,850	\$66,303	\$84,153	...
All Children Matter	\$84,140	...	\$84,140	...
National Right to Life	...	\$61,900	\$61,900	...
Coalition to Save Florida Jobs	...	\$2,500	\$2,500	...

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
JustGoVote.org	...	\$285,450	\$285,450	...
AARP	\$143,770	\$14,400	\$158,170	\$768,560
Get Out to Vote	...	\$145,190	\$145,190	...
Mi Familia Vota	\$72,500	...	\$72,500	...
American Civil Liberties Union	...	\$53,400	\$53,400	...
Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration	...	\$53,030	\$53,030	...
Families for a Secure America	...	\$29,700	\$29,700	...
Committed to Restoring Integrity in Politics	\$22,500	...	\$22,500	...
The Latino Coalition	...	\$17,800	\$17,800	...
Citizens Speaking Out, Inc.	\$13,700	...	\$13,700	...
Liberty Council	...	\$12,000	\$12,000	...
Citizens for Public Integrity	...	\$10,083	\$10,083	...
League of Women Voters	\$5,568

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 2-2.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals and Progress for America Voter Fund have been included in the Progress for America totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

**Table 2-2
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Florida Presidential Race, 2004^a**

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc.	60	3	1	1	4	5	23	97
<i>Political parties</i>								
DNC	15	10	1	1	1	5	29	62
Florida Democratic Party	6	28	...	1	1	3	...	39
<i>Interest groups</i>								
America Coming Together	16	25	1	42
NARAL Pro-Choice America	25	3	28
AFL-CIO	15	7	22
League of Conservation Voters	14	4	...	2	1	...	1	22
The Media Fund	...	4	8	3	15
Environment 2004	10	4	14
MoveOn.org	3	...	4	1	4	12
Sierra Club	8	4	12
EMILY's List	7	7
Working America	...	5	2	7
AFSCME	...	4	4
People for the American Way	5	5
Planned Parenthood Action Fund	...	4	1	5
Florida Education Association	...	4	4
Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund	...	3	3
Human Rights Campaign	1	2	3
Women's Voices. Women Vote.	...	3	3
American Family Voices	...	2	2
American Federation of Teachers	...	2	2
National Jewish Democratic Council	...	1	1	2
Wake Up!	...	1	1	2
Young Voter Alliance	1	1	2
Alliance for Retired Americans	...	1	1
Billionaires for Bush	1	...	1
Committee for an Informed Electorate	1	1
Democracy for America	1	1
Democratic Coalition	1	1
Mothers Opposing Bush	1	1
PunkVoter.com	1	1
Rock the Vote	1	1
The Unity Campaign	1	1
TruthAboutWar.com	1	...	1
United Automobile Workers Union	1	1

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
You Decide	...	1	1
Republican allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Bush/Cheney '04	77	7	9	18	36	147
Bush/Cheney '04 / RNC	1	2	6	9
<i>Political parties</i>								
RNC	7	45	2	9	9	72
Republican Party of Florida	10	35	1	2	3	2	2	55
<i>Interest groups</i>								
National Rifle Association	7	2	1	10
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth	...	2	1	6	9
Republican Jewish Coalition	...	3	5	8
Progress for America	2	3	2	7
National Right to Life	...	2	4	...	6
All Children Matter	...	4	4
Associated Builders and Contractors	...	4	4
Club for Growth	3	1	4
Americans for Job Security	...	2	2
Vote Your Sport	2	2
New Republican Majority Fund	...	1	1
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	1	1
Nonpartisan								
<i>Interest groups</i>								
Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration	...	2	2
League of Women Voters	1	1
Voices for Working Families	...	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 2-1.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals and Progress for America Voter Fund data have been included in the Progress for America totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

The Impact of BCRA on the Presidential Nomination Process: The Iowa Caucuses¹

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Since the mid-1970s, presidential candidates have focused on winning the Iowa caucuses. Frontrunners see it as an opportunity to solidify their position, and dark horse candidates see it as a way to validate the seriousness of their campaign. Iowa, as a result, takes on an importance well beyond the number of delegates selected.

The compression of the primary and caucus season after Iowa was thought to give the caucuses even more importance in 2004, but few predicted the enormous impact it had.² John Kerry won a victory in Iowa, and the frontloaded process allowed the momentum from Iowa to turn into an unstoppable force. The caucuses also helped John Edwards showcase his strengths and landed him the vice-presidential nomination.³ One reason that the 2004 caucuses had this unexpected influence is that they were fought in a new environment shaped by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) which magnified the impact of money and Iowa.

There are five aspects of the caucuses that are important to note. First, caucuses are low-turnout affairs with not nearly as many voters as a primary. Participation in a caucus requires more effort, as voters must show up on a cold January evening for an hour or two of discussion and decisions. The process is complicated enough that campaigns and outside groups must spend time educating citizens about how caucuses operate as well as persuading them to support a particular candidate.

Second, organization is much more important in a caucus than in a primary. This reflects both low turnout and a process that requires campaigns to get all of their supporters to the various caucus sites at the same time. On the Democratic side, this often helps candidates who have strong union support, though this was not the case in 2004.

Third, the key to the caucuses is doing “better than expected.” Because the caucuses are the first test, campaigns must convince the national press that their candidate is doing as well or better than predicted, resulting in national reports of the candidate’s “surprising strength” in Iowa. There is no simple benchmark for measuring expectations, so setting them is a dance choreographed by candidates, the press, and “experts.”

Fourth, the caucuses include issue discussions. In addition to choosing delegates to the county-level conventions, the caucuses also pass resolutions on issues that may move up the ladder to the state and national party conventions. Thus, some groups organize around their issue agenda more than any particular candidate, as there is a payoff for such an effort in a way that does not exist in a primary state. This payoff is multiplied because of the attention the national press gives to Iowa, allowing groups to influence the perceptions of national political reporters.

¹ I would like to thank my research assistant, Brian Wold, for his help gathering the data for this chapter.

² For a good discussion of the process of frontloading and its impact on the nomination process, see William Mayer and Andrew Busch, *The Front-Loading Problems in Presidential Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). They do, however, argue that, historically, Iowa has not been as important as New Hampshire. In 2004, that was not the case.

³ For a discussion of this process in the 2000 Iowa Caucus, see Arthur Sanders and David Redlawsk, “Money and the Iowa Caucuses,” in *Getting Inside the Outside Campaign*, edited by David B. Magleby (Brigham Young University: The Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 2000), pp. 20–29; and David Redlawsk and Arthur Sanders, “Groups and Grassroots in the Iowa Caucuses,” in *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 25, p. 270 (abstract) and at (www.apsanet.org/PS/June01/redlawsk.cfm [January 29, 2005]) (article).

Finally, the Democrats never take an actual vote. Instead, after discussing the candidates, people divide up into groups. Literally, Dean supporters go to one corner, Kerry supporters to another, and so on. Delegates are then apportioned based on the number of delegates the precinct is allotted, which is determined by the number of Democrats who live in the precinct, not by turnout at the caucus, and by the relative strength of the candidates at the precinct caucus. If a group is too small to qualify for a delegate—the minimum threshold in most caucuses is 15 percent, but in smaller caucuses, that number is higher—bargaining will occur in an attempt to bring the group that is “too small” into a larger group or sway some people to switch over, thereby increasing the number of delegates the candidate receives. These delegate numbers are what are reported in the press. Thus, delegate selection numbers are only partly related to the number of caucus-goers who support a candidate. A surge of support in a single precinct will have little impact on overall delegate numbers and caucus-goers may end up supporting their second choice candidate. The candidate who benefited the most from this process in 2004 was John Edwards.

The 2004 Democratic Caucus Contest

The presidential nomination funding process is a combination of public and private funds.⁴ In 2004 candidates who accepted public matching funds were limited to spending \$50,000,000 (\$37,310,000 plus fund-raising expenses and compliance costs),⁵ overall and \$1,343,757 in Iowa.⁶ Howard Dean, John Kerry, and President Bush refused federal matching funds and, as a result, were not limited in spending.

In the Democratic caucuses there were four major candidates. The early Iowa frontrunner was Missouri U.S. Representative Dick Gephardt who had won the caucuses in 1988 and, coming from the neighboring state of Missouri, was familiar to many caucus-goers. He also had strong ties to organized labor, an important factor in Iowa Democratic Party politics.⁷ The other “Washington insider” candidate was Senator John Kerry. In his previous campaigns in Massachusetts, he had relied on support from fellow veterans. The caucuses would follow that pattern.

There were also two “outside” candidates. Senator John Edwards was serving his first term in the Senate from North Carolina. Edwards had been a highly successful trial lawyer, and the skills he honed in front of juries helped turn him into a formidable campaigner, particularly in small group settings. And second, was former Vermont governor Howard Dean, who seemed a long shot, as he was little known in Iowa.

The only other candidate who had any presence at all in the caucuses after Florida U.S. Senator Bob Graham dropped out was four-term Ohio Representative Dennis Kucinich, who established himself as the most liberal of the candidates. Two other candidates who competed nationally, Connecticut U.S. Senator

⁴ For an overview of these rules, see John Green and Nathan Bigelow, “The 2000 Presidential Nominations: The Costs of Innovation,” in *Financing the 2000 Election*, edited by David B. Magleby (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002) pp. 49–78.

⁵ See the Federal Election Commission web site (www.fec.gov) for these figures.

⁶ Because of the overall exemption for fund-raising and compliance expenses and the fact that one can spend in a neighboring state to influence the results—for example, buying TV ads in Omaha, Nebraska to attract voters in western Iowa—a candidate can, by manipulating those expenditures, legally spend more than the limit in any particular state.

⁷ For a look at the role of the unions for Gore in 2000, see Sanders and Redlawsk, “Money in the Iowa Caucuses.” See also Redlawsk and Sanders, “Groups and Grassroots in the Iowa Caucuses.” For an examination of the role of the unions in the Congressional elections of 2002 see, David Redlawsk and Arthur Sanders, “The Iowa Senate and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Congressional District Races,” in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Provo, Utah: The Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 2003), pp. 70–101. See also David Redlawsk and Arthur Sanders, “The 2002 Iowa House and Senate Elections: The More Things Change...” *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Volume 36: 406, July 2003 (abstract) and (www.apsanet.org/PS/july03/redlawsk.pdf [January 29, 2005]) (article).

Joseph Lieberman and retired general Wesley Clark, attempted to follow the strategy that had been used successfully in 2000 by Arizona U.S. Senator John McCain of skipping Iowa and focusing on New Hampshire, hoping that undivided attention to that state would pay dividends while their opponents split their attention and resources between Iowa and New Hampshire. Unfortunately for Liebermann and Clark, this strategy did not prove as successful as it had for McCain, as neither was able to break out of the pack in New Hampshire. In addition, when John Kerry rode his momentum out of Iowa to victory in New Hampshire, they, too, were swept aside.

Gephardt was the early leader in Iowa, but by the end of the summer Dean surprisingly emerged as the frontrunner both in Iowa and nationally. (See table 3-1.) Dean made innovative use of the Internet to raise money and build an organization, and he struck a chord with voters with his strong anti-war message. He and Gephardt remained close, with Kerry in third place and Edwards trailing in fourth place through most of the campaign. When Iowa U.S. Senator Tom Harkin endorsed Dean on January 9, it seemed to presage a Dean win, but under relentless attack, the Dean campaign stalled. On January 11, the *Des Moines Register*, Iowa's major newspaper, gave a surprise endorsement to John Edwards, and on January 12 Christy Vilsack, the wife of Iowa Governor Tom Vilsack, endorsed John Kerry. By the final week, it looked like a four-way race, but the surge continued for Kerry and Edwards. On caucus night Kerry won a commanding 38 percent of the delegates. Edwards was a strong second with 32 percent. Dean dropped to a disappointing third with 18 percent, and Gephardt finished with just 11 percent of the delegates.

Candidate Organization and Spending

All four major candidates devoted enormous time and resources to their efforts (see table 3-3). They saturated the airwaves with commercials and built large, sophisticated ground operations. The sheer number of ads each of the campaigns was able to purchase magnified the importance of the air and ground war. It is to those efforts that we now turn.

The Air War

TV advertising was ubiquitous. The Wisconsin Advertising Project estimated that \$13 million was spent on TV ads during the caucuses.⁸ The Dean campaign was the first on the air, running a series of ads from mid-June through July 4, 2003, but the blitz began in late August when Edwards began running his commercials, with Kerry, Gephardt and Dean following in early September. To give some detail, in Des Moines, the largest Iowa market, Howard Dean ran 2,969 ads on the four broadcast network affiliates (see table 3-2).⁹ Dick Gephardt was the second most active advertiser in Des Moines with 2,065 ads, followed by John Edwards at 2,008 and John Kerry at 1,977. In aggregate, over 9,000 ads aired.¹⁰ By comparison, the biggest advertiser in Des Moines in the 2000 caucuses was Steve Forbes, who ran 1,829 ads.¹¹ In addition, Richard Gephardt ran an astounding 11,519 ads on the Des Moines cable system, while John Kerry ran 3,689 and Howard Dean ran 3,475 cable ads.¹² Dean spent over a million dollars on ads in Des Moines alone, while the others spent around \$900,000 each.¹³ Such figures make a mockery of the FEC spending limit for Edwards and Gephardt of \$1.3 million for the entire state. It was very difficult to break

⁸ As reported in Thomas Beaumont, "Parties Media Blitz Early in Iowa," *The Des Moines Register*, 26 March 2004, 1B.

⁹ These figures all come from the FCC open files maintained by the stations.

¹⁰ In addition, Dennis Kucinich ran 240 ads on the Des Moines network stations.

¹¹ The figures for the other major candidates in 2000 were Bradley: 1,574, Bush: 1,474, and Gore: 1,102. See Sanders and Redlawsk, "Money and the Iowa Caucuses," p. 22.

¹² Kucinich ran 1,020 cable ads.

¹³ The exact figures, as reported in the station's FCC files, were: Dean, \$1,077,270; Edwards, \$968,575; Kerry, \$940,556; and Gephardt, \$884,666.

through this sea of advertising and reach voters.¹⁴ Dean and Edwards focused on the need for change, Dean on the war, Edwards on the economy. Gephardt and Kerry focused on more biographical themes; Gephardt highlighted his steady leadership, Kerry his “strength of character” exemplified by his service in Vietnam. Toward the end of the caucuses, the tone became more negative. Gephardt and Kerry attacked Dean, as did some outside groups, and Dean attacked Gephardt for his stance on the war, later adding attacks on Kerry. Edwards was largely able to stay out of this attacking frenzy.

All of the campaigns felt that their TV ads were reasonably effective in conveying their designed messages, though the candidates also all agreed that the sheer number of ads meant that no one was able to benefit much from the advertising. Both the Edwards and Kerry campaigns felt that the cumulative effect of the ads helped, for Edwards by overcoming a strong name-recognition disadvantage and by portraying Edwards as the most positive campaigner,¹⁵ and for Kerry by keeping attention on his background, experience, and ability to beat Bush.¹⁶ The Dean campaign felt that the cumulative effect of attacks from multiple sources was a major factor in Dean’s decline.¹⁷

The Ground War

All of the campaigns put a major effort into the ground war, creating organizations designed to make direct contact with voters, in person, on the phone, and through the mail. Conventional wisdom suggested that Gephardt and Dean had the most effective ground organizations, so when the caucuses ended with Kerry and Edwards as the winners and Gephardt and Dean as the losers, many argued that this showed that the ground war did not matter as much as the pundits said it did.¹⁸ Such a conclusion, however, is misplaced. The ground war was central to all four of these campaigns, and each of their ground-war strategies reveal much about their relative strengths and weaknesses.

The Gephardt campaign followed the most traditional Iowa pattern. His campaign relied upon a well-disciplined field operation. The structure was largely in place by February 2003. The United Steelworkers and other unions lent both personnel and resources to the campaign, as well as running their own efforts. Gephardt’s operation relied heavily on phone contact and multiple mailings, but in the end, they were hurt by the lack of a compelling message.¹⁹ Late in the campaign when it became clear that Gephardt was fading and not going to win, the understanding that Gephardt had no chance to win the nomination without a win in Iowa accelerated the campaign’s decline.

In contrast, the Dean campaign espoused the least traditional organization. It relied heavily on volunteers, many from out of state. At least 3,500 people came to Iowa to work for Dean.²⁰ These volunteers knocked

¹⁴ The information on what the candidates were trying to accomplish in their advertising and elsewhere in the campaign come from interviews with the Iowa directors of each of the campaigns. These interviews were conducted by the author on the following dates: John Norris, Iowa campaign director, John Kerry for President, telephone interview by Art Sanders, February 13, 2004; John Lapp, Iowa state director, Dick Gephardt campaign, Des Moines, Iowa, March 9, 2004; Rob Bernsten, caucus director, John Edwards campaign, Des Moines, Iowa, May 26, 2004; and Jeanie Murray, Iowa political director, Howard Dean campaign, Des Moines, Iowa, June 10, 2004.

¹⁵ Rob Bernsten, interview, 26 May 2004.

¹⁶ Norris interview, February 13, 2004. Also, Paul Maslin, Howard Dean’s pollster argued that one of the problems for Dean was that the campaign ended up turning more on experience and electability, than on the desire for specific policy changes. See Paul Maslin, “The Front Runner’s Fall,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 2004, pp. 96–104. Jeanie Murray also echoed these thoughts in our interview.

¹⁷ Murray interview, June 10, 2004.

¹⁸ See, for example, Todd Purdum, “The 2004 Campaign: Shattering Iowa Myths,” *New York Times*, 20 January 2004, p. A1.

¹⁹ Lapp interview, March 9, 2004.

²⁰ Murray interview, June 10, 2004.

on doors and made phone calls. The campaign sent four statewide mailings to the entire Democratic list and numerous others to targeted segments of that list. The most innovative mail technique they employed was the “Adopt-An-Iowan” plan, where out-of-state Dean supporters sent handwritten letters to undecided Democrats in Iowa outlining why they supported Dean for president. These letters came early in the campaign, before people were inundated with mail and, being handwritten, stood out. The letter writers aimed to convince people to take a closer look at Dean at a time when his campaign was still growing and Jeani Murray, the Iowa political director for Dean, noted that her initial skepticism of this effort was replaced by a conviction that it was one of the more helpful efforts in the Dean ground war.²¹

Dean’s campaign had a more traditional side that grew out of the endorsement of Dean by two unions with strong political organizations in Iowa, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Workers (AFSCME). The Iowa political director of SEIU, Sarah Swisher, temporarily left the union’s political office to work for the Dean campaign. While they were careful to keep the SEIU and Dean efforts independent to avoid violating the law, the presence of Swisher on the Dean staff meant that the Dean campaign had a good sense of what SEIU might be doing.²² Building on the expertise of Swisher and Jeani Murray, the Dean campaign built a traditional, statewide, precinct-level organization that relied mostly on young volunteers.

The Dean campaign also made innovative use of the Internet. The campaign staff included three computer programmers, two Web designers, and two others working on Internet communication.²³ Local organizations often began with connections made using meet-up.com, an Internet service that connects people with common interests on anything from politics to UFOs. At the time of the caucuses, the Dean meet-up group in Iowa had 2,166 registered members.²⁴ The Internet also was used to raise money in unprecedented amounts, and they relied on blogs, online journals, to facilitate communication between supporters and the campaign. This extensive use of the Internet allowed the campaign to grow rapidly, especially among young voters not easily connected to the political world, but the broadness of the organization it created and the independence it gave to those involved made the organization harder to control. The Internet also had a tendency to funnel people into conversations with those already in agreement, which can be isolating.²⁵ The openness of the Web as a tool of political communication (the press and political opponents can read everything as well) made it difficult for the Dean campaign to respond to attacks. Joe Trippi, Dean’s national campaign manager, noted that it was hard to “say ‘we could be in real trouble here’ ... without raising the wrong impression.”²⁶ The Dean organization, then, was broad and sophisticated, but it relied heavily on inexperienced volunteers and a transparent communications system that made it difficult for it to control responses to his opponents’ attacks. The fact that the media finds negativity so appealing amplified the attacks.²⁷ The attacks led to a shift in the

²¹ Murray interview, June 10, 2004.

²² Sarah Swisher, Iowa political director, SEIU, telephone interview by Arthur Sanders, March 3, 2004. See also Murray interview, June 10, 2004.

²³ Jonathan Roos, “Internet Top Tool for Candidates,” *Des Moines Register*, November 17, 2003, p. B1.

²⁴ I tracked meet-up membership numbers from September through the end of the caucuses at www.meetup.com. The total number of members for Dean in Iowa is slightly less than Edwards had nationally on meet-up. In Des Moines, at the time of the caucuses, Dean had 651 members, Kucinich had 129, Clark, who was not actively campaigning, had 125, Kerry had 108. None of the others had more than 35 members.

²⁵ For a discussion of this danger of the Web, see, for example, Cass Sunstein, *republic.com*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

²⁶ Eric Auchard, “How Web Support Failed Dean in Crunch: Ex –Manager,” *Reuters New Service*, (www.reuters.com/printerFriendlyPopup.jhtml?type=politicsNews&storyID=4319510 [January 25, 2005]).

²⁷ Murray interview, June 10, 2004. Murray noted, as a particular example, the day that NBC reported on some remarks Dean had made in 2000 criticizing the caucuses, the local Des Moines NBC affiliate, WHO, spent so much time on the story, almost 20 minutes, that they actually skipped their sports report! For a discussion of the tendency

campaign's agenda from the message of change to issues of biography and viability. The Dean's early August focus groups had told him that if the agenda were to move to biography and electability, Kerry would win.²⁸ And that is what happened.

The Edwards campaign relied on what the campaign called the "neighbor-to-neighbor" approach.²⁹ By May the top echelon in the campaign (five people) was on the phone contacting voters and building a network of supporters. The campaign arranged small meetings where it would show a video about the Senator to groups of neighbors. As Edwards slowly hired more staff (five in June, ten each in July and August, and thirty each in September, October, and November), the number and frequency of these small gatherings grew. Campaign staffers were on the phone constantly, calling three or four hours a night, seven days a week. The senator and his wife when in the state also participated in the calling efforts and attended numerous small gatherings (see table 3-3). In fact, Edwards made visits to all ninety-nine of Iowa's counties.³⁰ The campaign sent follow-up mail to the people they talked with, which complemented the eight statewide and numerous targeted mailings that it did. The mailings, like their TV ads, avoided any attacks on other Democrats, as Edwards cultivated an image of a positive candidate with substance and vision.

The Edwards campaign also began using the Internet as a way to make regular contact with their supporters, but the campaign found that using blogs as a way to communicate in more depth was surprisingly helpful. In particular, Elizabeth Edwards, the candidate's wife, began a blog providing updates from the road and highlighting upcoming events. Larger than expected crowds began showing up for these events, and the campaign began to rely on the blog to get information to people.³¹ The Edwards campaign's use of blogs, however, was both more limited and controlled than that of the Dean campaign.

Edwards also benefited from the other three candidates attacking each other, leaving Edwards to stand out as a more positive choice. This phenomenon seemed to give Edwards the strongest boost from the peculiar rules of the caucuses. It was much easier for caucus-goers in precincts where their first choice candidate was not viable to switch over to Edwards than to another candidate who had been under attack by their first choice, and the rapid decline of Dean and Gephardt made more of these voters available than might have been originally anticipated. There are two pieces of evidence that suggest that Edwards was the prime beneficiary of this caucus process. First, more anecdotally, I sent twenty-three students to observe caucuses in the Des Moines area. Thirteen of those students provided the exact count in the caucus before and after those who were in nonviable groups switched support.³² In those thirteen caucuses, 217 people switched candidate groups. One hundred fourteen of them moved from some other group to Edwards. Kerry had the second most additions, fifty-seven. The results of the entrance poll done by Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International for the National Election Pool provide additional evidence. The poll results were Kerry, 35 percent; Edwards, 26 percent; Dean, 20 percent; and Gephardt, 11 percent.³³ This represents a measure of public opinion as they were going into the caucuses. The final delegate tally was Kerry, 38 percent; Edwards, 32 percent; Dean, 18 percent; and Gephardt, 11 percent. Edwards saw a relatively large jump of 6 percent. There is no sure way to determine the cause of this

of TV to focus on negative stories when available, see my book, *Prime Time Politics*, (Glen Allen, Va.: College Publishing Inc., 2002).

²⁸ Murray interview, June 10, 2004; see also Maslin, "The Front Runner's Fall," pp. 96-104.

²⁹ Bernsten interview, May 26, 2004.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² The other ten only provided information about which groups were viable and the final delegate counts.

³³ The poll results are in a table titled, "Iowa Democrats and the Candidates," in the *New York Times*, January 21, 2004, p. A18.

jump, but it does suggest that Edwards' positive strategy made him a more viable second choice than any of the other candidates.

Finally there was the victorious campaign of John Kerry. Kerry's organization relied heavily on support from veterans. After building a traditional campaign structure over the summer, in August the campaign began its veterans outreach program. Iowa offers a property tax benefit to veterans and their families, so the campaign visited all 99 county auditors' offices and compiled a list of 160,000 households receiving this benefit. They cross-matched the list with the Democratic voter file, coming up with a list of 85,000 families that became their target audience. Of this group, they identified those who had either participated in a previous caucus (15,000) or regularly voted in Democratic primaries (9,000), and they mailed a video about Senator Kerry to these 24,000 households. They followed up the video with phone calls and tried to use this group as a leadership group to contact other veterans and later other voters on their list. By October, veterans were a visible presence at all of Kerry's public engagements, some by invitation of the campaign, some through this informal network.³⁴

The campaign also made much use of mail, sending their first statewide mailing in June (120,000 pieces). They did little mailing during the fall, relying on phone and personal contact as they built their network of supporters centered on Iowa veterans, but in December they began heavy mailing, sending seven pieces to their veterans list of 85,000 households and five pieces to their list of undecided voters.

The Kerry campaign struggled nationally through the fall, unable to break through, and was trailing badly in both New Hampshire and Iowa. On November 14, Kerry announced that he would not accept public matching funds, putting \$6 million of his own money into the campaign and freeing his campaign from spending limits. The Iowa organization used a strong presence at the Iowa Democratic Party's Jefferson-Jackson Dinner on November 15 to convince the national office that they could win in Iowa and that such a win was the best way to turn things around in New Hampshire. The decision was made to target Iowa in the hopes that a win would provide the necessary momentum for the rest of the campaign.³⁵

As the Dean and Gephardt campaigns stalled, Kerry's organization was able to bring undecided voters, both veterans and others, to Kerry's public engagements. At the same time, he increased his visibility through mailings, TV ads and public appearances. As voters focused on the issue of who could win in November, Kerry's strength, everything came together as the campaign hoped it would.

In the entrance poll of caucus-goers, respondents were asked to pick out the single most important quality in making their selection. The most common answer was "Strong stands on the issues," selected by 29 percent, but Dean's lead among that group was only 5 percent over Kerry (31 percent to 26 percent) with Edwards another 3 percent behind. On the other hand, 26 percent selected the ability to beat Bush, and they gave Kerry a commanding lead, 37 percent to 30 percent for Edwards and only 20 percent for Dean. Moreover, Kerry won the support of an overwhelming 71 percent of the 15 percent who selected "has the right experience."³⁶ This surprisingly large win in Iowa gave Kerry the momentum he needed to capture the Democratic nomination.

³⁴ Norris interview, February 13, 2004.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ The other choice was "Cares about people like me." Here the top choice was Edwards, reflecting his person-to-person campaign approach, with 41 percent compared to 23 percent for Kerry and 15 percent for Dean. The figures can be found in the table in the *New York Times*, January 21, 2004, p. A18.

Outside Groups in the Caucuses

For the Iowa Democratic Party the caucuses were an opportunity to prepare for November.³⁷ The caucuses provided a major fund-raising event (the annual Jefferson-Jackson dinner) and an opportunity to build their voter list.³⁸ This list was rented by all four of the major campaigns, the Kucinich campaign, and Graham campaign. The candidates could use the list in any way they wanted, adding to the information in secure files that only they could access, but under agreement with the party that as soon as the caucuses ended the information gathered by each of the campaigns would be merged into the party's central list. In addition, the caucuses helped the party add 24,332 new Democrats to the state's registration list: 4,000 of these converted from their previous registration as Republicans, another 4,000 converted from an unaffiliated status, and 16,000 were new voters. That compares to a total of 2,500 newly registered voters (both Democrat and Republican) in 2000.³⁹

The groups most involved in promoting particular candidates were the unions, but unlike 2000 when the full weight of the Iowa Federation of Labor was behind Al Gore,⁴⁰ no central endorsement was made in 2004. Dick Gephardt had a number of unions working for his campaign, most prominently the United Steelworkers, who lent two operatives to his campaign as full-time campaign workers.⁴¹ The Steelworkers also ran TV ads supporting Gephardt. These ads stopped thirty days before the caucuses were held, allowing them to be paid for with union treasury money. In Des Moines, the ad buy was for forty-two ads at a cost of \$30,670. Two other union groups, the American Federation of Government Employees⁴² and the Alliance for Economic Justice,⁴³ ran issue ads attacking the Bush Administration focused on themes central to the Gephardt campaign prior to the thirty-day deadline.

Americans for Jobs, Healthcare and Progressive Values, a 527 organization, also worked to help the Gephardt campaign. David Jones, a former fund-raiser for Gephardt, headed the group, and the International Association of Machinists, who had endorsed Gephardt, was among the largest contributors to the group with a \$100,000 contribution.⁴⁴ The ads that this group ran, all prior to the thirty-day window, attacked Dean for his positions on Medicare, guns, NAFTA, and his lack of foreign policy experience.⁴⁵

Dean, as noted, was supported by two of the larger and more politically active unions in Iowa, AFSCME and SEIU. AFSCME, in addition to internal efforts, made at least two statewide mailings to Iowa Democrats promoting Dean. SEIU's support for Dean is exemplified by the leave of absence taken by the union's Iowa political director to work on the Dean campaign, but their involvement in the caucuses went beyond this direct support. Second, SEIU with funding from both the national and state unions ran an

³⁷ The Republican Party used their caucuses to recruit "team leaders" for the November elections, and they with a Republican group, grassfire.net, ran a few TV ads to remind people of the president's successes.

³⁸ For a discussion of the list and how it was built, see Redlawsk and Sanders, "The Iowa Senate and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Congressional Districts," and "The 2002 Iowa House and Senate Elections: The More Things Change ..." p. 80.

³⁹ Thomas Beaumont, "Number of New Voters Booms in Iowa," *The Des Moines Register*, February 17, 2004, p. A1.

⁴⁰ See Sanders and Redlawsk, "Groups and Grassroots in the Iowa Caucuses," [this page is simply the abstract for the article which was printed in PS. It does not tell you anything about Unions. For that, you have to go to the on-line version of the article which is referenced in the abstract and in the first note citing this article in this chapter. But it too has no page numbers. The reference is correct the way it was.

⁴¹ Lapp interview, March 9, 2004.

⁴² In Des Moines, they spent \$53,830 to run eighty-nine ads (see table 3-3).

⁴³ This particular group effort in Des Moines involved 216 ads at a cost of \$64,320 (see table 3-3).

⁴⁴ Jane Norman, "Anti-Dean Ad Sponsor's Details Revealed," *Des Moines Register*, March 7, 2003, p. 2B.

⁴⁵ In Des Moines, this group ran 519 ads at a cost of \$301,390 during a time period lasting about one month (see table 3-3).

independent campaign which included mail and TV under the name “Take Back America.”⁴⁶ In Des Moines, this group ran 146 hard-money ads explicitly endorsing Dean at a cost of \$118,475. (See table 3-3.)

Third, SEIU sponsored a group called Iowans for Health Care, which ran an issue advocacy campaign to identify and turn out voters concerned with health care and promote resolutions in support of universal health care at both parties’ precinct caucuses. Sarah Swisher noted that having these different efforts requiring separate funding tracks and no coordination led to some “schizophrenic” behavior at SEIU’s Iowa offices, but she did feel that they were able to keep these efforts separate.⁴⁷

A conservative group, the Club for Growth, worked to defeat Dean. This anti-tax group ran ads attacking Dean for being a “tax-hiking, government-expanding, latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving, New York Times-reading, Hollywood-loving, left-wing freak show” beginning in early December.⁴⁸ According to Stephen Moore, the group’s president, the goal was to alert “viewers that this man is economically dangerous.”⁴⁹ The Dean campaign felt these ads contributed to their decline, but that illustrates the risk of getting involved in the nomination process of “the other party.”⁵⁰ The Club for Growth supported President Bush, who would have preferred running against Howard Dean. If these charges against Dean did actually resonate with the public, the Club for Growth should have waited, let Dean win the nomination, and then unleashed the attack.

Finally, the Firefighters Union endorsed John Kerry. It emphasized internal communications and a GOTV effort in support of Kerry. The union was also a visible presence at Kerry campaign rallies.

There were also groups who made issue advocacy appeals with an eye toward November and influencing voter and press agendas, not the outcome of the caucuses. Every Child Matters (investing in children), Planned Parenthood (abortion), the Iowa State Education Association (education), and the Interfaith Alliance (diversity and tolerance) all had ground efforts promoting issue resolutions at the caucuses. Two groups, the Coalition for the Future of the American Worker, an umbrella organization representing groups seeking to reduce immigration, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a group founded and funded by Ted Turner focusing on the danger of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, ran very visible TV ads to raise voter and press awareness of their concerns.⁵¹

Conclusions

The impact of BCRA on the nomination process and the Iowa caucuses was structural. While the new law had some direct impact on the behavior of noncandidate groups, causing some to stop their advertising campaigns thirty days before the caucuses to avoid the need to shift funding sources to hard-money accounts, the most important impact was the way in which it made money more important. BCRA did this

⁴⁶ These ads ran inside the thirty-day window, explicitly endorsed Dean, and were as noted in the ads themselves as being paid for by SEIU, though the contracts were all issued to Take Back America.

⁴⁷ Swisher interview, March 3, 2004.

⁴⁸ In Des Moines, they ran 173 ads at a cost of \$79,980 (see table 3-3).

⁴⁹ Jodi Wilgoren, “Antitax Group Starts Ad Effort Against Dean,” *New York Times*, December 5, 2003, p. A31.

⁵⁰ Murray interview, June 10, 2004.

⁵¹ In Des Moines, the Coalition for the Future of the American Worker ran 257 ads at a cost of \$152,940. A similar effort was undertaken by a group of anti-immigration organizations in 2000. See Sanders and Redlawsk, “Groups and Grassroots in the Iowa Caucuses.” The Nuclear Threat Initiative ran 854 ads at a cost of \$408,000 (see table 3-3).

by increasing the incentives for candidates to opt out of the public funding scheme set up by FECA, creating pressure for others to opt out or find creative ways to increase their spending.⁵²

BCRA increased the incentives for opting out of public funding and the spending limits that go with them in three ways. First, it doubled the maximum amount that could be contributed by individuals to a federal candidate, cutting the relative help of the federal match in half. Second, BCRA did not increase the spending limits except as tied to inflation, creating a larger potential deficit for those accepting matching funds when their opponents did not. This is particularly a problem in the early states and after the nomination is secured but prior to the formal end of the nomination process at the time of the nominating conventions.⁵³

Third, BCRA eliminated party soft money. In 2000, Gore countered the barrage of spending by the Bush campaign with party soft-money funds. BCRA removed this option. That was why Democrats felt it was so important to establish 527 organizations to counter the expected Bush offensive. Knowing that party funds would not be available also increased the incentives for Dean to refuse public funds. That move by Dean caused Kerry to opt out of public funding as well. Edwards and Gephardt, both dependent on matching funds, were then forced to find creative ways to spend in Iowa—not impossible under the rules, but clearly more difficult than just spending without concern.

Finally, the continued frontloading of the system increased pressure on candidates to raise enormous sums of money early in order to succeed in Iowa and/or New Hampshire. As a result, money was important, but not determinative. Kerry and Edwards surged and won because of their campaigns' success in shaping the agenda and responding to voter preferences. But to compete in this environment, candidates had to be able to spend at least \$2 million in Iowa, as all four of the major candidates did even though Gephardt and Edwards were presumably limited by their acceptance of matching funds to \$1.3 million.

Money is a necessary, but not sufficient, resource to do well in the Iowa caucuses. In 2004 a candidate needed have close to \$2 million to compete. Since all four of the major candidates in Iowa reached that level of spending, the outcome became a function of the quality of the candidates and their campaigns. In the end, Democrats ended up being more concerned with the personal qualities of the candidates and the perception that they could win back the White House than with a strong issue-based challenge, and that helped Kerry and Edwards much more than Dean and Gephardt. The dominant factors in the outcome were matters of strategy, organization and voter concerns, not laws or money. Strategy, organization, and voter concerns, however, were placed inside a larger environment shaped by the changing nature of campaign finance, and that environment was dominated by the importance of money.

When John Kerry emerged from that environment with a large burst of momentum, the structure of that larger environment made it difficult for his opposition to recover. Dean, the frontrunner just two weeks before the caucuses, was left far behind, further harmed by his immediate reaction to defeat, the rally cry

⁵² For a good extended discussion of the expectation that this would, in fact, occur under BCRA, see Anthony Corrado and Heitor Gouvea, "Financing Presidential Nominations under the BCRA," in *The Making of the Presidential Candidates 2004*, edited by William Mayer (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 45–82; and John Green and Anthony Corrado, "The Impact of BCRA on Presidential Campaign Finance," in *Life After Reform: When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Meets Politics*, edited by Michael Malbin (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp.175–197.

⁵³ For a more comprehensive look at presidential campaign finance see Anthony Corrado, *Paying for Presidents* (New York, N.Y.: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993); Green and Bigelow, "The 2000 Presidential Nominations: The Costs of Innovation," pp. 49–78; and Anthony Corrado, "Financing the 2000 Elections," in *The Election of 2000*, edited by Gerald Pomper, (New York, N.Y.: Chatham House Publishers, 2001) pp. 92–124.

to his supporters that became known simply as “the scream.”⁵⁴ Dick Gephardt dropped from the race and the two major candidates who skipped Iowa, Joseph Lieberman and Wesley Clark, were left standing in New Hampshire far behind Kerry. John Edwards was able to use Iowa to become the leading challenger to Kerry and, eventually, the vice-presidential nominee.

Not every Iowa caucus will end up being as influential as the 2004 caucuses were in the selection of the eventual nominee, but a poor showing in Iowa, or not competing in Iowa, will likely be a major blow to a candidate’s chances of winning the nomination. This is likely to lead to a continued emphasis by campaigns on spending time and resources in Iowa. Furthermore, the most visible effort to “fix” BCRA is to further limit the activities of 527s, and such an action, without any changes in the spending limits or the match, would only serve to increase the pressure on candidates to opt out of matching funds and the limits that go with them.⁵⁵ That, in turn, will increase the pressure for all of the candidates to turn on the money spigot.

⁵⁴ In fact, the Edwards campaign, according to Rob Bernsten, felt that Dean’s “meltdown” on caucus night that culminated in “the scream” also hurt them because it drew so much media attention that the “Edwards story” did not get as much attention as it otherwise might have. Edwards did get a bounce from Iowa, but the campaign felt that a bigger bounce would have given them more of a shot at defeating Kerry. Bernsten interview, May 26, 2004.

⁵⁵For example, John McCain and Russ Feingold issued a joint statement arguing that the decision by the FEC to allow continued largely unregulated activities by 527s would continue a practice that “will violate the letter and the spirit of the law.” See Thomas Edsall, “In Boost for Democrats, FEC Rejects Proposed Limits on Small Donors,” *Washington Post*, May 14, 2004, p. A9.

**Table 3-1
KCCI Iowa Caucus Polls**

June 2-4		August 25-27	
Gephardt	27%	Dean	25%
Kerry	14%	Gephardt	21%
Dean	11%	Kerry	16%
Edwards	4%	Edwards	6%

October 26-28		January 5-7	
Dean	26%	Dean	29%
Gephardt	26%	Gephardt	25%
Kerry	15%	Kerry	18%
Edwards	8%	Edwards	8%

January 12-14		Entrance Poll	
Dean	22%	Kerry	35%
Kerry	21%	Edwards	26%
Edwards	18%	Dean	20%
Gephardt	18%	Gephardt	11%

Sources: The figures and details about the surveys can be found at KCCI.com, “Commitment 2004,” (www.TheIowaChannel.com/politics/2252292/detail.htm [January 29, 2005]) for the June survey. For the other surveys, the address is the same, except for the seven-digit number which is 2440457 for August, 2597550 for October, 2750996 for January 5-7, and 2269013 for January 12-14. The entrance poll was conducted by Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International for the National Election Pool and was in *New York Times*, January 21, 2004, p. A18.

Notes: The dates are the days on which the interviewing was conducted.

**Table 3-2
Candidate Visits to Iowa**

Candidate	Number of Days
Howard Dean	76
John Kerry	73
Dick Gephardt	67
John Edwards	64
Dennis Kucinich	54
Bob Graham	22
Joe Lieberman	16
Carol Moseley Braun	13
Al Sharpton	7
Wesley Clark	3

Notes: Days is the number of days from January 1, 2003 up through caucus night, January 19, 2004, that the candidate made an appearance in the state as counted by the *Des Moines Register*.

Source: DesMoinesRegister.com , “Caucus Watch 2004,” (DesMoinesRegister.com/extras/politics/caucus2004/days.html [January 29, 2005]).

**Table 3-3
Des Moines Television Advertising Total**

Candidates		
<i>Network television</i>	# of Ads	Cost
Dean	2,969	\$1,037,100
Edwards	2,008	\$968,575
Gephardt	2,065	\$783,590
Kerry	1,977	\$848,700
Kucinich	240	\$54,975
<i>Cable television</i>		
Dean	3,475	\$40,170
Gephardt	11,519	\$102,076
Kerry	3,689	\$91,856
Kucinich	1,020	\$21,152
Parties and interest groups		
Alliance for Economic Justice	216	\$64,320
American Federation of Government Employees	89	\$53,830
Americans for Jobs, Healthcare, and Progressive Values	519	\$301,190
Club for Growth	173	\$79,980
Coalition for the Future of the American Worker	257	\$152,940
Democratic National Committee	1	\$2,000
Grassfire.net	9	\$4,190
HillaryNow.com	110	\$806
NARAL Pro-Choice America	11	\$7,630
Nuclear Threat Initiative	965	\$410,005
Republican National Committee	35	\$17,980
Take Back America	146	\$118,475
United Steelworkers	42	\$30,670

Sources: Figures come from the FCC files of the four Des Moines network stations (KCCI – CBS; KDSM- FOX; WOI – ABC; WHO – NBC) and Mediacom, the local cable provider. All of the interest group ads were from the networks except for HillaryNow.com, which were all on cable.

Table 3-4
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Iowa Presidential Caucuses, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Dean for America	\$1,102,470	\$4,927	\$1,107,397	...
John Edwards for President	\$954,225	...	\$954,225	...
Kerry for President	\$940,556	...	\$940,556	\$577,829
Gephardt for President	\$885,666	...	\$885,666	\$608,412
Kucinich for President	\$76,127	...	\$76,127	\$69,210
<i>Political parties</i>				
DNC	\$2,000	...	\$2,000	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Americans for Jobs, Healthcare and Progressive Values	\$301,190	...	\$301,190	...
Coalition for the Future American Worker	\$152,940	...	\$152,940	\$51,248
Take Back America	\$118,475	...	\$118,475	\$189,400
American Federation of Government Employees	\$53,830	...	\$53,830	...
Iowans for Health Care	\$37,725	...	\$37,725	...
United Steelworkers of America	\$30,670	...	\$30,670	...
NARAL Pro-Choice America	\$7,630	...	\$7,630	...
Hillarynow.com	\$806	...	\$806	...
Republican allies^b				
<i>Political parties</i>				
RNC	\$17,980	...	\$17,980	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Club for Growth	\$79,980	...	\$79,980	\$26,965
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Nuclear Threat Initiative	\$382,595	...	\$382,595	\$25,044
Alliance for Economic Justice	\$64,320	...	\$64,320	...
Better Safer World	\$27,410	...	\$27,410	...
Grassfire.net	\$4,190	...	\$4,190	...
AARP	\$376

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study's sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study's relevant presidential primary races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 3-5.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 3-5
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Iowa Presidential Caucuses, 2004^a

Type and Organization	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^b			
<i>Candidates</i>			
Dean for America	12	...	12
Gephardt for President	8	...	8
Kerry for President	8	...	8
Kucinich for President	1	3	4
John Edwards for President	2	...	2
<i>Interest groups</i>			
AFSCME	5	...	5
Iowans for Health Care	2	...	2
Alliance for Justice	...	1	1
Republican allies^b			
<i>Interest groups</i>			
Common Sense Coalition	...	1	1
Nonpartisan			
<i>Interest groups</i>			
80-55 Coalition for Rural America	...	1	1
Every Child Matters	...	1	1
Iowa Physicians for Social Responsibility	...	1	1
National Corn Growers Association	...	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 3-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Taking it to the Streets: The Iowa Presidential Campaign of 2004¹

Arthur Sanders
Drake University

Byrna Rae Custer, 80, of North English and formerly of What Cheer died Friday, October 8, 2004 at the Mercy Hospital in Iowa City. ... The family asks that to honor Byrna Rae Custer's memory, you would consider voting for Senator John Kerry in the upcoming election. Byrna was deeply concerned that her grandchildren be able to enjoy America's great natural beauty, clean air, and water. She also deplored the current administration's lack of vision revealed by an ever increasing national debt and by a war in Iraq she thought was unjustified.

—Obituary in the *Des Moines Register*²

The 2004 Iowa Presidential campaign was everywhere, on TV, on the telephone, in the mail, on the doorstep, at state and county fairs, factory gates, concerts, and even in obituaries. The expectation was that the national election would be determined in a handful of states. While the initial lists of twenty or so states that were thought to be competitive dwindled, Iowa remained on the list.

The state is equally divided. According to the Secretary of State's Office, 31 percent of Iowa's registered voters are Republicans, 31 percent are Democrats and 38 percent are undeclared.³ The state's two U.S. Senators are conservative Republican Charles Grassley and liberal Democrat Tom Harkin. Four of the five members of the House delegation are Republicans, but one, Jim Leach, may be the most moderate Republican in the House, and, as the District he represents is the most Democratic in the State, it is hard to imagine any other Republican holding that seat. The governor, Tom Vilsack, is a Democrat, but the Republicans control the State Legislature.⁴ Al Gore carried the state in 2000, but by a margin of only 4,144 votes, approximately 0.3 percent of the total vote.

The 2004 presidential race in Iowa was always close. Polls throughout the campaign were generally within the margin of error. The *Des Moines Register's* Iowa Poll, for example, had President Bush ahead by one point in July, but Senator Kerry, "surging" ahead, had a three-point lead in the week leading up to the election.⁵ The candidates, parties, and interest groups all targeted the state. In the end, President Bush was able to reverse his narrow defeat of 2000, winning the state by 10,059 votes, approximately 0.7 percent of the total vote. With all that activity and such a narrow margin, it is hard to argue that any single decision, event, or activity was "the reason" that Bush carried the state, but some minor Democratic miscalculations may have been just enough to swing Iowa to Bush in 2004.

¹ I would like to thank my very able research assistant, Brian Wold, for his help gathering and entering the data needed for this chapter.

² "Obituary: Byrna Rae Custer," *Des Moines Register*, October 11, 2004, p. B5. According to one column in the *Register*, at least one undecided voter was persuaded by this obituary. See Marc Hansen, "Political Obituary Tips at Least One Voter to Kerry," *Des Moines Register*, October 19, 2004, p. B1.

³ Iowa Secretary of State, "Election Results" (www.sos.state.ia.us/elections/voterreg/regstat.html [December, 2004]).

⁴ And while Bush was narrowly winning the state this November, the Democrats cut the Republican majority in the Iowa House from 5 to 1, and in the Iowa Senate from 5 to a tie, with each party now holding twenty-five seats.

⁵ The margin of error in the Iowa Poll was 3.5 percent. See Jonathan Roos, "Kerry Edges Ahead in Iowa with Boost from Early Voters," *Des Moines Register*, October 31, 2004, p. 1A.

The Air War

Saturation advertising was the best way to describe the air wars in Iowa, and this was something that had been going on almost constantly since the summer of 2003. Beginning in the summer of 2003, four Democrats, John Kerry, John Edwards, Howard Dean and Richard Gephardt, had taken to the airwaves in the battle to win the Iowa caucuses.⁶ Iowans, consequently, were exposed to six months of record-setting ads from August of 2003 through January 19, 2004, the date of the Iowa caucuses. After a brief lull of six weeks, the advertising for the general election began, first with ads from President Bush and the Republicans in early March, followed shortly by Kerry, the Democrats and their allies.

According to CMAG (see table 4-1), the candidates spent approximately \$10.8 million on TV ads in Iowa during the general election.⁷ In addition, the parties spent \$3 million independently (almost all by the Democrats), and various groups spent an additional \$5.3 million. This does not tell the entire story, however. In addition to these figures, there were TV ads in some smaller markets that were not measured by CMAG, such as Mason City, Ottumwa and Sioux City. Thus, almost \$20 million was spent on TV ads in the state. Finally, these figures do not include the money spent on national cable ad buys. According to the *New York Times*, the Bush campaign spent at least \$20 million on national cable stations.⁸

Perhaps the best way to get a sense of the amount and range of ads is to focus on the totals from the one Iowa TV market for which we have complete figures, Des Moines, the largest city in the state. The Bush campaign bought 4,421 ads in Des Moines at a cost of approximately \$2.8 million.⁹ The Kerry campaign purchased 5,463 ads at a cost of approximately \$2.4 million.¹⁰ In addition the DNC spent \$1.5 million to run an additional 2,286 independent ads, though the RNC only spent \$138,000 on 225 ads.

Outside groups were also active. On the pro-Kerry side, the AFL-CIO spent \$235,000 on ads attacking the president's economic policies and the United Automobile Workers (UAW) spent an additional \$62,000 on similar ads. Between them they purchased 874 spots. The two largest media-focused Democratic 527 groups, the Media Fund and MoveOn.org were also active, with the Media Fund running 999 ads at a cost of \$350,000 and MoveOn running 775 ads at a cost of \$325,000. Three other smaller groups, the National Resource Defense Council (NRDC), This Vote Counts, and Win Back Respect spent a total of \$45,000 on sixty-six additional ads. On the pro-Bush side, most of the group spending came from the 527 The Progress for America Voter Fund, which spent \$1 million on 1,140 ads. In addition, the November Fund spent \$125,000 on 149 ads attacking John Edwards and other trial lawyers, the Club for Growth spent \$125,000 on 209 ads attacking Kerry on taxes, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent \$33,000 on sixty-two ads supportive of the President's economic priorities.

Thus, TV stations in Des Moines ran a total of 16,660 ads (not including those run on national cable stations) at a cost to the campaigns, parties and groups of approximately \$9 million dollars. While there

⁶ For an extended discussion of the Iowa Caucuses see chapter 3 in this volume.

⁷ We used CMAG data from the Des Moines, Cedar Rapids and Davenport, Iowa and Omaha, Nebraska markets. All presidential campaign advertising in Omaha was done because of a desire to reach western Iowa voters. No campaign was spending money for TV ads to solely reach Nebraska voters.

⁸ Katharine Seelye, "How to Sell a Candidate To a Porsche-Driving, Leno-Loving Nascar Fan," *New York Times*, December 6, 2004, p. A16.

⁹ These figures come from the FCC political files of the TV stations in Des Moines. The Bush figures include \$1.9 million spent by the campaign alone and another \$900,000 spent on ads paid for jointly by the Bush campaign and the RNC. According to the law, if the ad mentioned both the president and "his allies in Congress" or attacked Kerry and "his liberal allies in Congress" the RNC could pick up some of the expense, although these ads were still "approved" by the president. See the Federal Election Commission web site at (www.fec.gov [January 13, 2005]).

¹⁰ This includes \$2 million spent by the campaign alone and \$400,000 paid for jointly by the campaign and the DNC.

were some ups and downs in spending in the early months of the campaign (March through July), from August forward the spending and the ads were fairly constant. Particular groups came and went in different weeks, but the overall effect was a steady stream of ads. So, for example, Kerry did no spending at all in the period between the Democratic and Republican National Conventions as he wanted to save his federal general election public funds until the president was also required to use his federal funds. This strategy helped him avoid being underfunded in the last two months of the campaign, but the Democratic National Committee (DNC) picked up its spending during that month to keep the campaigns relatively equal.¹¹ To give a more specific example, in the week of October 17–23 on the pro-Kerry/anti-Bush side there were 749 ads run, 513 approved by the Kerry campaign, 231 from the DNC, and five from the NRDC.¹² On the pro-Bush/anti-Kerry side, there were “only” 395 ads run, 292 approved by the Bush campaign, sixty-two from the Progress for America Voter Fund, and forty-one from the November Fund. That works out to 1,144 ads per week, which is approximately 6.8 ads per hour. The ads, of course, were not spread out evenly over the course of a twenty-four-hour day, and they were spread over four different stations, but the point should be clear. It was impossible to watch TV in Des Moines and not see ads about the presidential campaign.

The impact of all of these ads, other than to cause people to tire of the campaign, is not at all clear, but it is clear that the TV advertising did not seem to give a decided advantage to either side. Both sides had more than enough money and more than enough ads running to get their message across, and whatever that message was, it was never enough to allow one of the candidates to gain any kind of lead in the state. Because of that, the ground war, especially in the area of turnout, took on even greater significance as each side knew that the key to winning Iowa was to get their supporters to the polls.

The Ground War

Both sides put enormous efforts into the ground war: calling people, using the web, knocking on doors, and handing out information at public events or at the workplace. Some of this activity can be seen in table 4-2, but in many cases, such as personal contacts, these activities are very hard to measure. The best way to understand the amount and breadth of activity is to describe it. We will look first at what was done on the Democratic side and then turn to efforts by those supportive of the Republican ticket.

Kerry Supporters

According to Gordon Fisher, Chair of the Iowa Democratic Party, the party began its effort in March, hiring 300 people by the end of April and opening over twenty-five field offices around the state by the first week in June.¹³ Over the summer they had several hundred people out in the field knocking on doors, trying to identify voters. The major focus of the organization was to secure absentee ballot voters. The

¹¹ Under campaign finance law, each candidate received their federal subsidy when they officially became the nominee of their party. Prior to that, both candidates were able to spend whatever privately raised funds they could obtain, since both had refused federal matching funds in the nomination process. Thus, the Bush campaign was still able to use these privately raised funds for a month after Kerry was no longer allowed to do so. Kerry had to spread his approximately \$75 million over three months. Bush only had to spread his over two months. Kerry’s solution was to not spend it (at least as much as possible) until Bush was forced to spend his as well.

¹² These weekly figures are only an approximation. We entered the station contract figures in the closest week. Many of the contracts overlapped weeks, so a “best approximation” was made. But the purpose here is simply to provide a sense of the level of advertising, so these approximations seem sufficient. The total spending figures are accurate.

¹³ Gordon Fisher, chair, Iowa Democratic Party, interview with Arthur Sanders, Des Moines, Iowa, November 9, 2004.

party had had much success with absentee ballot drives in the past.¹⁴ In fact, in 2000, Al Gore actually lost among those voters who cast their ballots on Election Day by 7,000 votes, but his 11,000 vote margin among absentee voters allowed him to win the state. So the party conducted a massive early voter campaign, and they were able to sign-up approximately 80,000 absentee voters, about 27,000 of whom were new voters.¹⁵ The party identified people as likely voters based on their past history. All those voters who had voted in two of the last three federal elections were classified as likely voters. Those who had only voted in one of the past three elections, or who were new voters, were classified as less likely voters. Both groups were targeted for absentee ballots. Only the less likely voters were targeted for persuasive appeals. But that meant, according to John Norris, the Kerry campaign's national field director, the focus on early voting may have been too strong. He wanted to use the field workers to both increase absentee voting and to identify undecided voters for persuasion. But because there were so many absentee ballot applications that were handed out to people, for ten days in September, the party had to stop all of its persuasion contacts to focus on chasing down the outstanding absentee ballots.¹⁶ That meant extra effort contacting likely Kerry voters to make sure they returned their absentee ballots.¹⁷ Still, even with this focus on absentee ballot recovery, the party was able to get back to its basic program by October 1.

The party made an enormous amount of contact with voters. While they contacted voters throughout the state, the focus on door-knocking meant particularly targeting the largest cities in Iowa, usually the places where most Democratic voters are found. The party sent out three mailings requesting absentee ballots to all registered Democrats and to voters not registered with any party. These nonaffiliated voters, called "nonparty voters," had been previously identified as leaning toward the party. The party then followed this up with three "chase mailings" reminding people to return their ballots. They also tied a visit to the state by Senator Kerry to the date on which absentee ballots could first be returned, a strategy followed in a number of states.¹⁸ In addition, they sent five persuasion mailings to their undecided universe of approximately 75,000 individuals. They also made countless phone calls, both to persuade undecided voters and to motivate committed supporters to volunteer time to help out. Calling was started in August and was done every night until the end of the campaign.¹⁹ On the day before the election, one Des Moines household received seven calls from either the party or interest groups supporting Kerry asking for help on Election Day or reminding them to vote.²⁰ E-mail was also a constant. Persons on the e-mail list were likely to receive almost daily e-mails asking for help, money, or support in other ways.

The door knocking was also extensive. John Norris, Kerry's national field director, estimated that the campaign knocked on at least 250,000 doors in October. On the weekend of October 9 and 10, the

¹⁴ See David Redlawsk and Arthur Sanders, "The Iowa Senate and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Congressional District Races," in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Provo, Utah: The Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 2003), pp. 70–101.

¹⁵ These figures come from an interview with John Norris, national field director, Kerry-Edwards campaign, interview by Arthur Sanders, Des Moines, Iowa, November 18, 2004.

¹⁶ Under Iowa law, absentee ballots can be mailed in or collected by independent (non-family members) workers who have gone through state mandated training. Thus, the party spent a lot of time training workers for certification. Once those 90,000 absentee ballots were requested, they needed to devote time to making sure they were returned.

¹⁷ John Norris interview, November 18, 2004. As will be noted below, Jeff Link of America Coming Together shared this perspective.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Calls were placed by volunteers and paid staff with occasional recordings, though recordings tended to be reserved for alerts to upcoming events such as visits or rallies.

²⁰ That does not include the phone call urging them to vote for someone in an Indiana House race. For an article about how those mistaken phone calls were made see Elizabeth Owens, "Iowans Receive Calls Regarding Indiana Race," *Des Moines Register*, November 2, 2004, p. 5A.

national party organized a campaign to knock on the doors of one million voters nationally.²¹ According to the e-mail announcing the weekend event, there were over 700 “canvass events” scheduled around the nation that weekend. According to my count, 139 of those events were in Iowa.²² Two weeks before the election, a similar weekend event was held with over 1,000 locations nationally, while John Norris thought they knocked on 120,000 doors the weekend before the election.²³ In sum, all of this activity was expensive. Norris estimated that the Iowa ground-war effort cost over \$4 million.

The party was not the only one working the ground for Kerry. America Coming Together (ACT), targeted Iowa as one of seventeen states in their effort to elect Kerry and other Democrats to office. ACT had an Iowa administrative staff of twenty people manning eight field offices.²⁴ They began in the summer contacting voters by phone and in person. Any Democratic voter who had voted in at least two of the last three elections was put on their lists to get-out-the-vote (GOTV). For independents, they asked a series of four questions. If they had a “Democratic” score they were put on the GOTV list. If they were undecided they were put on a list to receive appropriate persuasion mail. They sent out three rounds of absentee ballot request mail with 150,000 recipients in each round, and 6 rounds of persuasion mail to a universe of 100,000. In the larger cities they also knocked on doors of less likely Democratic voters. The door knocking resulted in 40,000 absentee ballot requests, over half of which were from their target group of “less likely” Democratic voters.

The major activity for volunteers after the initial canvas was to participate in the “Activate 8” program, where each of 1,100 volunteers was given a list of eight people in their precinct to communicate with and get to vote either early or on Election Day. The major organized activity of ACT in October was to concentrate weekend door knocking events in some smaller towns in Iowa. They ignored the big cities, assuming the party would handle those communities, and instead concentrated on those towns where their targeted universe was between 140 (Earlham) and 10,000 (Newton). On October 24, 30, and 31 they organized 600 people to knock on doors in those communities both to encourage turnout and to identify potential independent supporters and provide them with information. On Election Day, they targeted the same communities but restricted themselves to their “unlikely, but supportive” list. In total, they knocked on 55,000 doors on those four days.

According to Jeff Link, the Iowa Director for ACT, they met all of their targets in Iowa and, in some places actually exceeded their targets, but their targets were based on a model where turnout increased over the 2000 turnout, but not as much as it did. Had he started with a higher turnout model, he argued he might have hired another twenty-five canvassers over the summer and increased his absentee ballot total by 10,000, enough to win. He also argued that the indiscriminate solicitation of absentee ballots by the party caused them to spend an inordinate amount of time collecting absentee ballots from “safe” Democratic voters, those who would have voted with little prodding. He estimates that ACT spent \$3 million in Iowa.²⁵

²¹ This came in an e-mail sent out to people supportive of the Kerry campaign sent out by the Kerry-Edwards campaign signed by Mary-Beth Cahill.

²² There was a link in the e-mail to “show me canvasses in my state.” See (www.volunteer.johnkerry.com/event/search/?State=IA&TimeSpan=WholeCampaign&*MilesFrom=0&Type=30&1=1 [January 13, 2005]).

²³ John Norris interview, November 18, 2004.

²⁴ Jeff Link, Iowa director, America Coming Together, interview by Arthur Sanders, Des Moines, Iowa, December 6, 2004.

²⁵ Mark Smith, president, Iowa Federation of Labor, interview by Arthur Sanders, Des Moines, Iowa, November 16, 2004.

The unions also worked hard, as they always do, for the Democratic ticket.²⁶ Compared to the past, the unions put more effort into phone calls, door knocking and passing out leaflets at the workplace and less into mailings. According to Mark Smith, president of the Iowa Federation of Labor (IFL), these changes were decided upon by the national AFL-CIO.²⁷ The phone calls were constant, beginning with a round of 50,000 to 70,000 ID calls to separate union households supportive of Kerry from those who were not, and ended with 50,000 GOTV calls in the last weekend of the campaign. The unions knocked on at least 75,000 doors, though exact figures for both activities are hard to come by since some locals engaged in activities beyond what was organized by the IFL. Traditionally, for example, the Service Employees Industrial Union (SEIU) organizes their own mail and calling campaign, as they did again this time, and the UAW also organized some independent activities. For leafleting, there were nine different printings, and individual unions could order customized leaflets for their own use. The number of “unique” leaflets was, therefore, quite large.²⁸ Some unions made substantial orders. The machinists ordered 30,000 on a number of occasions. And the total number printed was 535,425 at a cost to the national AFL-CIO of \$21,598. An individual worker might, therefore, get up to nine of these at the factory gate on different days. Internal studies by the unions found that, whereas in the past when only two or three such handouts were made, only 35 percent of members recalled receiving such pieces, this time 85 percent did.²⁹ Individual mailings done in a similar fashion where locals could order their own design, however, were down. The IFL only printed between 10,000 and 15,000 of such mailings whereas in the past they printed 35,000 or more. The other mailings were the regular union newsletters containing strong messages of support for Kerry that went to 70,000 members in the state. Smith felt the unions could have used more release staff from the locals to spend more time shoring up support among union households by knocking on doors and making more literature drops to focus greater attention on economic issues likely to draw union households to Kerry.

Other groups made efforts as well. MoveOn was active in the state, organizing a large voter identification and GOTV drive.³⁰ They also had three of their “Vote for Change” concerts in Iowa, one with James Taylor and the Dixie Chicks in Iowa City, one with Jackson Browne in Des Moines, and one with the Dave Matthews Band in Ames. A group called the Iowa Citizens Action Network (ICAN), a grassroots organization with 13,000 members that has been active on environmental and consumer issues in Iowa for twenty-five years, in partnership with the national Campaign for America’s Future, organized a voter registration drive with a goal of 10,000 new voters in Des Moines, Waterloo and Davenport.³¹ The Sierra Club targeted Iowa, making phone calls and mailings to all of its members in the state, urging support for Kerry. Music for America, a partisan, political nonprofit organization which worked to turn out one million new voters nationwide, organized fifteen events in Iowa,³² while punkvoter.com’s Rock Against Bush tour also had events in Iowa.³³ At all of these music events, there were tables set up where concert-goers could pick up information about registering, voting and issues, targeted toward younger voters.

²⁶ See Redlawsk and Sanders, “The Iowa Senate and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Congressional District Races.”

²⁷ Smith interview, November 16, 2004.

²⁸ I was shown copies of thirty different leaflets, though there were more. Some differed only in the name of the local, but others had entirely different messages. Some were printed with English on one side, Spanish on the other. Most were only in English, but a few were only in Spanish. Counting each variation as a separate piece would overstate the number of “unique” pieces. So in the table, I counted each printing as a separate unique piece.

²⁹ Smith interview, November 16, 2004.

³⁰ For information about MoveOn.org go to their web site at (www.moveon.org [January 17, 2005]).

³¹ For information about ICAN go to (www.yawp.com/ican [January 17, 2005]). Also, see Rob Borsellino, “Looking for New Voters an Eye-Opening Process,” *Des Moines Register*, September 22, 2004, p.1B.

³² See Music For America, (musicforamerica.org [January 17, 2005]).

³³ See Punk Voter, (punkvoter.com [January 17, 2005]).

Bush Supporters

On the Republican side, the strategy was slightly different. According to Gentry Collins, executive director of the Iowa Republican Party, the party's goal was two-fold. First, there was a perception among some that absentee ballots were a problem for the party. Collins analysis of the issue, however, was that they could afford to lose the absentee ballot battle as long as they continued to win the Election Day GOTV battle. In 2002, for example, by his calculation, the Democrats had 30,000 more of their registered voters vote by absentee ballot than the Republicans, but the Republicans won the turnout battle on Election Day by 40,000.³⁴ Still, he felt a need to satisfy others in the state party and in the press who saw this issue as important. Furthermore, he needed to win the Election Day battle for turnout by an even wider margin.

The party used a special election to the Iowa State Legislature in the spring of 2003 to test some theories about how to allocate time. This confirmed to them that spending too much time chasing absentee ballots was not a good thing to do with the Republican electorate. Thus, beginning in early 2004, they began their effort. All Republican voters who had voted in either three or four of the last general elections were only targeted for Election Day GOTV efforts. For unlikely or suspect voters who had voted in two or less of the last four elections, initial efforts were made to encourage both absentee balloting and later, Election Day GOTV efforts. For nonparty voters, volunteer phone banks were used to make contact with nonparty likely voters (they had voted in three of the last four elections) or new nonparty registrants. They were asked a series of issue questions on wedge issues such as gay marriage, abortion, the death penalty and a choice between tax cuts or education spending. The results were immediately plugged into an equation which told the volunteer whether or not to add them into the absentee ballot universe. The party then raised \$600,000 just for the separate absentee ballot campaign. That allowed them to hire canvassers to contact the people in their absentee ballot universe. Prior to the canvassers, however, each person on the list received two mail pieces on issues of agreement and a call by a volunteer. This intense screening process generated 25,000 absentee ballot requests. More importantly, it accomplished two purposes. It got the party through the potential "absentee ballot storm." While they clearly did not have as extensive an effort as the Democrats, and thought the Republicans did not win the absentee ballot battle, it satisfied those in the party who did not want to "give away too much" to the Democrats on this tactic. Second, the absentee ballot operation gave the party an organized, experienced, and eager group of volunteers.³⁵ This entire effort was wrapped up by mid-September and attention from that point on was on GOTV.

Constant calling was done by volunteers over those last forty days of the campaign. According to Collins, the activists from the so-called Christian Right were much more willing to work hard in this campaign as volunteers. The president was a remarkably strong unifying force. Presidential and vice-presidential visits were important, and the state saw many. By my count, President Bush made sixteen campaign stops in the state, and Vice President Cheney made thirteen.³⁶ These visits were always closed. To get in required a ticket, and to get a ticket one often had to sign a pledge of support for the president. The purpose was to rally supporters and get them to do more in the campaign. This was often done in more explicit ways. Workers who did extra phone calls or door knocks or mailings were given VIP seats at the rallies. In fact, at many rallies, rooms were set up at the venue to allow volunteers to "earn" their better seats prior to the event or with promises to help immediately after the event. According to Collins, these offers were

³⁴ Gentry Collins, executive director, Iowa Republican Party, interview by Arthur Sanders, Des Moines, Iowa, December 7, 2004.

³⁵ Collins interview, December 7, 2004.

³⁶ By comparison, Senator Kerry was here twelve times after the end of the caucuses, and Senator Edwards was here fifteen times. So in total visits, the two campaigns were quite similar.

remarkably well received, especially in Western Iowa where the president visited three times, the vice president twice. Most who were asked were happy to do so.³⁷

In the past, the Iowa Republicans had done very well on the calling and mailing aspect of the GOP's 72 Hour Task Force turnout plan but had not been very effective at door knocking. This time, with all the volunteers they had, and all of the information they had gathered about less likely voters, they spent Friday through Monday before the election knocking on doors and dropping off issue specific literature all over the state, but with a particular focus on Polk County and the Northwest portion of the state (sixteen counties). On Election Day, follow-up phone calls were made. They spent about \$4 million on this effort. As with the Democrats, they felt that they met or exceeded all of their targets, and, unlike the Democrats, they were pleased with the outcome.

As with the Democrats, there were other groups helping to organize for the Republicans. Just as the unions targeted workers, the Iowa Association of Business and Industry, with help from a \$150,000 grant from BIPAC, organized an effort to have business owners provide information about the campaign to their workers in what was called the Iowa Prosperity project. This group put up posters at work asking employees to look at the Prosperity Project's web site for information about the candidate's stands on the issues providing the message that the president's policies would be better for the economy. They also put leaflets in paychecks urging people to vote, and again, pointing them to the Prosperity Project's web site.³⁸ Similarly, former state GOP chairman Brian Kennedy formed an organization in Eastern Iowa, Campaign for One, which used grassroots efforts to increase Republican turnout in that part of the state.³⁹ The Center for Bio-Ethical Reform visited Iowa as part of its Key States Initiative to educate voters about "the horrors of abortion."⁴⁰

Conclusion

In the end, then, Iowa was witness to an unprecedented amount of political activity. Both sides expended enormous resources to contact as many potential voters as they could. People were inundated with mail, phone calls, TV and radio ads, leaflets, lawn signs, visits by volunteers and paid workers, and e-mails. It was expected to be a close race, and it was. The president carried the state by 10,000 votes out of 1.5 million cast. Turnout was remarkably high, at 68.03 percent, according to the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, the sixth highest in the nation.⁴¹ So the final question is this: did it all matter, or did the parties efforts simply cancel each other out, leaving the final margin to be determined by the relative strengths and weaknesses of the candidates and the broader national campaign?

Clearly, much of what happened in Iowa was not a function of anything that happened in Iowa. So questions such as "Should Kerry have responded more quickly to the Swift Boat attacks" or "Should the president have been better prepared for the first debate?" may help us understand why Kerry did not win or how the president could have won more easily. These questions do not, however, help us understand the impact of what went on in Iowa, but given the context of the national campaign, there are a couple of clues about the impact of the efforts here in Iowa.

³⁷ Collins interview, December 7, 2004.

³⁸ Business Industry PAC, "Iowa Prosperity Project,"

(www.bipac.net/page.asp?g=IOWA&content=P2_Participants&parent=IOWA [October, 2004]). Also Iowa Association of Business and Industry (www.iowaabi.org [October, 2004]). See also, Donnelle Elleer, "Businesses Hope to Spur Voters," *Des Moines Register*, September 21, 2004, p. 1D; or Michael Moss and Ford Fessenden, "Interest Groups Mounting Costly Push to Get Out Vote," *New York Times*, October 20, 2004, p. 1A.

³⁹ See "Activist Urges One-on-One-Campaigning," *Des Moines Register*, August 30 2004, p. 4A.

⁴⁰ Lynn Campbell, "Anti-Abortion Banners Coming to Iowa," *Des Moines Register*, July 29, 2004, p. 2B.

⁴¹ See Lynn Campbell, "Iowa Ranks High in Voter Turnout," *Des Moines Register*, November 18, 2004, p. 1B, with chart on 6B.

First, both campaigns did have some basic successes. The Democrats targeted the largest population centers in the state. In seven of the ten largest counties, John Kerry picked up more votes compared to Al Gore four years ago than George Bush picked up over his performance in the last election. In fact, in those ten counties, Kerry had a net gain of 6,280 votes.⁴² One of the three where he lost net votes was Polk County, the largest in the state, but that was also a county targeted by the Republicans. With both parties targeting the county, the result was a net gain of 398 votes for President Bush in a county where 202,618 people voted. If you look at the sixteen counties in the Northwest portion of the state which the Republicans targeted, we find a net gain for the president of 7,226 votes, enough by itself, if all other things had been equal, to flip the election to Bush. The only one of these sixteen counties where the president did not have a net pick-up was Woodbury County, whose largest city, Sioux City, is the only place in this corner of the state which the Democrats targeted.⁴³ Both parties, therefore, had successes where they put the most effort.

There were also some things unique to Iowa that may have been outside of the campaigns' control. The most important of these was that in three counties contiguous to Polk County, there were gambling initiatives on the ballot. All three of those counties saw activity by religious groups to defeat those initiatives. All three of those initiatives went down to defeat, and in those three counties Bush saw his margin of victory increase by a net total of 4,440 votes. Again, given the closeness of the election in both 2000 and 2004, this amount is enough to have flipped the state the other way.

More importantly, one way in which the two parties' efforts differed was in the attention paid to obtaining absentee ballots from strong, likely voters. The Democrats put effort into this. The Republicans did not. It did provide the Democrats with a large absentee ballot edge, though full statewide figures on this are not yet available. To give one example, on absentee ballots in Polk County, Kerry had a 13,380 vote margin over Bush, but on Election Day, Bush received 3,990 more votes than Kerry did. This gave Kerry a total margin of 9,380 votes, slightly smaller than Gore's margin four years ago.⁴⁴ It may be that spending a little less time chasing down absentee ballots from strong supporters and slightly more time persuading less likely voters to support Senator Kerry might have made a difference. Both John Norris and Jeff Link, who helped organize the Kerry and ACT campaigns, thought this was the case, and the Republicans decided early on that they would pursue the opposite strategy, and they did, in the end, pull out a very small victory.

In an election this close with a 10,059 vote difference in an electorate of 1,506,908 votes, one would not want to make too much of any factor and claim that it was "the key" to Republican victory. It does, however, seem that the decision to work on getting as many absentee ballots as possible rather than on a more strategic approach might have been enough to tip things in the Republican direction. Once the commitment was made to try and convince these voters to vote by absentee ballot, time had to be committed to make sure they had also returned those ballots. On the Republican side, strongly committed voters requested absentee ballots on their own, and thus, the party made no effort to make sure they had voted by absentee ballot until their usual GOTV contact at the end. That gave them more time to fire up the strong supporters, get them more involved in the campaign and, most importantly, work on persuasion

⁴² All of these figures were computed from election results made available on the web by the Iowa Secretary of State's office, "Election Results" (www.sos.state.ia.us [December, 2004]).

⁴³ Kerry had a net pick-up of 177 votes in this county, where 44,195 votes were cast.

⁴⁴ The vote totals for each precinct in Polk County, including absentee ballots, can be found at the *Des Moines Register's* web site, (www.desmoinesregister.com [January 13, 2005]).

and solidifying support among more weakly committed voters. Those lost two weeks for the Democrats, as John Norris put it, may have been the difference between victory and defeat.

Table 4-1
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Iowa Presidential Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc.	\$3,078,325	\$7,611	\$3,085,936	\$4,197,482
John Kerry / DNC	\$711,515	\$168	\$711,683	\$799,220
<i>Political parties</i>				
DNC	\$2,391,270	\$18,820	\$2,410,090	\$2,832,912
<i>Interest groups</i>				
The Media Fund	\$659,510	\$19,620	\$679,130	\$1,315,031
MoveOn	\$633,710	...	\$633,710	\$707,584
AFL-CIO	\$387,420	...	\$387,420	\$535,144
United Automobile Workers Union	\$90,560	\$14,620	\$105,180	\$117,561
National Education Association	...	\$20,000	\$20,000	...
This Vote Counts	\$19,900	...	\$19,900	\$11,892
Win Back Respect	\$19,875	...	\$19,875	\$20,614
Safer Together 04	\$16,875	...	\$16,875	...
Stronger America Now	\$5,735	...	\$5,735	\$5,184
Truth&Hope.org	\$4,000	...	\$4,000	\$2,410
National Resource Defense Council	\$6,000	...	\$6,000	\$6,821
Campaign for America's Future	\$189,400
Coalition for the Future American Worker	\$91,597
Human Rights Campaign	\$10,634
The Nature Conservancy	\$8,157
Republican allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Bush/Cheney '04	\$2,322,905	\$61,701	\$2,384,606	\$3,285,212
Bush/Cheney '04 / RNC	\$1,867,705	...	\$1,867,705	\$2,479,344
<i>Political parties</i>				
RNC	\$197,545	\$25,620	\$223,165	\$151,372
Republican Party of Iowa	\$23,170	...	\$23,170	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Progress for America Voter Fund	\$1,846,700	...	\$1,846,700	\$2,206,151
November Fund	\$181,060	...	\$181,060	...
Club for Growth	\$142,995	...	\$142,995	\$176,418
United Seniors Association	\$85,250	...	\$85,250	\$140,865
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$57,290	...	\$57,290	\$66,504
Breath of Life	\$5,100	...	\$5,100	\$2,868
National Right to Life	...	\$3,720	\$3,720	...
Americans for Tax Reform	\$6,791
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
AARP	\$21,730	...	\$21,730	\$85,671

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot

propositions not in the study's sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study's relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 4-2.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, "... " only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

**Table 4-2
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organizations, Iowa Presidential Race,
2004^a**

Type and Organization ^b	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Calls	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c						
<i>Candidates</i>						
Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc.	33	33
John Kerry / DNC	5	5
<i>Political parties</i>						
DNC	5	...	1	...	19	25
Iowa Democratic Party	17	17
<i>Interest groups</i>						
AFL-CIO ^d	9	9
America Coming Together	8	8
The Media Fund	3	5	8
Iowa Citizen Action Network	...	7	7
Iowa Federation of Labor	7	7
MoveOn.org	6	6
Music for America	6	6
AFSCME	4	4
Sierra Club	3	1	4
Individual Donor: George Soros	1	2	3
This Vote Counts	3	3
Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund	2	2
Iowa for Health Care	2	2
Planned Parenthood Action Fund	2	2
Americans for Health Care	1	1
America Forward	...	1	1
Dr. Rath Health Foundation	...	1	1
Individual Donor: Jerald Gerst	...	1	1
National Resource Defense Council	1	1
Rescue American Jobs	1	1
Rock the Vote	1	1
Individual Donor: Roland and Barbara Zimany	...	1	1
SEIU	...	1	1
United Automobile Workers Union	1	1
Veterans Institute for Security and Democracy	1	1
Republican allies^c						
<i>Candidates</i>						
Bush/Cheney '04	4	15	19
Bush/Cheney '04 / RNC	13	13
<i>Political parties</i>						
RNC	15	2	3	20
Republican Party of Iowa	8	...	1	9
<i>Interest groups</i>						
Progress for America Voter Fund	1	4	5
Republican Jewish Coalition	3	3
Club for Growth	2	2

Type and Organization ^b	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Calls	TV	Total Unique Ads
November Fund	2	2
United Seniors Association	2	2
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	1	1	2
Breath of Life	1	1
Individual Donor: Jim Nepola	...	1	1
Individual Donor: John Dodgen	...	1	1
National Federation of Republican Women	1	1
National Right to Life	1	1
NRA Political Victory Fund	...	1	1
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth	1	1
Thanksgiving 2004 Committee	...	1	1
Nonpartisan						
<i>Interest groups</i>						
AARP	1	3	4
American Automobile Association	...	1	1
Vietnam Veterans of America	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 4-1.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. For instance, Iowan Sierran data have been included in the Sierra Club totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^d Organized labor contributed in many ways to the Democratic campaign. Among the groups representing labor were: the AFL-CIO, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFSCME, Service Employees International Union (SEIU), United Automobile Workers Union, Rescue American Jobs (a project of the Steelworkers Union), Americans for Health Care (a project of SEIU), and Iowans for Health Care (a project of Iowa SEIU).

Battleground No More? The Presidential Race in Missouri

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Missouri aligned with the winner for the twelfth consecutive time since 1960 in the 2004 presidential election but lost its battleground status mid-race. While hotly contested from March through mid-September, both the candidates and the national party committees moved to more competitive states by early October, leaving the presidential race largely to the state parties, interest groups, and 527 organizations, especially America Coming Together (ACT) and the Media Fund for Senator Kerry and Progress for America (PFA) for President Bush.

Despite losing its battleground label before Election Day, voter turnout in Missouri rose 18 percent. The increased turnout was spurred by a substantial March to August TV outburst, a significantly expanded ground war by both sides and their allies, and a hard fought gubernatorial race. The larger electorate spelled good news for Bush, as he extended his winning margin from 78,786 votes (51.7 percent of the two-party total) in 2000 to 196,542 in 2004 (53.6 percent).¹ Although ACT's intensive efforts did help boost turnout in their targeted Democratic urban areas of Kansas City, St. Louis City, and St. Louis County by 15.3 percent, the Republicans, working primarily through the state party organization, did even better in the remainder of Missouri, spurring turnout there by 19.2 percent. Kerry added slightly more than fifty thousand votes to Al Gore's 2000 lead over Bush in the three urban areas, but Bush more than tripled that elsewhere in Missouri by adding 169,691 votes to his 2000 advantage over Gore.

Independent polls had the race moving from too-close-to-call in July before each party's national convention to a clear Bush lead in mid-September.² Three July surveys—CNN/Gallup/USA Today (July 19 to 22), Kansas City Star (July 13 to 20), and Research 2000/St. Louis Post-Dispatch (July 20 to 22)—all had Kerry with a two-point edge. The three mid-September polls—American Research Group (September 16 to 19), Mason Dixon (September 14 to 16), and Research 2000/St. Louis Post-Dispatch (September 13 to 16)—each showed Bush with either a six or seven point advantage, a gap reflecting the ultimate outcome. Each side's internal tracking polls concurred that Bush had pulled ahead.³

The Democratic National Committee (DNC), which had been funding the bulk of the presidential TV advertising since late July, went off the air in Missouri in late September. In response, both the Bush campaign and the Republican National Committee (RNC) effectively went dark throughout October. Four days after the October 8 presidential debate in St. Louis, the Kerry campaign closed up shop, shifting all of its fifty-plus paid staffers in Missouri to Ohio and Wisconsin.⁴ Although the Kerry forces devoted about \$170,000 to Missouri TV in October and the RNC spent about \$20,000 to support its last week's get-out-the-vote (GOTV) initiative, the presidential campaign's media face all but disappeared three weeks ahead of Election Day, leaving the air war mainly to labor unions and the Media Fund for Kerry and Progress for America for Bush.

¹ All vote data were obtained from the Office of Secretary of State of Missouri, "Election Night Reporting" (www.sos.mo.gov/enrweb/statewideresults.asp?eid=131 [November 2004]).

² All poll results were obtained from National Journal, (www.nationaljournal.com [accessed November 28, 2004]).

³ John Hancock, Missouri Republican political consultant, interview by E. Terrence Jones, St. Louis, Mo., November 16, 2004; Michael Kelley, Missouri Democratic political consultant, interview by E. Terrence Jones, St. Louis, Mo., September 28, 2004. Hancock served as the Missouri Republican Party executive director in 2000 and 2002. Kelley held the equivalent post with the Missouri Democratic Party in 2002.

⁴ Pearlina Boyd, campaign staff, Kerry campaign, interview by E. Terrence Jones, St. Louis, Mo., November 24, 2004.

Round One: March to Labor Day

The presidential race in Missouri was frontloaded, especially the air war. By late March, the campaign was in full swing.

Candidates and Parties

Most of the big money was spent in Missouri before each party's national convention ended, after which the constraints imposed by accepting federal funding for the general election were implemented. TV spending was both the biggest item and the best example. Between March 1 and the Democratic National Convention in late July, the Bush campaign spent \$4.4 million on TV advertising and Kerry campaign effort almost matched the Bush campaign with \$4.2 million of its own TV advertising.⁵

Primed to define Kerry as soon as possible after he had wrapped up the nomination, the Bush campaign spent \$1.3 million in March followed by an equal amount in April. Kerry, conversely, could only find approximately \$350,000 for March and \$690,000 for April. The Massachusetts Democrat reversed the trend from May to July, outspending the Bush forces during those three months by \$3.2 million to \$1.8 million.

Attempting to press their advantage of having a later convention and thus the ability to continue spending without limits, the Bush campaign, after going off the air during the Democratic National Convention, came back with a major buy in August, funding \$1.3 million in spots between August 1 and Labor Day. With the Kerry camp already under the general campaign restrictions, the DNC dipped into its hard money accounts to purchase \$1.8 million in independent expenditures for TV ads during the same period.

There was considerably less emphasis on radio. The Bush campaign was much more active on this medium than either the Kerry campaign or the DNC. Between March and Labor Day, it spent slightly more than \$300,000 on radio spots, far more than the DNC's \$55,000 and the Kerry campaign's \$40,000. Much of the Kerry buy was focused on African American audiences.

The candidates came to the state frequently. Kerry finished ahead of Bush in Missouri appearances, twelve to seven, while Cheney and Edwards tied at four apiece. Excluding the October 8 presidential debate, neither Kerry nor Bush visited the state after mid-September, again signaling that there were higher priorities elsewhere.

The Bush campaign was the first on the ground with paid staff. Five arrived in Missouri in March and, within a few months, were joined by more than thirty additional paid workers.⁶ The Kerry campaign had one part-time advance person scouting the territory in March but paid staff did not arrive in substantial numbers until July.⁷ The Bush campaign staffers meshed closely with the operations of Missouri's U.S. Senators Christopher Bond and James Talent as well as with the existing infrastructure for the five incumbent Republican House members (Todd Akin, Roy Blunt, Jo Ann Emerson, Kenny Hulshof, Sam Graves), giving it additional leverage.⁸ The campaign also maintained close connections with the

⁵ This only includes spending by the presidential campaigns through purchases at Missouri television outlets in Cape Girardeau, Columbia, Jefferson City, Kansas City, Springfield, and St. Louis. It excludes any national cable television buys and expenditures by political parties, interest groups, or 527s. The prices are based on purchase orders obtained by the researchers from the station files.

⁶ Hancock interview, November 16, 2004.

⁷ Boyd interview, November 24, 2004.

⁸ Hancock interview, November 16, 2004. Also Paul Zemitsch, Missouri Republican political consultant, interview by E. Terrence Jones, St. Louis, Mo., November 9, 2004.

Missouri State Republican Party.⁹ Conversely, the Kerry staffers acted independently and maintained an arms-length relationship with both local and state Democratic entities including Representative Richard Gephardt's extensive apparatus and the Missouri State Democratic Party.¹⁰

Interest Groups

Kerry allies, especially the AFL-CIO and 527 organizations, were the major players during the campaign's early phase.¹¹ For them, Bush was the universal target. The AFL-CIO spent slightly more than \$1 million on TV spots between March and June with most ads emphasizing Bush's shortcomings on health care and the economy. The Media Fund had an even greater presence, airing \$1.9 million worth of spots between March and June that emphasized the theme of "Bush as Misleader." Striking a similar note with a somewhat more strident tone was MoveOn.org which spent about \$467,000 on TV starting in March and ending in June.

These buys, totaling almost \$3.5 million, gave Kerry a considerable advantage during the campaign's first round, since the two candidate campaigns came close to matching each other's TV presence. Nevertheless, Kerry's numbers did not move upward. The one early 2004 trial heat, embedded within a poll for Democratic Senate candidate Nancy Farmer, showed Kerry 49 percent and Bush 46 percent.¹² Five months and \$7.7 million worth of TV ads later, the three July polls all had Kerry ahead by the same narrow margin. Even more telling, Kerry never broke the 50 percent barrier, suggesting that the Bush campaign's strategy to portray him as a flip-flopping elitist liberal kept many Missourians from accepting him as a viable alternative to the incumbent.

Other groups had a much more modest presence. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce presented its views on health care in a \$145,000 series of spots aired between March and May, the Club for Growth had a one-week TV buy (\$77,000) in May, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) did a smaller round (\$29,000) in March and April, the National Right to Work effort did a small Kansas City cable purchase (\$5,810) in late August, and Americans for Prosperity, an anti-tax group, had even less of a presence (\$3,495) in Kansas City in late July. People of Color United purchased about \$40,000 on African American radio stations in July and August, bashing Kerry for not supporting unemployment benefits and chiding Teresa Heinz Kerry for claiming the African American label.¹³

On the ground, ACT dominated the scene.¹⁴ A small advance party began the Missouri program in Summer 2003. By June 2004, there were approximately one hundred paid staff statewide located in four offices: Columbia, Kansas City, St. Louis, and Springfield. The summer was devoted to recruiting volunteers and training them with on-the-job "Countdown Tuesdays," door-to-door canvassing in targeted precincts. In late summer, America Votes supplied a director, Mike Dolan, to coordinate the numerous

⁹ David Barklage, Missouri Republican political consultant, interview by E. Terrence Jones, St. Louis, Mo., November 18, 2004.

¹⁰ Personal observation, E. Terrence Jones. Jones has served as a consultant both to the Gephardt organization and to the Missouri State Democratic Party. The Kerry staff offended some of the locals by not seeking their advice.

¹¹ Some of the more controversial ads, most notably the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth ads, appeared only on cable television in Missouri. Since they were purchased nationally, there is no local information about how often they played.

¹² The poll was conducted February 14–19 by Decision Research, had a sample of 800 likely voters and is reported on www.nationaljournal.com.

¹³ David Goldstein, "Anti-Kerry Ads Aimed at Black Voters," *Kansas City Star*, August 14, 2004, p. A9.

¹⁴ Mark Logan, western Missouri volunteer coordinator, America Coming Together, interview by Martha Kropf, Kansas City, Mo., November 4, 2004; Elizabeth Gaines, eastern Missouri volunteer coordinator, America Coming Together, interview by E. Terrence Jones, St. Louis, Mo., November 20, 2004.

registration initiatives. ACT claimed these efforts yielded approximately 125,000 new voters on the rolls, most in St. Louis and Kansas City.¹⁵

Along with the AFL-CIO, Working America, an affiliate, also made a substantial registration effort. Starting in November 2003 and ultimately spending upwards of \$4 million, both distributed leaflets at work sites, issued numerous flyers, did door-to-door canvassing, and mounted a phone program.¹⁶

Round Two: Labor Day to Early October

After an early September spurt of party-funded ads, the candidates and parties both paused in mid-September, assessing whether Missouri was still in play.

Candidates and Parties

The Democratic and Republican national committees funded most of the air war during the four weeks following Labor Day. Each spent approximately \$370,000. The Bush campaign added another \$125,000 but the Kerry campaign stayed off the air. The Republicans maintained a noticeable radio presence with the RNC (\$44,000) and the Bush campaign (\$25,000) splitting the tab. The DNC spent \$27,000 on radio, mostly on urban contemporary stations.

Once the mid-September public polls concurred that Bush had moved well ahead of Kerry in Missouri, rumors began to circulate that the Kerry camp was rethinking Missouri's battleground status.¹⁷ The Kerry staff remained silent on its plans during late September and early October, perhaps not wanting to offend Missourians prior to the third presidential debate in St. Louis on October 8.¹⁸ Edwards visited Kansas City on October 12, renewing local Democratic hopes that the Kerry campaign would stay. During a fundraiser attended by Edwards, however, "the (staffer) cell phones started ringing," and observers described Edwards' as having a "what was I here for then?" look on his face.¹⁹ That same day, the Kerry campaign made its withdrawal official, and, by the end of the week, all Kerry offices were closed and every paid staffer dispersed to other states.

Interest Groups

Interest groups largely avoided TV and radio during September. The major exception was the Media Fund spending \$131,250 for TV spots criticizing the Bush family's links to the Saudis. The Media Fund also joined forces with the NAACP Voter Education Fund to pay for approximately \$250,000 for radio advertisements on African American stations in Kansas City and St. Louis aimed at enhancing turnout.²⁰ The People of Color United returned with a \$38,000 round of anti-Kerry radio commercials aimed at African Americans.

¹⁵ Election officials in Kansas City and St. Louis report additional registration numbers consistent with the ACT claim. See Jo Mannies, "Kansas City May Be Key To Win for Democrats," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 20, 2004, p. A1; and Jo Mannies and Jake Wagman, "Hundreds Will Monitor Voting in City, County," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, November 2, 2004, p. A3.

¹⁶ Sue Ledbetter, national field representative, Midwest region, AFL-CIO, interview by Martha Kropf, Kansas City, Mo., November 15, 2004. Also Kelley interview, September 28, 2004.

¹⁷ Jo Mannies, "Democrats Aren't Letting Up in Spending on Political Ads," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, September 27, 2004, p. B2.

¹⁸ Kelley interview, September 28, 2004.

¹⁹ Steve Kraske, "Kerry Camp Reduces Its Effort in Missouri," *Kansas City Star*, October 13, 2004, p. A2.

²⁰ NAACP National Voter Fund Press Release, "NAACP National Voter Fund and The Media Fund Join Forces to Combat Voter Intimidation: New Radio Ads Focus on Voting Rights Information," (www.naacpnvf.org/c_news.news.voter_intimidation.php [December 7, 2004]).

With Missouri's October 6 registration deadline pending, the primary emphasis in September was signing up voters. Although the parties and the candidates gave some attention to these drives, most of the effort was funded and staffed by interest groups. Among those involved were ACT, America's Families United, Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Focus on the Family, the Human Rights Campaign, the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), the Media Fund, Missouri Disability Vote Project, MoveOn, and Voting Is Power. The primary sites were strong Democratic precincts with low turnout rates, especially those in African American neighborhoods, and college campuses. The appeals ranged from bland good citizenship to emotional exploitation. The ACT leaflets for African Americans were especially blunt. Sample phrases included, "Republicans are trying to shut us out—they don't want us to vote and they'll do anything to stop us" and, accompanied by a "White Only" photograph from the Jim Crow era, "signs like this belong in the history books—not where we vote." Focus on the Family mailed two letters. Both stressed that voting is a "Christian responsibility" and emphasized social issues like abortion and gay marriage.

Round Three: Early October to Election Day

Even though Missouri was no longer in the battleground spotlight, the air and ground struggle remained intense during the campaign's final few weeks.

Candidates and Parties

For the Republicans, the campaign in October moved almost totally to mobilization. With a lead in hand and the Kerry staff gone, persuading on the air gave way to mobilizing on the ground.²¹ The Bush campaign effort had no TV or radio spots after October 16 while the RNC spent just \$20,870 on TV in the last week to supplement its GOTV program and \$14,150 on urban contemporary radio to depress African American turnout.²² Kerry purchased about \$120,000 in TV and \$15,000 in radio the last three weeks while the DNC spent less than \$5,000.

The mail initiatives were also modest, although the Democrats had a greater presence. Each side focused on its supporters. The Missouri State Democratic Party mailed at least nine separate pieces, some mentioning just the Kerry-Edwards pairing and others featuring them plus other federal or state candidates. The mail themes included education, health care, and jobs. The DNC also had two unique mailers on the presidential race. The Missouri State Republican Party had at least three unique mail pieces that mentioned the presidential race, the RNC had a GOTV mailer, and the Bush campaign had one as well. The GOP messages stressed values, trust, leadership, and security.

For Republicans, the last two weeks were all about GOTV. Missouri's 72 Hour Task Force program had been a key factor in Jim Talent's 2002 U.S. Senate win over Jean Carnahan.²³ Using that race as a testing ground, the 2004 effort added 25 percent more Republican identifiers to the data base and doubled the number of paid staffers.²⁴ The 72 Hour Task Force was a combined initiative of the Bush campaign, RNC, and Missouri State Republican Party funded exclusively with hard money, enabling close

²¹ Hancock interview, November 16, 2004.

²² Both in 2004 and 2002, the Republicans had sent a "Democrats-aren't-really-your-friends" message targeted at African Americans in an attempt to blur the distinction between the two parties. In neither campaign was this tactic seen as being effective. Hancock interview, November 16, 2004.

²³ Martha Kropf, E. Terrence Jones, Matt McLaughlin, and Dale Neuman, "Battle for the Bases: The Missouri U.S. Senate Race," in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 137-158.

²⁴ Hancock interview, November 16, 2004.

coordination and avoiding duplication. The program stressed person-to-person campaigning with one team leader for every fifty targeted voters, registration goals for each county, voter identification using door-to-door canvassing, identification of Republicans to solicit their friends, and close cooperation with county clerks on absentee voter efforts.²⁵

With the Kerry staff gone, the Democratic candidate and party GOTV effort was left largely to the Missouri State Democratic Party. Legally blocked from connecting their efforts to 527s and other supportive groups like labor unions, the Democratic Party's effort was smaller and less effective than the GOP's effort.²⁶ This not only crippled the Democrats' chances for the presidency but also contributed to the narrow defeats of the party's candidates for governor and lieutenant governor.²⁷

Interest Groups

527 Groups. Progress for America, a pro-Bush entity, filled the gap left by the GOP's general absence from the October air waves by sponsoring two TV ads worth \$1,322,018 in the last three weeks. One ad, "Ashley's Story," stressed the president's compassion while the other emphasized his administration's accomplishments. Both helped create a reassuring and positive aura about the incumbent. The Media Fund was the only Democratic 527 group airing commercials, spending almost \$100,000 on radio. These spots mixed negative (tax cuts for the wealthy, deficits, and weak record on homeland security) with positive (President Clinton's endorsement of Kerry) messages.

ACT and MoveOn unleashed their mobilization effort, deploying thousands of volunteers and hundreds of temporary paid staff during the campaign's final days. ACT distributed at least six different door hangers, a minimum of five leaflets, as well as a half dozen unique direct mailers (see table 5-2). The messages often had a populist tone ("Under George Bush the Rich Get Richer"), and many of the materials targeted African Americans. There were more anti-Bush than pro-Kerry points. All avoided urging a vote for a specific candidate, substituting either a generic appeal to turn out or phone numbers and web sites to obtain more information. The literature drops gave the highest priority to households that earlier canvasses had labeled as either leaning toward Kerry or being undecided.²⁸ On Election Day, ACT itself covered upwards of 750 precincts statewide with poll watchers. They both monitored for discrepancies and kept running tallies of voters, enabling afternoon contacts for those who had not yet come to the polling place.²⁹

Labor. Missouri has almost 750,000 active and retired labor union members and, in the typical election, slightly more than one out of five ballots is cast by someone from a union household. The national AFL-CIO did a dozen mailings, and its affiliate, Working America, did another half dozen mailings. Some consciously countered potential Kerry negatives such as featuring an International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) member who was part of the Swift Boat crew ("I trusted John Kerry with my life") or addressing Kerry's support for guns ("In this election, my gun is safe...but my job isn't"). Two health care mailers were targeted toward female union members. The remaining issues were standard union fare: health care, jobs, social security, union regulation. The AFL-CIO in Kansas City also helped organize poll monitors on Election Day, called the "Voters Right Project," who observed at least 50

²⁵ Missouri Republican Party, *72 Hour Task Force: 7 Steps to 72 Hour Success* (Jefferson City, Mo: Republican National Committee, 2003).

²⁶ Michael Kelley, Missouri Democratic political consultant, interview by E. Terrence Jones, St. Louis, Mo. December 3, 2004.

²⁷ Consultants from both sides concur on this point: Hancock interview, November 16, 2004; Kelley interview, December 3, 2004.

²⁸ Gaines interview, November 20, 2004.

²⁹ Gaines interview, November 20, 2004.

polling places and had attorneys available by phone to answer voting questions.³⁰ In retrospect, devoting so much effort toward possible obstacles to voting might have been misplaced since relatively few problems occurred.

The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and the United Auto Workers (UAW) each had substantial TV buys in October. SEIU spent \$378,930 in the final two weeks, criticizing the Bush-Saudi connection, and UAW purchased \$158,440 to stress that Bush had made “wrong choices” on jobs, health care, and taxes and, thus, was the “wrong leader” for America. Most individual unions also conducted mail and phone campaigns with their own memberships.

The written union materials avoided a direct solicitation to vote for the Kerry-Edwards ticket. The United Commercial and Food Workers ending comment was typical: “How you vote is your choice—your union has researched the candidates—on the issues, John Kerry is the candidate that best supports the concerns of working people.” SEIU came the closest to the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) bright line with “join SEIU members in supporting John Kerry for president.”

Social Issues. The usual suspects—Missouri Right to Life, NARAL Pro-Choice America, National Right to Life, and Planned Parenthood—conducted their typical campaign by sending mailers to their lists of pro-life and pro-choice voters, each numbering 100,000 to 130,000 in Missouri. In addition, pro-life groups leafleted Catholic Churches on the Sunday before the election, a standard practice in Missouri for the past several elections.

Gay marriage’s emergence as an issue in 2004 and controversial comments by St. Louis Archbishop Raymond Burke, however, broadened the role of religiously-charged matter. In January 2004, while he was still the Archbishop-designate, Burke stated that priests should refuse communion to elected officials who supported abortion rights.³¹ On June 24, after he had arrived in Missouri, he extended the communion prohibition to Catholics who vote for candidates who back reproductive choice.³² Burke later modified this position, but, in doing so, he promulgated five issues that should prevail in a Catholic voter’s calculus: abortion, euthanasia, embryonic stem cell research, human cloning, and gay marriage. More than one-third of the St. Louis region’s electorate and more than one-fifth of Missouri voters are Catholics.

This created an opening for Catholic Answers (table 5-2), a California-based nonprofit group promoting a conservative view of Catholicism, to distribute in churches a ten-page pamphlet throughout the St. Louis Archdiocese and sponsor a full page ad in the October 26, 2004 *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. It repeated the five priorities and, although not mentioning any candidate by name, urged that readers “do not vote for candidates simply because they declare themselves to be Catholic.”³³

Missouri had approved a constitutional amendment in August 2004, stating that marriage could only be between a man and a woman, so that issue was also part of the fall political climate. Republican materials repeatedly mentioned Bush’s support for a federal constitutional amendment banning gay marriage and several fundamentalist groups—the Christian Coalition, Citizen Leader Coalition, the Family Values Association, and Focus on the Family—distributed voter guides stressing the Bush and Kerry’s differences on the issue. The Human Rights Campaign countered during the fall with full-page ads in the Kansas City and St. Louis gay/lesbian press and with a direct mailer decrying discrimination against gays.

³⁰ Ledbetter interview, November 15, 2004; Kelley interview, December 3, 2004.

³¹ Patricia Rice, “No Bishop Has Gone as Far as Burke,” *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 18, 2004, p. B1.

³² Jo Mannies and Tim Townsend, “Burke: Voting for Abortion Rights Candidate Is a Sin,” *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, June 26, 2004, p. A1.

³³ *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 26, 2004, p. B6.

Collectively, this emphasis on social issues might have helped elevate social issues in the voting calculus. In the July 20–22 Research 2000/St. Louis Post-Dispatch survey, 8 percent of likely voters said “moral values” would be “the single most important issue in determining your vote for president.”³⁴ On the exit poll survey, that share tripled to 24 percent.³⁵

Business. Although business organizations did very little publicly, they increased their efforts within their own enterprises. Both the Missouri Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) significantly increased their persuasion and mobilization campaigns for employees within each of their member firms.³⁶

Environmental Groups. LCV, the national Sierra Club, the Sierra Club of Eastern Missouri, and the Thomas Hart Benton Sierra Club (Kansas City) did mailings within their respective organizations as well as to other pro-environmental lists. Each piece concluded that a Kerry presidency would be better for the environment.

Gun Control. Only the National Rifle Association (NRA) had a visible role in Missouri with the gun control advocates avoiding the state. Working through its PAC (NRA Political Victory Fund), it did about \$40,000 in TV advertising in southwestern Missouri and a \$48,000 radio buy in outstate Missouri during the last three weeks. More innovatively, it paid for plastic newspaper wrappers in many parts of the state, including Kansas City, near Election Day. The wrappers read “Freedom First–George W. Bush for President–NRA Political Victory Fund.”

Other. Several diverse groups also entered the fray. The United Seniors Association spent almost \$250,000 on TV, mainly in October, supporting privatizing social security, a subtle nudge toward the Bush side. The Swift Boat Veterans and POW’s for Truth mailed two pieces (see table 5-2), one eight pages long and the other twelve, repeating the same anti-Kerry messages contained in their cable TV spots. George Soros sent an eight-page letter with a lengthy critique of the Bush record, saying that “President Bush is endangering our safety, hurting our vital interests, and undermining American values.”

Goals for Americans, a pro-9/11 Commission group, sent a mailer to Missouri teachers noting that “Senator Kerry has already indicated that he would implement the entirety of the Commission’s recommendations [but that]...President Bush is still on the fence.” The Republican Jewish Coalition published a series of full-page ads in the Kansas City and St. Louis Jewish press, stating that Bush was pro-Israel and Kerry not so. They also sent two unique mailers with the same message to Jewish lists.

Conclusion

Kerry’s decision to deemphasize Missouri may have been unfortunate for statewide and local Democratic candidates, but, for scholars it did test whether interest groups would remain engaged even if the race was apparently no longer in play. The answer is a decided yes. They purchased more than \$2 million on TV and radio spots after it was public knowledge that the Kerry campaign had exited and the Bush effort was being scaled back. Although definitive accounting is impossible, at least \$5 million more was spent on direct mail, door hangers, leaflets, billboards, newspaper advertisements, and staff after the candidates stripped Missouri of its battleground status. A few of ACT’s out-of-state volunteers followed the Kerry campaign elsewhere, but most volunteers and the entire paid staff remained engaged in Missouri.³⁷ Much

³⁴ “Survey Results,” *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 25, 2004, p. A12.

³⁵ CNN.com, “Election Results,” (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/MO/P/00/epolls.0.html) [November 15, 2004].

³⁶ Hancock interview, November 16, 2004.

³⁷ Gaines interview, November 20, 2004.

of this might simply be due to inertia, executing plans already made prior to Kerry's de facto concession in early October. Plans, however, especially media buys and direct mail, can be altered and, in many cases, they were not altered in Missouri, suggesting a less-than-lockstep connection between the presidential candidates and their outside allies. Having committed so many resources to the cause, these outside allies were not willing to concede in the final weeks.

As for Missouri, the evidence is mixed about its battleground status. Certainly the Republicans did well in 2004, not only delivering Missouri to Bush but also winning three out of the four open-seat statewide races and extending their margins in the state legislature. What is more ambiguous is how much should be credited to the GOP's superior organization—a point openly conceded by Democrats—and how much can be assigned to the Republicans being closer to the median voter, especially on social issues. Several parts of rural and small town Missouri have their historical roots in the U.S. South. As the South has continued its transition from conservatively Democratic to conservatively Republican, the South-like portions of Missouri seem to be making a similar journey. In a too-close-to-call state where a small shift can change an outcome, it may be enough to color Missouri light red rather than dark purple.

Table 5-1
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Missouri Presidential Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc.	\$4,985,578	\$39,950	\$5,025,528	\$3,838,712
<i>Political parties</i>				
DNC	\$2,464,435	\$116,772	\$2,581,207	\$2,882,188
Missouri Democratic Party	...	\$7,175	\$7,175	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
The Media Fund	\$1,926,187	\$94,877	\$2,021,064	\$2,253,624
AFL-CIO	\$1,069,190	...	\$1,069,190	\$1,324,163
MoveOn	\$471,541	\$4,770	\$476,311	\$924,331
SEIU	\$378,930	...	\$378,930	\$103,652
The Spot Buy	\$11,338	\$158,429	\$163,767	...
United Automobile Workers Union	\$158,440	...	\$158,440	\$205,766
EMILY's List	...	\$19,450	\$19,450	...
Communication Workers of America	\$6,500	\$4,650	\$11,150	\$5,496
AFSCME	\$3,225	...	\$3,225	\$15,286
National Air Traffic Controllers	\$3,200	...	\$3,200	\$14,389
Republican allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Bush/Cheney '04	\$6,612,978	\$338,722	\$6,951,700	\$5,737,003
Bush/Cheney '04 / RNC	\$420,623
<i>Political parties</i>				
RNC	\$463,355	\$63,444	\$526,799	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Progress for America Voter Fund	\$1,322,198	...	\$1,322,198	\$1,008,354
United Seniors Association	\$247,923	...	\$247,923	\$406,168
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$158,268	\$8,448	\$166,716	\$179,222
BL Media Services	...	\$109,700	\$109,700	...
National Rifle Association	\$37,650	\$48,320	\$85,970	...
People of Color United	...	\$77,120	\$77,120	...
Club for Growth	\$76,925	...	\$76,925	\$75,713
All Children Matter	...	\$48,254	\$48,254	...
American Defense Council	...	\$38,200	\$38,200	...
National Right to Work Committee PAC	\$5,810	...	\$5,810	...
Citizens United	\$5,000	...	\$5,000	...
Americans for Prosperity	...	\$3,495	\$3,495	...
National Right to Life	...	\$1,094	\$1,094	...
Other party allies				
<i>Political parties</i>				
Libertarian Party	...	\$420	\$420	...
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Royal Saudi Arabian Embassy: Sandler & Innocenzi	...	\$37,285	\$37,285	
AARP	\$28,865	...	\$28,865	\$119,002
Voices for Working Families	...	\$7,550	\$7,550	...
Operation Truth	...	\$650	\$650	...
League of Women Voters	\$11,382

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 5-2.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 5-2
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Missouri Presidential Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc.	...	3	3	...	1	44	51
John Kerry / DNC	13	13
<i>Political parties</i>							
DNC	6	10	26	42
Missouri State Democratic Committee	3	14	...	2	1	...	20
Local Democratic Parties	...	2	2
DSCC	...	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>							
AFL-CIO	2	17	...	3	22
America Coming Together	...	12	...	8	1	...	21
MoveOn	11	2	4	17
League of Conservation Voters	...	3	7	10
NARAL Pro-Choice America	3	7	10
SEIU	...	5	4	9
Working America	...	9	9
Teamsters Union	...	7	1	8
United Automobile Workers Union	...	5	2	7
The Media Fund	...	1 ^d	1	...	1	3	6
Communications Workers of America	...	3	...	1	4
National Education Association	...	3	3
New Democratic Network	3	3
Sierra Club	...	2	1	3
This Vote Counts	3	3
TruthandHope.org	3	3
United Food and Commercial Workers Union	...	3	3
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now	...	2	2
Freedom Incorporated	...	2	2
Human Rights Campaign	...	1	1	2
Planned Parenthood Affiliate in Missouri	...	2	2
Stronger America Now	2	2
Supporters of John Kerry in KC	2	2
AIPAC	1	1
Alliance for Retired Americans	...	1	1
American Family Voices	1	1
American Mint: Democratic Chapter	...	1	1
Clergy Labor Coalition of St. Louis	...	1	1
Don't Forget to Vote	...	1	1
Driving Votes	...	1	1
EMILY's List	...	1	1

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	TV	Total Unique Ads
Individual Donor: George Soros	...	1	1
Goals for Americans Foundation	...	1	1
International Association of Fire Fighters	...	1	1
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers	...	1	1
Laborers International Union of North America	...	1	1
Missouri Progressive Vote Coalition	...	1	1
Mothers Opposing Bush	1	1
National Air Traffic Controllers Association	1	1
National Organization for Women	...	1	1
National Resource Defense Council	1	1
Personal Rights of Missourians	...	1	1
Sheet Metal Workers' International Union	...	1	1
St. Louis Boilermakers	1	1
U.S. Citizens for a Stronger, Smarter America	...	1	1
Western Missouri and Kansas Laborer's District Council	...	1	1
Republican allies^c							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Bush/Cheney '04 / RNC	23	23
Bush/Cheney '04	2	3	1	15	21
<i>Political parties</i>							
Missouri Republican Party	...	8	...	4	12
RNC	1	3	3	7
<i>Interest groups</i>							
National Right to Life	...	6	3	9
National Rifle Association	...	3	1	4	8
Republican Jewish Coalition	...	2	5	7
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth	...	2	3	5
Progress for America	4	4
United Seniors Association	...	1	3	4
Let Freedom Ring	3	3
Focus on the Family Action	...	2	2
Americans United to Preserve Marriage	1	1
Christian Coalition of America	...	1	1
Citizen Leader Coalition	1	1
Citizen Playbook	...	1	1
Eagle Forum PAC	...	1	1
Kansas Freedom Fund	1	1
National Beer Wholesalers Association ^e	1
Softer Voices	1	1
Susan B. Anthony List	...	1	1
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	1	1
Volunteer PAC	1	1

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	TV	Total Unique Ads
Other party allies							
<i>Political parties</i>							
Libertarian Party	...	2	2
Nonpartisan							
<i>Interest groups</i>							
America's Families United	...	2	2
Catholic Answers	...	1	1	2
Individual Donor: Robert J. Landgraf	2	2
Voting is Power	...	2	2
AARP	...	1	1
American Medical Student Association	...	1	1
Citizens Change	...	1	1
Committee of Faithful Catholics	1	1
Common Cause: Vote for America	1	1
Family Values Association	...	1	1
Federal Voting Assistance Program	1	1
Made in His Image	...	1	1
Missouri Disability Vote Project	...	1	1
United States Student Association	...	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 5-1.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, NARAL Pro-Choice Missouri data have been included in the NARAL Pro-Choice America totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^d Erik Smith, president, Media Fund, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 11, 2004

^e National Beer Wholesalers Association reported distributing payroll stuffers in the Missouri presidential race. Linda Argulis and David Rehr, political affairs director and president, National Beer Wholesalers Association, interview by Kelly Patterson and Betsey Gimbel, Alexandria, Va., November 8, 2004.

New Mexico Presidential Race 2004: The Battle for Five Electoral Votes

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The 2000 New Mexico presidential race was the closest in the nation in terms of raw votes, with a mere 366 votes separating the state winner, Democratic candidate Al Gore, from his Republican opponent George W. Bush. The very tight gap was in spite of the overwhelming registration advantage that Democrats (52 percent) had over Republicans (33 percent). In 2004 the Electoral College race appeared close enough to make the small state of New Mexico, with about 1.9 million people and only five electoral votes, a battleground state. In addition, New Mexico is the first so-called minority-majority state where whites and Hispanics dominate the political and cultural landscape with 44.7 percent and 42.1 percent of the state population, respectively. American Indians were the next largest group representing about 9.5 percent of the state population.

Given the low number of GOP registrants in the state, the Republican Party is forced to seek out potential crossover voters. In the 2004 election, two key groups were seen as likely crossover voters. First, the large number of Hispanics, who are often identified as social conservatives, especially on moral issues such as abortion and gay marriage, were targets.¹ Second, the large numbers of military soldiers, veterans, and their families were also potential swing voters for the president.² Likewise, Democrats and their allies also saw opportunities for a win, particularly given the large Democratic base. The key for Democrats was mobilizing those voters who were least likely to turn out on Election Day, especially Hispanic and American Indian voters.³ These factors brought tremendous amounts of activity to New Mexico, bombarding residents with information through TV, radio, mail, and person-to-person contact from early spring of 2004 to voting day.

Overview of New Mexico Race

While Kerry held the lead in the state in mid-July before the conventions, once the race started intensifying in terms of group, party, and candidate activity, the horsrace tightened considerably (see figure 6-1).⁴ By the end of July, the race was in a statistical dead heat.⁵ In part, this was due to the increased TV advertising activity by the Bush campaign starting in late August. These ads conveyed positive images about Bush related to the economy, values, opportunity and ownership, and national security as well as negative images about Kerry, particularly regarding intelligence systems and taxes. Because Kerry relied on public financing after his nomination, the campaign was not very active on TV in August, relying instead on allies, especially the Media Fund and MoveOn.org, 572 organizations whose TV ads were nearly all anti-Bush.

The TV campaign throughout the election was highly negative. Bush ran six negative ads against Kerry beginning in March, and Bush did not start running positive ads until August. In August, five of the eight Bush ads were positive. After August, however, Bush's negative ads again outnumbered the positive ads. Bush's negative ads focused on taxes, Kerry "doublespeak," crime, abortion, and terrorism intelligence.

¹ Greg Graves, executive director, Republican Party of New Mexico, interview by Lonna Atkeson, Albuquerque, N.M., November 10, 2004.

² Graves interview, November 10, 2004.

³ Vanessa Alarid, executive director, Democratic Party of New Mexico, interview by Nancy Carrillo, Albuquerque, N.M., November 16, 2004.

⁴ Poll data taken from RealClear Politics (realclearpolitics.com [December 31, 2004]).

⁵ No poll taken after the beginning of September found a gap between the two candidates of more than five percentage points. With one exception, the Mason-Dixon poll ending October 18, all of these polls were within their margins of error.

His positive ads presented optimistic portrayals of the economy, American values, and the war on terror. On the other hand, all of Kerry's ads before August were positive. Changing tactics, in August and September nearly every Kerry ad was negative, especially regarding health care, the economy, and Iraq. Kerry's October ads continued these themes and added several defensive ads that responded to attacks on Kerry's character, his patriotism, and his record on national security and taxes. Various 527s also contributed to this negative activity with groups like Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and MoveOn "educating" the voters on candidate "records." While the news media reported greater spending by Democratic allies, our data indicate that the eighteen interest groups aligned with Democrats that participated in the air war spent an estimated \$1.2 million on TV and radio ads over the course of the campaign. Although only nine GOP allies purchased TV and/or radio ads, they spent almost twice as much, nearly \$2 million. Overall, the two sides spent remarkably similar amounts of money on the air war. On the Democratic side, the candidate, party, and interest groups spent an estimated \$5.27 million in New Mexico. Republican groups spent \$5.38 million. (See table 6-1.)

By September, with the GOP convention in New York and a barrage of ads by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth capturing the attention of the media and voters alike for days, Bush took the lead for the first time (45 percent versus 42 percent), but the margin of error made the race still too close to call.⁶ A poll taken in mid-September, soon after these events showed a slightly stronger lead for Bush with a 47 percent to 43 percent split, though still within the margin of error.⁷ The poll, however, showed some serious problems for Kerry in the state this late in the race.⁸ First and foremost, while Kerry was in a statistical dead heat with Bush in the state's largest metropolitan area and Bush was easily winning the more conservative South (61 percent versus 33 percent), Kerry did not have a majority in the Democratic stronghold of Northern New Mexico. His numbers showed only an 11 percent gap (49 percent versus 38 percent), with 10 percent of the voters still undecided. In addition, 27 percent of Hispanics and 20 percent of Democrats were supporting Bush. According to state conventional wisdom, the Republican candidate needs about a quarter of both the Hispanic and Democratic vote to win.⁹ Moreover, Bush had a majority of support from likely voters on issues like the economy and unemployment, the war in Iraq, and homeland security and terrorism. Meanwhile Kerry was only favored over Bush on the issue of health care, and he did not have support of a majority of likely voters (47 percent versus 41 percent). Even more unfortunate for Kerry was the fact that health care rated fifth in importance (7 percent), behind Iraq (24 percent), homeland security and the war on terror (23 percent), the economy and unemployment (19 percent) and moral issues and family values (11 percent).

At the end of September, despite Kerry's strong performance in the debates, polls remained tight. As early voting began Democratic and Republican groups intensified their mobilization efforts. That meant more phone calls, more volunteers and staff on the streets going door-to-door, and an increase in campaign advertising that often featured back-to-back political ads during commercial breaks. Bush won the state by 5,988 votes, but he did not win a majority. Once again New Mexico was the closest state in the country, with Bush receiving 49.8 percent (376,930) of the popular vote to Kerry's 49.1 percent (370,942).

⁶ And other polls, as shown in figure 6-1, showed Kerry still ahead.

⁷ As shown in Figure 1, a poll ending the same day showed Kerry ahead.

⁸ The data were taken from KOBTV poll margins, conducted by Mason-Dixon Polling and Research, Inc., September 15-16, 2004.

⁹ Andy Lenderman, "Oh, So Close! Bush Has Slight Lead in N.M.," *Albuquerque Journal*, September 5, 2004, p. A1.

The Mobilization Game

Democratic and Republican groups both knew that the key to winning this race was mobilization; the question was how to do it. Both groups reflected on recent internal and external research that demonstrated the potential power of person-to-person mobilization efforts. J. Scott Jennings, executive director of the Bush-Cheney campaign in New Mexico, indicated that internal GOP research showed that it took on average seventeen TV ads, but only six person-to-person contacts to get their message to a voter.¹⁰ Likewise, Democratic allies were discussing cutting edge research by political scholars Green and Gerber who argue personal contact is the most effective means for voter mobilization.¹¹ For both groups person-to-person contact became the primary focus in their get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts. However, which voters they focused on and how they reached them became a critical difference between the campaigns and may help to explain the election outcome.

The GOP Allies

GOP staff came into New Mexico early. Both the executive director for the state campaign for Bush-Cheney, J. Scott Jennings, and the Bush Victory 2004 executive director, Jay McClesky, arrived in January and began operations February 1. This gave them the necessary time to set up a, “statewide, comprehensive, grassroots, precinct-level organization.”¹² This was a top-down, centralized campaign model led by Jennings and McClesky who organized volunteers and paid staff and kept local party activists focused on the task of reelecting Bush. This centralized effort proved critical because the Republican Party of New Mexico (GOPNM) was somewhat fractured from in-fighting over local issues and control. The presidential campaign had the potential to pull them together.¹³ Moreover, this was a new approach. While in the past the party relied on local party activists and county customs to fight the ground war, this time the national actors from the Bush and Bush Victory 2004 campaigns were calling the shots.¹⁴ Their goal was more than reelecting President Bush; it was to “leave something behind.”¹⁵ They were investing in building an apparatus that would make the state party stronger for future contests.

With these thoughts in mind the Bush campaign set turnout targets for each county. Knowing that Democrats were going to focus on turning out their base in the most populated and Democratic counties, Republicans knew that they had to remain competitive in these areas (Bernalillo, Sandoval, Valencia, Santa Fe and Doña Ana). Republicans also had to offset the more populated counties with hard work in the rural southeast counties (Lincoln, Otero, Chaves, Roosevelt, Curry, Lea, Eddy) and the two northern counties, Los Alamos and San Juan, where Republican registration exceeds that of Democrats (see table 6-2). Hard work in these areas included satellite offices in small counties, ad purchases of about \$80,000 in El Paso, Texas, for southern New Mexico voters who receive El Paso TV, a radio campaign, and visits to these key areas by Bush and Cheney (see table 6-3). A smaller part of this strategy involved a voter registration drive. Recognizing that they could not compete with the Democratic groups on this front, the GOPNM set a modest goal of registering 30,000 Republican voters.¹⁶ Their efforts far exceeded their goals, with an estimated 50,000 voters registered by the GOP.

¹⁰ J. Scott Jennings, New Mexico executive director, Bush-Cheney '04, interview by Lonna Atkeson, Albuquerque, N.M., November 5, 2004.

¹¹ Margaret C. Toulouse, New Mexico state campaign director, League of Conservation Voters, interview by Lonna Atkeson, Albuquerque, N.M., December 12, 2004.

¹² Jennings interview, November 5, 2004.

¹³ Graves interview, November 10, 2004.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Jennings interview, November 5, 2004.

¹⁶ Ibid.

While the Bush and Bush Victory 2004 campaigns' main strategy was mobilizing the Bush base, in a state with registration numbers that favor Democrats strongly, that meant finding Democratic crossover voters. During the summer, the campaign focused on voter identification and built a swing voter file to determine voter preference on candidates and issues.¹⁷ Given the high number of new registrants in the state since 2000, Republicans focused their attention on early voting and Election Day turnout and not the more confusing absentee voter turnout that they successfully used in 2002.¹⁸ Early voting lasted from October 16 to October 30 (the Saturday before Election Day), a fifteen day window. In addition, they organized local communities to work on registration and turnout by identifying and recruiting volunteers to be leaders in evangelical churches, Catholic parishes, and every precinct in the state.

Much like the Democratic group America Coming Together (ACT), they used these data in the field to take targeted messages to individual voters through telephone calls, door-to-door canvassing, and direct mail. As Jennings said, "We have returned campaigning to what it was years and years ago. Shoe leather campaigns, telephone-driven campaigns where you have actual volunteers on the ground making the difference."¹⁹ However, what was different was the GOP emphasis on personal contact from a like-minded and local individual. Evangelical Christians and Catholics received calls from other evangelicals and Catholics, respectively, encouraging them to vote for life by voting for Bush. Hispanic and veteran outreach emphasized the war on terror and social issues. Women often cared about education, and callers left messages about the success of No Child Left Behind legislation.²⁰ Neighbors called neighbors, hunters called hunters, and veterans called veterans, all identifying themselves as kindred hearts and emphasizing their passion for the election and the issues. This gave GOP canvassing a personal touch that was matched by very few groups on the left. The campaign also encouraged strong Republicans to find three Bush supporters and vote with them early.

The last weekend of the campaign was intense. Fifteen hundred volunteers from southwest Texas went to Lea and Eddy counties to make phone calls, knock on doors, put up signs, and offer rides on Election Day. The GOP rented hundreds of vans to GOTV. Walk teams and phone banks in Albuquerque were also used. The GOP estimates it made about 100,000 phone calls on Election Day and 1 million voter contacts overall. This was one-half million more contacts than in 2000.²¹ Estimated costs for these activities were placed at \$2 million.²²

The Republican National Committee (RNC) supplemented these efforts with massive amounts of direct mail to potential New Mexico voters, some of it in Spanish. Many of these ads highlighted family-oriented, conservative values. Others addressed issues such as the nationally hot topics of terrorism and senior issues as well as Second Amendment rights. Ads targeted particularly to New Mexico included two endorsements by popular Republican Senator Pete Domenici and a description of the candidates' positions on a local environmental issue. The RNC and Bush-Cheney also ran TV and radio ads, spending an estimated \$3.4 million on the air war, compared to \$4.1 million spent by Kerry and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The Republican TV ads covered more domestic issues than the direct mail and often highlighted Kerry's changing positions on issues. Several ads were run on Spanish TV stations and discussed domestic issues and family values (see table 6-4).

¹⁷ Jay McClesky, campaign director, Victory 2004, interview by Lonna Atkeson, Albuquerque, N.M., November 10, 2004.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Andy Lenderman, "Campaign Calls Bombard Voters," *Albuquerque Journal*, October 28, 2004, p. A1.

²⁰ Graves interview, November 10, 2004.

²¹ Jennings interview, November 5, 2004.

²² McClesky interview, November 10, 2004.

A number of other Republican allies sent direct mail to New Mexico voters, although the RNC was certainly the most active and the only group to narrowly tailor their direct mail specifically to New Mexicans. The 527 group Swift Boat Veterans for Truth sent two booklets of multiple pages mirroring the attacks of their TV ads. The November Fund sent two pamphlets regarding problems with medical malpractice. Both attacked John Edwards as a personal injury lawyer and praised Bush's commitment to medical liability reform. Progress for America sent a poster of Bush comforting Ashley Faulkner, the reverse side describing Bush's support of the family and his leadership qualities. The Citizen Leadership Coalition sent a packet of information to pastors of conservative churches to distribute particularly to young, new voters in their churches. Their "voter guides" compared Kerry and Bush on a number of religious issues. They also included flyers describing the "left's assault on Christianity," especially focusing on Michael Moore. National Right to Life sent two handouts, one bilingual, with comparisons of Bush and Kerry regarding abortion-related policies.

The Democratic Allies

Kerry's campaign in New Mexico focused particularly on mobilizing voters in the more populated and urban areas. The campaign utilized five thousand volunteers for phone and door-to-door activities in Democratic strongholds in the North and in Albuquerque (Bernalillo County).²³ The Coordinated Campaign of New Mexico defined its targets as any precinct that was at least 65 percent Democratic, ignoring completely eastern regions of the state, a mistake they lamented in hindsight.²⁴ DPNM Executive Director Vanessa Alarid noted that in the ignored northeastern counties of the state, more citizens actually voted for local offices, especially judgeships, than for president.²⁵ The Kerry campaign and DPNM attempted to focus on women, college-educated men, Hispanics, and American Indians.

The Democratic campaign in New Mexico focused mostly on three domestic issues: health care, the economy, and education.²⁶ Although Hispanics were targeted, Alarid felt Kerry and the Democratic Party "took them for granted" because the campaign ignored religious issues.²⁷ Another problem, according to Alarid, was the Kerry campaign's lack of planning in New Mexico and the campaign's failure to modify its strategy, particularly after the Republican National Convention when polls showed Kerry losing his initial lead.²⁸

Democratic interest groups played a major role in the New Mexico presidential contest. Using their 501(c)(4), 501(c)(3), or 527 IRS tax status depending on their activities, groups such as the America Votes Coalition took over much of the party building work that was previously funded by soft money. In New Mexico, the America Votes Coalition consisted of ACT, the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), Moving America Forward, the NARAL Pro-Choice America, MoveOn, and the Southwest Young Voter Alliance. The coalition's purpose was to create efficiency by communicating with each other about activities, messages, and targets to prevent any overlap. Many groups started as early as May organizing, planning, and beginning operations such as voter registration, voter identification for targeting, and voter mobilization. All groups focused on pushing their targets to vote absentee or early.

Because of the state's already high Democratic registration numbers, only a few members of the America Votes Coalition directed their resources toward voter registration, focusing on groups that are hard to

²³ Moses Mercado, New Mexico state director, Kerry-Edwards campaign, interview by Nancy Carrillo, Albuquerque, N.M., November 4, 2004.

²⁴ Alarid interview, November 16, 2004.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Mercado interview, November 4, 2004.

²⁷ Alarid interview, November 16, 2004.

²⁸ Ibid.

turnout (e.g. Hispanics, the young, and American Indians).²⁹ One major player in this area was New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson's 527 called Moving America Forward.³⁰ Its focus was on getting new and low propensity voters, especially Hispanics, American Indians, and newly registered voters to the polls. According to the director, Dan Sena, its mission was to "register and protect these voters' voting rights by educating them about the vote process."³¹ Moving America Forward began its efforts in May and continued through Election Day with an aggressive educational message. The early start was the key to "building a successful relationship with a voter."³² The initial efforts focused on a registration drive using over ninety paid staff that did site registration, door-to-door registration, and a phone bank that matched home ownership to voter registration data to help determine if some adults in a home were not yet registered. To obtain access in pueblos, where potential voters are spread out, often have no phones and/or rely on the Chapter House for mail service because they lack a mailing address, Moving America Forward focused on building a relationship with tribal leaders who could provide them with the best information on how and when to reach potential American Indian voters. This meant different strategies were used at different pueblos. The results of these activities were 27,921 successfully registered Hispanics and American Indians, outpacing their goal of 25,000 new voters. Of these, about ten thousand were American Indian.

In addition to its registration activities, Moving America Forward focused mobilization efforts on any Hispanic or non-Republican potential voter who was either newly registered as of January 2003 or an infrequent Democratic voter. The universe targeted 190,407 potential voters. These targets were then educated about the voter process, particularly voting by mail, early voting, provisional ballots and voter identification issues. Potential voters received a minimum of twelve contacts, including mail from Governor Richardson, person-to-person contact through phone or canvass, and "robocalls" from the governor encouraging them to vote. The call also provided them with a contact phone number for voting questions. Their voter care line was a busy and crucial part of their GOTV effort. According to Sena their efforts were very successful. Over 57 percent of their targeted voters cast early or absentee ballots, and an additional 20 percent turned out on voting day.

The local group Southwest Organizing Project (SWOP) also worked to register voters as part of its broader community-organizing mission. It focused on two groups: unregistered members and young Hispanics. It sent mail to members, went door-to-door, and used phone banks in Carlsbad and Albuquerque. It used imagery (such as a graffiti contest) and local issues (such as local anti-assembly laws) to appeal particularly to young citizens. Youth organizer Lolita Roybal noted that the high amount of national mobilization efforts made it difficult for local groups to compete; and that many people were simply turned off by "overkill."³³ Similarly the Young Voter Alliance also registered young people, focusing largely on the southern part of the state.

Other nonpartisan groups focused on increased registration as well. Victor Landa of the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP) came to New Mexico from Texas in March to train New Mexicans to register voters. He organized registration drives in seventeen communities, chosen for their high number of unregistered Hispanics, including Hobbs, Las Cruces, Silver City, Zuni, Gallup, McKinley county, and Santa Fe counties. Rather than moving door-to-door, it did site registrations at

²⁹ Courtney Hunter, New Mexico communications director, America Coming Together, telephone interview by Lonna Atkeson, December 30, 2004.

³⁰ The information in this paragraph comes from Dan Sena, regional director, Moving America Forward, telephone interview by Lonna Atkeson, January 4, 2005.

³¹ Sena interview, January 4, 2005.

³² Ibid.

³³ Lolita Roybal, youth organizer, Southwest Organizing Project, telephone interview by Nancy Carrillo, January 4, 2005.

grocery stores, fiestas, and churches. This group registered twenty thousand new voters in the state. After the registration deadline, it focused on mobilizing those newly registered voters using telephone calls and home visits. Landa estimates that about seventy percent of those it registered turned out to vote.³⁴ SVREP also targeted young people to vote with their “Take 5 and Drive” contest. Participants completed a form with the names of five friends they would get to the polls. If everyone on the form voted, the participant’s form went in a drawing for a Ford Mustang. The organization sent direct mail to advertise the contest, and followed up with recorded phone messages, including one by actor Danny Glover.

ACT started its New Mexico operation in late May with an office in Albuquerque, followed by an office in June in Santa Fe, one in Las Cruces (Doña Ana County) in July, and one in October in Española (Rio Arriba County).³⁵ Late in the campaign it also placed about 10 percent of its effort in more rural areas, including some of the larger cities in the North (Las Vegas, Gallup, and Los Alamos), and in the Southeast in Carlsbad and Roswell. Its state goals were the same as its national goals: to “defeat George Bush, elect John Kerry, and elect other progressive candidates,” and to do so by working on persuading registered Democrats, registered members of third parties and those “decline to state” voters through a focus on issues.³⁶ ACT used a large paid staff and volunteers for its efforts. Its voter issue identification project began in June. It found that, like other battleground states, its target voters saw Iraq as the top issue, but unlike other states there was no top second issue. In New Mexico, the other issues—health care, social security, education, and the economy—were equally important. ACT made over 200,000 contacts, and by August targeted voters were receiving at least one piece of mail each week on their “most important issue.” Courtney Hunter, communications director for ACT, anecdotally noted that Democrats in the Southeast were particularly hard sells, appearing scared and fearful and often arguing that even though “I don’t like Bush, we need to stay the course and let him finish the job he started and protect our families.”³⁷ Nevertheless Hunter believed their New Mexico efforts were successful, especially for increasing the turnout of younger voters.³⁸ ACT spent about \$3 million on its mobilization efforts.

The LCV’s goal was to focus on the top four hundred precincts that were identified as volatile (i.e. it could go for Bush or Kerry) and compact enough to enable face-to-face contact with voters.³⁹ Interestingly almost every precinct in Albuquerque was identified as “volatile.” In the end, it focused on the northeast areas of Albuquerque (Bernalillo County), as well as the cities of Santa Fe (Santa Fe County) and Rio Rancho (Sandoval County and a suburb of Albuquerque). It had four different canvass pieces all focused on environmental and energy issues. The LCV knocked on the doors of 80,000 households with a total of 175,000 door knocks, averaging over two door knocks per address. In addition, it had five mailings that it sent to about 12,000 potential voters. Two of these addressed dependence on foreign oil. The other three mailings specifically addressed New Mexico’s main environmental concerns: air and water pollution. It also spent \$16,500 on one small TV ad, late in the campaign. The LCV spent a total of \$8 million all for John Kerry and against George W. Bush.

The NARAL Pro-Choice America focused on two groups.⁴⁰ First, it focused on its membership, which consists of about five thousand men and women throughout the state. One positive and two negative

³⁴ Victor Landa, central region registration director, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, telephone interview by Nancy Carrillo, January 4, 2005.

³⁵ The data in this paragraph come from Courtney Hunter, New Mexico communications director, America Coming Together, telephone interview by Lonna Atkeson, December 30, 2004.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Hunter interview, December 30, 2004.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ The data in this paragraph come from Margaret C. Toulouse, New Mexico state campaign director, League of Conservaton Voters, telephone interview by Lonna Atkeson, December 21, 2004.

⁴⁰ The data in this paragraph come from Giovanna Rossi, executive director, NARAL Pro-choice New Mexico, telephone interview by Lonna Atkeson, December 21, 2004.

pieces of direct mail discussing medical privacy as well as abortion rights were addressed to donors and members from the national NARAL Pro-Choice America. Another piece of direct mail from the state organization compares Kerry and Bush (as well as congressional candidates) on abortion, medical privacy, judicial nominees, and the “gag rule” related to overseas medical clinics. Second, it attempted to reach infrequent women voters who cared about social issues by calling or by canvassing. To identify these women, they did a phone canvass that asked three questions, one each on the environment, gay rights, and choice. Women who supported at least two out of three of these issues were then targeted, resulting in a target group of about eleven thousand women. NARAL Pro-Choice America’s theme throughout was: “Voting, it feels good,” a predominantly GOTV message that was neither anti-Bush nor pro-Kerry. One nonpartisan mailer from the state office, for example, has two women talking, one saying, “Yeah, you should do it. It felt so good.” Their first priority for both target groups was to get them to vote by mail, and if a voter indicated she wanted to do so, NARAL Pro-Choice America sent her an absentee application. When this window closed, they shifted their focus to early voting. When early voting ended, they turned their remaining attention to a phone bank consisting of twenty-five phone lines and person-to-person contact. At this point their operation was folded into ACT for purposes of “live” phone calls whose only message was “go vote.” They were able to contact about 28,000 potential voters in the last four days.

The Democratic ally and progressive group MoveOn started its election efforts in June, late in the process by comparison.⁴¹ For Democrats this group was the closest mobilization effort to the Republican machine. It relied on a grassroots, volunteer campaign that used members to contact neighbors and friends mostly in Bernalillo and Santa Fe Counties. After a door-to-door voter identification campaign determined potential Kerry supporters and undecided voters, it followed up six or seven times with each target with in-person or phone contacts. Like other groups, MoveOn encouraged targeted voters to vote early or absentee. Its main theme was “beat Bush,” and for these advocacy efforts MoveOn used its PAC status and hard dollars. Though part of the America Votes Coalition, it asserted its independence by choosing not to participate in GOTV efforts on Election Day. Consequently, it occasionally overlapped with other groups because of its reliance on volunteer door-to-door activity. MoveOn was also busy as a 527, educating voters on Bush policies through two TV commercials.

The Sierra Club began its voter identification process in March and, with directions from the national group, had clear-cut compliance standards for staying within the law.⁴² It used 501(c)(3) money for voter education and 501(c)(4) monies when specifically advocating for a candidate. For example, 501(c)(4) money was used for endorsement materials. The organization mostly focused on its seven thousand state members through phone banks and phone contacts; it used a chapter in California for these efforts as well. Like other Democratic and Republican groups, it encouraged its members to vote absentee or early. Much of its efforts overlapped with other groups, and, according to Rio Grande Chapter President Susan Martin, some members got angry about the abundance of calls. Organizers explained that “if every member voted, it could make the difference in the election outcome.”⁴³ Indeed long-term member John Schultze quit the Sierra Club after begging them to stop calling.⁴⁴ Sierra Club members also volunteered for candidate campaigns and Moving America Forward.

⁴¹ The information in this paragraph comes from Ed Sullivan, New Mexico state organizer, MoveOn.org, telephone interview by Lonna Atkeson, January 5, 2005.

⁴² The information in this paragraph comes from Susan Martin, Rio Grande chapter president, the Sierra Club, telephone interview by Lonna Atkeson, January 6, 2005.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ John Schultze, former member, Sierra Club, interview by Lonna Atkeson, Santa Fe, New Mexico, November 2, 2004.

A variety of other groups also focused on GOTV efforts. In Albuquerque the Association of Community Organizing for Reform Now, New Mexico (ACORN) hired citizens to visit homes in highly Hispanic neighborhoods with a nonpartisan GOTV message. Peace Action sent activists from California to canvass select neighborhoods in urban areas, armed with a voter guide comparing the candidates on nuclear waste and weapons policy. It also sent out one piece of direct mail.

Evaluation of Activity

Overall, the campaign influenced New Mexico's political landscape. As shown in table 6-5, from 2000 to 2004, the electorate grew by 131,839, a 13.5 percent increase. Democratic allies that targeted young voters were particularly successful. While voters under twenty-five comprise only 11 percent of registered voters in the state, this group represented 36 percent of new voters. Changes in county voter registration from 2000 to 2004 are shown in table 6-6. It also shows the overall change in the distribution of these three registration categories. The data indicate that despite large increases in overall registration, Democratic registration declined in twelve counties and Republican registration declined in four. The big winner in terms of party registration was the no party option of "decline to state," which increased in every county. When we examine the overall change in each county, we find that Democrats on average lost more of the registration pie than they gained, actually losing a small proportion of the overall registration numbers in twenty-eight of thirty-three New Mexico counties. At the state level, Democratic registration declined two percent, from 52 percent to 50 percent, from 2000 to 2004, while Republican registration saw no overall percentage change. So, while both Republican and especially Democratic groups were able to increase overall registration, they were unable to attract as many of these voters as they hoped into their own party.

The GOTV efforts were largely successful for both groups, and turnout in the state increased by 22.9 percent from 615,607 voters in 2000 to 756,304 in 2004 (see table 6-5). Both Democratic and Republican groups were also successful at getting voters to the polls early, which was a big push for both groups.⁴⁵ Early voting saw lines and waiting periods unheard of in New Mexico and represented 31 percent of voting activity. Another 20 percent voted absentee. In 2004 just over half (51 percent) of the electorate cast its ballot before Election Day. This represented a large change from 2000 when over two-thirds (69 percent) voted on Election Day and only 13 percent voted early.

The basic strategy of both parties was to turn out their base. For Democrats, this represents the most populated counties in the state. Democrats worked hardest in these areas to get out the vote and by all counts succeeded as seen in table 6-7, which shows the total votes in each county by party. For example, in Bernalillo Democrats increased their turnout by 33 percent, while Republican turnout increased by 28 percent. In Santa Fe, Democrats turned out an additional 15,000 voters for an increase of 47 percent, while the Republican increase was only 32 percent. Republicans, therefore, had to offset the gains of Democrats in the more urban areas of the state with gains in the more rural counties. Amazingly, the Republican strategy of offsetting the northern and more populated parts of the state with the southeastern and less populated part of the state was a success. As table 6-7 shows, in the Southeastern part of the state (including Lea, Eddy, Otero, Curry, Roosevelt, Lincoln and Chaves), Republicans increased their percentages consistently and with gains much larger than the Democrats. The difference in the change in votes for the party candidates from 2000 exemplifies the Republican success. For example in Lea County, the difference in the change in votes for the party candidates, showed a surge for Bush of 47.5 percent. In Eddy County the Republican increase compared to Democrats was 31.6 percent. These data indicate that

⁴⁵ Information comes from New Mexico Secretary of State, "Canvass of Returns of General Election Held on November 2, 2004—State of New Mexico" (www.sos.state.nm.us/PDF/Gensumm_04.pdf [January 12, 2005]); and Steve Fresquez, director of data process, Information Systems Division, New Mexico Secretary of State Office, Bureau of Elections, telephone interview by Mekoce Walker, January 7, 2005.

in the end, the Bush-Cheney strategy was successful, resulting in a win for Bush. Strategically, the Democratic error involved ignoring or at least not attending to voter mobilization in the rural and especially southeastern parts of the state where Republicans invested greater resources in terms of candidate visits, manpower (people on the ground and organization), and voter registration. Simply stated, the Democrats put most of their balls in the same “large population” courts.

According to exit polls, Republicans also made Election Day gains among New Mexico Hispanics.⁴⁶ Gore won two thirds of the Hispanic vote in 2000, while Kerry received only 56 percent of it. Exit polls indicated that 21 percent of New Mexico Hispanics, compared to 11 percent of Hispanics nationally, viewed strong leadership as the attribute that mattered most in their voting decision, and fully 83 percent of these voters supported Bush. Hispanics were about equal with their national counterparts on moral values, with one in five New Mexico Hispanics identifying it as their top issue in making their vote decision.⁴⁷

Finally, despite a focus on American Indians by Democratic groups and the extensive fieldwork done by the Kerry campaign and DPNM in Indian Country (especially McKinley County), it did not appear to help Kerry. Data in table 6-6 indicate that in McKinley County, Bush achieved a 5 percent gain compared to 2000, while Kerry received no vote gain compared to Gore in 2000.

Conclusion

In the end, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) did not attenuate campaign activity. Groups were still able to do what they had always done, though, in some cases, they had to change the source of the money to do it. For example, for the Bush-Cheney and Bush Victory 2004 campaigns, that meant relying on hard money for their mobilization efforts. Bush also benefited from the air and ground-war activities of 527 groups like the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and the November Fund. Democrats relied heavily on 527s and very carefully targeted educational activities using their 501(c)(3) status. When pressed about the source of funds, group leaders mentioned the lawyers and directives involved because of BCRA; however, organizational leaders never seemed to think that BCRA hindered their activities.

What seems clear is that the ground war and how and where voters were targeted is important in understanding the New Mexico outcome. Person-to-person contact was successful for both groups, but in the end it was more successful for the GOP who were able to turn out Bush voters in both the urban and especially the rural counties. Where Democrats organized and fought, they fared better, but the areas they ignored were staffed, organized and won by the GOP and President Bush. It is also important to note that the GOP may also have benefited from its style of person-to-person contact that emphasized what neighbors might have in common, e.g. veterans for veterans, hunters for hunters, *etc.* It seemed to work better than the paid and volunteer staff used more frequently by Democratic allies who often had no specific social connection to those they contacted. In a close race, minor differences in mobilization tactics may be pivotal for a group’s success.

⁴⁶ It is important to be very careful with our inference here. Fully 51 percent of voters turned out before Election Day and we have no way of knowing if Election Day voters were representative of those who voted early or absentee. Indeed they may well not be representative given the targets by GOP and Democratic groups. Therefore our inference with these voters is to Election Day voters only.

⁴⁷ Barry Massey, “Bush Made Gains Among N.M. Hispanics,” *Santa Fe New Mexican*, November 6, 2004, p. B4.

Table 6-1
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
New Mexico Presidential and 1st Congressional District Races, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc.	\$1,647,355	\$85,903	\$1,733,258	\$4,069,065
Romero for Congress	\$772,879	...	\$772,879	\$1,661,226
John Kerry / DNC	\$211,390	\$8,055	\$219,445	\$514,170
<i>Political parties</i>				
DNC	\$2,008,690	\$144,993	\$2,153,683	\$1,916,970
DCCC	\$899,090	...	\$899,090	\$908,037
<i>Interest groups</i>				
The Media Fund	\$378,324	\$37,235	\$415,559	\$1,034,567
AFSCME	\$215,895	...	\$215,895	...
MoveOn.org	\$136,555	...	\$136,555	\$308,035
American Family Voices	\$98,030	...	\$98,030	\$32,438
American Federation of Teachers	...	\$73,490	\$73,490	...
New Democratic Network	\$66,500	...	\$66,500	\$88,803
National Air Traffic Controllers	\$36,080	...	\$36,080	\$44,417
American Federation of Government Employees	...	\$20,987	\$20,987	...
Heritage Forest Campaign	\$14,800	\$2,415	\$17,215	...
League of Conservation Voters	\$16,590	...	\$16,590	\$49,590
Save Our Environment	\$15,700	...	\$15,700	\$48,656
TrueMajority.org	...	\$14,955	\$14,955	...
Stronger America Now	\$12,505	...	\$12,505	\$13,554
National Resource Defense Council	\$14,650	...	\$14,650	\$32,198
National Progress Fund	\$5,700	...	\$5,700	...
Moving America Forward	...	\$1,120	\$1,120	...
AFL-CIO	\$173,091
People for the American Way	\$1,204
Republican allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Bush/Cheney '04	\$1,354,780	\$187,091	\$1,541,871	\$2,334,837
Heather Wilson for Congress	\$1,398,682	\$63,552	\$1,462,234	\$2,270,718
Bush/Cheney '04 / RNC	\$651,135	...	\$651,135	\$1,973,126
<i>Political parties</i>				
RNC	\$1,145,065	\$63,570	\$1,208,635	\$509,543
NRCC	\$1,024,705	...	\$1,024,705	\$779,702
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth	\$895,655	...	\$895,655	\$741,055
Progress for America	\$826,015	\$16,215	\$842,230	\$846,117
November Fund	\$206,290	...	\$206,290	...
United Seniors Association	\$149,975	\$7,200	\$157,175	\$225,836
National Rifle Association	...	\$14,409	\$14,409	...
The Latino Coalition	...	\$11,400	\$11,400	...
Priests for Life	...	\$9,800	\$9,800	...
American Family Coalition	...	\$3,030	\$3,030	...
National Right to Life	...	\$3,000	\$3,000	...
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$56,591
Alliance for Quality Nursing Home Care	\$54,687

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Other party allies				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Michael Badnarik for President	\$29,920	\$5,994	\$35,914	\$102,407
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Compare Decide Vote	\$28,825	...	\$28,825	...
New Mexico Alliance for Legal Reform	\$28,510	...	\$28,510	...
JustGoVote.org	\$9,628	...	\$9,628	...
American Civil Liberties Union	...	\$2,700	\$2,700	...
People Who Believe the Truth Really Matters	\$1,560	...	\$1,560	...
New Mexico Sees	...	\$1,500	\$1,500	...
AARP	\$84,198

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 6-4.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. For instance, Progress for America Voter Fund data have been included in the Progress for America totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 6-2
Registration Totals by Party and Decline to State,
Ranked by County from Most to Least Number of Registered Voters

County	Democrat	Republican	No Party	Other	Total Registered
Bernalillo	162,461	122,840	60,002	11,118	356,421
Santa Fe	58,254	17,432	14,051	4,980	94,717
Doña Ana	47,767	28,078	16,337	2,528	94,710
Sandoval	29,227	22,278	10,158	2,288	63,951
San Juan	24,134	28,540	10,118	716	63,508
Valencia	18,438	12,058	5,110	1,051	36,657
McKinley	22,910	6,077	5,786	536	35,309
Chaves	12,954	15,335	4,265	907	33,461
Otero	11,192	14,545	5,097	215	31,049
Lea	11,601	13,350	4,475	65	29,491
Eddy	15,256	9,706	2,881	85	27,928
Rio Arriba	19,804	2,879	1,562	510	24,755
Taos	15,523	3,489	2,876	1,192	23,080
Grant	12,885	5,114	2,862	630	21,491
Curry	8,444	10,104	2,744	57	21,349
San Miguel	15,494	2,873	2,109	605	21,081
Cibola	9,572	3,039	1,347	323	14,281
Lincoln	3,945	7,817	1,875	382	14,019
Los Alamos	4,964	5,751	2,458	401	13,574
Socorro	6,605	3,783	1,532	480	12,400
Luna	5,980	3,552	1,417	186	11,135
Roosevelt	4,627	4,464	1,765	88	10,944
Torrance	4,182	3,956	1,113	307	9,558
Colfax	4,960	2,637	788	146	8,531
Sierra	3,090	3,113	1,000	55	7,258
Quay	3,798	1,848	496	46	6,188
Mora	3,451	741	115	103	4,410
Guadalupe	3,110	458	60	66	3,694
Hidalgo	2,138	672	133	43	2,986
Catron	970	1,478	282	18	2,748
Union	1,387	981	134	24	2,526
De Baca	985	386	83	10	1,464
Harding	383	366	28	7	784
Total	550,491	359,740	165,059	30,168	1,105,458

Source: Secretary of State, "Voter Registration Report for 04 Election," (www.sos.state.nm.us/Election/04general/county.htm [January 29, 2005]).

Table 6-3
Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidate Visits to New Mexico by County,
July 1 through Election Day 2000 and 2004

County	Democratic Ticket 2000	GOP Ticket 2000	Democratic Ticket 2004	GOP Ticket 2004
Bernalillo	7	3	4	4
Santa Fe	2	0	2	0
Doña Ana	0	2	2	1
Sandoval	0	1	0	1
San Juan	0	0	0	2
Valencia	0	1	0	1
McKinley	0	0	1	0
Chaves	0	1	0	1
Otero	0	0	0	1
Lea	0	0	0	1
San Miguel	0	0	1	0
Total	9	8	10	12

Note: Counties not included were not visited.

Source: Data compiled by authors.

Table 6-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
New Mexico Presidential Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc.	15	1	...	1	6	1	41	65
John Kerry / DNC	10	10
<i>Political parties</i>								
DNC	5	12	...	1	...	2	24	44
New Mexico Democratic Party	...	18	...	2	2	22
Democratic Party of Santa Fe County	1	...	1	1	3
<i>Interest groups</i>								
MoveOn.org	58	1	2	61
America Coming Together	6	18	...	2	26
Sierra Club	...	17	...	1	1	...	1	20
Labor ^d	...	7	1	6	14
League of Conservation Voters	...	5	...	6	1	12
The Media Fund	1	6	7
Human Rights Campaign	...	5	1	6
People for the American Way	...	5	1	6
Democracy for America	5	5
Moving America Forward	...	4	1	...	5
NARAL Pro-Choice America	...	5	5
JustGoVote.org	...	3	1	4
New Mexico Federation of Education Employees	...	4	4
Peace Action	1	1	...	2	4
American Federation of Teachers	...	2	1	...	3
Individual Donor: George Soros	...	1	2	3
New Democratic Network	3	3
American Civil Liberties Union	...	1	1	...	2
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now	2	2
Greenpeace	...	2	2
Heritage Forest Campaign	1	1	2
Stronger America Now	2	2
America Family Voices	1	1
Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund	...	1	1
NAACP National Voter Fund	...	1	1
National Air Traffic Controllers	1	1
National Progress Fund	1	1
National Resource Defense Council	1	1
New House PAC	1	1
Physicians for Social Responsibility	...	1	1
Planned Parenthood Action Fund	...	1	1
Public Citizen	...	1	1
Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice	...	1	1
Save Our Environment	1	1
Southwest Organizing Project	1	1
True Majority	1	...	1

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Republican allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Bush/Cheney '04	...	3	2	20	25
Bush/Cheney '04 /RNC	21	21
<i>Political parties</i>								
RNC	...	41	...	2	...	1	3	47
Republican Party of New Mexico	...	1	...	1	2
<i>Interest groups</i>								
NRA Political Victory Fund	...	1	1	4	6
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth	...	2	4	6
Progress for America	...	1	4	5
National Right to Life	...	2	1	...	3
The November Fund	...	2	1	3
America's PAC	1	1
American Family Coalition	1	1
Citizen Leader Coalition	...	1	1
National Right to Work Committee PAC	...	1	1
Priests for Life	1	...	1
Nonpartisan								
<i>Interest groups</i>								
Southwest Voter Registration Education Project	...	1	2	3
Campaign for Communities	...	1	1
Compare Decide Vote	1	1
Leadership Forum	...	1	1
National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials	...	1	1
New Mexico Conservation Education Fund	...	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 6-1.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, Sierra Club Rio Grande Chapter data have been included in the Sierra Club totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates they supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^d The labor category under Democratic affiliated interest groups includes the AFL-CIO, AFSCME, Service Employees International Union, and United Automobile Workers Union.

Table 6-5
Changes In State Party Registration and Voter Turnout from 2000 to 2004

	2000	2004
Registered voters	973,533	1,105,372
Turn-out	615,607	756,304
Absentee	18%	20%
Early	13%	31%
Voting day	69%	49%

Source: Information comes from New Mexico Secretary of State, “Canvass of Returns of General Election Held on November 2, 2004—State of New Mexico” (www.sos.state.nm.us/PDF/Gensumm_04.pdf [January 12, 2005]); and Steve Fresquez, director of data process, Information Systems Division, New Mexico Secretary of State Office, Bureau of Elections, telephone interview by Mekoce Walker, January 7, 2005.

Table 6-6
Change in Registration Data from 2000 to 2004

County	Change in Democratic Registration	Change in Republican Registration	Change in Decline to State Registration	Percentage Difference Democrats 2004-2000	Percentage Difference Republicans 2004-2000	Percentage Difference Decline to State 2004-2000
Bernalillo	10.9	9.5	42.3	-1	-2	3
Santa Fe	20.1	11.11	46.7	0	-2	3
Doña Ana	10.9	11.9	51.4	-2	-1	4
Sandoval	24.3	30.9	79.4	-2	0	4
San Juan	3.8	20.7	28.7	-4	2	2
Valencia	7.8	13.7	50.2	-3	0	3
McKinley	6.4	6.7	50.9	-4	1	4
Chaves	-8.4	7.1	36.8	-5	2	3
Otero	1.1	21.8	43.2	-5	2	3
Lea	-7.4	24.1	35	-7	5	3
Eddy	-9.5	11.3	27.1	-5	4	2
Rio Arriba	8	17.4	17.2	-2	1	1
Taos	24.8	9.1	32.5	2	-2	1
Grant	4.4	11.5	31.2	-3	1	2
Curry	-7.8	22.7	16.2	-7	6	1
San Miguel	10.5	17.6	88	-4	1	4
Cibola	5	6.9	41.6	-2	0	2
Lincoln	-4	15.3	14.1	-4	4	0
Los Alamos	-1.7	-1.4	13.4	-1	-2	2
Socorro	11.7	7.2	43.2	-1	-2	2
Luna	2	4.6	37.4	-2	0	3
Roosevelt	4.9	18.6	46.6	-7	3	3
Torrance	2.9	12.5	58.3	-3	0	4
Colfax	-3.8	3.3	8.3	-2	1	1
Sierra	7.2	0.6	2.6	-2	1	1
Quay	-7.5	10.2	21.8	-4	3	1
Mora	8.8	2.9	78.5	0	-1	0
Guadalupe	8.3	-8.1	22.5	1	-3	1
Hidalgo	-13.2	-0.3	-3	-2	2	0
Catron	-8.9	12.4	17.9	-5	-4	1
Union	0.7	9.1	6.4	-2	2	0
De Baca	-12.2	14.1	40.7	-5	4	2
Harding	-1.8	-8	44.4	2	1	1
Total	8.3	13.5	42.1	-2	0	3

Source: Data compiled from New Mexico Secretary Of State, "Final Voter Registration Report by County as of 11/02/2004," (www.sos.state.nm.us/Election/04general/county.htm [January 29, 2005]); and New Mexico Secretary of State, "Voter Registration Report by County as of 11/2000," (www.sos.state.nm.us/avrs/november.htm [January 29, 2005]).


Table 6-7
Vote Choice in 2004 and Change in Party Vote Choice From 2000 by County

County	Democrat 2004	Republican 2004	Percent Increase Democrat	Percent Increase Republican	Difference in Increase (Democrats- Republicans)
Bernalillo	132252	121454	33.0	27.5	5.5
Santa Fe	47074	18466	47.0	32.1	14.9
Dona Ana	31762	29548	32.8	39.0	-6.2
Sandoval	21421	22628	43.8	46.7	-2.9
San Juan	14843	29525	23.9	37.7	-13.8
Valencia	11270	14474	14.8	34	-19.2
McKinley	13051	7351	26.9	45.0	-18.1
Chaves	6726	14773	6.1	29.8	-23.7
Otero	6433	14066	17.7	37.1	-19.4
Lea	3646	14430	-5.4	42.1	-47.5
Eddy	6880	13268	-3.2	28.4	-31.6
Rio Arriba	9753	5149	19.4	47.3	-27.9
Taos	10987	3666	56.1	33.6	22.5
Grant	7095	6135	25.1	23.7	1.4
Curry	3541	10649	2.0	28.3	-26.3
San Miguel	8683	3313	32.8	49.6	-16.8
Cibola	3913	3477	-5.2	26.3	-31.5
Lincoln	2822	6070	39.2	36.2	3.0
Los Alamos	5206	5810	25.5	3.3	22.2
Socorro	4025	3696	22.2	16.5	5.7
Luna	3340	4164	12.3	22.7	-19.7
Roosevelt	2082	4997	18.2	32.8	-14.6
Torrance	2386	4026	27.7	39.3	-11.6
Colfax	2824	3082	6.4	18.5	-12.1
Sierra	1926	3162	14.0	16.2	-2.2
Quay	1422	2661	-3.3	16.1	19.4
Mora	1876	928	28.8	38.9	-10.1
Guadalupe	1340	914	24.5	66.8	-42.3
Hidalgo	861	1081	2.6	13.3	-10.7
Catron	551	1427	56.1	12.1	44.0
Union	411	1454	-9.1	14.6	-23.7
De Baca	281	706	-19.5	15.4	-34.9
Harding	259	380	21.0	3.8	17.2
Total	370,942	376,930	29.3*	31.6*	-2.3

*Average percent increase from 2000 to 2004

Sources: New Mexico Secretary of State, canvass report of the 2004 election, (www.sos.state.nm.us/ [January 29, 2005]). For 2000 data, New Mexico Secretary of State, "Official 2000 General Election Results By County By Office," (www.sos.state.nm.us/Election/00General/cntyindx.htm [January 29, 2005]).

Figure 6-1
New Mexico Presidential Election Polls, July 8 to November 1



Source: Poll data taken from RealClear Politics (realclearpolitics.com [December 31, 2004]).

The Battle for Ohio: The 2004 Presidential Campaign¹

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In 2004, one bit of conventional wisdom was strongly confirmed: the presidential election was settled in Ohio. From the outset, the Buckeye state was a focus of the presidential campaigns and their allies, producing a level of campaign activity unprecedented in modern times. This struggle included intensive candidate combat (rallies and events), an extensive air war (broadcast advertising), and an extraordinary ground war (voter registration and contact programs). On the last count, innovations in grassroots organization on both sides were especially noteworthy. As a consequence, the level of voter participation approached modern day records and the contest went right down to the wire.

Despite its unusual intensity, scope and duration, the battle for Ohio resembled a classic contest between a marginal incumbent and a quality challenger. George W. Bush played the first role, having won Ohio by a small margin in 2000. John F. Kerry was the quality challenger, well-funded and well-organized, and poised to exploit the incumbent's problems. As is often the case in such races, the incumbent edged out the challenger: President Bush won reelection by winning 50.7 percent of the Ohio vote and the state's twenty electoral votes.

The Battlefield

The battle for Ohio was waged across the state's complex terrain. A critical feature was its great social, economic, and cultural diversity. In demographic terms, Ohio is a microcosm of the nation, with just a few exceptions.² Thus, from the perspective of both the incumbent and challenger, the Buckeye state was a "target rich" environment. Such targeting was made easier by Ohio's political geography. The state has five distinct regions with unique collections of big cities, suburbs, and rural areas, one or more media markets, and at least one major newspaper (see figure 7-2).³ *Northeastern Ohio* contains the sprawling metropolitan areas of Cleveland, Akron, Canton, and Youngstown. Democratic and liberal, it is the most populous region of the state. *Central Ohio* contains the state capitol, Columbus, and its rapidly growing suburbs, an area that is on balance Republican but increasingly cosmopolitan. *Southwestern Ohio* is the most Republican and ideologically conservative region. It includes Cincinnati, Dayton and Springfield, and their suburban and rural hinterlands. *Northwestern Ohio* includes the Toledo metropolitan area, but also small cities like Lima and Findlay and farming areas. It is on balance Republican and conventional. *Southeastern Ohio* is part of Appalachia: largely rural, economically depressed, and culturally traditional. The least populous region, it has a penchant for voting against incumbents.

In 2004 this diversity was compounded by a complex issue agenda. For starters, the Buckeye state was hit very hard by the 2001 recession. The loss of jobs approached one-quarter of a million, with more than 60,000 in manufacturing. Northeastern Ohio was hurt the most, with Cleveland losing 8 percent of its employment after 2001 and becoming America's poorest major city.⁴ A powerful symbol of these economic woes was the announced closure of the Timken bearing plants in Canton, where President Bush

¹ The authors would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Annie Hanson, Dan Birdsong, and Delton Daigle.

² One exception is the Latino population (about 1 percent compared to 12 percent of the country at large). This section draws upon John C. Green "Ohio: The Heart of it All" (www.bepress.com/forum/vol2/iss3/art3 [December 10, 2004]).

³ *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, "The Five Ohios" (www.cleveland.com/fiveohios [December 10, 2004]).

⁴ Paul Farhi, "Jobs Loss May Affect Who Wins the Vote," *Washington Post*, June 1, 2004, p. A1; *Wall Street Journal*, "Midwest Express: A Campaign Rooted in the Heartland," June 2, 2004, p. A2; Steven Litt, "Retail Plan Brings Worst of Suburbs to Flats," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, October 5, 2004, p. E1.

had proclaimed the success of his economic policy.⁵ Even when the recovery began, Ohio lagged behind the rest of the country, with unemployment consistently exceeding 6 percent.

The weak economy presented the Democratic challenger with a great opportunity. Other factors were also favorable. Ralph Nader failed to get on the ballot in the state, removing a potential drain on the anti-incumbent vote.⁶ In addition, several prominent state Republican officeholders were tainted by scandal, while others were unpopular, including Governor Taft, the co-chair of the Ohio Bush campaign. The surprising results of the 2000 election were also encouraging. After enjoying a double-digit lead in the polls, Bush won Ohio by just a 3.5 percent margin—even after Vice President Gore had pulled his TV advertising out of the state in early October.

However, the economy was not the only issue on the agenda in 2004. The wars on terrorism and in Iraq made foreign policy salient, giving the incumbent a potential source of strength. Social issues were also prominent. In defiance of GOP leadership, religious conservatives put a state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage on the ballot (Issue 1).⁷ Most observers felt Issue 1 would on balance help Bush. These non-economic issues were especially important in the southern and western regions of the state. In addition, the Ohio Republicans had formidable organizational resources, having dominated state politics for more than a decade.

Finally, the battle for Ohio took place in an atmosphere of uncertainty due to changes in the law. Campaign finance operated under new rules imposed by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), and it was unclear how the candidates and their allies would respond. In addition, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was largely untested—and unimplemented—in Ohio, creating controversy around voting rules and equipment. Indeed, a common view was that Ohio could be “another Florida” if the results were close.⁸

The Rival Forces

Over one hundred different entities were active in the battle for Ohio, including the presidential candidates, the major party organizations, and a wide range of interest group allies (see 7-1 for a listing of the most prominent entities). It is worth noting that there were also extensive campaign efforts by numerous individuals and informal groups, both from within and from outside the state.⁹

Bush-Cheney Campaign and the Republican Party

Bush’s campaign committee was the prime mover of the GOP campaign in Ohio. As an incumbent with an existing organization and no primary opposition, Bush was able to implement his strategy early. The result was a high degree of integration between the campaign and the Republican party committees. The Bush campaign directed events and conducted most of the air war, leaving a smaller role for the national committee. Meanwhile, the state and local committees carried out the bulk of the ground war, including personal contacts, telephone calls, and direct mail.

⁵ Mark Naymik, “Timken Could Add Fuel to Ohio Presidential Race,” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, May 15, 2004, p. A1.

⁶ See Alan Johnson, “Nader Off Ohio Ballot,” *Columbus Dispatch*, September 29, 2004, p. A1.

⁷ Alan Johnson, “Issue 1 Wording Makes it Strictest,” *Columbus Dispatch*, October 11, 2004, p. A1.

⁸ Jonathan Riskind, “Storm Brewing in Ohio: Voting Issues Right Mix for Repeat of Florida, Report Says,” *Columbus Dispatch*, October 20, 2004, p. A8.

⁹ The best known examples were full-page newspaper ads paid for by financier George Soros, a major donor to liberal 527 committees. Alan Johnson, “Billionaire Brings Crusade to Oust President to Ohio,” *Columbus Dispatch*, October 14, 2004, p. A8.

To conduct the ground war, the GOP constructed an extraordinary grassroots organization that reached into every region of the state.¹⁰ Based on roughly 150 field staff and involving some 12,000 local party officials, it recruited more than 85,000 volunteers. The overall effort also included a full-time registration coordinator, fifty field personnel dedicated to registration, and ten coordinators working with churches. These activists were recruited from social and political networks and the Bush web site, which generated six different kinds of “team leaders.” The success of these efforts relied on detailed information about voters, clear goals, and a high degree of accountability for results.¹¹ Another important factor was money: state campaign officials claimed to have never seen the level of resources for the grassroots effort.

Conservative Allies

Because of the integrated GOP organization in Ohio, many of the Republican constituencies did not mount independent campaign efforts. There were, however, some important allied interest groups. One example was Republican-leaning “527 committees,” which were largely involved in the air war. The most prominent were the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, Progress for America, the Club for Growth, and Let Freedom Ring. By law these groups could not coordinate their activities with the Bush campaign, but because they represented a small portion of the overall Republican effort, this lack of coordination was not problematic.

Other conservative groups operated through 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) tax-exempt organizations, which mobilized thousands of volunteers to register and get-out-the-vote (GOTV).¹² Of particular importance were Christian conservatives, including the Christian Coalition, Focus on the Family, and Citizens for Community Values (the group that put Issue 1 on the ballot). A number of programs were implemented by particular denominations, such as the “I Vote Values” campaign and “Five Questions for Serious Catholics.” A special set of groups reached out to the black community, with an emphasis on churches.

Other conservative groups active in Ohio included the National Rifle Association (NRA), the National Right to Life Committee, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Many business organizations were also involved in voter registration drives among their employees, operating as tax-exempt 501(c)(6) groups. For example, every Ohio member of the National Association of Manufacturers was active in this regard. Many businesses participated in “Helping Americans Vote” a web-based voter registration program.

Kerry-Edwards Campaign and the Democratic Coordinated Campaign

The Kerry campaign was “first among equals” in the Democratic effort, which relied heavily on allied interest groups and therefore was less integrated than the Republican camp. As a challenger, Kerry had to create a new campaign organization from scratch, but due to the unprecedented post-primary fund-raising, he quickly assembled a formidable team. The Kerry campaign directed the air war and the direct-mail effort, frequently in coordination with the national and state party committee. The ground war was conducted by a traditional Coordinated Campaign, a pooling of staff and finances by Democratic Party and candidate committees.¹³ In 2004, the Coordinated Campaign was especially well organized and

¹⁰ See Matt Bai, “The Multilevel Marketing of the President,” *New York Times Magazine*, April 25, 2004, p. 43.

¹¹ On the Republican targeting, see Katharine Q. Seelye, “How to Sell a Candidate to a Porsche-Driving, Leno-Loving Nascar Fan,” *New York Times*, December 6, 2004, p. A18.

¹² Matthew Dolan and Frank Langfitt, “Voters Elect to Take Stand on Faith: In Ohio, the Delicate Mix of Religion and Politics Help Clinch Re-Election for the President,” *Baltimore Sun*, November 7, 2004, p. A1.

¹³ On the Ohio Coordinated Campaigns, see Melanie J. Blumberg, William Binning, and John C. Green, “No Mo[mentum] in Ohio: Local Parties and the 2000 Presidential Campaign,” in *The State of Parties*, 4th ed., edited by John C. Green and Rick Farmer (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 203–213.

unusually flush with funds. Overall, it deployed over 100 field personnel and perhaps as many as 30,000 volunteers.

Liberal Allies

The most innovative part of the Democratic campaigns was the 527 committees, the largest of which were referred to as the “shadow Democratic Party.”¹⁴ For legal reasons, the 527 committees could not coordinate their work with the Kerry campaign or the Democratic Coordinated Campaign. This impediment was overcome to some extent by extensive press reports of their activities, a marked contrast to the Republicans, who could communicate largely out of public view. The heavy reliance on 527 committees probably reduced the efficiency of the Democratic effort, but brought extensive new resources to the campaign. The 527 committees did, however, work with each other with some effectiveness.

The Media Fund was a major participant in the air war and MoveOn.org also ran well publicized ads. Local 527 committees, such as Bring Back Ohio and Facts 4 Ohio, also participated in the air war, as did traditional Democratic allies, such as the AFL-CIO and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT).

The most prominent 527 committee was Americans Coming Together (ACT), which concentrated on voter registration and GOTV. ACT created an impressive grassroots organization based on paid canvassers.¹⁵ Concentrating in Democratic areas, ACT deployed 250 field staff and by Election Day had hired some 12,000 additional workers. It also recruited thousands of volunteers, many from out of state, whose numbers swelled as the election approached.¹⁶ The canvassing was reinforced by an extensive telephone and mail program conducted by the ACT state headquarters. As with the GOP organization, it relied on detailed information, clear goals, and strict accountability.

ACT was part of “America Votes,” an alliance of thirty-two labor and progressive membership groups dedicated to voter registration and GOTV. Most of these groups were active in Ohio, bringing hundreds of staffers and some 20,000 volunteers into play by Election Day. Of special note was the Service Employees’ International Union (SEIU) “hero” program, where union members worked full time on the grassroots campaign, and “Project Vote,” a voter registration program directed at low income areas organized by The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). Other prominent participants included MoveOn, the Sierra Club, NARAL Pro-Choice America, AFSCME, AFT, Human Rights Campaign, League of Conservative Voters (LCV), Young Voters Alliance, and NAACP.

A variety of other progressive groups were also active, including faith-based organizations such as the American Friends Service Committee, Pax Christi, Catholics for Kerry, and National Jewish Democratic Council. Special efforts aimed at mobilizing the youth were especially noteworthy in Ohio, including Rock the Vote, Vote Mob, the 21st Century Democrats, and the Hip-Hop Summit Action Network.¹⁷

Organized labor was deeply involved in the 2004 campaign apart from its support of America Votes. The Ohio AFL-CIO and its member unions implemented a grassroots program entitled “Take Back Ohio” and participated in the national AFL-CIO’s community-based program “Working America.” Organized all

¹⁴ Jim Drinkard, “Outside Political Groups Full of Party Insiders,” *USA Today*, June 28, 2004, p. A7.

¹⁵ Matt Bai, “Who Lost Ohio?” *New York Times Magazine*, November 21, 2004; see also Ann Gerhart “Steve Rosenthal Wages a \$100 Million Battle to Line Up Democratic Votes,” *Washington Post*, July 6, 2004, p. C1.

¹⁶ See Paul Farhi, “Parties Square Off In a Database Duel Voter Information Shapes Strategies,” *Washington Post*, July 20, 2004, p. A1.

¹⁷ John Higgins, “Political Foot Soldiers on March at College,” *Beacon Journal*, October 30, 2004, p. A1; Timothy Egan, “Vote Drives Gain Avid Attention of Youth in ’04,” *New York Times*, September 15, 2004, p. A1.

across Ohio, these efforts involved more than 5,000 volunteers who engaged in worksite contacts, door-to-door visits, and GOTV activities. Unions that were especially active with their own members included the United Steel Workers, AFSCME, Communication Workers, United Auto Workers, and the Ohio Educational Association.

Candidate Combat

The size of the rival forces was both a cause and a result of the close poll numbers in Ohio, which fluctuated within a very narrow range from March to Election Day (see figure 7-1). Indeed, the number of undecided and persuadable voters was uncharacteristically small from the beginning of the campaign. From this perspective, the campaign can be divided into four segments: 1) from May until the Democratic convention, when the lead changed hands and left Kerry slightly ahead; 2) the period between the two party conventions, when Bush pushed ahead; 3) the period after the Republican convention, when Bush's lead declined; and 4) the period from the presidential debates till Election Day, when Kerry pulled even and the race was very tight. On the day before the election, an average of Ohio polls showed Bush ahead by a little more than two percentage points—which proved to be his margin of victory.¹⁸

The most visible combat of the battle for Ohio was the many and varied campaign events staged by the candidates and their surrogates. The sheer number of visits was impressive even for a perennial battleground state. On the Republican side, Bush was in Ohio on thirty-two separate occasions; Cheney eighteen; Laura Bush, thirteen; and Lynn Cheney, fourteen. The comparable numbers for the Democrats were: Kerry, thirty-six; Edwards, twenty-five; Elizabeth Edwards, ten; and Teresa Heinz Kerry, eight.¹⁹ If one counts the actual events during these visits, the figures more than double. Numerous officials, politicians, and celebrities also campaigned in Ohio, headlined by Arnold Schwarzenegger for Bush and Bruce Springsteen for Kerry.

The variety of events was impressive as well, ranging from intimate town meetings and bus trips to formal speeches and mass rallies with tens of thousands of participants. These events covered every part of the state, including numerous forays into small cities and rural areas usually ignored in presidential campaigns. A good example was Zanesville, an Appalachian city last visited by a national campaign in 1912.

The rival campaigns had different approaches to events, however. The Bush events were carefully scripted and attendance was strictly limited to campaign supporters. Although criticized in the press, this strategy produced consistent messages, and more importantly, provided a potent reward to the campaign's army of volunteers.²⁰ The Kerry campaign opted for more traditional events, less scripted and open to its diverse constituencies. This approach produced more interesting news and inspired the legions of volunteers, many outside of the Kerry campaign proper.

Both campaigns visited Ohio regularly in the spring and surrounded their national conventions with Buckeye events in the summer. Kerry kept up a steady stream of appearances in the fall, but Bush was absent from the state for nineteen days after the presidential debates. Both campaigns finished with a flurry of activity in Ohio, hitting all of the major markets. Kerry rallied in Cleveland the Sunday before the election, while Bush was in Columbus on Election Day.

¹⁸ The poll average was done by RealClear Politics at (www.realclearpolitics.com [November 2, 2004]).

¹⁹ These counts were supplied by *Hotline*, personal communication to authors, November 20, 2004.

²⁰ David M. Halbfinger, "Going to Bush Rally, Finding Strings Attached," *New York Times*, September 28, 2004, p. A1.

The Air War

The air war waged in the 2004 battle for Ohio was unprecedented in volume, variety, and duration. It can be illustrated by two sources of data: Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG) data for TV advertising for the entire state and data produced by the Ohio Reconnaissance Network (ORN) for the major media markets (see table 7-1).²¹

The CMAG data reveal a total of \$87.2 million in TV spending; the ORN data show \$44.8 million of TV and radio, with a total of 104 different TV and 47 radio spots. According to the CMAG data, the Bush-Cheney and GOP committees spent less than the Kerry-Edwards and Democratic committees (\$31.6 to \$36.7 million), a disparity that grows quite large when the conservative and liberal allies are included (\$39.4 to \$60.9 million), largely due to the liberal 527 committees. The ORN data shows less of a discrepancy in TV buys in the major media markets, \$19.4 million for the Republicans and their allies and \$23.6 million for the Democrats and their allies. Interestingly, most observers judged the air war in Ohio to have been a draw, perhaps because the Republican effort was more unified.²²

The air war began early in February, and its intensity grew throughout the spring and early summer, so that by the time of the national conventions the air waves were saturated. Indeed, by mid-October there were no open ad slots left to buy on local TV news shows and local political candidates were crowded out by the presidential race.²³ By late August, six Ohio media markets ranked in the top ten nationally in terms of the spots purchased (Toledo #1; Cleveland #3; Cincinnati #4; Columbus #6; Youngstown #8; and Dayton #10).²⁴

Bush-Cheney Campaign and the Republicans

According to the CMAG data, the Bush campaign and Republican Party committees spent \$31.6 million on TV advertising in the battle for Ohio (table 7-1). The Bush committee spent \$16.2 million²⁵ and another \$12.9 million in combination with the Republican National Committee (RNC). The latter represented a creative interpretation of the campaign finance laws first exploited by the Republicans, allowing the national parties to split the cost of advertising with the candidate campaigns, so long as the ad mentioned “our leaders in Congress” or attacked the opponent by using phrases such as “Kerry and liberals in Congress.”²⁶ The RNC spent another \$2.5 million directly on the presidential campaign. The ORN data revealed the following figures for the major markets: Bush-Cheney, \$7.2 million; joint

²¹ The ORN data are based on information obtained from public files at stations in Cincinnati, Columbus, Cleveland, and Youngstown as well as reports of ads and other campaign contacts collected by some 250 informants.

²² Many of the Democratic activists interviewed noted that the advertising by liberal 527 committees was often counter-productive, a view reported by James Ruvolo, chairman, Ohio Kerry Campaign, interview by John Green and Annie Hanson, Akron, Ohio, December 8, 2004.

²³ Mark Ferenchik, “Presidential Campaigns Push Local Spots Aside,” *Columbus Dispatch*, October 17, 2004, p. D1.

²⁴ However, by October, only Cleveland (#6); Toledo (#7), and Columbus (#8) were still in the top ten. These data come from Nielsen Monitor-Plus and University of Wisconsin Advertising Project studies released in March, July, August, and October, 2004. For good descriptions of the Ohio air wars, see Paul Farhi, “Toledo Tube War: 14,273 Ads and Counting,” *Washington Post*, October 11, 2004, p. A1; and Jim Rutenberg, “Ads of Both Campaigns Zero in on a Typical City,” *New York Times*, June 9, 2004, p. A17.

²⁵ These figures include hard money raised during the pre-nomination campaign and public funds expended after the nomination.

²⁶ Liz Sidoti, “Bush Team Uses Loophole for Ad Buys,” *Associated Press*, September 23, 2004, (www.dispatch.com/election/election-president.php?story=dispatch/2004/09/23/20040923-A1-03.html [January 17, 2005]).

campaign and RNC, \$4.6 million; and the RNC, \$2.5 million. In addition, the ORN data found about \$0.7 million in radio ads in Ohio (\$0.5 million from Bush-Cheney and the balance from party committees).

The Republicans produced a large number of different spots (table 7-1). For example, the ORN data found that Bush-Cheney had twenty-three different spots on TV and five on radio. The RNC had ten different spots in each medium and one unique TV spot for the joint campaign/party spending. The variety of spots speaks to extensive targeting by demographic groups. But interestingly, the Bush team ran very few Ohio-specific ads, opting instead for national messages emphasizing Bush's leadership on national security matters and attacking Kerry as indecisive and liberal. The Bush/RNC ads emphasized tort reform and health care, contrasting the plan of "Kerry and liberals in Congress" with the Bush positions. The RNC ads were almost exclusively attacks on Kerry. The GOP also ran spots on black and Christian radio stations across the state.

The Republican advertising campaign was fairly constant over the campaign and extended to all the major and minor media markets, but there were some variations by time and geography. In July, only one Ohio market was in the top ten in GOP spots (Dayton #9), although the Republicans were quite active in smaller markets, such as Lima and Zanesville. By August, the GOP advertising had expanded dramatically, so that three major markets were in their top ten markets (Toledo #3; Cleveland #4, and Cincinnati, #5). But by mid-October, the air war had narrowed again, with just two Ohio markets in the Republican top ten (Cleveland #2 and Cincinnati #6).²⁷

Conservative Allies

The CMAG data found that Bush's conservative allies spent \$7.7 million on TV advertising in Ohio (table 7-1). The ORN data shows \$5.2 million in TV buys, and in addition, \$129,000 on radio. So, roughly speaking, the conservative allies provided about one-fifth of the advertising on the Republican side. These groups aired twenty-two unique TV and twelve different radio spots (table 7-1). Most of these efforts occurred after the Democratic convention and into the fall.

Two 527 committees were major participants in the Ohio air war: Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT) and Progress for America (PFA) (see table 7-1). The SBVT was the most active of these groups, and also the best known and most controversial. It attacked John Kerry's Vietnam War record and questioned his fitness to be commander-in-chief. Initially the group's ad buys were modest, but after a flood of national media coverage, the group received an infusion of cash that allowed it to run six different TV ads and one radio spot in Ohio (for a total of \$4 million).

PFA spent \$2.2 million in Ohio for a single ad, "Ashley's Story," a spot that described how President Bush comforted Ashley Faulkner, a teenager whose mother was killed in the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Strongly emotional, the PFA ad had a special appeal because Ashley was from Mason, Ohio, and a photo of Bush embracing her appeared in the *Cincinnati Enquirer*.²⁸

Other conservative groups active in the Buckeye air war included the United Seniors Association, the Chamber of Commerce, the NRA, and the Club for Growth. Citizens for Community Values spent one-half million dollars on TV ads advocating Issue 1, probably an indirect benefit to the Republican cause. Groups active on radio also included National Right to Life Committee and America's PAC, which ran

²⁷ These data come from the Nielsen Monitor-Plus and University of Wisconsin Advertising Project studies released in March, July, August, and October, 2004.

²⁸ Kristina Goetz, "Bush Pauses to Comfort Teen," *Cincinnati Enquirer*, May 6, 2004, p. C1.

anti-Democratic ads on black radio stations.²⁹ Together these groups ran nine unique TV and eight radio ads.

Kerry-Edwards Campaign and the Democrats

According to the CMAG data, the Kerry campaign and Democratic committees spent \$36.7 million on TV advertising in Ohio (see table 7-1). The Kerry-Edwards campaign spent \$19.5 and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) \$14.1 million. Another \$3.1 million was spent jointly by the Kerry campaign and the DNC in October, when the Democrats followed the Republican innovation in joint spending.³⁰ The ORN data showed Kerry-Edwards spending \$8.2 million in the major media markets, \$0.7 million in joint campaign/party spending, and \$8.4 million by the DNC. In addition, the Democrats spent \$617,000 on radio ads, with the largest portion coming from the DNC.

The Democrats produced a larger number of unique ads than the Republicans (see table 7-1): Kerry-Edwards with thirty-four unique ads and the DNC twenty-one (the Ohio Democratic party produced one TV ad). Unlike the Republicans, the Democrats produced many Ohio-specific spots. One spot featured a worker laid off from the defunct Timken plant near Canton speaking about job outsourcing, while another ad titled “Ohio Jobs” began with Kerry addressing Ohioans. The Kerry ads often emphasized economic issues, drawing attention to the state’s loss of manufacturing jobs and blaming Bush for failing to close tax loopholes that gave companies incentives to “outsource” jobs overseas. The Kerry campaign ran very few negative ads against Bush, sticking to comparative ads and positive ads about Kerry. The DNC mostly ran negative ads, many as independent expenditures.

The Democratic air war was also fairly constant over the campaign, especially in the major cities. By July, four Ohio media markets were in the top ten Kerry’ markets (Toledo #1; Columbus #3; Dayton #4; and Cleveland #7). By August, the Kerry campaign was giving top-ten priority to three Ohio markets (Toledo #1; Dayton #4; and Youngstown #6). But by October, the salience of the Ohio markets had declined to just two in the Democratic top ten (Columbus #6; and Charleston, WV #8), and the slack was taken up by DNC ads, with four Ohio markets in the top ten (Toledo #3; Cleveland #4; Cincinnati #5; and Columbus #7).³¹

Liberal Allies

The CMAG data found that liberal allies spent \$24.0 million dollars of TV ads; the ORN data found a total of \$7.2 million in the major TV markets, and in addition, \$445,000 was spent on radio (table 7-1). So, roughly speaking, the liberal groups accounted for two-fifths of the total advertising on the Democratic side. These groups aired forty-five unique TV and fourteen radio spots (table 7-1).

Although a number of traditional Democratic allies, especially labor and environmental groups participated in the air war, the liberal 527s were by far the most prominent. The Media Fund was the largest, spending a total of \$12.4 million on thirteen different TV and two radio ads. These spots assailed Bush on a variety of issues ranging from granting of no-bid contracts to Halliburton in Iraq to prescription drugs and job loss. These ads included spots made specifically for Ohio, such as “Ohio Outsourced,” criticizing Bush for a tax break that encouraged corporations to move jobs overseas.

²⁹ *Fox News*, “Anti-Dem Ads Airing on Black Radio,” September 29, 2004, (www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,133910,00.html [December 12, 2004]).

³⁰ The CMAG data demonstrate how the Republicans more effectively exploited this loophole statewide. The Bush/GOP joint spending on TV ads was \$12.9 million, compared to just \$3.1 million for Kerry/DNC.

³¹ These data come from the Nielsen Monitor-Plus and University of Wisconsin Advertising Project studies released in March, July, August, and October, 2004.

MoveOn spent \$6.7 million on eight different TV and two radio ads. These spots were not customized for Ohio, but offered especially sharp attacks on the President and his record. In the fall, MoveOn crafted two special ads in response to the SBVT, designed to shift the focus to Bush's National Guard record. It also introduced an ad in the last week of the campaign to compete with PFA's "Ashley's Story" for emotional appeal. The ad featured Brooke Campbell, whose brother Ryan was killed in Iraq, criticizing the President for joking about not finding weapons of mass destruction. However, MoveOn spent less in total on this spot than PFA spent on "Ashley's Story" in Ohio.³²

In contrast to the conservative 527 committees, the liberal groups began spending early in the year with the goal of keeping the contest close for the eventual Democratic nominee. In fact, these efforts were able to substantially match the Bush spending in Ohio throughout the spring, exclusively in the form of negative ads. Throughout the year, four Ohio media markets were consistently among the top ten for the liberal 527 committees (Toledo, Columbus, Cleveland and Dayton), with two more often making the list (Youngstown and Cincinnati).

The Ground War

Because the number of persuadable voters in Ohio was small and the impact of the air war was something of a draw, the ground war took on added importance. Here, too, the level, variety, and duration of activity were unprecedented in modern times.³³ Sophisticated grassroots organizations were the centerpiece of these efforts, aided by allied interest groups. Both camps had these organizations in place by May, earlier than in any previous campaign, and they continued to grow until Election Day.

There were three overlapping phases in the ground war: registration, pre-election contacting, and GOTV. Each phase involved a mix of face-to-face contacts, telephone calls, direct mail, and advocacy e-mail.³⁴ The ORN data found a total of 408 unique forms of contact and 348 different advocacy e-mails.³⁵ By these numbers, the Democrats appeared to have a slight advantage over the Republicans (210 forms of contact to 198 for the GOP; 290 to 58 in terms of e-mail). All told, these activities produced a high number of contacts with targeted voters. The average number of contacts may have been as high as twenty over the duration of the campaign, and during the GOTV phase, receiving eight to ten contacts was not uncommon.³⁶

Another innovative feature of the ground-war campaign was the high degree of coordination of the message across modes of communication. A striking example occurred during the Republican national

³² Jonathan Riskind, "Independent Ads Emit Emotion in Final Week," *Columbus Dispatch*, October 28, 2004, p. A4.

³³ James Dao, "To Get Ohio Voters to the Polls, Volunteers Knock, Talk, and Cajole," *New York Times*, November 1, 2004, p. A17.

³⁴ On telephone calls, see Jonathan Riskind, "Celebrities, Politicians Lend Voices for Late Push," *Columbus Dispatch*, November 2, 2004, p. A2; Carol Bilicsky, "Flurry of Recorded Ads Dial into Homes," *Beacon Journal*, October 30, 2004, p. B2; On mail, see Mark Naymik, "You've got Political Mail: Facing the Campaign Flood," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, October 19, 2004, p. A8; and Catherine Candisky, "Targeted Mailing Saturating Ohio Voters," *Columbus Dispatch*, October 28, 2004, p. A1.

³⁵ The e-mail data are from a sample of the e-mail reported by the ORN, while the other forms of contact represent the universe of reports. Thus, the two kinds of data should not be totaled.

³⁶ At this writing there are no reliable estimates of the amount of money spent on the ground war. But all told it may have equaled about one-half of the air war. See Stephen Ohlemacher, "Ohio Campaign a Struggle for Both Bush and Kerry," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, June 27, 2004, p. A1; Alan Johnson and Catherine Candisky, "New Emphasis on Voter Turnout Will Continue," *Columbus Dispatch*, November 7, 2004, p. A1.

convention: thousands of Ohioans received a recorded phone call from President Bush urging them to vote absentee and on the same day received a mailing with an absentee ballot application.³⁷

The Republican ground war put a strong emphasis on suburban and rural areas, especially thirty-one counties in the southern and western regions. Meanwhile, the Democratic ground war concentrated on the eight largest metropolitan areas, particularly the large cities. But both campaigns also worked on each other's turf: the GOP did not abandon Northeastern Ohio and the Democrats worked hard in the Southwest. In this regard, the larger GOP organization may have had a broader reach. Some observers believe that the Democratic ground war probably reached a few more potential voters, but that the Republican efforts were a bit more effective.³⁸

Part of the ground war was legal jockeying over election rules and the development of ballot security programs. Republicans raised the specter of vote fraud, and in accordance with state law, made plans to challenge voters' qualifications at polling places.³⁹ In response, Democrats charged vote suppression and intimidation, and deployed observers of their own at the polls. Both sides mobilized a small army of lawyers to handle anticipated problems. The Ohio Voter Protection Coalition, made up of organized labor, League of Women Voters, Project Vote, and other interest groups, stationed workers outside polling places to provide voters with information and assistance including a toll-free number that would reach a command center (at AFL-CIO state headquarters) ready to dispatch lawyers to the scene if necessary.⁴⁰

Bush-Cheney Campaign and the Republicans.

The Republicans built their volunteer organization to work through social and political networks at the local level.⁴¹ Successful trial runs were conducted in the summer and fall. The major voter contact program was dubbed "W ROCKS," ("Registration, Organizing, Calling, and Knocking"). The volunteers held some 3,254 house parties and staffed forty telephone banks. A key factor was the enthusiasm for Bush among the volunteers.⁴²

Although the Republican voter registration efforts began later than planned, it registered at least 175,000 voters.⁴³ Beyond registration, the GOP organization produced an impressive number of contacts before the election: 2,139,000 telephone calls and 339,000 doors knocked. The 72 Hour Task Force GOTV program produced an additional 1,795,000 telephone calls and 761,389 doors knocked in the last three days of the campaign. These numbers include more than one-half million contacts on Election Day alone.

³⁷ Alan Johnson, "Voters get Pitch from Bush to Cast their Ballot Absentee," *Columbus Dispatch*, September 1, 2004, p. C4.

³⁸ Many Ohio operatives agreed with this judgment, and so did Mark Mellman, principal, The Mellman Group, interview by Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 12, 2004.

³⁹ In part, the Republican voter challenges may have been a diversion designed to tie down Democratic resources. However, there was genuine concern about fraudulent voter registrations among many Republican officials in the state.

⁴⁰ Pierrette Talley, director, Ohio Voter Protection Coalition, interview by Stephen Mockabee and David Magleby, Columbus, Ohio, October 27, 2004. On the legal maneuvering see, Mark Niquette, "Dispute Over New Voters Rages on GOP Wants Provisional Ballots for Registrants it has Challenged," *Columbus Dispatch*, October 29, 2004, p. A1.

⁴¹ See John F. Harris, "In Ohio, Building a Political Echo Campaigns Rely on Word of Mouth to Spread Message," *Washington Post*, May 12, 2004, p. A1.

⁴² This section draws heavily on an interview with Robert Paduchik, executive director, Ohio Bush Campaign, interview by John Green and Annie Hanson, Akron, Ohio, November 13, 2004.

⁴³ John F. Harris, "Boasts and Bluster in the Ground War," *Washington Post*, October 4, 2004, p. A1.

These activities were reinforced by a large and sophisticated direct-mail program. Overall, the GOP sent 3.5 million pieces of mail in Ohio.⁴⁴ The ORN data reveal a total of eighty-eight unique pieces of mail from the Republican committees (table 7-1). This range of mail allowed for an extraordinary level of targeting. The mail program was supplemented by hundreds of thousands of automatic telephone calls during the last days of the campaign. The ORN data found fifty-nine unique calls from Republican committees by a wide range of personages, including Laura Bush, Rudy Guliani, Arnold Schwarzenegger and retired general Tommy Franks.

Advocacy e-mail also played an important role in the GOP effort. Directed by Ed Gillespie, the GOP “Team Leader” mailing list built an innovative electronic communication “tree.” Each team leader built and maintained e-mail contact with one or more teams. Leaders would use their own e-mail address to pass information and requests for action to their teams. In this way centrally initiated messages would come from someone the team member knew, not from someone in Washington, D.C. or some other distant locale.⁴⁵ The ORN data found fifty-eight unique advocacy e-mails advertising the campaign from GOP committees. The volume of such e-mail from GOP lists increased from March through May, flattened out during the summer, and then reached a crescendo in the weeks before the election.

Conservative Allies

The most prominent conservative allies in the ground war were religious conservatives.⁴⁶ The Christian Coalition fostered voter registration drives via “Citizenship Sunday” program and passed out two million voter guides, principally in evangelical Protestant congregations.⁴⁷ Citizens for Community Values reported registering some 50,000 voters as part of the Issue 1 petition drive and sending 2.5 million church bulletin-inserts to 17,000 Ohio churches. (One measure of the interest of conservative Christians was the 550,000 signatures collected on the Issue 1 petitions during the summer and fall.) An unusual range of denominations were involved in these efforts, including Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, black Protestants, and even the Amish. Another novel feature was the great interest of clergy in activating the vote on behalf of Issue 1. The National Right to Life Committee had seven mail pieces and three newspaper ads. Overall, the ORN data found sixteen unique mail pieces from religious conservatives and also six unique newspaper/magazine ads.

Other conservative groups were also active in the ground war. Both the SBVT and PFA produced mail pieces to accompany their broadcast ads. Another major player was the NRA, which produced four unique mail pieces and three newspaper/magazine ads. The ORN data found an additional twenty unique mail pieces from secular conservative groups. It is worth noting that the ORN data found few telephone calls and advocacy e-mails from the conservative allies.

Kerry-Edwards Campaign and the Democrats

The Kerry-Edwards campaign and the Democratic committees ran an especially effective version of the traditional Coordinated Campaign. This effort concentrated almost exclusively on voter contact and

⁴⁴ Johnson and Candisky, 2004.

⁴⁵ Joongsik Kim and Michael Margolis, “What They Did Online: Campaign E-mail in the 2004 Presidential Nominating Contests,” Paper presented at the APSA Political Communication pre-conference “Faith, Fun, and Futuramas,” University of Illinois, Chicago, September 1, 2004.

⁴⁶ Dolan and Langfitt, 2004; Frank Langfitt, “Proposition is Put to Test in a Swing State Amendment,” *Baltimore Sun*, October 16, 2004, p. 1A.

⁴⁷ This section is based in part on an interview with Chris Long, executive director, Ohio Christian Coalition, interview by John Green and Annie Hanson, Akron, Ohio, November 30, 2004.

GOTV. By Election Day, it had produced an estimated 1,250,000 telephone calls and 200,000 doors knocked. In the large urban counties, the GOTV activities were judged to be unusually effective.⁴⁸

The Democrats also mounted an extensive direct-mail campaign. There are no good estimates for the total number of pieces mailed, but several million is a reasonable guess offered by some observers. The ORN data reveal eighty-one unique pieces of mail from the Kerry-Edwards and Democratic committees. This large number of different mail pieces reveals a high degree of targeting, much of it Ohio-specific. And the Democrats made hundreds of thousands of automated telephone calls, from political personages such as Elizabeth Edwards, Bill Clinton, and John Glenn, but also from celebrities such as Sara Jessica Parker, Kirsten Dunst, and Hal Linden. The ORN data found forty-one different telephone messages from Democratic committees and also three newspaper ads by the DNC.

The Democratic camp was especially active in advocacy e-mail: the ORN data show 188 unique advocacy e-mails from the Kerry-Edwards and Democratic committee. The Kerry campaign used its web site to recruit and communicate with activists, who were encouraged to act as opinion leaders with friends, family, and coworkers, write letters to newspapers, and call radio and TV stations. But in contrast to the Republicans, the Democrats' requests tended to come directly from the center of the campaign, not through a mediated electronic network. The volume of advocacy e-mail from the Democratic camp was also quite high in the early spring and then reached its peak in the weeks before the election.⁴⁹

Liberal Allies

The Democratic Coordinated Campaign was predicated on the existence of the grassroots activities of the 527s and other liberal allies. Indeed, the largest innovation in the ground war was the grassroots efforts by ACT, including its voter registration, contact, and GOTV programs.⁵⁰ ACT began to organize in Ohio in late 2003 and began voter contact in February 2004. The initial plan was to cover the core Democratic areas with paid canvassers and then canvass the swing areas with volunteers. One goal was to register new voters, a program aided by a tour of celebrities in the fall, including Chad Lowe, Marissa Tomei, and Kevin Bacon. A second goal was to contact target voters a total of eight times, and six times before GOTV. The program was called "CKCC" ("card, knock, call, card"); the central activity was door-to-door canvassing, complemented by telephone calls and direct mail. In fact, many targeted voters may have been contacted a total of a dozen times by ACT before the end of the campaign. A final goal was a strong GOTV effort that involved a dramatic expansion of paid staff (twenty-fold in key areas) that made three contacts with targeted households on Election Day.⁵¹

Although ACT was unable to meet all of its goals (for example, the volunteer canvassing of swing areas was largely abandoned), the results were nonetheless impressive. ACT registered 85,000 voters, knocked on 3.7 million doors, and made hundreds of thousands of contacts by telephone and mail.⁵² The ORN data found that ACT had used five different telephone calls, thirty-two advocacy e-mails, and twenty-seven

⁴⁸ This section is based in part on an interview with James Ruvolo, chairman, Ohio Kerry Campaign, interview by John Green and Annie Hanson, Akron, Ohio, December 8, 2004.

⁴⁹ Kim and Margolis, 2004.

⁵⁰ See John F. Harris and Paul Farhi, "The Battle for Ohio: Taking the Campaign to the People, One Doorstep at a Time," *Washington Post*, April 18, 2004, p. A1.

⁵¹ This section is based on an interview with Jess Goode, communications director, America Coming Together Ohio, interview by David Magleby and Stephen Mockabee, Columbus, Ohio, October 27, 2004; Patricia Hallam, director, America Coming Together Akron, Ohio, interview by John Green and Annie Hanson, Akron, Ohio, November 11, 2004; and William Padisak, director, America Coming Together Youngstown, Ohio, interview by John Green, William Binning, and Annie Hanson, Youngstown, Ohio, December 6, 2004.

⁵² Chris Suellentrop, "I want my GOTV," *Slate*, October 25, 2004, (www.slate.msn.com/id/2108616 [October 30, 2004]).

unique pieces of mail. The latter focused on the economy and was carefully targeted to Ohio, complete with a symbol that closely resembled Ohio State University's logo.

ACT's efforts were part of America Votes, whose other members registered an additional 215,000 voters and made thousands of voter contacts. Among the coalition members, MoveOn was quite active in GOTV, with two different telephone calls and three unique pieces of mail. As one might expect from a "dot org," it was especially involved in advocacy e-mail, with 50 different messages. Other prominent groups were ACORN's Project Vote and the Sierra Club (three different calls, nineteen pieces of mail, and a newspaper ad.) Other liberal membership organizations combined for five different telephone messages, thirty-three unique pieces of mail, twenty different advocacy e-mails, and twelve newspaper ads. The liberal faith-based groups specialized in the latter.

Organized labor was a critical factor, both within and beyond America Votes.⁵³ The "Take Back Ohio" program distributed more than six million worksite flyers, knocked on two million doors, and did extensive GOTV work. In addition, "Working America" program contacted nearly 600,000 households in 2004. The ORN data found that labor unions had two different telephone calls, forty-nine unique pieces of mail, and five newspaper ads. Union officials are confident these programs reached a very high percentage of union members and households.

The Results

The hard fought battle for Ohio produced closely balanced results. Bush received 50.7 percent of the vote and Kerry 48.6 (or 51 and 49 percent of the two-party vote, respectively). Bush obtained roughly 2.86 million votes compared to Kerry's 2.74, for a margin of just over 118,000. Compared to 2000, the Republicans gained over 500,000 additional ballots, while the Democrats expanded their total by more than 550,000. Thus, Kerry was able to shave some 46,000 votes off of Bush's 2000 margin of 165,000. One important difference between 2000 and 2004 was the absence of Ralph Nader on the Ohio ballot, and it is quite possible that his absence accounted for Kerry's net gain in ballots.⁵⁴

A crucial part of the story was the dramatic increase in voter participation. The number of registered voters increased by 439,482, for a total of 7.9 million, an increase of 5.8 percent over 2000.⁵⁵ Almost 94 percent of the voting age population was registered to vote. The registration gains by the two sides appear to have been fairly even.⁵⁶ More importantly, turnout increased in 2004, rising to 71.8 percent of registered voters, an increase of 8.2 percent over the previous election. Put another way, almost a million more people cast presidential ballots than in 2000, for a record 5.7 million. One telling statistic is that the level of turnout was nearly equal in counties won by Bush (72.8 percent) and Kerry (72.5 percent).

True to form, Kerry won Northeastern Ohio comfortably (see figures 7-2 and 7-3); he also won seven of the eight major urban counties (and nearly carried Hamilton County due to strong support in the city of

⁵³ See William Burga, "Ohio Labor Has Much to be Proud of Despite Presidential Election Results," *Cleveland Citizen*, December 10, 2004; Alison Grant, "Business and Politics do Mix for Workers who Drive for Votes," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, September 28, 2004, p. C1. This section also relies on an interview with William Burga, director, Ohio AFL-CIO, interview by John Green, Canton, Ohio, December 21, 2004, and Derek Clay, executive director, SEIU Ohio, interview by John Green and Annie Hanson, Akron, Ohio, November 18, 2004.

⁵⁴ An analysis of the 2000 exit polls suggests that the absence of Nader would have given Gore about 50,000 extra votes; see Green, "The Heart of It All," 2004.

⁵⁵ Data on registration and turnout are available at the Ohio Secretary of State's Office web site at (www.sos.state.oh.us/sos [January 17, 2005]).

⁵⁶ Ohio does not have party registration, so the partisan tendencies of the counties are the best way to assess the impact of the voter registration. There was an increase of 205,362 (5.5 percent) in the counties won by Gore in 2000 and 234,120 (6.0 percent) in the counties won by Bush.

Cincinnati). In the sixteen counties he won, Kerry's margin was 56 percent, with a mean increase of 3 percent and a mean 9.6 percent increase in turnout over Gore's performance in 2000. The Democrats won Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) by a 217,000 vote margin, Franklin County (Columbus) by more than 40,000 votes, and bellwether Stark County (Canton). Although understandably disappointed with the outcome, the Democrats and their liberal allies were justifiably proud of these accomplishments, having met all their vote and turnout targets.⁵⁷

The Republicans carried Southwestern Ohio handily and won the other three regions as well. In the 72 counties he won, Bush had an average margin of 61 percent, with a mean increase of 2.1 percent and a mean 7.8 percent increase in turnout over his performance in 2000. The Republicans did well in suburban and rural counties, especially in southern and western Ohio. In this regard, Issue 1 (which passed by a large margin) may have helped the Bush campaign indirectly by encouraging high turnout among social issue conservatives in Republican areas. The Republicans and their conservative allies were able to meet or exceed their vote and turnout goals, especially in the thirty-one targeted counties.

In an important sense, the battle for Ohio was made possible by the new campaign finance rules under BCRA, with both sides effectively adapting to the new rules. The most obvious impact was the 527 committees and the deployment of some of the banned soft money in the air and ground wars. However, the increase in the hard dollar contribution limits to parties and candidates was just as important, allowing both parties to raise large war chests free from the legal constraints associated with spending soft money. In this regard two developments indirectly related to BCRA were critical: the decision by Bush and Kerry to forego public financing in the primaries, thus raising vast sums of pre-nomination money, and the ability of both parties to raise millions of dollars in small donations, much of it via the Internet. If reducing the amount of money in the presidential campaign was a goal of BCRA, then the battle for Ohio suggests it had little impact. However, if changing the sources and uses of campaign funds was the goal, then BCRA had a major impact—although not perhaps the one envisioned by its advocates.⁵⁸

Despite the fears that Ohio would be “another Florida” in 2004, the election took place with few confrontations and no more balloting problems than typically occur.⁵⁹ This situation is less a case of adaptation to HAVA than the fact that Bush won by a large enough margin to forestall any serious legal

⁵⁷ Steve Rosenthal, “How Bush Won Ohio,” *Washington Post Weekly Edition*, December 19–20, 2004, p. 23.

⁵⁸ Three other features of BCRA are worth mentioning. First, the ban on electioneering communication paid for by union or corporate money within sixty days of the election had little effect in Ohio. The 527s were able to spend within the window by raising hard dollars or funds from individual donors. Second, the ORN data suggests that the “Stand by Your Ad” BCRA provision was largely ineffective: the ORN data revealed that even attentive observers had difficulty differentiating candidate, party, and interest group spots from one another, despite the personal identification by the candidates. Finally, no Levin accounts were employed in the battle for Ohio: the local party organizations were well funded via hard-dollar donations and unwilling to tackle the complex rules required to raise soft money.

⁵⁹ Michael Powell and Peter Slevin, “Election 2004: Ohio's Lost Voters and Other Problems,” *Washington Post Weekly Edition*, December 20, 2004, p. 12–13. Even though the “widespread irregularities” in voting did not turn Ohio into “another Florida,” aspects of the 2004 Ohio balloting resembled those of Florida in 2000. In both cases, the Secretaries of State in charge of overseeing the elections statewide—Ken Blackwell and Katharine Harris respectively—were also leaders of George W. Bush's state campaign. In both cases, charges included discrimination or intimidation against black voters, confusing or erroneous ballots, a lack of proper equipment in heavily Democratic areas, and administrative rulings that clearly favored the Republican cause. The new wrinkle was that in contrast to 2001, members of Congress who objected to certifying the state's electoral college's outcome in 2004 were able to get the required senatorial support to force a discussion of the these irregularities in both houses of Congress before final certification on January 6.

challenge.⁶⁰ Thus, the battle for Ohio was settled by the extraordinary campaigns waged by both sides and not by the courts.

⁶⁰ This reality did not prevent the growth of a cottage industry in conspiracy theories about how the election was “stolen,” including strained law suits over the election results and an inconsequential recount paid for by the Green and Libertarian presidential candidates.

Table 7-1
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures, Ohio Presidential Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc.	\$8,218,271	\$21,795	\$8,240,066	\$19,565,868
John Kerry / DNC	\$700,159	\$18,500	\$718,659	\$3,133,681
<i>Political parties</i>				
DNC	\$7,895,270	\$549,274	\$8,444,544	\$14,196,408
<i>Interest groups</i>				
The Media Fund	\$3,780,313	\$63,950	\$3,844,263	\$12,403,664
MoveOn.org	\$1,756,326	\$14,710	\$1,771,036	\$6,720,324
United Automobile Workers Union	\$232,200	\$126,875	\$359,075	\$495,805
National Air Traffic Controllers	\$331,490	...	\$331,490	\$459,454
AFL-CIO	\$301,700	...	\$301,700	\$1,549,731
Bring Ohio Back	\$60,955	\$96,830	\$157,785	\$96,050
Communities for Quality Education	\$148,810	...	\$148,810	\$1,841,418
Real Economy Group	\$106,625	...	\$106,625	\$254,624
American Federation of Teachers	...	\$95,550	\$95,550	...
Coalition to Defend the American Dream	...	\$48,100	\$48,100	...
Human Rights Campaign	\$27,575	...	\$27,575	\$59,606
Running for Change	\$27,300	...	\$27,300	\$12,489
Mothers Opposing Bush	\$7,500	...	\$7,500	\$16,990
This Vote Counts	\$6,550	...	\$6,550	\$14,626
Environmental Defense	\$3,275	...	\$3,275	\$8,344
Physicians for Social Responsibility	...	\$3,200	\$3,200	...
Stronger America Now	\$89,267
Ohio Education Association	\$44,641
Sierra Club	\$12,467
American Patriots Coalition	\$7,929
NARAL	\$6,372
Communication Workers of America	\$3,238
Republican allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Bush/Cheney 04	\$7,207,164	\$542,851	\$7,750,015	\$16,213,269
Bush/Cheney 04 / RNC	\$4,630,915	\$45,381	\$4,676,296	\$12,918,755
<i>Political parties</i>				
RNC	\$2,399,973	\$101,867	\$2,501,840	\$2,491,964
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth	\$2,883,020	...	\$2,883,020	\$4,081,218
Progress for America	\$1,348,785	...	\$1,348,785	\$2,277,687
Citizens for Community Values	\$500,100	...	\$500,100	...
United Seniors Association	\$157,750	\$30,790	\$188,540	\$619,886
November Fund	\$167,830	\$15,600	\$183,430	...
NRA Political Victory Fund	\$95,250	...	\$95,250	\$150,493
America's PAC	...	\$74,400	\$74,400	...
Club for Growth	\$36,750	...	\$36,750	\$150,092
Let Freedom Ring	\$12,450	...	\$12,450	\$66,498
American Defense Council	...	\$8,250	\$8,250	...
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$3,550	...	\$3,550	\$360,554
National Right to Work Committee PAC	...	\$1,940	\$1,940	...

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Softer Voices	\$63,264
Americans United to Preserve Marriage	\$13,245

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senatorial, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data are included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. These data do not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 7-2.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

**Table 7-2
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization, Ohio Presidential Race, 2004^a**

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc	86	1	...	19	...	34	140
John Kerry / DNC	2	2
<i>Political parties</i>							
DNC	72	25	3	11	3	21	135
Ohio Democratic Party	6	52	...	9	...	1	68
Local Democratic Parties	22	3	...	2	27
<i>Interest groups</i>							
MoveOn.org	50	3	...	2	2	8	65
America Coming Together	32	27	...	5	64
Sierra Club	...	19	1	3	1	...	24
The Media Fund	2	...	2	13	17
AFL-CIO	...	11	2	1	14
NARAL Pro-Choice America	12	2	14
National Education Association	...	11	1	1	13
United Automobile Workers Union	...	6	2	...	2	3	13
Working America	...	9	1	10
Campaign for America's Future	7	1	8
AFSCME	...	6	6
American Federation of Teachers	...	4	1	...	5
Communities for Quality Education	...	3	...	1	...	1	5
Alliance for Retired Americans	...	4	4
Bring Ohio Back	1	3	4
Human Rights Campaign	...	3	...	1	4
NJDC Victory Fund	...	1	3	4
Planned Parenthood Action Fund	...	3	1	4
American Civil Liberties Union	...	2	1	3
Facts 4 Ohio	3	3
League of Conservation Voters	...	3	3
National Air Traffic Controllers	3	3
Ohio Victory 2004	1	2	3
21 st Century Democrats	...	1	...	1	2
Coalition to Defend the American Dream	2	...	2
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force	...	2	2
People for the American Way	...	1	1	2
United Food and Commercial Workers International	...	2	2
America Votes	1	1
American Family Voices	1	1
Americans for Democratic Action	...	1	1
Black Women's PAC	1	1
Brady Voter Education Fund	1	1
Campaign for Communities	...	1	1
Catholics for Kerry	1	1
Cleveland Jewish Democrats	1	1
Communication Workers of America	1	...	1
Doctors for Kerry	1	1
Environmental Defense	...	1	1
Greenpeace	...	1	1
Media04.org	1	1
Mothers Opposing Bush	1	1
National Resource Defense Council	...	1	1

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Ohio Public Employees Retirement System	...	1	1
Ohio Voterization Project	...	1	1
Pax Christi USA	1	1
PunkVoter.com	1	1
Real Economy Group	1	1
Save Our Environment	1	...	1
Stronger America Now	1	1
U.S. Action	1	1
Voices for Working Families	1	...	1
Vote MOB	1	1
Win Back Respect	1	1
Republican allies^c							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Bush/Cheney '04	35	4	...	37	5	23	104
Bush/Cheney '04 / RNC	1	1	1	3
<i>Political parties</i>							
RNC	14	56	...	15	10	10	105
Ohio Republican Party	3	25	...	5	33
Local Republican Parties	2	3	...	2	7
<i>Interest groups</i>							
National Rifle Association	...	4	3	4	11
National Right to Life	...	7	3	...	1	...	11
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth	...	2	1	6	9
All Children Matter	...	5	5
Progress for America	2	2	1	5
America's PAC	3	...	3
November Fund	1	2	3
People of Color United	2	1	3
American Conservative Union	...	2	2
Citizen Leader Coalition	...	2	2
Club for Growth	2	2
Human Events	...	2	2
United Seniors Association	...	1	1	...	2
American Defense Council	1	...	1
Americans United to Preserve Marriage	1	1
Catholics Against Kerry	1	1
Christian Coalition of Ohio	...	1	1
Church and Truth Project	1	1
Citizens United	...	1	1
Focus on the Family Action	...	1	1
Investors Action	...	1	1
Life Issues Institute, Inc.	...	1	1
Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage	...	1	1
Republican Jewish Coalition	1	1
Softer Voices	1	1
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).


^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 7-1.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, NARAL Pro-Choice Ohio data have been included in the NARAL

Pro-Choice America totals and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund and National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals.


^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Figure 7-1
The Presidential Horse Race in Ohio, May–November 2004




Legend: a. Democratic National Convention; b. Republican National Convention; c. presidential debates
Source: RealClear Politics, (www.realclearpolitics.com [November 2, 2004]).

Figure 7-2
Ohio Margins of Victory by County



Source: Map generated from vote data compiled at Ohio Secretary of State, "Ohio Secretary of State, J. Kenneth Blackwell," (www.sos.state.oh.us/sos [January 27, 2005]).

Figure 7-3
Ohio Change in Total Votes, 2000–2004



Source: Map generated from vote data compiled at Ohio Secretary of State, "Ohio Secretary of State, J. Kenneth Blackwell," (www.sos.state.oh.us/sos [January 27, 2005]).

The Alaska U.S. Senate Race¹

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An election in Alaska would not normally capture national attention. After all, the state has the minimum number of members of Congress (one representative and two senators) who have all been Republicans since 1980. The 2004 election cycle, however, was different. With the close party balance in the U.S. Senate, the unusually competitive Senate race in Alaska between Republican Lisa Murkowski and Democrat Tony Knowles could have, if Knowles had won, helped tip the balance to a Democratic majority in the Senate. In the end Murkowski triumphed, but only after a neck and neck battle down to the last few days in what was the most expensive election race in Alaska's history with close to \$11 million spent.²

Background to the Election

Many Alaskans like to think of themselves as independent and unique—a breed apart from the rest of the nation. However, in the economic and political realm, Alaska has much in common with other states of the American West. This similarity provides an important context in which to understand elections in Alaska, including the 2004 U.S. Senate race.

Alaska's Economic, Social and Political Landscape

Alaska has a population of 648,818 inhabiting a land area more than twice the size of Texas. Contrary to what might be expected, however, Alaska is an urban state; almost 60 percent of its people live in and around Anchorage in south-central Alaska. Like most western states, regionalism plays an important role in politics. The state has four major political regions: Anchorage and south-central Alaska; the interior region in the central part of the state with Fairbanks as the hub (82,000 people); the southeast region of Alaska with Juneau (30,000 people) the state capital; and the remaining population is scattered in over two hundred cities, towns, and villages, some of which have less than fifty inhabitants. This fourth region is often referred to as the "Bush" and is mostly inaccessible by road. At about 16 percent of the population, Alaska has the highest percentage of Native Americans (Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts) of any state, with just under half living in urban areas and the rest in the Bush. Alaska has other minorities but only in small numbers: African Americans (less than 2 percent), some Latinos, and small communities of Asians, mainly Koreans, Filipinos and Vietnamese.³

The state's economy is based on a combination of natural resources, including oil, fishing, some mining and logging, federal grants and subsidies, tourism, and government employment. One-third of the workforce is employed by federal, state, and local government. The state has virtually no manufacturing sector and only a token agricultural sector. Alaska is very dependent on outside forces, including the market price of its raw materials—particularly oil, which accounts for about 70 percent of state revenue—

¹ The authors would like to thank Lori Weed, research assistant, for all the contributions, time, and energy she devoted to this effort. It would not have been possible without her.

² See table 8-1 for details of overall campaign receipts and expenditure and categories of expenditures.

³ Alaska Department of Labor, "Workforce Info, Economic Information" (almis.labor.state.ak.us/cgi/databrowsing/localAreaProfileQSResults.asp?countyName=&menuChoice=localAreaPr o&selectedarea=Regional&selectedindex=0&SearchResult=10&geogArea=0201000000&population+census+data=Population&B1=View+Report [12/29/04]) for total population; Alaska Department of Labor, "Workforce Info, Home, POP-L3-Population Estimates" (almis.labor.state.ak.us/?PAGEID=67&SUBID=171 [December 29, 2004]) for ethnic breakdown of population.

and federal grants and subsidies, for its well-being.⁴ In this latter regard, U.S. Senator Ted Stevens, a thirty-five year veteran of the U.S. Senate and one of its most influential members, secures major federal funding for Alaska. With the serious problems that a fall in oil prices can bring, the state is constantly chasing the elusive goal of economic development. This issue plays prominently in all state and federal elections, the 2004 U.S. Senate race being no exception.

Even so, like many inhabitants of the American West, Alaskans think of themselves as being “free and independent.” This contradiction of westerners between dependence on government and a belief that they are “independent” has been called the western political paradox.⁵ With regard to Alaska, it has been labeled “dependent individualism.”⁶ This feeling of “independence” is reflected in the fact that over 52 percent of Alaskans declare themselves as “independent” or not associated with any political party for purposes of voter registration.⁷ Except on the very right and the very left of the political spectrum, party labels do not mean a lot. Alaska, like other western states, has weak political parties, and elections are often centered on the candidate’s personal qualities, such as the region of the state from where a politician hails. This tendency of voters is pronounced in the Bush, where the ability of a candidate to secure much-needed services trumps ideology even more than in urban Alaska. In short, Alaskans are pragmatists.⁸

In the first twenty years of statehood, Democrats and Republicans were about evenly balanced in both federal and state office-holding. Since 1980, however, the state has elected only Republicans to Congress, and in the twelve presidential elections since statehood, only in 1964 did the state cast its three electoral votes for a Democrat, Lyndon Johnson.⁹ Furthermore, since the early 1990s, the state legislature has been overwhelmingly Republican. Yet, in line with the pragmatism and personality-based nature of western politics, Democrats do get elected to the governorship but tend to be centrist to right leaning as was Tony Knowles as governor.

The Candidates

The incumbent Republican, Lisa Murkowski, age forty-seven, was born in Ketchikan in southeast Alaska but has been a long-time resident of Anchorage. She is a former member of the State House of Representatives, a lawyer, community activist, and mother. Her father, Frank Murkowski, was Alaska’s junior U.S. Senator from 1980 until he ran successfully for the Alaska governorship in 2002. After his election as governor, he appointed his daughter, who had just been narrowly reelected to the State House, to his vacant Senate seat. This surprised many and angered some, particularly those Republicans who saw themselves in line for Frank Murkowski’s U.S. Senate seat. As an appointed member, Lisa had to stand for the seat in the 2004 federal election. Her appointment by her father obviously raised the question of nepotism and assured that this would be an issue in her 2004 bid for election.

⁴ The exact percentage that oil contributed to state revenues is subject to dispute. For a discussion, see David M. Reume, “The Contemporary and Future Alaska Economy: Prospects for Economic Development and Diversity,” in, *Alaska Public Policy Issues: Background and Perspectives*, edited by Clive S. Thomas (Juneau, Alaska: Denali Press, 1999), p. 35, note 2.

⁵ Clive S. Thomas, ed., *Politics and Public Policy in the Contemporary American West* (University of New Mexico Press, 1991), p. 15.

⁶ Thomas A. Morehouse, “Alaska’s Political and Economic Future,” lecture delivered to the faculty at the University of Alaska, Anchorage, April 28, 1994.

⁷ State of Alaska Division of Elections, “Election Results and Figures for the 2004 Election” (www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/04genr [January 5 2004]).

⁸ Thomas, *Politics and Public Policy*, pp. 8–13.

⁹ See, Gerald A. McBeath and Thomas A. Morehouse, *Alaska Politics and Government* (University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 246; see also, Erik W. Austin with Jerome M. Clubb, eds., *Political Facts of the United States Since 1789* (Columbia University Press, 1986), Table 3.2.

As a state representative, Lisa Murkowski was a moderate Republican. Like most politicians in Alaska, she favored economic development, particularly opening federal lands on the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) for oil and gas exploration and building a gas pipeline to the lower forty-eight states from fields near Alaska's arctic coast. On social issues she was pro-choice and in favor of gun control, so much so that the National Rifle Association (NRA) opposed her 2002 re-election to the Alaska State House. Since joining the U.S. Senate, however, she has moved to the right, particularly on the abortion issue where she now straddles the fence: "I think that at this point in time, neither side [pro-life nor pro-choice] claims me" she said in February 2003.¹⁰

The Democratic candidate, Tony Knowles, age sixty-one, was Alaska's governor from 1994 to 2002. Originally from Tulsa, Oklahoma, he served in Vietnam in the mid-1960s before settling in Anchorage in 1969. He established several restaurants and served two terms as the mayor of Anchorage (a non-partisan post) from 1982 to 1987. As mayor and as governor, Knowles epitomized the political pragmatism of western politicians and the new style Southern Democrat, perhaps a product of his border South origins. He has long favored "sustained development," particularly working to open ANWR for oil exploration, but simultaneously promotes environmental protection. He is liberal on social issues, including being pro-choice and favoring some gun control. During his eight years as governor, the legislature had comfortable Republican majorities, and he prided himself on being able to work across party lines. His success in working for "all Alaskans" became a central theme of his U.S. Senate bid in 2004.

Thus, going into the race there was very little difference between the candidates on the major political and social issues, particularly those most crucial to Alaska's economic development.¹¹ This confluence resulted in the campaign being less a debate about clear differences on issues and more a debate over process—the best way to secure these goals politically. The campaign revolved around the question of which Alaska delegation in Washington, D.C.—Stevens, Murkowski and Young; or Stevens, Knowles and Young—could best achieve the state's key goals and by what means.

The Campaign in Overview

The financial and interest group involvement in the campaign air and ground war is best understood by outlining the key elements of the contest: the major issues; candidate styles and campaign approach; fear of changing the members of a winning Congressional team, which we see as the deciding factor in the campaign; and the election results overall and by region.

The Major Issues

To be sure, many issues of national concern were debated during the campaign—including the war in Iraq and health care, particularly veterans health care—but four Alaska issues dominated political discussion: Frank Murkowski; the opening of ANWR and building of a gas pipeline; the influence of out-of-state interests; and the consequences of electing a Democrat to the Senate.

Frank Murkowski. Prior to the primary in August, the nepotism issue looked like it would dominate the campaign and be a major liability for Lisa Murkowski. Many believed that moderate Republicans would vote against her on ethical grounds. In addition, it appeared that Lisa Murkowski would be burdened by

¹⁰ Liz Ruskin, "Newest Senator Is Finding Her Way," *Anchorage Daily News*, February 3, 2003, p. B1.

¹¹ A total of seven candidates were on the ballot for the Senate seat in 2004, including perennial Green Party candidate Jim Sykes and Alaska Independence Party candidate Jerry Sanders, but all five minority party candidates mustered only 6 percent of the vote between them. This is an interesting fact, given that the combined Green Party, Libertarian, and Alaska Independence Party vote when Senator Ted Stevens last ran for re-election in 2002 totaled 11.2 percent.

her relationship with her father, and by association, his unpopular decisions as governor, including the elimination of a senior citizen pension begun in the oil boom days. Knowles made statements that he was not going to raise the nepotism issue, but indirectly he called attention to it constantly, particularly in TV and radio ads right after the primary. As predicted, he also tried to saddle his opponent with the unpopular policies of her father.

To the surprise of many, this issue was eventually sidelined because Lisa Murkowski was able to make a case for her own ability. “Don’t judge me by how I got my job, judge me by how I’ve done my job” was her constant refrain. This effort was buttressed by Don Young and particularly Ted Stevens. In one October ad, Stevens said: “Now I have the best Senate partner I have ever had,” a criticism of her father’s time in the U.S. Senate and a further separation of Lisa from Frank Murkowski. Lisa’s success in defanging the nepotism issue is further evidenced by the fact that while the voters elected her they also approved a state ballot proposition (Proposition No. 4) to repeal the law allowing the governor to fill a vacancy in the U.S. Senate and instead provide for an election. This passed easily by 55 to 45 percent.¹²

ANWR. The debate between Murkowski and Knowles over the opening of ANWR and building of a gas pipeline revolved around who could best achieve these goals. Tony Knowles blasted Lisa Murkowski for her failure to open ANWR and make progress on a loan guarantees agreement for the pipeline during her two years in the Senate.¹³ He cited the advances he had made while governor for Alaska’s economic development, including lifting the ban on the export of Alaska oil in 1995 and preparing the way for a gas pipeline. For her part, Murkowski countered by emphasizing the advantages of her relationship with Senator Stevens and her contacts already made in the U.S. Senate.

An apparent misstep by Knowles was to include former Senator Frank Murkowski in his criticism of why ANWR was not opened. An upset Stevens perceived himself as being included in the criticism, galvanizing his support for Lisa during the crucial last weeks of the campaign.¹⁴

The Out-of-State Issue. The influences and role of out-of-state interests is a regular issue in Alaska politics, taking on a populist tone that resonates with notions of Alaskan independence and individualism. The issue has mainly been pushed by the Alaska Independence Party (AIP) but was also exploited in this election by both campaigns. On the one hand, Knowles accused Murkowski of being beholden to outside interests, particularly those in Washington, D.C. and New York. Certainly, she received more campaign funds from outside interest groups such as the National Association of Home Builders, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and other organizations than did Knowles. Knowles, however, received major funding from the National Democratic Party, despite his efforts to distance himself from the Democratic National Committee (DNC).

Consequences of Electing a Democrat. Senator Stevens and Representative Young both warned of the consequences of electing a Democrat and splitting the party affiliation of the Alaska delegation, arguing that Lisa Murkowski’s seniority of two years was more than Knowles would have if elected. This became a major theme of the media blitz mounted by the Republicans in the last few days of the campaign.

¹² State of Alaska Division of Elections, “Election Results and Figures for the 2004 Election” (www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/04genr [January 5, 2004]).

¹³ Liz Ruskin, “Energy Bill Won’t Include ANWR,” *Anchorage Daily News*, November 15, 2003, p. A1.

¹⁴ Sean Cockerham, “Knowles Ad Irks Stevens, Young,” *Anchorage Daily News*, October 9, 2004, A1. Also see Nicole Tsong and Richard Mauer, “Outlandish Political Ad Envisions Death of Stevens, Mocks His Son,” *Anchorage Daily News*, October 28, 2004, p. A1.

Candidate Styles and Campaign Approach

While neither candidate had much charisma or dynamism, both had reputations as strong family people, committed advocates of Alaska's interests, and competent elected officials. Despite this, the influence of their political careers and the necessities of the campaign lead them to exhibit differing styles and approaches to the campaign.

Lisa Murkowski emphasized her concern for kids and improving education, her close relationship with Stevens and Young, and her work with prominent U.S. Senators such as Democrat Ron Wyden of Oregon during her tenure. While not overly emphasizing her association with the Republican Party, she did talk about being part of a team with Stevens, Young and President Bush. Her key message, as expressed in several of her TV, radio and newspaper ads, noted that Alaska is a state with unique resources and needs that can best be addressed by keeping together the Republican team in Congress. The implication was obviously that voters should not change the members of the "winning team."

Three factors shaped Knowles' style and approach in 2004: his role as the challenger, his past political modus operandi, and Ted Stevens. As the challenger, Knowles had to show he was more qualified and politically successful than Murkowski in securing funding for Alaska. This he did by making innuendos about nepotism and by showing that he had achieved more for Alaska as governor than Murkowski had in the U.S. Senate. However, his past operating style and the presence of Ted Stevens were the major factors shaping Knowles' style and approach. He had to be cautious in criticizing anything Stevens has done or not done because of Stevens' power in the Senate and as Alaska's major federal cash cow. This approach fit well with Knowles' past record of bipartisanship and working across party lines, or as he often expressed it, "putting Alaskans first."

Knowles' constantly used examples of his successes working across party lines as governor to show that he would work on Alaska's behalf with Republicans in Congress. To reinforce his credibility on this issue, and to show that he was not a puppet of the Democratic Party, Knowles emphasized on several occasions his break with Democratic Party nominee John Kerry and former President Jimmy Carter over their opposition to opening ANWR.¹⁵

Fear of Changing the Winning Team

The deciding factor can be summed up in six words: fear of changing the winning team. In short, electing a Democrat could have serious consequences for federal funds for Alaska. First, the Senate could tip to a Democratic majority, leaving Ted Stevens in the minority, a threat voiced by Stevens himself and a major theme of many radio and TV ads during the last few weeks of the campaign.¹⁶ Even in the majority, Knowles would be a very junior senator and not able to secure the type of pork that Stevens ensured. In the media blitz at the end of the campaign, several ads stated that a vote for Knowles would be a vote against Stevens.

Stevens himself played a prominent role in delivering this message in the last few days of the campaign. Don Young also helped. The last three days of the campaign saw a media blitz on the negative consequences of electing a Democrat, and it forced Knowles to fight back with some negative campaigning. In the end, Knowles, despite mounting the most serious challenge to the Republicans' lock on the Alaska congressional delegation in twenty-five years, could not convince the Alaska public that

¹⁵ Tony Knowles For U.S. Senate Campaign, "Sitnews," (www.sitnews.us [April 22, 2004]); and Governor's letter to former President Jimmy Carter, August 8, 2000.

¹⁶ Sean Cockerham, "Stevens' Future Weighs Into U.S. Senate Race," *Anchorage Daily News*, October 17, 2004, p. A1.

changing the team would be beneficial. With their concerns reinforced by Stevens and Young, many Alaskans apparently felt that electing Knowles could well be to their detriment.¹⁷

The Results Overall and By Region

A total of 307,371 of the 472,160 registered votes cast ballots in this U.S. Senate race for a turnout of 65.1 percent.¹⁸ This percentage is higher than that of any other election since statehood, according to the Knowles campaign,¹⁹ and a substantially higher turnout rate than the previous three Congressional elections, where turnout averaged only 53.53 percent.²⁰ Turnout in 2004 was stimulated by the approximately 200 “troops” sent to Alaska by the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) to canvass and get out the vote,²¹ as well as the more than 400 campaign workers recruited by the Knowles campaign who registered over 10,000 new voters.²² In addition, the DSCC provided 120 paid staffers and 2,100 Election Day volunteers in Alaska.²³ Both campaigns encouraged absentee voting, especially among the elderly. However, given the delays in printing absentee ballots by the Division of Elections and the failure to provide sufficient postage on many of the ballots,²⁴ many voters who had applied for them did not receive them prior to the election.²⁵

The two major candidates received just over 94 percent of the total votes cast. Murkowski received 121,027, or 49.21 percent of the total, while Knowles got 110,699, or 45.1 percent of the total votes cast. The final margin was close to 10,400 votes and a 4.2 percentage point victory for Murkowski. The 5.88 percent of the vote cast for minority candidates, while substantially below the 10.23 percent average in the previous three federal races in Alaska, reflects the individualist, anti-government, and particularly the anti-federal feeling among a small but vocal minority of Alaskans.

In all but one federal election since 1980 (the 1990 U.S. House race between Don Young and Democrat John Devens), there has been only token opposition from the Democrats and the Republican candidate has won all regions of the state, averaging 65 to 75 percent of the total vote cast.²⁶ On one hand, the 2004 voting patterns by region, contained in table 8-1, indicate that Knowles carried the Southeast and the Bush and won in Anchorage by 2.1 percent of the vote. This reflects the strategy followed by the four successful Democratic candidates in the five gubernatorial races since 1982 (including Knowles twice), i.e., focusing on the Southeast and South-central regions, with the understanding that they could win by carrying the Anchorage bowl area. Knowles, in his two gubernatorial campaigns and in this Senate race, included an emphasis on the Bush or Native Alaska as well, making several personal appearances throughout the region, running ads in several weekly newspapers as well as the Anchorage television ads

¹⁷ Bill McCallister, “Election Day Reveals Surprising Lessons,” *Anchorage Daily News*, November 7, 2004, p. M2.

¹⁸ State of Alaska Division of Elections, “Election Results and Figures for the 2004 Election” (www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/04genr/data/results.htm) [January 5, 2004].

¹⁹ Alaska Democratic Party, “A Message From Tony Knowles,” e-mail communication to supporters, December 27, 2004.

²⁰ State of Alaska Division of Elections, “Election Results and Figures for the 2004 Election,” (www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/04genr/data/results.htm) [January 5, 2004].

²¹ Patrick Davis, political director, NRSC, interview by Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, Washington D.C., November 11, 2004. See also Nicole Tsong, “Outside Helpers to Bolster GOP Side,” *Anchorage Daily News*, September 30, 2004, p. B1.

²² Alaska Democratic Party, “A Message From Tony Knowles.”

²³ Benjamin Jones, research director, DSCC, interview by David Magleby and Quin Monson, Washington, D.C., November 10, 2004.

²⁴ Lisa Demer, “Ballots delayed in Juneau,” *Anchorage Daily News*, October 30, 2004, p. A1.

²⁵ Lisa Demer, “Knowles Campaign Hears Stories of Absentee Hitches,” *Anchorage Daily News*, November 7, 2004, p. B3.

²⁶ McBeath and Morehouse, *Alaska Politics and Government*, p. 95.

carried on local cable systems in the Bush, and establishing effective recruitment systems among high school youth and local political activists.

On the other hand, those 2004 voting patterns indicate that Murkowski undoubtedly followed a strategy that deviated from long-standing Republican practice in statewide elections by focusing her efforts more intensively on the interior region and the parts of the south-central region to the immediate north and south of Anchorage, all of which voted Republican, as well as the Anchorage area itself. These areas, particularly the Mat-Su Valley, have voted increasingly Republican since statehood in 1960.²⁷ While she did campaign in southeast and the Bush regions, her focus was clearly on the more conservative Republican areas of the state.²⁸

Money in the Elections

What money did for Murkowski was to allow her to cut her own swath, both in person and through the media, as an individual distinct from her father. For Knowles money added to his high profile in the state and enabled him to compete effectively.

Sources of Money

As table 8-2 shows, close to 85 percent of Knowles' money came from individuals or the party while less than 60 percent of Murkowski's funds came from those sources. Interest groups accounted for about 35 percent of the Murkowski campaign revenues but only 13 percent of Knowles' revenues.

Both major parties invested heavily in this race, but the NRSC outspent the DSCC on broadcast advertising by approximately \$132,000 (see table 8-4 below). The parties accounted for about a fifth of the money raised by the candidates. The various elements of the National Democratic Party usually do not give much money to Alaska Democratic candidates because these candidates are usually not competitive. The 2004 Alaska Senate race, however, was an exception. The party money for Murkowski lagged behind that for Knowles until the last few weeks. During the last fourteen days of campaigning, the NRSC implemented its spending strategy, when the committee felt that voters were paying closer attention.²⁹ While Murkowski was trailing in the polls up until Election Day, the advertising blitz funded in part by the NRSC and the prominent support of Stevens and Young did much to push her to victory.

The largest difference in the financing of the Alaska Senate race was the role played by interest groups. As table 8-2 indicates, Knowles received \$784,870 from PACs, or only 39.5 percent of the \$1,988,177 received from PACs by Murkowski. For both candidates, all but the Business Alaska contributions were from national rather than local groups. As table 8-4 indicates, interest groups spent over \$370,000 on radio and television ads for Knowles, compared to only \$147,878 for Murkowski. She received considerably more funds from business and interests like energy, finance, transportation, health and real estate (\$903,862) than Knowles (\$40,906) while Knowles raised almost four times as much as Murkowski from organized labor (\$282,819 to \$84,500)³⁰. Knowles, in addition to the traditional support

²⁷ Gerald A. McBeath and Thomas A. Morehouse, editors, *Alaska State Government and Politics*, (University of Alaska Press, 1987), pp. 122–141.

²⁸ Richard Mauer and Nicole Tsong, "Senate Campaigns Crisscross State," *Anchorage Daily News*, November 1, 2004, p. A1. Mauer and Tsong, "Pledge Puts Murkowski in Bit of a Bind," *Anchorage Daily News*, September 16, 2004, p. A1.

²⁹ Patrick Davis, political director, NRSC, interview by Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 11, 2004.

³⁰ Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [January 17, 2005]).

of organized labor for Democrats, earned a reputation for being a strong supporter of labor, while the Murkowski campaign alienated a large portion of the NEA-Alaska membership by using the Anchorage School District e-mail system to target teachers with an unauthorized blanket campaign mailing.³¹ Knowles captured the endorsement of the AFL-CIO, while Murkowski's labor support was primarily from the United Fishermen of Alaska.³²

The Effects of Money

Expenditures by both the Murkowski and Knowles campaigns for ads and the number of ads are very closely matched (see table 8-5). Besides spending campaign funds on ads, both sides were able to attract outside money from party committees and interest groups to fund ads on their behalf. Both sides made extensive use of e-mail to get out their respective messages, with Knowles having a slight edge in this medium. The Knowles campaign maintained a much more elaborate and complete web site that included all his television ads, than did the Murkowski campaign. Total regular mail communications by the Murkowski campaign and its Republican allies surpassed those of the Knowles campaign and its allies slightly, as did the use of newspaper and magazine ads. While the Murkowski campaign and its allies ran more radio ads (36 to 23) than the other side, the Knowles campaign and its allies used more televised appeals (46 to 37) than the Murkowski campaign and its allies.

There is no question that money affected the result of the election in Alaska. While it did not result in a Knowles' victory, it enabled Knowles to run a competitive race and brought Alaska closer to having a Democratic member of the U.S. Senate than it has since 1980. Democratic Party money made it possible for many of the Knowles campaign field workers to be paid, an unusual occurrence in Alaska elections, and one that anecdotal evidence suggests may well result in increased participation among Alaska youth in future campaigns.³³

If Knowles had had more money, bought more airtime, or traveled more would he have won? Our educated guess, based upon post-election interviews, is that Knowles may have narrowed the 10,400 vote margin if he had been able to counter the last minute media blitz of Stevens on Murkowski's behalf. However, there was not sufficient time to mount such a counterattack.³⁴ The issues, probably the changing teams theme, the diffusion of the nepotism issue (which may have brought many potential stay-at-home Republicans out to vote after all),³⁵ and the strong showing for Murkowski in the south-central region because of increasing conservatism likely made the difference.

Conclusion

In many ways, Alaska's U.S. Senate race reflected the course and results of the 2004 federal elections in general. The campaign was very competitive down to the last few days, giving the Democrat much grist for hope of victory. In the end, however, the election was not close and the Republicans walked away with a clear victory. This is likely because, even though there are no exit polls in Alaska to confirm it, there was a fear of changing the membership of a winning team. Certainly, the current team is Republican, and there is a long tradition of voting Republican in federal elections in Alaska, but Knowles'

³¹ Don Hunter, "Political Message in Inbox," *Anchorage Daily News*, September 16, 2004, p. B1.

³² Richard Mauer, "Fishermen: Knowles is Pushing 'Cruel Hoax,'" *Anchorage Daily News*, October 7, 2004, p. B1.

³³ Dianne Moxness, campaign treasurer, Tony Knowles for U.S. Senate, interview by Carl Shepro, Anchorage, Alaska, November 29, 2004; also comments by students to the authors between September and the general election.

³⁴ Leslie Ridle, campaign manager, Tony Knowles for U.S. Senate, interview by Carl Shepro, Anchorage, Alaska, November 29, 2004.

³⁵ Matt McKenna, National Democratic Party coordinator, Tony Knowles for U.S. Senate, interview by Carl Shepro, Anchorage, Alaska, November 29, 2004.

defeat by only 4 percentage points is evidence of how close the Democrats can come when they have a viable candidate who mounts a serious campaign. In contrast, Bush won handily in the state with 62 percent of the vote to Kerry's 35 percent, likely because Kerry wrote off Alaska as too small and too conservative and because he opposed opening ANWR.

Murkowski's victory was probably driven more by Alaska circumstances and issues than national ones and with an insignificant presidential coattails effect. Because it was hard to tell who was more development oriented, Murkowski or Knowles, and with few other major differences between them on policy issues, in the end, the fear of changing a winning team dominated. This was undoubtedly reinforced by the personality of Senator Stevens and the ability of Lisa Murkowski to defuse the nepotism issue and, again with the help of Senator Stevens, present herself as being separate from her father. However much they may have liked Knowles, for many Alaskans it was too much of a risk to go with someone who would be an even more junior senator than his opponent and whose victory may possibly be at the cost of Stevens' political and economic clout. This was the outcome despite Knowles playing the non-partisan card and pounding home time after time how much he respected Senator Stevens and how he could work across party lines with him. Thus, Murkowski's victory was linked to party control of the Senate; but it was more subtle than that, as she herself was not a strong candidate and Knowles had a much higher profile in the state.

Knowles certainly ran the most high profile, competitive, well-financed and well-organized race of any Democrat for federal office in twenty-five years. However, the fact that he still failed, despite all his fundraising, spending, and outside help in running against a controversial candidate, does not bode well for Democrats running for Congress in Alaska in the future.

Table 8-1
2004 Alaska Senate Race by Region

	Turnout	Murkowski	Knowles
Anchorage	46.11%	46.11%	49.10%
Kenai/MatSu	44.93%	50.62%	40.25%
Bush/Native AK	47.58%	29.41%	66.44%
Interior	46.13%	52.46%	41.55%
SE	38.14%	44.03%	51.25%

Source: Compiled by the authors from data provided by the Alaska Division of Elections
Note: Turnout figures compiled represent percent of total population by region.

Table 8-2
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Alaska Senate Race, 2003-04

	Tony Knowles (D)	Lisa Murkowski (R)
From PACs	\$784,870	\$1,988,177
From individuals	\$4,849,912	\$3,382,485
From party	\$37,689	\$51,949
From candidate	\$0	\$0
Other contributions	\$162,223	\$268,815
Total receipts	\$5,834,694	\$5,691,426
Total expenditures	\$5,695,069	\$5,272,255
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$139,627	\$287,881

Source: Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004, (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [January 12, 2005]).

Table 8-3
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, Alaska Senate Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DSCC	AK Sen	Tony Knowles	\$2,954,847	...	\$2,954,847	\$2,954,847
	AK Sen	Lisa Murkowski	
NRSC	AK Sen	Tony Knowles	...	\$417,605	\$417,605	\$500,145
	AK Sen	Lisa Murkowski	\$82,540	...	\$82,540	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (<ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC> [January 5, 2005]).

Table 8-4
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures, Alaska Senate Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent
Democratic allies^b			
<i>Candidates</i>			
Tony Knowles for U.S. Senate	\$605,999	\$71,618	\$677,617
<i>Political parties</i>			
DSCC	\$499,808	\$47,698	\$547,506
<i>Interest groups</i>			
Citizens for a Strong Senate	\$305,348	...	\$305,348
New Democrat Network	\$50,587	...	\$50,587
American Family Voices	\$11,779	...	\$11,779
Issues Matter	...	\$2,099	\$2,099
National Air Traffic Controllers	\$540	...	\$540
Republican allies^b			
<i>Candidates</i>			
Lisa Murkowski for U.S. Senate	\$473,449	\$104,970	\$578,419
<i>Political parties</i>			
NRSC	\$640,389	\$39,142	\$679,531
<i>Interest groups</i>			
Americans for Job Security	\$65,748	\$2,972	\$68,720
American Medical Association	\$39,091	\$19,822	\$58,913
NRA Political Victory Fund	\$5,799	\$2,295	\$8,094
United Seniors Association	\$7,706	...	\$7,706
Business Alaska	\$2,467	...	\$2,467
National Right to Life	...	\$1,978	\$1,978
Nonpartisan			
<i>Interest groups</i>			
Health Coalition of Liability	...	\$8,314	\$8,314
National Taxpayers Union	...	\$2,040	\$2,040

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, Kelly D. Patterson, J. Quin Monson, and the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 2004 Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Database (Brigham Young University, 2004).

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senatorial, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study's sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study's relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 8-5.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

**Table 8-5
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization, Alaska Senate Race, 2004^a**

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Person	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Tony Knowles for U.S. Senate	44	4	9	...	2	17	32	108
<i>Political parties</i>								
Alaska Democratic Party	...	20	20
DSCC	2	9	11
<i>Interest groups</i>								
AFL-CIO	...	4	4
AFSCME	...	4	4
Citizens for a Strong Senate	...	2	2	4
Alaska State Employees Association	...	1	1	2
Association of Trail Lawyers of America ^d	...	1	1	2
Individual Donor: Bill Bobrick	2	...	2
Issues Matter	2	...	2
National Education Association ^e	...	1	1	2
American Family Voices	1	1
New Democrat Network	1	1
Republican allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Lisa Murkowski for U.S. Senate	35	4	3	1	...	30	25	98
<i>Political parties</i>								
NRSC	...	8	1	...	2	2	5	18
Alaska Republican Party	...	11	...	1	1	13
<i>Interest groups</i>								
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	6	1	1	1 ^f	9
Americans for Job Security	1	3	4
Alaskans for Don Young	2	1	...	3
National Rifle Association	...	2	1	3
National Right to Life	...	2	1	3
American Medical Association	2	...	2
The Seniors Coalition	...	2	2
United Seniors Association	...	1	1	2
Alaska Support Industry Alliance	1	1
Americans for Tax Reform	...	1	1
Associated Builders and Contractors	...	1 ^g	1
Business Alaska	1	1
Hunting and Shooting Sports Heritage Fund	...	1	1
National Association of Home Builders	...	1	1
Republican Main Street Partnership PAC	1	1
Republican Majority for Choice	...	1	1
Thanksgiving 2004 Committee	1	1
United Fisherman of Alaska	1	1

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Person	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
USA Medicare	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, Kelly D. Patterson, J. Quin Monson, and the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 2004 Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Database (Brigham Young University, 2004).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 8-4.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, Alaska AFL-CIO data have been included in the AFL-CIO totals and National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^d Linda Lipson, senior director of public affairs, Association of Trial Lawyers of America, telephone interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, December 14, 2004.

^e Dennis Friel, government relations manager, National Education Association, interview by Kelly Patterson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., November 4, 2004.

^f Bill Miller, vice president, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, interviewed by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2004.

^g Ned Monroe, director of political affairs, Associated Builders and Contractors, interviewed by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004.

The Colorado U.S. Senate Race
Kyle Saunders and Robert Duffy
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In an open-seat senate race that attracted national attention, Democrat Ken Salazar, a two-time state attorney general, defeated GOP beer magnate Pete Coors in the most expensive statewide race in Colorado history.³⁶ In addition to its cost, Salazar's run to succeed retiring Republican Ben Nighthorse Campbell was noteworthy because he was the only Democrat to win a tightly-contested Senate seat in what was a disappointing year for the Democratic Party. Moreover, Salazar's win came in the mountain west, in a state won by President George W. Bush, where Republicans hold an almost 180,000-person edge in voter registration.

Salazar ran as a moderate and was able to win by mobilizing the Democratic base, carrying the independent vote, and picking up a larger than usual number of Republicans. Salazar ran better than Senator John Kerry, the Democratic presidential candidate, in all but two counties; he also did very well in rural areas and in the western slope, where his brother John won a very close and expensive race for the open Third District House seat. Conversely, Bush outperformed Coors in every county in Colorado. After the election, Salazar's ability to attract votes in the rural, largely Republican parts of the state was said to be a model for Democrats seeking to compete in areas outside of the Northeast and West Coast.³⁷

Reflecting his political inexperience, Pete Coors got off to a rough start in the primary, stumbling in a few early appearances. However, over the course of the campaign, he improved as a candidate and made only a few mistakes during the fall, none especially significant.³⁸ In the end, Coors lost not because he was an especially poor or inexperienced candidate, but because Salazar was a better candidate than Coors.

The Electoral Context

Although Colorado is a large state, 80 percent of its estimated 4.6 million residents reside in the rapidly growing urban corridor along the Front Range, most within a two-hour drive of Denver. Colorado's population increased 30 percent from 1990 to 2000 and has shown few signs of letting up; in fact, only 41.1 percent of current residents were born in-state. Colorado is also a relatively wealthy and educated state, ranking seventh nationally in per capita income and second in the percentage of college graduates. Like most states in the mountain west, Colorado is disproportionately white, but Hispanics constitute 17.5 percent of the voting-age population, an important consideration given Salazar's Hispanic heritage.³⁹

While Colorado is often perceived as being reliably Republican, the reality is more complicated. As recently as 1992, Coloradans voted for Bill Clinton and Campbell, then a Democratic House representative from the western slope, for the U.S. Senate. In 1995, however, Campbell switched parties, giving Colorado two Republican senators for the first time since 1972. Since then Colorado voters, like those in many mountain states, have consistently elected Republicans in statewide elections. Going into 2004, therefore, most experts predicted that both Bush and Campbell would cruise to victory.⁴⁰ Everything changed in March, however, when Campbell announced that he would not seek reelection.

³⁶ The authors would like to thank John Straayer for his wise counsel and expertise, as well as Andrew Kear, Matt Buttice, and Michael Roloff for their research assistance on this project.

³⁷ Gwen Florio, "Rural Roots Appeal," *Rocky Mountain News*, November 5, 2004, p. 4A.

³⁸ Coors also fared poorly in his appearance with Salazar on NBC's *Meet the Press*, for example, but because he was well known to most Coloradans, it seemed that any damage was fleeting.

³⁹ Michael Barone and Richard E. Cohen, *The Almanac of American Politics, 2004* (Washington, D.C.: National Journal Group, 2003), pp. 302-03.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Voter interest in the state was high in 2004, with the prospects of a competitive Senate race, several tight House races and, of course, the presidential election. Voter registration increased by 230,618 or 8 percent from 2000 in Colorado. Going into the 2004 election, registered Republicans (1,125,374) outnumbered registered Democrats (947,866) by 177,000, but a third of the electorate (1,028,886) was registered as unaffiliated.⁴¹

Boosted by competitive races at all levels, including a surprisingly tight presidential race, turnout in Colorado rose dramatically from 57.5 percent of the voting eligible population in 2000 to 67.4 percent in 2004. This represents an increase of 9.9 percent, one of the largest increases in the nation.⁴² Exit poll results demonstrated that Salazar won the Hispanic vote by a margin of three-to-one. Perhaps more importantly, given their sizable number, Salazar did much better than Coors among independents, winning that group by a margin of three-to-two. In addition, many more self-identified Republicans (10 percent) voted for Salazar than did Democrats defecting to Coors (4 percent), indicating a larger level of ticket-splitting among Republicans than Democrats.⁴³

The Candidates

Ken Salazar, a fifth-generation Hispanic Colorado rancher, water lawyer, and former state natural resources chief, began 2004 in the middle of his second-term as state attorney general. Although others, including Representative Mark Udall, expressed interest in seeking the Senate seat, the field cleared once Salazar announced his candidacy. Only Mike Miles, an educator and former ambassador, challenged Salazar; in fact, Miles actually won more votes at the party convention before losing decisively in the August primary. Salazar had twice been elected statewide and was clearly the most popular Democrat in Colorado. Although running for the U.S. Senate was different than running for attorney general, Salazar essentially campaigned as he had before. Stressing his roots in the rural San Luis Valley, Salazar ran as a moderate who understood the concerns of ranchers, farmers, and small business owners.

For much of the race Salazar, wearing a white cowboy hat, campaigned in his old green pick-up truck and promised to protect Colorado's "land, water, and people."⁴⁴ Salazar's emphasis on water was of particular importance to farmers and ranchers, who were concerned about losing water rights to the rapidly growing Front Range suburbs. To reinforce his moderate, populist agenda, Salazar talked often about the struggles of the working class, tax cuts for the middle class rather than for millionaires, affordable health insurance, and prescription drugs; he also repeated his support for the death penalty and gun owners.⁴⁵

Pete Coors, a well-known face but political neophyte whose great-grandfather founded the Colorado-based Adolph Coors Company, was drafted by GOP leaders, notably Governor Bill Owens, to run for the open Senate seat. Although Owens had promised to endorse former Representative Bob Schaffer, he was apparently concerned Schaffer was too conservative to win a statewide election. Owens' reversal angered Schaffer and his supporters, and contributed to a bruising primary. Although Coors prevailed, many conservatives never fully embraced his candidacy, which may have contributed to his loss in November.

⁴¹ Colorado Secretary of State, "October 2004 Voter Registration Numbers: Voter Recap by Party," (www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/oct2004.htm [November 25, 2004]).

⁴² United States Election Project, "2004 Voting-Age and Voting-Eligible Population Estimates and Voter Turnout," (elections.gmu.edu/Voter_Turnout_2004.htm [November 29, 2004]).

⁴³ CNN, "U.S. Senate/Colorado/Exit Polls," (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/CO/S/01/epolls.0.html [November 19, 2004]).

⁴⁴ M.E. Sprengelmeyer, "For Last Sprint, Salazar Heads Home," *Rocky Mountain News*, November 1, 2004, p. 6A.

⁴⁵ Mark P. Couch and Karen E. Crummy, "Senate Seat Goes Blue as Salazar Ices Coors," *Denver Post*, November 3, 2004, p. A1.

Coors did not do as well as Bush among social conservatives, who expressed concerns about his firm's racy advertising, marketing to gays, and comments Coors made about the possibility of lowering the drinking age.⁴⁶

Coors campaigned on a platform of lower taxes, economic growth, anti-terrorism, and conservative "Colorado values."⁴⁷ At every turn, Coors emphasized his experience as a businessman who understood how to create jobs and opportunity. At the same time, though, Coors articulated a variety of "liberal" positions on social issues; he opposed the death penalty, for example, and his company provided benefits to same-sex partners. Coors welcomed a series of visits by Bush, Cheney, and various GOP senators, and often shared a stage with national Republicans.⁴⁸ Salazar, on the other hand, did not appear in public with Kerry until late October, citing scheduling conflicts. It is more likely that he was avoiding Kerry, whose polls consistently showed that he was running behind Salazar in the state.⁴⁹ Given the expectation of a very close race, an enormous registration disadvantage, and the subsequent need to attract ticket-splitters, the Salazar campaign wanted the focus to be on the two Senate candidates, rather than on the presidential race.⁵⁰

Money

Because it was an open seat and thus a target of both parties, it was expected that the Colorado Senate race would be very expensive. It turns out that these expectations were warranted.

Candidates

Lack of money was not a problem in the race, as the two candidates combined to raise and spend record amounts for a Colorado statewide election. As indicated by table 9-1, fund-raising by the candidates approached \$18 million. Despite Coors' personal wealth and business ties, the Salazar campaign raised \$9.8 million while the Coors campaign raised only \$7.9 million. Approximately 80 percent of Salazar's money came from individual donors, with PACs contributing just over 10 percent; in comparison, individual donors accounted for 64 percent of Coors' funds while PACs contributed 17 percent.⁵¹

Coors loaned more than \$1 million to his campaign for the general election, including \$500,000 in the final week. Ironically, that loan on October 24 triggered the "Millionaires' Amendment" provision in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) and allowed Salazar to raise up to \$6,000 from individual donors, three times the normal amount. In Colorado the amendment is triggered when a candidate spends more than \$571,000 of his or her own money. Coors had loaned his campaign \$400,000 in primary, and put another \$550,000 into the campaign earlier in the general. After learning that Coors had put another half million dollars into his race, Salazar's campaign immediately contacted supporters asking for more money, which was then used to buy an additional \$750,000 of radio and TV advertising.⁵² Coors, who had previously shied away from spending more of his own money for fear of triggering the Millionaires'

⁴⁶ Gwen Florio and Lynn Bartels, "Coors' Fizz Sapped by Ads," *Rocky Mountain News*, November 4, 2004, p. 34A.

⁴⁷ Couch and Crummy, "Senate Seat Goes Blue as Salazar Ices Coors," p. A1.

⁴⁸ Karen E. Crummy and Mark P. Couch, "Salazar Wins Senate Race," *Denver Post*, November 3, 2004, p. A7.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Jim Carpenter, campaign manager, Salazar for Senate, interview by Kyle Saunders, Denver, Colo., December 13, 2004.

⁵¹ The Center for Responsive Politics, "Ken Salazar," (www.opensecrets.org/politicians/summary/newmems.asp?CID [December 30, 2004]).

⁵² Burt Hubbard and M.E. Sprengelmeyer, "Salazar Topped Coors in Spending," *Rocky Mountain News*, December 3, 2004, p. 5A.

Amendment, said the extra money was needed to counter spending by outside groups, including the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) and Citizens for a Strong Senate (CSS).⁵³

Although the Salazar campaign took out a \$600,000 unsecured bank loan in August (which was not disclosed until October 15) the action did not trigger the Millionaires' Amendment. In an unusual step, the bank accepted future campaign contributions and "any and all terminated media contracts" as collateral for the loan.⁵⁴ The Coors campaign asked the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to intervene, but the Commission declined, saying that the Millionaires' Amendment did not apply because Salazar used his campaign's property but not his own to secure the loan.⁵⁵

The two campaigns spent a combined \$17.2 million, easily surpassing the previous state record of \$10.4 million set in the 2002 Senate contest between incumbent Wayne Allard and Tom Strickland, his Democratic challenger. Table 9-1 shows that Salazar spent \$9.6 million while Coors spent \$7.7 million. Perhaps more importantly, Salazar outspent Coors by a two-to-one margin in the final weeks of the campaign.⁵⁶ According to Sean Tonner, Coors' campaign manager, the "defining factor in the race was money and weight of message," with Salazar, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), and outside groups airing three ads for every one aired on behalf of Coors.⁵⁷

Political Parties

Given the Colorado seat's perceived importance to each party's hopes of controlling the U.S. Senate, it was no surprise that both senatorial campaign committees spent heavily in the state. What is surprising is that the DSCC outspent its Republican counterpart \$2.3 million to \$1.1 million (see table 9-2), with most of the spending going to TV and radio advertising (see table 9-3). The DSCC committed to the race early and never wavered in its support for Salazar. Indeed, the DSCC put more money into this race than any other Senate race. The relative lack of spending by the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) can be traced to its expectation that Coors would put more of his own money into the race, allowing the NRSC to direct its resources to other states.⁵⁸ Coors' campaign manager said of the NRSC, "We would have loved more money for TV, but understood that they had budgets, too, and other races."⁵⁹

Interest Groups

As shown in table 9-3, there was considerable interest group activity in the race, especially late in the campaign on the Democratic side. CSS, a 527 organization considered by the Coors campaign to be a front for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, spent \$921,000 on a TV and mail campaign.⁶⁰ The LCV, which had not planned to spend heavily in the race, ended up making close to \$1.1 million in independent expenditures targeting Pete Coors. This late shift in strategy was made possible by several large gifts to the LCV, which it then applied to the Colorado race.⁶¹ The New Democrat Network (NDN) also spent heavily. NDN, a Washington, D.C. based PAC focused on building a new Democratic

⁵³ Sean Tonner, campaign manager, Coors for Senate, personal e-mail communication to Robert Duffy, January 3, 2005.

⁵⁴ Karen Crummy, "Coors' Open Wallet," *Denver Post*, October 25, 2004, p. A1.

⁵⁵ Sean Tonner, campaign manager, Coors for Senate, telephone interview by Robert Duffy, November 12, 2004.

⁵⁶ Hubbard and Sprengelmeyer, "Salazar Topped Coors in Spending," p. 5A.

⁵⁷ Tonner interview, November 12, 2004.

⁵⁸ Patrick Davis, political director, NRSC, interview by Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 11, 2004.

⁵⁹ Tonner interview, November 12, 2004.

⁶⁰ Tonner interview, November 12, 2004.

⁶¹ Andy Schultheiss, southwest regional director, League of Conservation Voters, telephone interview by Robert Duffy, November 9, 2004.

majority, spent \$1.1 million on TV ads in Colorado, Alaska, and Oklahoma.⁶² Other groups that may have been expected to spend significant sums on the race, such as the AFL-CIO or the Sierra Club, chose to focus on other states.

Interest group spending was noticeably less on behalf of Pete Coors, perhaps because the groups expected Coors to devote more of his own fortune to the race, but another reason could be Coors' lesser appeal with Colorado's conservative voters. In the 2002 Senate race, Republican allied groups spent \$6 million compared to \$2 million for Democratic groups.⁶³ In 2004, in contrast, spending by Republican groups amounted to less than \$2 million. Americans for Job Security (AJS), a 501(c)(6) organization which spent approximately \$1 million on TV and mail criticizing Salazar's environmental record, made the biggest expenditure. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, whose mail endorsed Coors' business background, spent approximately \$500,000 on the effort.⁶⁴ The National Beer Wholesalers Association spent \$140,000 supporting their fellow brewer, and the National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund (NRA-PVF) put \$148,680 into the race.⁶⁵ Groups that were active in other states, like the Club for Growth, made no independent expenditures in the race, but it did help Coors with fund-raising by encouraging supporters to contribute to the campaign.⁶⁶

Also of note was the considerable amount of activity and spending by state 527 organizations, most of which were created for the 2004 election cycle and focused their efforts on state legislative races. Many of these organizations had field staff working to boost interest and turnout in those races, which almost certainly had an effect on the Senate race as well. This probably worked to benefit Ken Salazar, as a majority of the \$7.1 million was spent by groups working to elect Democratic candidates, primarily in swing districts also targeted by the U.S. Senate candidates.⁶⁷ In fact, the biggest surprise in Colorado on Election Night was that the Democrats gained control of both chambers of the state legislature. According to Sean Tonner, Coors' campaign manager, "in the end, we had the national 527s going after our head, and we were getting our ankles chopped by the local 527s."⁶⁸

Finally, it is also worth noting that Colorado Conservative Voters, a 527 organization headed by former members of Bob Schaeffer's campaign, spent nearly \$1 million during the primary attacking Coors from the right. The group's TV ads argued that Coors' positions on drinking and other social issues were insufficiently conservative, and pointedly noted Coors expressed support for lowering the drinking age to eighteen.⁶⁹ Ironically, liberal groups would later use these same issues to attack Coors in the general election.

⁶² M.E. Sprengelmeyer, "Dems Hitting Airwaves," *Rocky Mountain News*, October 6, 2004, p. 20A.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Bill Miller, vice president and national field director, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2004.

⁶⁵ Gwen Florio and Burt Hubbard, "Coors Gets \$1.65 Million in Two Weeks," *Rocky Mountain News*, October 22, 2004, p. 6A.

⁶⁶ Tonner interview, November 12, 2004.

⁶⁷ Burt Hubbard, "Outsiders Fueled Election," *Rocky Mountain News*, January 3, 2005, p. B5.

⁶⁸ Tonner interview, November 12, 2004. Tonner may have overstated the case, as later reports showed that Democratic 527s outspent their Republican counterparts by just over \$1 million. Democratic groups got off to an early lead, but Republican 527s spent \$1.8 million in the last two weeks of the race. In fact, one of the biggest spending 527s was Americans for Better Government, an organization headed by Mike Ciletti of Phase Line Strategies, a political consulting firm whose president is Sean Tonner. The group bought voter registration lists in many counties and did several mailings, spending a total of \$946,333 in the 2004 race. See Hubbard, "Outsiders Fueled Election," p. B5.

⁶⁹ Tonner interview, November 12, 2004.

The Effects of Money: The Ground War

Perhaps in reaction to BCRA restrictions on broadcast issue advocacy, interest groups and 527 groups played a very prominent role in the ground war on the Democratic side. The Republican Party, on the other hand, did it all “in house,” focusing its ground efforts on shoring up and producing the Republican base. The final stages of the ground war were critical to Salazar’s victory because both campaigns were cognizant of, and tracking, early voting and knew that Republicans were running about 140,000 votes ahead going into Election Day.⁷⁰

The Salazar campaign sent four pieces of direct mail stressing the candidate’s long ties to and understanding of rural Colorado (see table 9-4). All depicted rural images and photos of Salazar in his trademark white hat, often on horseback, and all prominently mentioned his opposition to the death tax on family farms, ranches, and small businesses. One brochure noted that Salazar’s family members settled in the state in the 1850s and “have been farming and ranching here ever since.” The mailer goes on to note that Salazar will fight “for Colorado’s water” and for “rural Colorado,” and claims that Pete Coors “doesn’t understand” either. In a clear effort to appeal to moderates, the mailer also notes that “Salazar’s values run deep—from the land, from his faith, from his family.”

In addition to direct mail, both campaigns placed ads in Spanish-language newspapers and created Spanish-language versions of their web sites.⁷¹ The Salazar campaign’s ground war also used e-mail extensively to contact supporters, as well as the telephone. One automated telephone message attracted attention for its script, which said “Pete Coors wants to change the law to let men convicted of domestic violence buy guns.” The claim was based on remarks that Coors made about supporting the repeal of the Brady Bill, which contained a provision barring people convicted of domestic violence from owning guns.⁷²

The Colorado Democratic Party paid for seven direct-mail pieces, three of which criticized Coors for his “extreme” positions on abortion. All three noted that Coors’ stance on abortion allowed for no exceptions, even in cases of rape, incest, or to protect the life of the woman. Two of the same pieces also noted Coors’ support for lowering the drinking age to eighteen. The state party also sent two mailings supporting both Kerry and Salazar, and two generic “Vote Democratic” pieces, one timed to arrive during early voting, and the other just before Election Day.⁷³ For its part, the DSCC paid for no independent expenditure direct mail, but it did send one fund-raising appeal to previous contributors (see table 9-4).

In coordination with the Coors campaign, the Colorado Republican Committee did seven unique ads and mailed more than 1 million pieces overall.⁷⁴ Such arrangements are typical because the parties can mail at the non-profit rate, thereby reducing costs by 30 percent. One brochure contrasted the Bush-Coors team with Kerry-Salazar, depicting the latter as the arrows on a weathervane “following the prevailing political winds.” Most of the other pieces reflected the campaign’s “Straight Talk, Honest Answers” theme and stressed that Coors was a businessman, not a professional politician, a not too subtle dig at Salazar. One such ad, from the “desk of Marilyn Coors,” explained why her husband would be a “great” U.S. Senator and touts his honesty and business experience.

⁷⁰ Tonner interview, November 12, 2004; and Carpenter interview, December 13, 2004.

⁷¹ Javier Erik Olivera, “Family’s Table-Talk Turns to Politics,” *Rocky Mountain News*, October 23, 2004, p. 26A.

⁷² Gwen Florio, “No Let-up in Senate Slugfest,” *Rocky Mountain News*, October 29, 2004, p. 30A.

⁷³ Chris Gates, chair, Colorado Democratic Party, telephone interview by Kyle Saunders, November 10, 2004; Carpenter interview, December 13, 2004.

⁷⁴ Tonner interview, November 12, 2004.

Both parties were involved in get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts. Colorado Victory 2004 (CV04) was a part of the federal coordinated campaign for the Democrats. CV04 conducted door-to-door efforts to identify and target base voters. CV04 had eleven coordinating offices statewide, hundreds of staff, and thousands of volunteers, all working only for named federal candidates. The money for CV04's phone banks came from their own fund-raising and from money transferred from the DNC (\$890,754), the DSCC (\$450,000), and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (\$57,500), the state party, and some transfers of excess funds from the Salazar campaign.⁷⁵ The Democratic Party also organized a three-state, eleven-city "Una Nueva Esperanza" bus tour aimed at registering Latinos that included towns in Colorado.⁷⁶

The Republican side did much of its GOTV and phone banks in house, as per national trends, with up to 8,000 volunteers walking well over 1,000 precincts and reaching out to more than 200,000 households. The Colorado GOP also had a mailing party in mid-September for Coors and other Republican federal candidates. Additionally, volunteers made more than 300,000 phone calls in the GOTV effort. The 96 Hour Campaign, the Republican effort in the weekend prior to Election Day, was a large part of this effort aimed at mobilizing core supporters.⁷⁷ The NRSC did not contribute to the federal coordinated campaign, but the RNC and NRCC transferred \$819,159 and \$670,000, respectively to the state party.⁷⁸

As indicated by table 9-4, liberal interest groups were considerably more active on the ground than conservative groups. The LCV sent three pieces of mail focusing on Coors' environmental record. One of the direct-mail pieces, titled "One Fish, Two Fish, Red Fish, Doomed Fish," is an obvious reference to Dr. Seuss and criticizes Coors for "hundreds of violations of environmental laws" and for being one of Colorado's "top three toxic polluters."⁷⁹ The Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Sierra Club paid for a mailer endorsing various candidates, but that was sent only to the Club's members. The parent organization also sent mail, and both, along with local groups, contacted members by telephone, using live and recorded calls. The Rocky Mountain Chapter called 4,000 "frequent voters" up to four times each.⁸⁰ Other groups doing mail, telephone, or e-mail included the Colorado Education Association and the Colorado AFL-CIO.⁸¹

NARAL Pro-Choice Colorado distributed three issue ad mailers all dealing with privacy and reproductive rights. None of the mailers referenced the election or any candidate. That was not the case, however, with

⁷⁵ Gates interview, November 10, 2004; Carpenter interview, December 13, 2004; spending figures from the Center for Responsive Politics, "National Party Transfers: Colorado,"

(www.opensecrets.org/states/type20.asp?states=CO&year=2004 [December 30, 2004]).

⁷⁶ The phrase translates as "A New Hope." See Susan Greene, "Latinos on a Drive for Dems," *Denver Post*, September 21, 2004, p. B4.

⁷⁷ David Wardrop, executive director, Colorado Republican Party, interview by Kyle Saunders, Denver, Colo., December 10, 2004.

⁷⁸ The Center for Responsive Politics, "National Party Transfers: Colorado," (www.opensecrets.org/states/type20.asp?states=CO&year=2004 [December 30, 2004]). Also of note, the Wyoming Republican State Committee shifted \$165,000 to its Colorado counterpart.

⁷⁹ One novel development was the decision by the Coors Brewing Company, at the end of the campaign, to take out full-page ads in most of the state's newspapers. The ads, which did not mention the candidate or the election, touted the firm's commitment to Colorado's people and environment and stressed its contributions to the state's economy, as well as its charitable giving. A company spokesman explained the unusual action as a necessary response to attacks on the company's environmental record and citizenship by the LCV and others. Although it is impossible to say for certain at this point, it seems that the ads did not cause the firm any lasting harm.

⁸⁰ Susan LaFever, director, Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Sierra Club, telephone interview by Robert Duffy, December 3, 2004.

⁸¹ Most of the mail pieces by LCV, CSS, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and AJS were 8.5 by 11.5 inch color "billboards;" mail from NARAL Pro-Choice Colorado, Straight Talk Colorado, Focus on the Family Action, and National Right to Life was smaller (6 inches by 11 inches).

NARAL Pro-Choice Colorado Fund, a 527 group established by the parent organization, which sent three pieces of mail criticizing Coors on the abortion issue. One, featuring a man in a suit peeking through a keyhole, read, “Pete Coors has some interesting ideas about privacy.” The other, depicting a young woman gazing out a window, read, “Pete Coors has some interesting ideas about helping rape victims.” The third read, “Pete Coors has some interesting ideas about letting women think.” The tag line for all three mailers was, “He’s opposed to it.”

The 527 organization CSS distributed seven pieces of mail in total, with one echoing its TV ad suggesting that Coors’ stance on the issues was not as good as his company’s beer. Another criticized Coors on abortion, while the other five ads made no reference to any candidate for federal office, but were clearly intended to urge Latinos to vote for Salazar. All were written in both English and Spanish, and four of the pieces stated that there were “no Hispanics in the United States Senate.” One continued by stating that Latinos have been part of Colorado for hundreds of years, but there has “never been a person who shares our values for Colorado in the United States Senate. Now, we have the power to change that. And make sure our voices are heard.”

In addition to mail, a number of organized groups were present on the ground in the Senate race. As a case in point, LCV was very active on the ground in Jefferson County, going door-to-door every day for seven weeks in the heavily targeted towns of Aurora, Arvada, Wheat Ridge, and Lakewood. Initially, LCV had been working the district for Dave Thomas, the Democratic challenger in the Colorado Seventh Congressional District, but shifted its focus to Ken Salazar when its canvassers reported that Thomas was in trouble. The focus of the first six weeks was voter identification and persuasion; in the last few weeks, the group did a literature drop with its “Polluter Pete” materials criticizing Coors’s environmental record. LCV contacted more than 50,000 households, most of which received three contacts, although some received four.⁸² LCV’s internal polling suggested that their “Polluter Pete” ground campaign, which delivered the same message at the same time as its TV and web site, broke through the campaign clutter and reinforced its advertised attacks on Coors. The goal of the synchronized campaign was to “create a brand” that encapsulated the group’s message, enabling it to build negative perceptions of Pete Coors. According to LCV, a full 25 percent of voters remembered the “Polluter Pete” label.⁸³

One of the more important developments in this election cycle in Colorado was the large number of liberal groups engaged in GOTV activities. The Coalition for a Better Colorado, for example, a 527 coalition comprised of the Colorado Conservation Voters, the Colorado AFL-CIO, the Colorado Education Association, and others, was very active in several closely contested state legislative races. There were also several 527 organizations that actively supported liberal ballot measures, including one mandating greater use of renewable energy. It is likely that their combined efforts to identify and mobilize voters for Democratic candidates in those races had some spillover into federal races.

As part of that effort, the Colorado AFL-CIO engaged in an intensive voter identification, education, and mobilization campaign dating back to March. In addition to polling in the state races, union volunteers knocked on “a ton of doors” of union members, primarily to discuss the state candidates. If the voter seemed receptive, the volunteer would sometimes push federal candidates as well, especially Salazar. The organization also encouraged early voting and absentee voting and drove activists into different state senate districts on different days to encourage voting that day. In the last four days, the organization had 2,500 volunteers helping in a “very targeted” GOTV effort, using information obtained from county clerks to focus on union members who had not yet voted.⁸⁴

⁸² Schultheiss interview, November 9, 2004.

⁸³ Mark Longabaugh, senior vice president for political affairs, League of Conservation Voters, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., November 10, 2004.

⁸⁴ Steve Adams, political director, Colorado AFL-CIO, telephone interview by Robert Duffy, December 6, 2004.

There were many newly formed organizations doing voter registration and GOTV activities that likely benefited Democratic candidates up and down the ticket. MoveOn.org was very active in the state, registering thousands of new voters and then working to turn them out during the election. The New Voters Project, whose goal was to register 265,000 eighteen to twenty-four-year-olds in six states, was active in Colorado, as was Moving America Forward, which focused on Hispanic GOTV.⁸⁵ JustGoVote.org, a non-profit, ostensibly nonpartisan organization engaged in education, outreach, and registration activities, sent five GOTV mailers aimed at likely Democratic voters, and People for the American Way participated in a Voter Protection Project, mostly in minority precincts.⁸⁶

Conservative groups were more active in the ground war than on TV or radio, although their efforts were mostly confined to direct mail, e-mail, and telephone. In addition to endorsing Coors during the primary, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent \$500,000 on seven direct-mail pieces. Several of the ads targeted women age eighteen to twenty-nine and addressed issues like medical liability reform and escalating health care costs that had tested well with this group. The Chamber also sent 2.5 million e-mails directing people to its web site.⁸⁷ In support of a fellow brewer, the National Beer Wholesalers PAC spent \$140,000 on an independent expenditure campaign involving direct mail, coasters, and a phone bank.⁸⁸ In addition to direct mail, the NRA-PVF supported Coors with two web ads and by paying for a plastic bag containing the Sunday newspaper. The bag read “Vote for Freedom First; Pete Coors for Senate.” AJS sent two pieces of direct mail, one assailing Salazar on taxes, the other repeating the charges made in group’s TV ads about the Summitville Mine. Finally, the Associated Builders and Contractors distributed a voter’s guide.⁸⁹

Social conservative groups were not a major presence in the race, with Focus on the Family Action sending two small mailers on abortion and gay marriage, and National Right to Life sending one mailer comparing the presidential and Senate candidates on a range of issues. Finally, Straight Talk Colorado, a state-based 527 organization, sent two mailings, one attacking Salazar for being a flip-flopper. The other featured Salazar, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Ted Kennedy, and Tom Daschle in cowboy hats, and argued that these “Liberal Lawmakers” would soon have Salazar supporting “abortion on demand,” “big government health care,” and “liberal judges.”

The Effects of Money: The Air War

The air war in the Colorado Senate race involved a concentrated set of actors: the two campaigns, the two senatorial campaign committees, AJS, the LCV, and CSS. Advertising from the parties, which was rather negative on both sides, was largely indistinguishable in content and style from the candidates’ own negative ads. Moreover, the themes and images used by the candidates and parties in their broadcast ads reinforced those that appeared in their mail.

⁸⁵ Ivan Frishberg, director, New Voters Project, interview by Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 11, 2004,

⁸⁶ JustGoVote.org, “About Just GoVote 2004,” (www.JustGoVote.org/about.htm [December 13, 2004]); and Kimberly Robson, deputy national field director, People for the American Way, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004.

⁸⁷ Miller interview, November 9, 2004.

⁸⁸ Linda Auglis and David Rehr, political affairs director and president, National Beer Wholesalers Association, interview by Kelly Patterson and Betsey Gimbel, Alexandria, Va., November 8, 2004.

⁸⁹ Ned Monroe, political affairs director, Associated Builders and Contractors, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Arlington, Va., November 8, 2004.

TV ad spending in the Denver market topped \$40 million, five times the amount spent in 2000.⁹⁰ As a result, advertising rates in the Denver market were very high, driven by the many actors seeking to buy time. Thirty seconds of advertising in the Denver market usually costs about \$140 per point; but in September and October, it cost three times that amount for the candidates, who were getting discounted rates, and as much as \$1,000 per point for interest groups who bought time in the final week of the campaign.⁹¹ In addition to driving up the cost, both campaigns noted after the election that the combined effect of the competitive presidential and Senate races had been to “suck the air out of the room” with respect to media coverage, making it much harder to get attention.

Both sides also spent heavily on radio advertising. The Salazar campaign in particular used the unique character and the relatively cheap production and broadcasting costs of radio to “narrowcast” to certain target audiences, especially outside the Denver market. Because of the aforementioned millionaire’s exception to BCRA, the Salazar campaign had quite a bit of money at the end of race to buy radio time. All told, the campaign produced twelve unique radio ads.⁹² The Coors campaign aired eleven mostly positive radio ads, which essentially mirrored those on TV with the exception of one ad featuring former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani.⁹³

Candidates

The Salazar campaign aired twenty-one unique TV ads and was the only campaign to air Spanish language ads.⁹⁴ In a gamble that nearly bankrupted the campaign, Salazar bought TV time for late October on August 11, taking advantage of the lower rates and effectively blocking out Coors and other campaigns. To make the buy, the campaign spent \$2 million, which included the \$600,000 loan noted above.⁹⁵

The campaign’s first ad began airing two days after the primary and was typical of the many positive ads it would run in the general election. More often than not, Salazar’s ads would feature him having friendly conversations with ordinary people. This first ad stated that Ken Salazar’s values “run deep, from the land, from his faith, and from his family,” and went on to tout his record as attorney general when “he took on criminals who prey on seniors and those who pollute the land and water that he loves.” The ad concluded with a promise that “in the Senate, he’ll always be a champion of the people.”

Another set of positive ads focused on Salazar’s record as head of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources, where he defended water rights for the people of Colorado, and his record as attorney general of going after polluters, criminals, and drug companies. The tag line for many of these ads was “experience that money can’t buy,” a reminder of Salazar’s accomplishments as well as a shot at Coors’ political inexperience and wealth.

Salazar did run several ads criticizing Coors as a millionaire who was out of touch with ordinary people. Several ads used a creatively edited sound bite of Coors saying, “I don’t know what a common man is” pointing contrast with Salazar’s humble beginnings and his understanding of middle class concerns. In

⁹⁰ Chris Walsh, “Political Spots Fill TV’s Pots,” *Rocky Mountain News*, November 6, 2004, p. 1C.

⁹¹ Tonner interview, November 12, 2004; this point was also substantiated by a review of the available per point data. For example, on KCNC, the Denver CBS affiliate, an ad during “Dr. Phil” cost \$185 per point when purchased on September 15. By October 18, the cost was \$450 per point. Demand definitely drove up the cost of advertising in the Denver market.

⁹² Carpenter interview, December 13, 2004.

⁹³ Tonner interview, November 12, 2004.

⁹⁴ Carpenter interview, December 13, 2004; see also Walsh, “Political Spots Fill TV’s Pots,” p. 6C.

⁹⁵ Mark P. Couch, “Savvy Fund-raising, Publicity Fueled Salazar’s Senate Drive,” *Denver Post*, November 4, 2004, p. A19.

other ads, Salazar hit Coors hard on environmental violations by the Coors brewery and for advocating tax cuts for the rich.

The Coors campaign aired thirteen TV ads during the general election, some positive and some negative.⁹⁶ The positive ads portrayed Coors as an honest family man and businessman who had done good things for the state. In these ads, Coors vowed to end the “Washington, D.C. spending spree” and advocated lower taxes and stronger federal efforts against terrorism. In other ads, Coors said that he was “not a politician or a lawyer” and laments attacks from people who “have never created a job or had to meet a payroll.”

Coors’ negative ads were primarily contrast ads. One highlighted Salazar’s “tax agenda,” and linked Salazar to Kerry’s tax-and-spend liberalism; the ad concluded with Coors looking directly into the camera and saying, “Ken Salazar wants to raise taxes. I don’t.” An ad featuring a “Keystone Kops” theme detailed “John Kerry and Ken Salazar’s tax plan” and told Coloradans to “hang on to their wallets.” A number of Coors’ ads noted that he was not a lawyer which, of course, Salazar was. Among the charges leveled in these ads were that Salazar was a pawn for the trial lawyer lobby and that “lawsuit abuse” was “killing jobs, hurting families, and putting doctors out of business.” Other ads criticized Salazar’s record as attorney general, alleging that he failed to attend important homeland security meetings and that he allowed polluters to plea bargain their cases.

Political Parties

Both senatorial campaign committees aired TV ads, but the DSCC far outspent the NRSC; it is thus likely that this relative imbalance, as well as the synergy with the ads from the interest groups and the campaign, benefited Salazar. The DSCC ran five attack ads that emphasized one theme: “Good for Pete Coors, bad for Colorado.” Several of the ads linked Coors to his company’s poor record on the environment and job outsourcing. Another begins with an audio clip of Coors saying “I don’t think there’s anything wrong with being self-serving,” and then proceeds to mention Coors’ expressed desire to eliminate corporate taxation and establish a national sales tax that would harm ordinary Coloradans. A humorous ad featured grainy black and white footage of “bad ideas,” including a plane with ten wings and a man crashing on a winged bicycle. Meanwhile, the voice-over detailed a litany of criticisms of Coors’ support for a national sales tax, the privatization of Social Security, and lowering the drinking age “to make bigger profits.”

The NRSC aired three attack ads; most criticized Salazar as a tax-and-spend liberal and tried to tie Salazar to Kerry. In fact, one analysis found that Kerry was attacked in 42 percent of the ads run by Coors and the NRSC between September 24 and October 7.⁹⁷ The NRSC’s first ad, for example, which began airing in the first week of October, linked Salazar to Kerry on cuts in military spending and for seeking to limit the investigative tools needed to capture terrorists. The second took on Salazar’s record as Colorado Attorney General and concluded “Ken Salazar is the last person to deserve a promotion.” The NRSC’s final ad details the “scary ideas that will hurt Colorado,” including Kerry and Salazar’s plans for higher taxes. The ad concluded by suggesting that “We cannot afford Ken Salazar in Washington.”

Interest Groups

Largely because of Denver’s high advertising rates, only three interest groups bought significant TV time. The first to go on the air was AJS, which ran an ad shortly after the primary attempting to connect Salazar, in his former role as head of the Department of Natural Resources, with a cyanide spill at the notorious Summitville mine. The ad blamed Salazar’s “lax oversight” of the Department for the disaster

⁹⁶ Tonner interview, November 12, 2004.

⁹⁷ John Aloysius Farrell, “Colorado Among Top TV Ad Targets,” *Denver Post*, October 13, 2004, p. A14.

and alleged that as attorney general, Salazar cut a deal with the company responsible for the spill, leaving Colorado taxpayers to pick up the \$230 million bill. The ad generated considerable media attention and prompted Salazar to demand that Coors renounce the ad, even though Coors had nothing to do with it. Nevertheless, the Coors campaign had to answer a lot of questions about the ad, diverting attention from its own message.

The LCV aired two TV ads at a combined cost of almost \$800,000.⁹⁸ The first ad was a response to the AJS ad criticizing Salazar's environmental record. LCV spent much more to air its "Polluter Pete" ad, which received national attention. The ad discussed an incident in which the Coors Brewery, one of the "top three" polluters in Colorado, illegally dumped 77,000 gallons of waste into Clear Creek, killing 50,000 fish. Coors, the ad claimed, helped shape a law that made it easier for polluting business to escape penalties. The ad ended by directing viewers to a special web site criticizing Coors' environmental record, www.polluterpete.com.

CSS paid almost \$1 million to run two ads, including one in the final week of the campaign, when advertising costs were at their peak.⁹⁹ That ad featured repeated images of severe automobile accidents while the announcer criticized Coors for advocating lowering the drinking age to eighteen and claimed that "overnight" Coors would have 200,000 more customers in Colorado. The ad concluded by claiming that for Coors it does not matter that a lower drinking age is bad for kids, as long as it's really good for business. The ad hurt Coors badly, according to Sean Tonner, who said that the campaign's internal polling showed that it resonated with voters.¹⁰⁰ The ads, which stressed issues also featured in ads by the DSCC, LCV, and in the primary by the Colorado Conservative Voters, may have been particularly effective in rural Colorado and among social conservatives, who never quite embraced the beer millionaire.¹⁰¹

Conclusion

After the election, Brad Woodhouse, DSCC spokesman, hailed Ken Salazar's candidacy as a model for the direction the Democratic Party needs to take to be successful in future elections, claiming that "[Salazar] pays homage and respect to the beliefs and values of rural voters, while also staying true to core Democratic principles. I think that combination is instructive for the type of candidates that we need."¹⁰²

While the Colorado Senate contest illustrated many of the characteristics of a competitive senate race, especially reflected in the inordinate amount of money that was raised and spent, there were some differences. The most striking difference was that the forces on the left outraised and outspent the forces on the right, whether at the level of candidates, parties, or interest groups, by a sizeable margin. The second important difference was the Coors campaign's triggering of the Millionaires' Amendment to BCRA, which enabled Salazar to raise even more money at a crucial time in the campaign. The third difference was the critical role played by the many interest groups and state-based 527 organizations whose efforts in state legislative races drove up Democratic turnout which, in turn, helped Salazar.

⁹⁸ Andy Schultheiss, southwest regional director, League of Conservation Voters, telephone interview by Robert Duffy, November 9, 2004.

⁹⁹ Burt Hubbard And Tillie Fong, "\$17 Million For Ads; Outside Groups Spend a Fortune to Influence Races," Rocky Mountain News, November 6, 2004, p. 4A.

¹⁰⁰ Tonner interview, November 12, 2004.

¹⁰¹ Florio and Bartels, "Coors' Fizz Sapped by Ads," p. 34A.

¹⁰² Gwen Florio, "Rural Roots Appeal," p. 4A.

Salazar won the race in Colorado because he offered a moderate populist message and had more resources at his disposal. On the other side, Coors had won the Republican primary because he was seen as a moderate and as more electable by party leaders than was Bob Schaffer. Ironically, though, Coors lost the general election because conservative Republicans thought he was too liberal, and Democrats and a majority of independents thought he was too conservative. In short, Coors was effectively “whipsawed” by the attacks from the left and less-than-needed support from the right, while Salazar was able to capture a large enough portion of the middle to win the election.

Table 9-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Colorado Senate Race, 2003-04

	Ken Salazar (D)	Peter Coors (R)
From PACs	\$1,014,712	\$1,301,667
From individuals	\$7,834,808	\$5,013,371
From party	\$40,200	\$50,000
From candidate	\$0	\$1,450,000
Other contributions	\$905,222	\$44,869
Total receipts	\$9,794,942	\$7,859,907
Total expenditures	\$9,561,566	\$7,730,473
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$233,375	\$133,683

Source: Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 23, 2004]).

Table 9-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, Colorado Senate Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DSCC	CO Sen	Pete Coors	\$2,301,264
	CO Sen	Ken Salazar	\$2,301,264	...	\$2,301,264	
NRSC	CO Sen	Pete Coors	\$63,890	...	\$63,890	\$1,139,946
	CO Sen	Ken Salazar	...	\$1,076,056	\$1,076,056	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ [January 5, 2005]).

Table 9-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Colorado Senate Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Salazar for Senate	\$2,597,683	\$106,119	\$2,703,802	\$4,549,846
<i>Political parties</i>				
DSCC	\$1,620,975	...	\$1,620,975	\$1,300,240
DNC	\$24,400	\$63,750	\$88,150	\$2,565,565
<i>Interest groups</i>				
New Democrat Network	\$723,590	...	\$723,590	\$581,988
Citizens for a Strong Senate	\$596,765	...	\$596,765	\$742,815
League of Conservation Voters	\$414,250	...	\$414,250	\$498,261
American Family Voices	\$298,650	...	\$298,650	\$239,027
American Federation of Government Employees	...	\$1,265	\$1,265	...
Communication Workers of America	\$4,337
Stronger America Now	\$3,124
Republican allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Pete Coors for Senate	\$2,258,641	\$187,480	\$2,446,121	\$4,174,756
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRSC	\$474,880	\$35,250	\$510,130	\$1,024,256
RNC	\$124,050	...	\$124,050	\$310,325
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Americans for Job Security	\$382,220	...	\$382,220	\$655,595
Small Business Survival Committee	...	\$36,000	\$36,000	...
Republican Leadership Council	...	\$7,250	\$7,250	...
United Seniors Association	\$4,570	...	\$4,570	\$534,457
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$110,738
National Rifle Association	\$5,980
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
JustGoVote.org	\$32,275	\$9,350	\$41,625	...
Hispanics Together	...	\$41,440	\$41,440	...
Campaign Money Watch	\$3,320	\$20,000	\$23,320	...
Americans for Better Government, LLC	...	\$17,265	\$17,265	...
AARP	\$130,350

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senatorial, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study's sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study's relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 9-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

**Table 9-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Colorado Senate Race, 2004^a**

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Other	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c									
<i>Candidates</i>									
Salazar for Senate	12	4	1	...	12	21	50
<i>Political parties</i>									
Colorado Democratic Party	...	7	...	1	2	10
DSCC	...	1	5	6
Adams County Democratic Party	...	1	1
DNC	...	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>									
Citizens for a Strong Senate	...	6	2	8
Sierra Club	...	2	5	7
League of Conservation Voters	...	3	1	...	2	6
NARAL Pro-Choice Colorado	...	6	6
JustGoVote.org	...	5	5
Colorado Education Association	...	3	1	4
Colorado AFL-CIO	3	3
Association of Trial Lawyers of America ^d	...	1	1	2
Committee to Protect Our Families	...	1	1
Moving America Forward	...	1	1
WILD PAC	...	1	1
Republican allies^c									
<i>Candidates</i>									
Pete Coors for Senate	...	1	1	...	11	13	26
<i>Political parties</i>									
Colorado Republican Committee	...	7	2	9
NRSC	3	3
<i>Interest groups</i>									
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	7	...	1	8
Americans for Job Security	...	2	1	3
National Federation of Independent Business ^e	...	2	1	...	3
National Rifle Association	...	2	1	3
Coors Brewing Company	2	2
Focus on the Family Action	...	2	2
National Right to Life	...	1	1	...	2
Straight Talk Colorado	...	2	2
Associated Builders and Contractors	...	1 ^f	1
National Beer Wholesalers Association	...	1	1

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Other	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Nonpartisan									
<i>Interest groups</i>									
Americans for Better Government, LLC	...	1	1	2

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 9-3.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. For instance, League of Conservation Voters Education Fund data have been included in the League of Conservation Voters totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^d Linda Lipson, senior director of public affairs, Association of Trial Lawyers of America, telephone interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, December 14, 2004.

^e Sharon Wolff Sussin and Andrew Finka, national political director and political programs coordinator, National Federation of Independent Business, interview by Quin Monson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington D.C., December 14, 2004.

^f Ned Monroe, director of political affairs, Associated Builders and Contractors, interviewed by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004.

The Florida U.S. Senate Race: Contentious from Start to Finish

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The 2004 Florida U.S. Senate race was a fiercely fought contest from start to finish. One of the nation's eight open Senate seats, it generated a crowded field of candidates in both the Democratic and Republican party primaries. Inside the state, it was a competitive tug-of-war between the two major political parties. Democrats were determined not to lose the seat held for eighteen years by U.S. Senator Bob Graham, a Florida political icon, and Florida Republicans saw the 2004 election as an opportunity to reclaim one of the state's Senate seats for the GOP.⁴

This was a race filled with possible "firsts." Had she won, Democrat nominee Betty Castor would have been the state's first female Democratic U.S. Senator. Republican nominee Mel Martinez emphasized that, if elected, he would become the nation's first Cuban American U.S. Senator. Florida was one of only two U.S. Senate contests in the nation not featuring a white male.⁵ The Florida Senate race turned out to be even more competitive than the much-anticipated presidential contest in Florida. It ranked eighth among the costliest Senate contests in the nation. As the race progressed, the advertising and personal attacks became more venomous. The terrorism issue dominated both the primary and general election campaigns, cited by voters as the most important issue, according to exit polls.⁶

Political Environment⁷

Florida's Hispanic population played a critical role in the Senate race. While African Americans comprise 15 percent of the state's population, Hispanics make up 17 percent.⁸ In 2004, for the first time, exit polls showed that Hispanic voters made up a larger share of the Florida electorate (15 percent) than African Americans (12 percent).⁹

Political analysts divide the state's Hispanic population into two groups of voters: Cubans and non-Cubans. Cubans, who constitute 5 percent of voters, are staunch anti-communists who provide financial and electoral support to the Republican Party.¹⁰ Non-Cuban Hispanics, especially Puerto Ricans and Mexicans living in the Orlando area, are more likely than are Cuban Hispanics to be Democratic, but are considered a key swing group of voters. Republicans have made major inroads into the non-Cuban Hispanic communities beginning with Jeb Bush's reelection as governor in 2002. The fact that Republican U.S. Senate candidate Mel Martinez is from the Orlando area, is a Cuban immigrant, and speaks Spanish was not lost on anyone trying to understand the White House's "interest" in his

¹ With the assistance of Rebecca Young and Elise Heffner, Florida State University.

² With the assistance of Adrienne Mathews and Erica Thomas, University of Central Florida.

³ With the assistance of Amber Davis, University of South Florida.

⁴ Republican U.S. Senator Connie Mack retired in 2000 after serving two terms.

⁵ Illinois was the other; two African American males competed for that seat.

⁶ U.S. President/Florida exit poll survey conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International for the AP and television networks. Survey results were posted on CNN.com web site: (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/FL/P/00/epolls.0.html [December 21, 2004]).

⁷ For a more comprehensive treatment of the Florida political environment, see chapter 2 in this volume.

⁸ U.S. Census Bureau, "Florida QuickFacts," (quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12000.html [January 10, 2005]).

⁹ U.S. President/Florida exit poll survey conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International for the AP and television networks. Survey results were posted on CNN.com web site: (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/FL/P/00/epolls.0.html [December 21, 2004]).

¹⁰ Pew Hispanic Center, "Pew Hispanic Center Fact Sheet,"

(www.pewhispanic.org/site/docs/pdf/Florida%20voters%20fact%20sheet.pdf [January 13, 2005]), p. 1.

candidacy. Martinez' personal story of his assimilation into American life, educational pursuits, and career achievements resonated well with Florida's Hispanic voters.

The Primary Candidates

On February 27, 2003, popular Democratic U.S. Senator Bob Graham announced that he would seek the presidency. It was a rather short campaign, and by October 6, he ended his presidential bid. A month later, November 3, 2003, Graham announced he would not seek reelection to a fourth term in the Senate, a race he would surely have won.

Graham's retirement drew three strong Democratic contenders into the race—U.S. Representative Peter Deutsch from Broward County, Miami-Dade County Mayor Alex Penelas, and former Florida commissioner of education Betty Castor from Tampa, plus a fourth lesser-known candidate, Bernard Klein, a businessman from Plantation.

Senator Graham's decision not to run again also opened up the floodgates among Republicans. Two candidates flirted with running but eventually backed out while one candidate withdrew too late to be removed from the ballot. That left seven, two of whom were the front-runners from the very beginning—former ten-term U.S. Representative Bill McCollum, who lost the 2000 U.S. Senate race to Democrat Bill Nelson and Mel Martinez, who resigned as secretary of Housing and Urban Development to run.¹¹

The newly-formed Veterans Party of America fielded candidate Dennis Bradley, a retired Army veteran, businessman from Kissimmee and former Republican.

The Primary Campaign: Democrats

The three strongest Democratic candidates slugged it out in the primary. They each believed that they could capture a plurality of the vote and, with no runoff election, win the party's nomination.¹² Deutsch believed he could capitalize on his home base, Broward County, the state's most staunchly Democratic enclave and home to high-turnout senior voters, a sizable Jewish population, and a large bloc of African American voters. Penelas, from the state's largest county, calculated that he could hold his county's Democrats, win the votes of Hispanic Democrats throughout the state, and capture the anti-war vote because of his staunch opposition to the war in Iraq. Castor banked on her previous experience winning statewide office as education commissioner, her gender, and her appeal in the critical I-4 Corridor and in more conservative North Florida.

For Deutsch and Penelas, the primary was always an uphill battle. Castor led in the polls from start to finish. Deutsch's aggressive TV, radio, and direct-mail attack ads ineffectively tried to paint Castor as weak on terrorism for not firing a tenured University of South Florida (USF) computer science professor who was accused of being a fund-raiser for the Islamic Jihad.¹³ Yet it was a picture that lingered long

¹¹ Mel Martinez immigrated to the United States when he was fifteen years old as part of "Operation Pedro Pan" and became a successful trial lawyer in Orlando. In 1998 he was elected as the first Hispanic to hold the nonpartisan Orange County chairman position. Two years later, Martinez co-chaired the Florida Bush for President Committee. Martinez served as the secretary of Housing and Urban Development in the Bush cabinet until he resigned his position in December 2003.

¹² In 2002, the state legislature suspended the runoff primary but only for the 2002 election. The legislation called for the runoff to be restored automatically in 2004 unless the Legislature voted to again suspend it. It did. This was the first U.S. Senate nomination contest in Florida where it was understood that there would be no runoff, thereby affecting campaign strategy.

¹³ The professor, Sami Al-Arian, was later indicted by the U.S. government but that was well after Castor left the USF presidency to take another position. Castor repeatedly said she could not have fired Al-Arian with the evidence

after Castor drubbed Deutsch in the primary with a vote of 58 percent to 28 percent. The remaining votes were captured by Penelas (10 percent) and Klein (4 percent).¹⁴

The Primary Campaign: Republicans

McCollum began his campaign well over a year in advance of the primary.¹⁵ Martinez entered rather late on January 5, 2004. Once Martinez officially entered the Republican primary, the race was cast as a two-candidate contest: McCollum v. Martinez. Their battle dominated media coverage, but that did not stop the other candidates from fighting on, especially Byrd and Gallagher.

Doug Gallagher spent over \$6.5 million of his personal funds on his race, primarily on TV ads.¹⁶ The ads were effective in raising his name recognition from a blip in the polls to 83 percent one week from the primary.¹⁷ Gallagher portrayed himself as a political outsider and his opponents as indistinguishable from each other.

A shocking direct-mail advertisement unleashed by Martinez during the final week of the race attacked long-time pro-life conservative McCollum for taking positions “to appease certain political constituencies, including the radical homosexual lobby” and suggested that McCollum had become the “new darling of the extreme homosexuals.”¹⁸ During that last week, a Mason-Dixon poll showed Martinez pulling ahead of McCollum 33 percent to 27 percent.¹⁹ Martinez likely saw the ad as an opportunity to differentiate himself from McCollum among social conservatives.

In a statewide TV debate on August 27, the Friday before the August 31 primary, McCollum blasted Martinez’s tactics as “despicable” and vowed not to support Martinez should he win the nomination. In disgust, the *St. Petersburg Times* retracted its endorsement of Martinez and endorsed McCollum instead, thereby capturing headlines across the state.²⁰ The “dirty campaigner” label dogged Martinez until primary day and throughout the general election. In spite of winning the nomination (45 percent to

available at the time. Al-Arian’s indictment came after passage of the Patriot Act, which allowed government records to be matched, but that Act was passed by Congress long after Castor had left USF. As of December, 2004, Al Arian is in federal prison awaiting trial.

¹⁴ Florida Department of State, Division of Elections, “August 31, 2004 Primary Election,” (election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=8/31/04&DATAMODE= [January 10, 2005]).

¹⁵ Although McCollum did not formally file to run until August 12, 2003, he was being mentioned as a possible candidate in early 2003, even before Senator Graham had made the decision to retire; see Charlie Cook, “How Much Will Bush Muscle Into Senate Races?,” *National Journal*, March 8, 2003, p. 762. McCollum commissioned a poll in June 2003. Conducted by John McLaughlin and Associates, it showed McCollum leading another possible Republican contender, Representative Mark Foley, 30-18 percent. See also Evote.com, “Florida Free For All?,” (www.evotecom/features_section/2003-08/08052003florida.asp [December 29, 2003]).

¹⁶ Mark Hollis and Linda Kleindienst, “Castor, Martinez Win U.S. Senate Primaries,” *South Florida Sun Sentinel*, September 1, 2004, p. 1A.

¹⁷ Statewide survey of 500 likely primary voters conducted August 23–24, 2004 by Mason-Dixon Polling & Research for various news outlets in the state; margin of error: 4.5 percent.

¹⁸ The “basis” for Martinez’s claims stemmed from McCollum’s votes while in Congress to include homosexuals in a federal hate crimes bill and to step-up AIDS treatments in another bill.

¹⁹ Statewide survey of 500 likely primary voters conducted August 23–24, 2004 by Mason-Dixon Polling & Research for various news outlets in the state; margin of error: 4.5 percent.

²⁰ “McCollum for GOP,” *St. Petersburg Times*, August 30, 2004, p. 8A. The editorial took Martinez to task for taking “his campaign into the gutter with hateful and dishonest attacks on his strongest opponent...The *Times* is not willing to be associated with bigotry. As a result, we are taking the almost unprecedented step of rescinding our recommendation of Martinez.”

McCollum's 31 percent, Gallagher's 14 percent, and Byrd's 6 percent)²¹ and eventually getting a lukewarm endorsement from McCollum, general election returns suggest some McCollum supporters ended up voting for Castor in retribution.²²

The Role of Money

Both Betty Castor and Mel Martinez had well-funded campaigns with support for each coming from individuals, political parties, and interest groups. Raising money both outside and inside Florida was made easier by the glass-ceiling-breaking biographies of the two candidates and by the fact that the seat was a key to party control of the U.S. Senate. Twenty-eight percent of individual contributions to Martinez's campaign came from outside of Florida while 30 percent of individual contributions to Castor came from out of state.²³ Still, the four hurricanes which devastated various regions of the state delayed the fund-raising activities of both candidates. The Senate candidates found that they had to reschedule or cancel several campaign events, and they found it hard to ask for money from persons who had suffered severe property damage and loss. Neither candidate wished to be seen as insensitive to the personal and financial traumas facing many Floridians, their families, or friends.²⁴

The Candidates

The Federal Election Commission (FEC) reports that Democrat Castor raised a total of \$11.5 million while Republican Martinez raised a total of \$12.8 million. Martinez received more support from PACs and his own party, while Castor's largest source of financial support came from individuals (see table 10-1). Both candidates spent heavily on broadcast advertising, including broadcast and cable TV and radio.

The Castor campaign spent over nearly \$8 million on TV advertising. The Martinez campaign far outspent the Castor campaign. They spent over \$9 million on TV advertising. The Castor campaign spent approximately 85 percent of its broadcast advertising dollars on TV in the Tampa, Orlando, Miami, Jacksonville, and Tallahassee media markets. In contrast, the Martinez campaign spent 99 percent of its broadcast dollars on TV advertising in those areas. (See table 10-3.)

²¹ The remaining four candidates listed on the ballot (Klayman, Kogut, March, and Saull) received less than 5 percent among themselves. See Florida Department of State, Division of Elections, "August 31, 2004 Primary Election," ([election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=8/31/04&DATAMODE=\[January 10, 2005\]](http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=8/31/04&DATAMODE=[January 10, 2005])).

²² The U.S. Senate/Florida exit poll showed that Castor got 18 percent of the conservative vote; 12 percent of the white conservative Protestant vote. Exit poll survey conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International for the AP and television networks. Survey results were posted on CNN.com, "Election Results," (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/FL/S/01/epolls.0.html [December 13, 2004]).

²³ Castor's advantage in out-of-state contributions may partially be explained by EMILY's List's strong national support for Castor's campaign and her hiring of the former deputy campaign finance director for Howard Dean's presidential campaign as a key deputy. Larry Biddle, initially trained at EMILY's List, was brought into the Castor campaign specifically to raise money via the Internet. See Vicki Chachere, "'BettyNet' Web Site Boosts Castor's Senate Bid," *The Ledger*, June 14, 2004, (www.theledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040614/NEWS/406140355&SearchID=73195940142265 [January 13, 2005]). By July, Castor had collected 5,870 donations from EMILY's list members (5,315 from out of state and 555 from Florida. See Anita Kumar, "Castor's Ties to Group Draw Fire," *St. Petersburg Times*, July 18, 2004, p.1B. This pattern continued throughout the campaign.

²⁴ Polls suggest that Republican candidates, including Martinez, may have benefited slightly from both the governor and the president's handling of the hurricane damage. The U.S. Senate/Florida exit poll showed that among voters who approved of government responses to hurricanes, 53 percent voted for Martinez, 44 percent for Castor. Exit poll survey conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International for the AP and television networks. See CNN.com, "Election Results," (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/FL/S/01/epolls.0.html, [December 13, 2004]).

The Parties

The national political parties were heavily involved in the race. Both the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) and Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) put the Florida U.S. Senate race near the top of their funding priority lists. They spent nearly equal amounts on their respective candidates' races. The NRSC spent \$5,799,822 on TV and radio advertising supporting Martinez. The DSCC spent \$5,362,595 on Castor's behalf, a difference of some \$440,000, but for TV advertising alone. (See table 10-3.)

The NRSC heavily supported Martinez because of his perceived electability and ability to win Hispanic votes. Hispanics voted for Martinez in large numbers (60 percent) and Martinez helped President Bush among Hispanics with a "reverse coattail" effect.

Interest Groups

Interest groups were also big players in funding the U.S. Senate race. Castor's interest group support came primarily from EMILY's List and the AFL-CIO, both of which outspent all other pro-Castor interest groups on broadcast advertising. EMILY's List spent over \$1.2 million and the AFL-CIO spent just over \$750,000 on TV advertising. Castor also benefited from spending by groups such as Communities for Quality Education, Florida Women Vote, the Human Rights Campaign, and People for the American Way, who ran sympathetic TV and/or radio ads on Castor's behalf. (See table 10-3.)

Martinez benefited from limited advertising done by traditional Republican-leaning groups such as the National Rifle Association (NRA), the National Right to Life Committee, and from advocacy groups such as Progress for America and the United Seniors Association.

The Ground War

The Florida U.S. Senate race was overshadowed by the presidential race and by four powerful hurricanes that hit Florida between August 13 and September 26, causing loss of life and billions of dollars in property damage.

Media attention inside and outside Florida was heavily focused on the presidential race throughout 2004. It was understandable in light of the events surrounding the 2000 presidential contest, the 537 vote victory for Bush of 5.9 million votes cast, and the controversial recount.²⁵ Polls showing the strong possibility of another close election thrust Florida right back into the spotlight as a crucial battleground state. Frequent visits by the presidential and vice presidential candidates, their spouses, children, and other surrogates drew bigger crowds than appearances by the U.S. Senate candidates alone.

The issues dominating both the presidential and senatorial campaigns were virtually the same, but ranked differently. National exit polls showed that concern about moral issues was the most often cited reason voters chose Bush over Kerry, but in Florida, it was terrorism over moral issues (24 percent versus 20 percent, respectively).²⁶

²⁵ Florida's critical role stemmed from the fact that the Electoral College tally in other states resulted in neither candidate winning the necessary 270 votes without Florida.

²⁶ U.S. President/Florida exit poll survey conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International for the AP and television networks. Survey results were posted on CNN.com web site: (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/FL/P/00/epolls.0.html [December 21, 2004]).

Terrorism loomed large in Florida for many reasons. The large number of military installations and deep water ports and the large number of commercial and private airports, combined with the fact that some of the 9/11 hijackers received their flight training in Florida and one of the anthrax deaths occurred in southern Florida, caused Floridians to be more concerned about terrorism than voters in other states. Plus, Florida's tourist economy was particularly hard hit after the 9/11 attacks.

Castor attempted to emphasize domestic issues. The Castor campaign's printed materials (direct mail and brochures left with potential supporters by canvassers) reflected her emphasis on domestic issues of interest to women voters. The Castor campaign mailed five unique advertisements, all of which focused on the candidate's domestic policy record. Several of the mailers, as well as the canvassing materials, featured a bulleted list of four or five of Castor's issue positions. On every list, national security was listed last.²⁷ News coverage, however, of the missing explosives and the Osama bin Laden tape released in October kept terrorism and homeland security issues prominent.

The Martinez ground war stressed his personal biography, including his arrival in the U.S. as a young immigrant from Cuba and his service as a member of the Bush Cabinet. The four unique mailings generated by the Martinez campaign showed Martinez and Bush together, a strong visual endorsement from the president. Another ad highlighted a quotation from Bush endorsing Martinez and a photograph showing the two sharing a podium. Martinez' mailings also focused on his conservative issue positions, particularly with regard to domestic, social, and economic issues. In order to be clear to voters that Martinez and Bush held the same issue positions, the Republican Party of Florida distributed a door hanger that featured two columns. The left column featured a photograph of Martinez and three bullet points outlining his position on health care, taxes and terrorism. The right column featured a Bush photograph and the same positions on the same issues as those outlined under the Martinez photograph.

Most of the campaign materials collected for the study were printed in English. A few were printed in Spanish or had both English and Spanish elements in the same piece. The Martinez campaign had more Spanish-language literature than the Castor campaign. Castor's campaign, like that of Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry, has been criticized for not using more Spanish language campaign advertising. Critics say it hurt her campaign. Exit poll figures for the Hispanic vote support this claim.

Interest groups and political parties were also active in the ground war. Twelve different interest groups supported Castor's campaign while nine interest groups supported Martinez. Castor got more of her help from advocacy groups than from the Florida Democratic Party. The reverse was true for Martinez, who was heavily supported by the Republican Party of Florida and by the NRSC. Martinez benefited greatly from Florida's "three-pack" law that permits the party to advertise on behalf of a candidate if at least two other candidates are also mentioned in the ad.

The ground war mailings reflected each candidate's strongest assets from the perspective of the group being targeted by the mailer. For example, EMILY's List, which sent out two unique mailings, featured Castor's record on health care, specifically her role in creating Florida's "Healthy Kids" program. These ads claimed that it was "Betty's fault" that Florida's children were healthier thanks to the program. While EMILY's List is a strong supporter of reproductive choice, this issue was not mentioned in the mailings. The Castor campaign also benefited from advertising by a national 527 group called "Women's Voices. Women Vote," which sent out three unique mailings aimed at increasing turnout among registered women voters. The Florida-based "Florida Women Vote," with the same goal, also supported Castor in its advertising.

²⁷ In the national security text bullet, terrorism was listed last, and the focus was on supporting veterans (a large population in Florida) and the military, as well as protecting communities from terrorism at home. There was no mention of international terrorism in these advertisements.

NRSC-financed advertising for Mel Martinez filled voters' mailboxes. Several of these mailings focused on how Castor handled the Al Arian situation as president of the USF. Statements quoted from prominent Florida newspapers were featured in these mailings, such as "Two men who were professors under Castor at USF now face charges of helping Islamic Jihad terrorists kill civilians in Israel." That same print ad featured a photograph of apparent Islamic militants burning an American flag. The caption, a quotation from a *Washington Times* editorial published on October 7, 2004, read: "Alleged terrorists found safe harbor at the university on Mrs. Castor's watch." Quotations and photographs taken from Representative Deutsch's primary election campaign material were also included in this mailing. This approach was designed to undermine Castor's support among Democrats, independents, and some moderate Republicans by showing that even "one of her own" was against her on the terrorism issue.

The content of the ground-war materials was merely consistent with each candidate's overall campaign strategy. The Castor campaign, her party, and allied interests emphasized domestic issues and strong efforts to exploit the gender gap. The Martinez campaign, his party, and allied interests focused on Martinez's ties to Bush, including his pledge to support the confirmation of the president's nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court. The advertising also touted Martinez's Cuban immigrant background, reminded voters he would be the first Cuban in the U.S. Senate, and attacked Castor for her handling of the Al Arian situation.

The Air War

Since the 2002 gubernatorial election, some Democrats have questioned the degree to which their party and candidates emphasize broadcast TV as opposed to cable, radio, and direct mail.²⁸ Martinez's money edge allowed him to target heavily in North Florida in the waning days of the campaign. Castor attributes her narrow loss to her inability to compete with Martinez in that region at a key time in the campaign.²⁹

The air war mimicked the ground war in terms of which organizations provided the strongest support for each candidate. The candidates themselves aired the greatest number of unique ads. Martinez's TV advertisements featured his humble background while Castor's advertisements emphasized her support for bread and butter domestic issues such as health care. However, it was Castor, not Martinez, who ran the first post-primary ad mentioning Al Arian. The Castor campaign undoubtedly thought running the ad would allow her to move on to domestic issues. In retrospect, the decision to run that ad may have been the costliest of her campaign. Rather than changing the subject, it legitimized hard-hitting Republican response ads on the subject—and they were unending.

The air war was limited to fewer players. Many organizations that participated in the ground war sat out the air war, probably due to the prohibitive costs of broadcast advertising, particularly TV. Nine candidate organizations or their allies sponsored TV advertisements while twenty-two organizations or their allies utilized direct mail. Of course, direct mail is easier to target with precision than either broadcast or cable TV because it is only sent to narrow groups of registered voters. Castor ran more unique TV ads than Martinez (nine versus five, respectively), while the Florida Democratic and Republican Parties aired two advertisements each. The Republican National Committee (RNC) played a more active role in the air war than did the Democratic National Committee (DNC); the RNC aired four different advertisements while

²⁸ Some \$10 million of the \$15.7 million raised in the final weeks was spent on TV ads. See Susan A. MacManus, "Florida Governor: Three Elections in One," *Midterm Madness: The Elections of 2002*, edited by Larry J. Sabato (Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), p. 204.

²⁹ Betty Castor, Democratic candidate for U.S. Senate, interview with Susan MacManus, Tampa, Fla. December 10, 2004.

the DNC aired two. Radio advertising by the candidates and their allies was far less prevalent than TV advertising. (See table 10-4.)

Unique Circumstances

The 2004 election was also the first presidential election to be conducted under election reforms put in place by the Florida Legislature and Congress via the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). The state outlawed punch card voting machines, mandated better poll-worker training and voter education, provided for provisional ballots, and expanded early voting.

Nonetheless, pre-election lawsuits challenging the absence of a paper trail for electronic touch screen voting machines, the counting of provisional ballots cast in the precinct in which the voter is registered and nowhere else, and other attributes of the election system led Florida voters to expect another election system meltdown on Election Day. These fears permeated both the presidential and U.S. Senate campaigns. Fortunately, the legal battles which typically pitted Democratic plaintiffs against the Republican-controlled Department of State's Division of Elections were resolved before voting began, but the fear of another 2000 had already been raised. Contrary to some predictions of a resulting decline in turnout, voter turnout increased from 70 percent to 74 percent.³⁰

This was the first presidential election that gave Florida voters the option of voting early at either a supervisor of elections' office or at select public libraries.³¹ These early voting sites were required to be open for at least four hours each day, including weekends, in the two-weeks leading up to Election Day. Both parties and their candidates promoted early and absentee voting in their campaign literature. As a result 30 percent of Florida's voters cast their ballots before November 2; that is, 18 percent voted early, and 12 percent voted absentee.³²

Early voting clearly impacted the air and ground wars because it affected spending decisions. Many voters received recorded telephone messages from current and former politicians and other celebrities,³³ direct mailings, or were also approached by canvassers at their homes days, if not weeks, after they had voted.³⁴ This also meant that organizations that saved their money in order to spend it during the last days

³⁰ All data from the Florida Department of State Division of Elections web site. 2004 data from (election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/2/04&DATAMODE= [January 10, 2005]); 2000 data from (election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/7/00&DATAMODE=0 [January 10, 2005]).

³¹ Early voting was first used in the 2002 gubernatorial election.

³² Of those who voted early, 43 percent were Republicans, 39 percent Democrats, and 15 percent Independents. Of those who voted absentee, 47 percent were Republicans, 39 percent Democrats. Source: A telephone survey of a random sample of 800 Floridians who voted in Election 2004, conducted November 2–3 for The Collins Center For Public Policy, Inc. by Barcelo & Company and Hamilton Beattie & Staff. The survey's margin of error is +/- 3.5 percent at the 95 percent confidence level.

³³ Bush-supporting celebrities making recorded phone calls included California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, many members of the Bush family (former First Lady Barbara, First Lady Laura, Florida Governor Jeb, and his son George P. Bush), former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, conservative political commentator Sean Hannity, Arizona U.S. Senator John McCain, Reverend Franklin Graham, and President Bush himself. Celebrities calling for Kerry included former Vice President Al Gore, celebrities Barbara Streisand, Jack Nicholson, Sean "P. Diddy" Combs, Michael J. Fox, Mary J. Blige, Vanessa Williams, Martina Navratilova, Spike Lee, U.S. Senator and former First Lady Hillary Clinton, former President Bill Clinton, former presidential candidate Jesse Jackson, and Caroline Kennedy.

³⁴ Susan A. MacManus, "WFLA-USF Communication Project: Targeting Misses New, Young Voters," Weblog of Political Insight, Tampa Bay Online, November 29, 2004; (tbo.com/weblogs/weblogmacmanus.shtml [January 10, 2005]).

and weeks of the campaign found that their efforts may have been for naught as many of their targeted constituencies had already voted. Early voting clearly affected TV advertising strategies. Before early voting began on October 18, many of the ads featured older voters and their issues—Social Security, Medicare, health care, terrorism, and national security. Once early voting began, the ads featured young and female voters and their concerns. Both groups are renowned for making a late decision in whether to vote at all, and if so, for whom.

Conclusion

Heading into Election Day, the polls consistently showed both the U.S. Senate and the presidential races in Florida to be statistical dead heats. In the end, the Castor-Martinez Senate race (Martinez, 49 percent; Castor, 48 percent; Bradley, 2 percent)³⁵ was much closer than the presidential contest which Bush won 52 percent of the vote to Kerry's 47 percent.³⁶ Castor had a tougher time holding on to Democratic voters (85 percent) than Martinez had in keeping Republican voters (90 percent) in the fold, but Castor did receive a majority of the votes from independents (59 percent).³⁷

Each candidate hoped to secure support from their “niche” constituencies: women for Castor; Hispanics for Martinez. They did. Exit polls show that Castor received a majority of women's votes (53 percent), but more from non-white women (61 percent) than from white women (49 percent). Martinez won the Latino vote, receiving 60 percent of the bloc compared to Castor's 39 percent.³⁸

The 2004 Senate election in Florida elected the first Cuban-American in American history to the prestigious post of U.S. Senator. It also affirmed what national party leaders had predicted, namely that support for Martinez among Hispanics, especially Cubans in south Florida, would help reelect Bush and help the GOP widen its control over the U.S. Senate.

³⁵ Florida Department of State, Division of Elections, “August 31, 2004 Primary Election,” (election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=8/31/04&DATAMODE= [January 10, 2005]).

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ The U.S. Senate/Florida exit poll conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International for the AP and television networks. See CNN.com, “Election Results,” (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/FL/S/01/epolls.0.html [December 13, 2004]).

³⁸ Ibid.

Table 10-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Florida Senate Race, 2003-04

	Betty Castor(D)	Mel Martinez (R)
From PACs	\$880,326	\$2,179,228
From individuals	\$10,162,049	\$9,794,320
From party	\$6,703	\$50,117
From candidate	\$214,480	\$0
Other contributions	\$250,012	\$753,213
Total receipts	\$11,513,570	\$12,776,878
Total expenditures	\$11,138,992	\$12,584,298
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$372,331	\$193,581

Source: Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 20, 2004]).

Table 10-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, Florida Senate Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DSCC	FL Sen	Betty Castor	\$3,726,182	...	\$3,726,182	\$3,726,182
	FL Sen	Mel Martinez	
NRSC	FL Sen	Betty Castor	...	\$3,178,765	\$3,178,765	\$4,168,203
	FL Sen	Mel Martinez	\$989,438	...	\$989,438	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ [January 5, 2005]).

Table 10-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Florida Senate Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Betty Castor for US Senate	\$750,195	\$129,420	\$879,615	\$7,816,123
<i>Political parties</i>				
DSCC	\$2,485,753	...	\$2,485,753	\$5,362,595
<i>Interest groups</i>				
The Media Fund	\$2,359,023	\$260,825	\$2,619,848	\$6,007,579
Florida Women Vote	\$383,450	\$13,800	\$397,250	...
EMILY's List	\$318,780	\$40,800	\$359,580	\$1,224,338
AFL-CIO	\$350,010	...	\$350,010	\$754,032
New Democrat Network	\$320,190	\$8,670	\$328,860	\$1,045,294
Communities for Quality Education	\$247,970	...	\$247,970	\$48,398
SEIU	\$113,320	\$73,078	\$186,398	\$403,843
Human Rights Campaign	...	\$122,500	\$122,500	...
Coalition to Defend the American Dream	...	\$116,836	\$116,836	...
Save Our Environment	...	\$18,700	\$18,700	...
This Vote Counts	\$10,155	...	\$10,155	...
People for the American Way	...	\$2,340	\$2,340	\$2,351
American Family Voices	\$1,300	...	\$1,300	...
Sierra Club	\$204,641
The Nature Conservancy	\$95,737
Natural Resource Defense Council	\$42,845
Communication Workers of America	\$6,553
National Right to Work Committee	\$6,428
Stronger America Now	\$6,406
Republican allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Mel Martinez for Senate	\$2,692,322	\$16,108	\$2,708,430	\$9,077,985
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRSC	\$2,568,040	\$78,335	\$2,646,375	\$5,799,822
Republican Party of Florida	\$60,100	\$21,700	\$81,800	\$330,708
Republican Party of South Florida	...	\$36,300	\$36,300	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Progress for America	\$876,360	\$198,460	\$1,074,820	\$2,585,767
Citizens for a Fair Share	\$469,490	...	\$469,490	...
United Seniors Association	\$378,880	\$11,500	\$390,380	\$812,871
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$86,480	...	\$86,480	\$335,585
National Rifle Association	\$17,850	\$66,303	\$84,153	...
All Children Matter	\$84,140	...	\$84,140	...
National Right to Life	...	\$61,900	\$61,900	...
Coalition to Save Florida Jobs	...	\$2,500	\$2,500	...
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
JustGoVote.org	...	\$285,450	\$285,450	...
AARP	\$143,770	\$14,400	\$158,170	\$768,560
Get Out to Vote	...	\$145,190	\$145,190	...
Mi Familia Vota	\$72,500	...	\$72,500	...
American Civil Liberties Union	...	\$53,400	\$53,400	...

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration	...	\$53,030	\$53,030	...
Families for a Secure America	...	\$29,700	\$29,700	...
Committed to Restoring Integrity in Politics	\$22,500	...	\$22,500	...
The Latino Coalition	...	\$17,800	\$17,800	...
Citizens Speaking Out, Inc.	\$13,700	...	\$13,700	...
Liberty Council	...	\$12,000	\$12,000	...
Citizens for Public Integrity	...	\$10,083	\$10,083	...
League of Women Voters	\$5,568

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 10-4.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals and Progress for America Voter Fund have been included in the Progress for America totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

**Table 10-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Florida Senate Race, 2004^a**

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Betty Castor for U.S. Senate	25	3	...	2	4	...	9	43
<i>Political parties</i>								
Florida Democratic Party	1	4	2	7
DNC	1	1	2
DSCC	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>								
EMILY's List	8	2	10
Florida Women Vote	...	3	3
National Education Association	...	2	1 ^d	3
Women's Voices. Women Vote.	...	3	3
American Federation of Teachers	...	2	2
Human Rights Campaign	1	1	2
America Coming Together	...	1	1
Environment 2004	1	1
People for the American Way	1	1
Sierra Club	1	1
Voices for Working Families	...	1	1
Republican allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Mel Martinez for Senate	15	4	2	2	5	28
<i>Political parties</i>								
Republican Party of Florida	...	17	...	1	1	1	2	22
NRSC	...	6	2	8
RNC	...	1	4	5
<i>Interest groups</i>								
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	6	...	1	7
National Rifle Association	...	4	4
American Democracy Project	...	3	3
Hispanos Unidos	...	3	3
All Children Matter	...	1	1
Associated Builders and Contractors	...	1 ^e	1
Club for Growth	1	1
Florida Leadership Council	1	1
National Federation of Independent Business	...	1	1
National Right to Life	...	1	1
Nonpartisan								
<i>Interest groups</i>								
Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration	...	2	2
AARP	...	1	1

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
League of Women Voters	1	1
Rock the Vote	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 10-3.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^d Dennis Friel, government relations manager, National Education Association, interview by Kelly Patterson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., November 4, 2004.

^e Ned Monroe, director of political affairs, Associated Builders and Contractors, interviewed by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004.

**The Southern Ticket-Splitter Shall Rise Again:
The 2004 North Carolina Senate Campaign**

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North Carolina has become a competitive two-party state over the last thirty years. Like much of the South, it has consistently voted for Republicans in presidential elections and Democrats for state offices and the state legislature. In 2004, this pattern was likely to recur. President Bush was expected to win North Carolina, despite John Kerry's selection of North Carolina Senator John Edwards as the Democratic vice presidential nominee and Democratic Governor Mike Easley's reelection efforts. The outcome of the Senate campaign would be determined by how voters split their tickets: whether the Bush presidential and Easley gubernatorial voters would select Republican U.S. Representative Richard Burr or Democrat Erskine Bowles.

North Carolina Senate races have shown similar political divisions. Since the retirement of U.S. Senator Sam Ervin in 1974, this seat has consistently switched back and forth between the parties every six years. The other Senate seat was held throughout that period by Republican Jesse Helms, who consistently won close elections with a coalition of Republicans and "Jessecrats," culturally conservative Democrats from rural eastern North Carolina. Helms retired in 2002 and the campaign to succeed him, in which former Reagan cabinet secretary and Republican presidential candidate Elizabeth Dole defeated former Clinton chief of staff Erskine Bowles, set the stage for the 2004 Senate campaign.

Though Bowles would come into the 2004 race with a clear advantage in name recognition, he would face an obstacle that was not there in 2002—George W. Bush, the Republican President. No Democrat had won a U.S. Senate race in North Carolina in a presidential election year since Sam Ervin in 1968. In a state that has not given its electoral votes to a Democrat since Jimmy Carter in 1976, Bowles would be facing a tougher context, if not a tougher candidate, in 2004.

The Candidates

Erskine Bowles seized another opportunity when John Edwards vacated his Senate seat to run for the Democratic presidential nomination. Bowles started the 2004 campaign with name recognition from his 2002 Senate run and personal wealth to supplement his fund-raising. Bowles was determined to run a better campaign in 2004 than he had in 2002. He vowed to select his own issue priorities rather than run on the generic national Democratic Party agenda.¹ However, his key weaknesses in both years were largely out of his control: his association with Bill Clinton, his residence in Charlotte, and his "geeky" appearance. Swing voters in eastern North Carolina generally perceive Charlotteans as elitist. Bowles would be especially hurt by this stereotype because of his wealth and his connection to Bill Clinton.²

The Republicans had a quality candidate, too. Representative Richard Burr of Winston-Salem had been viewed by many as a rising star in the Republican Party. The White House signaled early that Burr was its candidate of choice and helped clear the field of potential competitors in the primary.³ Burr was a candidate from central casting: good hair, a nice smile, and an energetic and personable demeanor. He also was a serious legislator who had made his mark in health care legislation from his seat on the House

¹ Mark Johnson, "Same Man, New Approach," *Charlotte Observer*, March 21, 2003, p. 1B, 13B.

² Stefanos Arethas, field representative, Erskine Bowles for Senate, interview by Eric Heberlig, Charlotte, N.C., November 15, 2004.

³ Mark Johnson, "Senate Hopeful Has GOP Support," *Charlotte Observer*, September 10, 2003, p. 1B, 5B; Tim Funk, "GOP Heavyweights Backing Senate Bid," *Charlotte Observer*, February 11, 2003, p. 1B, 3B; Rob Christensen, "Burr Carries Bush Torch," *Raleigh News and Observer*, May 2, 2004, p. A1.

Committee on Energy and Commerce. This committee assignment also gave Burr early access to contributions and support from corporate PACs.⁴ This proved to be a double-edged sword as Bowles and allies would spend much of the campaign accusing Burr of being the largest recipient of special interest groups' cash in the House and a sellout to their agenda. Burr's key weakness at the start of his campaign was his lack of name recognition, having not previously run for statewide office.

The Campaign

Both campaigns considered the socially-conservative, registered Democrats in the eastern part of the state to be the key to winning the race. These voters are classic swing voters, tending to vote their partisanship in state and local races, but regularly supporting Republicans in presidential and Senate elections. With the goal of keeping these voters in the Democratic column, Bowles set out to run a campaign based on ideological moderation and pragmatism. He consistently focused on his many "plans" for helping North Carolinians and emphasized his executive branch experience finding solutions and building consensus across parties. In a September 27 debate, he explicitly noted that he disagreed with national Democrats on Bush's tax cuts and the war in Iraq, supported English as the official language, and emphasized his opposition to gay marriage.

Issue-wise, the campaign focused on jobs and health care. North Carolina has been hard hit by the loss of textile and manufacturing jobs.⁵ Bowles wanted to run an upbeat campaign focusing on his positive, pragmatic solutions for North Carolina's problems. Bowles hoped to run an entirely positive campaign and rejected calls from within his campaign to define Burr negatively until Burr began with negative ads in September.⁶

In keeping with his strategy of emphasizing his independence, Bowles kept the national Democratic Party at arms length. Other than a July rally in Raleigh with Edwards and Kerry, he avoided all other such opportunities, including skipping the Democratic convention. The Bowles campaign felt it was essential to run significantly ahead of the national Democratic ticket. Going into the race, they thought they could do at least four-points better than Kerry.⁷ In that sense Bowles did his part, winning 47 percent of the vote in North Carolina, as opposed to Kerry's 43 percent.

Burr campaigned as he had in his House races. He would climb in his car, without staff or schedule, and find people with whom to chat.⁸ Before politics, Burr was a traveling salesman, and he was most comfortable campaigning this way. His plan for the first two-thirds of the campaign was to amass resources and to introduce himself to voters. He would save the money for advertising until after Labor Day when he thought voters would be paying attention. If he spent early to increase his name recognition, he did not think he would have enough money to compete with Bowles in the last weeks of the campaign.⁹

⁴ Dave Boyer, political director, Richard Burr for Senate, interview by Eric Heberlig, Winston-Salem, N.C., November 4, 2004.

⁵ Rob Christensen, "Trade is Central, Slippery," *Raleigh News and Observer*, September 30, 2004, p. A1.

⁶ Gary Pearce, political consultant, Erskine Bowles for Senate, interview by Steven Greene, Raleigh, N.C., November 22, 2004.

⁷ Pearce interview, November 22, 2004.

⁸ Mark Johnson, "At the Wheel of his Campaign," *Charlotte Observer*, April 11, 2004, p. 1B; Political director Dave Boyer estimated that he traveled with Burr only 10 days during the campaign. Dave Boyer, political director, Richard Burr for Senate, interview by Eric Heberlig, Winston-Salem, N.C., November 4, 2004.

⁹ Boyer interview, November 4, 2004; Douglas Heye, communications director, Richard Burr for Senate, interview by Eric Heberlig, Winston-Salem, N.C., November 4, 2004.

Bush, Cheney, Laura Bush, and other administration officials made appearances at rallies and fundraisers. Burr consistently noted that a Republican Senator was needed to help Bush to achieve his goals in national security, to confirm Court appointments, to make the tax cuts permanent, and so on. In the debate, Burr largely defended the Bush Administration's record rather than present his own agenda. When Bowles accused him of towing the administration line in Congress, Burr retorted, "I'm not embarrassed by voting with the president 96 percent of the time. He's right that often."¹⁰

The critical event during the campaign was the passage of the federal buyout of tobacco quotas.¹¹ Farmers said they needed a buyout of the Depression-era allotments to survive in a time when tobacco companies are increasingly buying cheaper leaves overseas. Republican congressional leaders appointed Burr to the conference committee overseeing the legislation, positioning him to claim credit for its passage. Douglas Heye, communications director of the Burr campaign, argued that this event shifted the momentum of the campaign by allowing Burr to run on his specific accomplishments for the state.¹²

The Role and Effect of Money

Both candidates were concerned about the role of money in the campaign. Burr was concerned that Bowles would use his personal wealth to outspend him. Bowles was concerned about national Republican party organizations and interest groups outspending his national Democratic allies. In the end, Bowles outspent Burr, \$13.3 million to \$12.7 million (see table 11-1).

Both candidates raised the majority of their funds from individual contributors, but otherwise the sources of their funds differed. Burr raised 22 percent of his funds from PACs (79 percent from corporate PACs), while only 6 percent of Bowles' contributions were from PACs (44 percent labor, 26 percent corporate).¹³ The real estate and health care industries were substantial contributors to Burr, while the banking industry, miscellaneous groups, and lawyers were Bowles' top sources of contributions. Bowles' personal wealth accounted for 15 percent of his contributions, but Burr made no contributions to his campaign.

The Air War

The data in table 11-2 indicate a considerable parity in the ad war. The Burr campaign outspent the Bowles campaign on TV and radio ads by less than \$1 million, \$6.3 million to \$5.5 million, and the two national senatorial campaign committees were within \$200,000 of each other in spending. Total spending was dominated by the two campaigns, the combined \$11 million plus accounting for nearly 60 percent of the total money spent on broadcast advertising. Though Burr and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) each outspent their counterpart, the greater spending of Democratic allies, primarily the 527 organization Citizens for a Strong Senate, amazingly led to an outcome where equal amounts of money were spent on broadcast advertising on behalf of each campaign. The \$1.2 million in spending of Citizens for a Strong Senate dwarfed that of the next closest outside group, the \$338,421 from the 527 group Americans for Job Security (AJS). All other interest group players made less than \$300,000 in ad buys (see table 11-2).

The advertising followed the standard progression of ads in competitive campaigns.¹⁴ The candidates started with biographical ads that painted a positive image of their own character while discussing consensual issues. After Labor Day, weeks of attack ads by the candidates and the parties followed. The

¹⁰ WSOC-TV, 2004 U.S. Senate Debate, September 27, 2004.

¹¹ Tim Funk, "Senate Advances Tobacco Buyout," *Charlotte Observer*, October 11, 2004, p. 1A, 8A.

¹² Heye interview, November 4, 2004.

¹³ Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org [November 11, 2004]).

¹⁴ Paul S. Herrnson, *Congressional Elections*, 4th edition (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), p. 213.

attacks largely focused on the “inconsistencies” in the other candidate’s record and disreputable allies (Bill Clinton versus “special interests”). Mail from the parties and candidates reinforced the same themes and images as their TV and radio ads.

The first TV ad came from AJS. It was a pro-Burr issue ad, praising the work of “Republican congressmen” to pass a prescription drug plan and urging viewers to call Burr. Bowles responded with an offer to bar ads from outside groups, but an agreement was not reached.¹⁵

Bowles first TV ad appeared in mid-June. His early ads attempted to re-introduce him as a pragmatic moderate. His first ad, for example, pictured Bowles incredulously shaking his head while discussing Congress’ spending for “a rainforest in Iowa!” In another early ad, Bowles shared that he “prays hard” about diseases that have afflicted family members and asserted that affordable health care is a “moral responsibility.” Burr’s more limited early ads featured a variety of ordinary people saying, “Thanks, Richard,” for his legislative accomplishments, such as promoting jobs and job training and getting drugs for women and children approved more quickly by the Food and Drug Administration.

Bowles had maintained a ten-point lead in the polls throughout the summer, but the margin closed in late September with the initial round of attack ads and the debate.¹⁶ Burr’s attack ads, and those run by the NRSC, consistently pictured Bowles with Bill Clinton and included a clip of Bowles introducing Clinton as “a man I respect and admire.” The ads also accused Bowles of “negotiating” trade deals with Mexico and China that sent North Carolina jobs abroad. In one, a communist China flag provided the backdrop to an unflattering photo of Bowles.

The ads linking Bowles to Clinton were especially effective and played a key role in Burr pulling ahead.¹⁷ Bowles field representative Stefanos Arethas concluded, for example, “Once Burr started with the Clinton attacks, we couldn’t stop the bleeding.”¹⁸

In eastern North Carolina, Burr targeted radio ads on the tobacco buyout. Jesse Helms and Representative Walter Jones taped ads praising Burr for helping protect farmers and for his moral values.¹⁹ Burr also ran radio ads in the east in which a female voice asserts, “It’s a shame that Erskine Bowles doesn’t have the courage to stand up for traditional marriage.”²⁰

The main theme of the TV ads and mail by Bowles, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), and the North Carolina Democratic Party was that Burr was a sellout to special interests. They accused Burr of siding with nursing home operators over patients, employers over workers in denying overtime pay, and in a prominent and controversial series of ads, insurance companies over breast cancer patients.²¹

Advertising from outside groups played a mixed role in the campaign. Advertising from the DSCC and NRSC was very important and was largely indistinguishable in content and style from the candidates’

¹⁵ “Editorial: A Lost Chance,” *Charlotte Observer*, June 4, 2004, p. 8A. Burr thought that Bowles would be advantaged in this scenario due to his greater personal wealth. Such an agreement would be unenforceable anyway. Heye interview, November 4, 2004.

¹⁶ Mark Johnson, “Poll says U.S. Senate Race Narrows,” *Charlotte Observer*, October 1, 2004, p. 8B.

¹⁷ Rob Christensen, “State Displays its Dual Nature,” *Raleigh News and Observer*, November 3, 2004, p. AA2.

¹⁸ Arethas interview, November 15, 2004.

¹⁹ Jim Morrill, “Helms Praises Burr on Tobacco Buyout,” *Charlotte Observer*, October 15, 2004, p. 7B; Boyer interview, November 4, 2004.

²⁰ Jason Zengerle, “At the Helm,” *The New Republic*, Nov. 1, 2004, p. 16; Jim Morrill, “Burr Ad Criticizes Bowles’ Position on Gay Marriage,” *Charlotte Observer*, October 12, 2004, p. 3B.

²¹ Jim Morrill, “Senate Hopefuls’ Backers Defend Record on Cancer,” *Charlotte Observer*, October 30, 2004, p. 4B.

ads. Interest group broadcast advertising played a minor role, however, perhaps as a result of BCRA's restrictions on issue ads (table 11-3). In addition to AJS's summertime ads for Burr, only two other groups ran TV ads in his behalf. The American Medical Association Political Action Committee ran ads for two weeks in September explicitly endorsing Burr. The National Rifle Association (NRA) ran ads in the last weekend praising Burr for protecting gun rights.

The groups supporting Bowles clearly decided to jump on the bandwagon of Burr's ties to special interests. Citizens for a Strong Senate, a pro-Democratic 527 organization headed by former staffers of Senator John Edwards,²² ran ads similar in theme to those of the Bowles campaign and the DSCC. These ads, however, had a more strident tone—one ad called a crowned Burr the “King of Special Interests”; another showed a man's back, claiming Burr had “turned his back on North Carolina.” The League of Conservation Voters ran ads in Raleigh and the eastern part of the state criticizing Burr for choosing special interests over the environment.

The Ground War

The effort to turn out voters involved extensive efforts on the part of the candidates, the parties, and a variety of interest groups. Several groups worked on each side, though only a handful appeared to make a major push (see table 11-3).

Both campaigns had similar grassroots strategies. They combined public databases on voter registrations, magazine subscription lists, etc., to “microtarget” narrow sectors of the electorate with contacts. This process created demographic profiles of voters to target mail, phone, door knocking, and candidate appearances. Both campaigns focused their attention on the swing votes, which meant spending most of their time and effort in eastern North Carolina, and relied on the political parties to mobilize their core supporters.

The microtargeting process identified the ticket-splitters: those who were likely to vote for Republican President Bush and Democratic Governor Easley. For the Burr campaign, the key ticket-splitters were thought to be two groups of people: unaffiliated women and Democratic men over age fifty.²³ The Burr campaign's basic message to the ticket splitters: “You agree with the president. Richard agrees with the president. Shouldn't you have a Senator who agrees with the president?”²⁴

Geographically, east of I-95 and south of New Bern was the key battleground for split-ticket voters. The Burr campaign also spent a lot of effort on the “exurban” areas of the counties surrounding Charlotte and Raleigh, while Bowles and the Democrats attempted to mobilize African Americans statewide.²⁵ The Bowles campaign credits the Republican margins in exurban counties with counterbalancing their less-than-expected margins in the cities.²⁶

Both parties focused on turning out their base with extensive mail, phone bank, and door-to-door efforts. There was considerable coordination between Democrats and the Bowles campaign and less on the

²² Jim Morrill, “Outside Backers Include California Billionaires,” *Charlotte Observer*, October 28, 2004, p. 5A.

²³ Rankin interview, October 22, 2004.

²⁴ Boyer interview, November 4, 2004.

²⁵ Rankin interview, October 22, 2004.

²⁶ Arethas interview, November 15, 2004.

Republican side.²⁷ Both parties responded to BCRA by placing considerably more resources into their grassroots and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts.²⁸

Both sides thought that having Senator Edwards on the presidential ticket helped them. Scott Falmlen, executive director of the North Carolina Democratic Party, believed it had a positive impact on the energy and enthusiasm of Democratic supporters and increased support for all statewide Democratic candidates.²⁹ The Bush campaign reacted to Edwards' selection by building an infrastructure for their field operation and left four staff members and their grassroots plan with the state party when they pulled out in mid-September.³⁰ This improved Republican GOTV efforts.

Interest groups also played a major role in grassroots mobilization for Burr. The National Association of Realtors (NAR) and the NRA did “tons of work; everyone else was secondary.”³¹ Both groups sent lots of mail (see table 11-3) and their members door-to-door on behalf of Burr. The NRA bought pro-Burr ads on hundreds of thousands of newspaper sheaths across the state on the Saturday before the election.³² They also held two workshops to train grassroots activists³³ and a rally for Burr at a major NASCAR race. NAR featured Burr in articles in the September and October editions of *Tar Heel Realtor*.

Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC) made repeated contacts to owners and managers, encouraging them to talk to their workers on behalf of Burr. They strongly encouraged their membership to volunteer for Burr's campaign. They also spent nearly \$1 million on ostensibly nonpartisan voter guides that were included in the paycheck envelopes of thousands of construction workers the Friday before the election.³⁴ Other business organizations, the NFIB, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce were also active on behalf of Burr, but confined their participation to mass mailings.

Religious conservatives participated largely through the mail and voter guides distributed in churches. Focus on the Family Action and the National Right to Life Committee both sent out multiple mailers across the state (table 11-3). Burr's father, a retired minister, sent letters to over 10,000 pastors urging support for his son.³⁵

The most important grassroots effort that benefited Bowles was the nonpartisan “All Souls to the Polls” campaign to educate African Americans on North Carolina's early vote option and to recruit churches to provide transportation to the polls after services on October 24. They distributed 130,000 pamphlets featuring Martin Luther King, Jr. through churches in Charlotte and other (mostly urban) counties.³⁶

²⁷ Scott Falmlen, executive director, North Carolina Democratic Party, interview by Steven Greene, Raleigh, N.C., December 1, 2004; Bill Peaslee, executive director, North Carolina Republican Party, interview Steven Greene, Raleigh, N.C., December 7, 2004.

²⁸ Peaslee interview, December 7, 2004.

²⁹ Falmlen interview, December 1, 2004.

³⁰ Boyer interview, November 4, 2004.

³¹ Rankin interview, November 10, 2004; Boyer interview, November 4, 2004.

³² Jim Morrill, “Newspaper Wrappers Will Carry Political Ad,” *Charlotte Observer*, October 29, 2004, p. 7B.

³³ Glen Caroline, director, Institute for Legislative Action Grassroots Division, National Rifle Association, interview by Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, Fairfax, Va., November 10, 2004; Rankin interview, October 22, 2004.

³⁴ Ned Monroe, director of political affairs, Associated Builders and Contractors, telephone interview by Steven Greene, November 8, 2004.

³⁵ Heye interview, November 4, 2004. Nancy Kraft, pastor, Advent Lutheran Church, personal communication to Eric Heberlig, October 24, 2004.

³⁶ The organizations included: Democracy North Carolina, NAACP, black fraternities and sororities, black Masons, and local black political organizations such as the Mecklenburg Black Political Caucus and the Mecklenburg Voter Coalition. Danielle Obiorah, chair, Mecklenburg Black Political Caucus, telephone interview by Eric Heberlig,

Perhaps in reaction to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) restrictions on issue advertising, mail and phone calls from 527 organizations played a prominent role on the Democratic side. Citizens for a Strong Senate mailed a series of bright yellow flyers featuring a variety of dogs begging for treats, accusing Burr of being a lap dog for special interests (reinforcing their advertising). Issues Matter targeted Democrats with GOTV calls. In addition to their TV ads, the LCV spent about \$200,000 on automated voice recordings called “robocalls.”³⁷ The Sierra Club provided staff assistance to Bowles in the final days of the campaign and made 10,000 robocalls and personal calls to infrequent voters on their membership list.³⁸

Organized labor relied on internal communications, such as mail and phone to members and leafleting at worksites, to promote Bowles.³⁹ North Carolina is one of the least unionized states in the country, so their assistance had less of an effect than many other places in the country. Eddie Davis, North Carolina Association of Educators president, felt that BCRA curtailed activities a moderate amount due to uncertainty about new regulations: “when in doubt, play it safe.”⁴⁰

On the whole, the groups assisting the Republican ground game seemed to be more effective.⁴¹ The efforts of the NRA, NAR, and ABC all received prominent mention by the Burr campaign as being particularly valuable in the ground war. On the Democratic side, no interest groups were mentioned in interviews as being of particular value in the ground effort.

Conclusion

When all was said and done on November 2, Burr won the election 52 percent to 47 percent and was part of a Republican sweep of Southern Senate seats. Bush’s commanding thirteen-point victory in North Carolina was a very steep hill for Erskine Bowles to overcome. Bowles’ polls had found that Bowles could win only if Bush’s margin in North Carolina was less than 8 points.⁴² It would seem that Burr’s tying himself closely to Bush and tying Bowles to Clinton was a highly effective strategy.

A major factor in Burr’s victory may have been the success of the Republican ground game in North Carolina. In a state in which Democrats have a roughly 14 percent advantage in party registration, the party identification of voters on election day was 40 percent Republican and 39 percent Democratic.⁴³ Despite the concerns of socially conservative Democrats splitting their tickets, it seems that Bowles was done in mainly by the sheer numbers of Republicans voting. Bowles actually did well within his party, garnering the votes of 89 percent of Democrats, not far below Burr’s 93 percent of Republicans.

October 26, 2004; Adam Sotak, organizer, Democracy North Carolina, telephone interview by Eric Heberlig, November 12, 2004.

³⁷ Randy Davis, North Carolina contractor, League of Conservation Voters, telephone interview by Steven Greene, November 21, 2004.

³⁸ Molly Diggins, state director, Sierra Club, e-mail communication to Eric Heberlig, November 19, 2004.

³⁹ Ray Riffe, COPE director, North Carolina AFL-CIO, telephone interview by Eric Heberlig, November 12, 2004; Scott Thrower, political coordinator, IBEW Local #379, telephone interview by Eric Heberlig, October 24, 2004.

⁴⁰ Eddie Davis, president, North Carolina Association of Educators, telephone interview by Steven Greene, November 30, 2004.

⁴¹ Rob Christensen, reporter *Raleigh News and Observer*, telephone interview by Steven Greene, December 13, 2004.

⁴² Arethas interview, November 15, 2004.

⁴³ CNN.com, “Election 2004” (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/NC/S/01/epolls.0.html [December 13, 2004]).

Geographically, Burr accomplished what he needed to, and Bowles did not. Burr won the eastern part of the state convincingly. His association with the tobacco buyout had a “huge” influence in this region.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, Bowles’ winning margins in the Raleigh/Durham and Charlotte areas were just not enough to offset losses elsewhere. For example, in Wake County, home to Raleigh and one of the “ideopolises” in Judis and Teixeira’s *Emerging Democratic Majority*, Bowles only managed a three-point margin (51 percent to 48 percent).⁴⁵

BCRA certainly had an impact on how the campaigns were run. Rather than millions of soft-money ads, one little-known 527 emerged on each side to spend significant dollars on TV. The party and interest group leaders interviewed generally suggested that more resources were invested in phone and mail efforts due to these legal changes. BCRA likely did not affect the intensity and amount of resources that parties and groups put into the campaign, but it did certainly affect how those resources were allocated.

In the end, Bowles could have run the perfect campaign and still lost. For a non-incumbent Democrat with close ties to Bill Clinton to win a Senate seat in a state that voted 56 percent to 43 percent for Bush is probably asking too much. One should not discount the importance of the campaign, though. Both candidates ran an expensive, professional campaign with considerable support from parties and interest groups. Had Burr not been a strong candidate with considerable resources, Bowles could have captured the race, as the success of Democrats in other statewide elections demonstrated. Given the very different issue context in Senate races, though, the prospect for Democrats in future Senate races remains an open question. Ultimately, however, this election may simply be one part in the larger pattern of the South’s Senate seats moving into the Republican column.

⁴⁴ Rankin interview, October 22, 2004.

⁴⁵ John Judis and Ruy Teixeira, *The Emerging Democratic Majority* (New York: Scribner, 2002).

Table 11-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, North Carolina Senate Race, 2003-04

	Erskine Bowles (D)	Richard Burr (R)
From PACs	\$822,974	\$2,794,484
From individuals	\$8,505,712	\$6,725,403
From party	\$34,300	\$58,058
From candidate	\$3,757,012	\$0
Other contributions	\$273,296	\$3,334,614
Total receipts	\$13,393,294	\$12,912,559
Total expenditures	\$13,276,538	\$12,745,114
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$145,667	\$167,443

Source: Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 22, 2004]).

Table 11-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee,
North Carolina Senate Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DSCC	NC Sen	Erskine Bowles	\$2,529,622	...	\$2,529,622	align="right">\$2,529,622
	NC Sen	Richard Burr	
NRSC	NC Sen	Erskine Bowles	...	\$1,731,539	\$1,731,539	align="right">\$1,853,330
	NC Sen	Richard Burr	\$121,791	...	\$121,791	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ [January 5, 2005]).

Table 11-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
North Carolina Senate Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Erskine Bowles for Senate	\$5,181,759	\$278,257	\$5,460,016	\$7,339,060
<i>Political parties</i>				
DSCC	\$2,488,235	...	\$2,488,235	\$1,453,253
North Carolina Democratic Party	\$246,517	\$58,147	\$304,664	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Citizens for a Strong Senate	\$1,202,058	...	\$1,202,058	\$607,291
League of Conservation Voters	\$234,425	\$14,750	\$249,175	\$166,826
Stronger America Now	\$199,600	...	\$199,600	\$376,235
NARAL Pro-Choice North Carolina	...	\$9,600	\$9,600	...
Communication Workers of America	\$6,000	...	\$6,000	\$2,118
American Federation of Government Employees	\$29,098
AARP	\$119,306
Republican allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Richard Burr for Congress	\$5,867,192	\$416,144	\$6,283,336	\$5,732,963
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRSC	\$2,548,736	\$143,300	\$2,692,036	\$1,561,901
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Americans for Job Security	\$338,421	...	\$338,421	\$495,409
American Medical Association	\$258,571	...	\$258,571	\$287,347
United Seniors Association	\$216,060	...	\$216,060	\$358,287
National Rifle Association	\$73,125	...	\$73,125	\$43,093
National Right to Life	...	\$10,065	\$10,065	\$6,249
Small Business Survival Committee	...	\$8,568	\$8,568	...
National Association of Realtors	\$220,639
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$175,435
National Right to Work Committee	\$7,168

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senatorial, or Presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study's sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study's relevant House, Senate, or Presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of television and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. Television ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 11-4.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 11-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
North Carolina Senate Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Erskine Bowles for Senate	...	1	1	...	8	6	42	58
<i>Political parties</i>								
North Carolina Democratic Party	...	9	...	1	3	...	2	15
DSCC	7	7
DNC	2	...	1	3
Mecklenburg County Democratic Party	...	2	2
<i>Interest groups</i>								
Citizens for a Strong Senate	...	5	1	...	2	8
AFL-CIO	...	3	2 ^d	5
National Education Association	...	3	1 ^e	4
Issues Matter	2	...	1	3
North Carolina Association of Educators	...	2	1	3
American Federation of Teachers	...	2	2
League of Conservation Voters	1 ^f	...	1	2
Sierra Club	2	2
AARP	1	1
Black Political Caucus of Charlotte-Mecklenburg	...	1	1
Democracy North Carolina	...	1	1
Healthy Kids PAC	1	1
NARAL Pro-Choice America	1	1
SEIU	...	1	1
Teamsters Union	1	1
United Auto Workers Union	...	1	1
Voices for Working Families ^g	1
Republican allies^c								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Richard Burr for Senate	4	1	3	1	3	7	35	54
<i>Political parties</i>								
NRSC	...	3	4	...	14	21
North Carolina Republican Executive Committee	3	9	9	21
RNC	2	2
Johnston County Republican Party	1	1
Mecklenburg County Republican Party	...	1	1

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Interest groups</i>								
National Association of Realtors	...	9	9
American Medical Association	...	3	5	8
National Rifle Association	...	3	3	2	8
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	7	1 ^h	8
United Seniors Association	...	3	2	5
Focus on the Family Action	...	3	3
Freedom Works ^l	1	1	1	3
Americans for Job Security	2	2
Associated Builders and Contractors	...	2 ^j	2
National Right to Life	...	2	2
Susan B. Anthony List	2	2
Council for Government Reform	...	1	1
Club for Growth ^k	1
Greater Greensboro Republican Women	1	1
National Federation of Independent Business	...	1 ^l	1 ^m	...	2
North Carolina Citizens for a Sound Economy	...	1	1
Retire Safe	...	1	1
Small Business Bureau	1	...	1
Triangle Republican Women	...	1	1
Nonpartisan								
<i>Interest groups</i>								
American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition	1	1
National Council of Textile Organizations	1	1
National Textile Association	1	1
Rock the Vote	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 11-3.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^d Ray Riffe, COPE director, North Carolina AFL-CIO, telephone interview by Eric Heberlig, November 12, 2004.

^e Eddie Davis, president, North Carolina Association of Educators, telephone interview by Steven Greene, November 30, 2004.

^f Randy Davis, North Carolina contractor, League of Conservation Voters, telephone interview by Steven Greene, November 21, 2004.

^g Arlene Holt Baker, president, Voices for Working Families, interview by Kelly Patterson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., October 3, 2004.

^h Bill Miller, vice president, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, interviewed by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2004.

ⁱ Rob Jordan, director of campaigns, Freedom Works, interview by J. Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 11, 2004.

^j Ned Monroe, director of political affairs, Associated Builders and Contractors, telephone interview by Steven Greene, November 8, 2004.

^k Unspecified race involvement. Stephen Moore, president, Club for Growth, interviewed by David B. Magleby and Richard Hawkins, November 5, 2004.

^l Dave Boyer, Burr political director, National Federation of Independent Business, interview by Eric Heberlig, Winston-Salem, November 4, 2004.

^m Sharon Wolff Sussin and Andrew Finka, national political director and political programs coordinator, National Federation of Independent Business, interview by Quin Monson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington D.C., December 14, 2004.

Issue Advocacy in the 2004 Oklahoma Senate Election

Ronald Keith Gaddie with Jennifer Christol, Charles Mullin, Katherine Thorne, and Benjamin Wilson
The University of Oklahoma

Oklahoma is a relatively poor, very conservative state located in the American Southwest. The state has a population that is about 78 percent white-Anglo, with the balance of the population more-or-less evenly divided among Hispanics, African Americans, and Native Americans. There are over three hundred Native American tribes located in the state.¹

The state has a powerful Democratic Party legacy. Until 2004, Republicans had won control of the legislature on just one occasion (1921), and registered Democrats still constitute a majority of all registered voters. Oklahoma, however, is considered by some to be the most red of the “red” states, voting Republican for president in every election since 1968. In 2004 George W. Bush took 66 percent of the vote and carried all seventy-seven counties in the state.²

Growth in the state population and economy have both been relatively stagnant. The tech boom economy of the 1990s largely passed Oklahoma by, and the state ranks near the bottom of most indicators of prosperity—education expenditures, median income, investment, new business starts—and near the top of most indicators of poverty, including divorce, teen pregnancy, children living in poverty, and working poor.³ Despite the existence of constituencies that should be sympathetic to Democratic candidates, Oklahoma has granted no Democratic candidate for major statewide office more than 45 percent of the vote since 1990. Since 1994 Democrats have not been able to win more than one of the state’s congressional seats in any election.

The force that drives the GOP ascendancy in Oklahoma is evangelical Christianity. Data on church membership and attendance in the state indicate that about 70 percent of Oklahomans belong to evangelical Christian churches and report attending church services at least once a week.⁴ Within the electorate, self-identified Christian conservatives number less than 70 percent. According to exit polls in 2004, 28 percent of Oklahomans were self-identified white, protestant conservatives, and 44 percent of all voters reported being evangelical Christians.⁵ This compares to just 23 percent evangelical Christians in the national electorate, and 33 percent evangelical Christians in the rest of the South. Among neighboring states, only Arkansas had a higher level of self-reported evangelicals in the electorate, at 53 percent.⁶

How much of an influence does the evangelical vote have? Table 12-1 illustrates the effect in 2004 on the county-level vote for president, U.S. Senator, and on the straight-party pull (individuals who choose to vote the straight-party option for one or the other of the major parties on the ballot).⁷ The dependent variable in all three analyses is the Democratic percentage of votes. When one controls for the proportion

¹ David R. Morgan, Robert E. England, and George G. Humphreys, *Oklahoma Politics and Policies Governing the Sooner State*, (University of Nebraska Press, 1990).

² State of Oklahoma Board of Elections, “2004 Results by County,” (www.state.ok.us/~elections/04rsltco.html [November 11, 2004]).

³ U.S. Census Bureau, (www.census.gov [January 28, 2005]).

⁴ Nancy L. Bednar and Allen D. Hertzke, “The Christian Right and Republican Realignment in Oklahoma,” *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 1. (March 1995), p. 11–15.

⁵ CNN.com, “Election Results,” (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/OK/P/00/epolls.0.html [November 21, 2004]).

⁶ CNN.com, “Election Results,” (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/AR/P/00/epolls.0.html [November 21, 2004]).

⁷ Ronald Keith Gaddie, “Oklahoma Politics: A Fish, A Flag, and a “W” Tag,” Distinguished Lecture on Perspective on State Government, Southeastern Oklahoma State University, Durant, Okla., December 5, 2004, (soonerpolitics.com/fishflagtag.ppt [January 28, 2005]).

white-Anglo population and the proportion of registered Republican voters in a county, the proportion evangelical Christian in the county still mitigates against Democratic vote shares. The effect is most pronounced for president, where a five-point increase in evangelicals decreases the Democratic vote by about one percent ($b = -.19$), followed by the straight-party pull ($b = -.15$, where a seven-point increase evangelical decreases the Democratic vote by one point) and then the U.S. Senate ($b = -.09$, an eleven-point increase in evangelical decreases the Democratic vote by one point). Or, to illustrate, in a 75 percent white county with 25 percent GOP registration and 70 percent evangelical population, the expected Democratic vote for president is 32.47 percent, and for the U.S. Senate 45.08 percent. These numbers are about average for the Oklahoma electorate. Any campaign for major office in Oklahoma will take place in an environment at least partially defined by a variety of issues important to evangelicals and conservatives.

The Candidates

The Democratic nominee, Oklahoma Second Congressional District Representative Brad Carson, prevailed out of an uneventful primary. Carson, had succeeded Tom Coburn in the U.S. House from the Second District. A thirty-seven-year-old attorney and resident of Claremore, Carson had previously served in the Clinton administration and had been a Rhodes Scholar. He defeated Coburn's former political aide Andy Ewing in the 2000 general election, then won reelection in an overwhelmingly Democratic district after redistricting in 2002. In the uneventful 2004 Senate primary, Carson prevailed. Though facing no effective opposition, Carson did not win the Democratic primary unopposed. There were five other candidates in the primary, including one statewide officeholder, and these five collectively split about 30 percent of the vote.

Tom Coburn, age fifty-six, was an obstetrician and former representative from Muskogee. One of the true conservatives of the Republican "Contract with America" class, Coburn had never engaged in politics or sought public office until elected to the U.S. House in 1994. As a junior representative, he proved to be a powerful voice in support of fiscal accountability, effectively exploiting rules of debate and amendment to force the Congress to address his concerns with regard to pork barrel legislation. Coburn was reelected twice, before voluntarily retiring from the House after three terms. He returned to Oklahoma to practice medicine.

Coburn had entered the U.S. Senate primary late, as an upstart opponent to the anointed candidate of the Republican state party establishment, former Oklahoma City mayor Kirk Humphreys. Dr. Coburn defied the expectations of the party insiders by obliterating their choice by a 61 percent to 25 percent margin in the July primary. The primary campaign emphasized honesty, integrity, and fiscal conservatism. Front-runner Humphreys was undone by an attack campaign on his ethics by another candidate, Corporation Commissioner Bob Anthony, which left Coburn and his primary sponsor, the Club for Growth, free to pursue a positive advertising track.⁸ The Club for Growth was determinative in the Republican primary. The organization spent almost \$1,000,000 on advertising for Tom Coburn, polled on his behalf, and endorsed Coburn a month before the primary. Efforts by Humphreys to attack Coburn backfired, and in

⁸ Associated Press, "Senate Race Heats Up as Candidate Hurls Charges," *Associated Press State & Local Wire*, June 28, 2004. While serving on the Putnam City School Board, Humphreys voted to commission a population growth study for the district in 1991. Humphreys bought a piece of property that was designated a "fast growth area" by the study in 1993, left the school board in 1995, and sold the land at a large profit to the school board in 1996. Humphreys' actions were found not to be illegal, but Anthony said that such behavior demonstrated "a betrayal of the public trust."

the last week of the primary, Coburn surged to achieve a landslide victory.⁹ An independent candidate, Shiela Bilyeu, also filed to run for office, and was allowed on the ballot.¹⁰

The national party and also the state party were rather tepid in their support for Coburn, but the state party rather grudgingly made its peace with Coburn in the weeks after the primary. A unity rally in Tulsa the day after the primary brought Coburn together with the Republicans who had endorsed Mr. Humphreys. However, other than Ernest Istook, most establishment Republicans were not visible in this campaign on behalf of Coburn, including Senator Nickles.

The stylistic contrast between the major party candidates was stark. Coburn continued his direct and plain-spoken approach to politics. Previously he had said that the death penalty should be applied to doctors who murdered babies, and that abortion should only be legal in the case of threat to life of the mother.¹¹ He distinguished himself from candidates generally when he said that he would not seek additional funding or programs for Oklahoma if those projects were unnecessary or would contribute to budget deficits.

Carson, meanwhile, looked younger than his thirty-seven years and portrayed himself as a conservative who embraced “Oklahoma values” and priorities. He promised to preserve federal funding for Oklahoma, but gave relatively few details about the other priorities that he would pursue while in office. In spite of his good personal campaigning, Carson’s debate style was very stiff and aggressive and, when combined with his youthful appearance, fostered negative perceptions of his candidacy. Both major candidates ended up with very high negative evaluations, in no small part due to the negative, comparative advertising pursued by both candidates, their parties, and allied interest groups.

The contest in Oklahoma emerged early on as one of the most important Senate races in 2004. Both parties and the national media identified the race as one of the most competitive races in the nation, a contest that would be critical to GOP efforts to retain control of the U.S. Senate. As a consequence, the race attracted extensive national and international media attention.

Money

The 2004 Oklahoma Senate race was the most expensive race in the history of the state. The two candidates combined to spend over \$10.6 million. Of that hard-money total, \$6.3 million was spent by the Democrat Carson, while Coburn spent in excess of \$4.6 million. Oklahoma political reporter Chris Casteel also notes that another \$3.7 million was spent by failed candidates in the Senate primaries, mostly by Republican Kirk Humphreys.¹²

Most of the fund-raising and spending by the candidates occurred in the closing month. Four weeks before the election, Carson had raised and spent about \$3 million while Coburn lagged with less than \$1 million raised and spent in the general election.¹³ The Federal Election Commission (FEC) reports candidate receipts by Coburn of approximately \$4.64 million. Of that money, \$3.4 million came from

⁹ Associated Press, “Senator Asks Humphreys to Pull Attack Ad,” *Associated Press State & Local Wire*, July 22, 2004.

¹⁰ Bilyeu, a former Oklahoman, resided in Virginia. She had previously run for statewide office in Texas, and was best known for her allegations that Bill Clinton had ordered the killing of her dog and that the government had planted a radio transmitter in her skull.

¹¹ Lois Romano, “In Okla., Bush’s Popularity Boosts GOP Senate Hopeful,” *Washington Post*, October 30, 2004, p. A10.

¹² Chris Casteel, “Senate Race State’s Costliest,” *The Oklahoman*, December 17, 2004, (www.newsok.com [January 28, 2005]).

¹³ “Oklahoma’s Senate Race,” *The Economist*, October 7, 2004, (www.economist.com [January 28, 2005]).

individuals while \$1,004,510 came from PACs. By comparison, Carson reported total receipts of approximately \$6.31 million. Of his receipts, \$4.6 million came from individuals while approximately \$1 million came from PACs. This pattern of U.S. Senate candidate fund-raising is typical, with U.S. funds coming from individuals as compared to House campaigns, wherein incumbents and viable open-seat candidates rely more heavily on PACs.¹⁴

The Coburn campaign was outspent by Carson, the first time this has happened to a Republican in a statewide Oklahoma contest since before the 1994 election. In the previous open U.S. Senate seat in Oklahoma in 1994, Republican Representative Jim Inhofe outspent Democrat Representative Mike McCurdy by about \$50,000 out of a total of \$3.8 million spent. Inhofe won that race by a fifteen-point margin.

Both candidates spent about the same proportion of their money on TV, with the Carson campaign spending over \$2.5 million (roughly 54.3 percent of all funds raised) on TV, and the Coburn campaign spent \$1.9 million (about 48.3 percent of funds raised).

Substantial amounts of money were directed into polling, get-out-the-vote (GOTV) contacting, and direct mail. The Coburn campaign and the party relied on mail and direct, door-to-door efforts, reserving phone calls for mobilizing likely supporters and core Republican voters.¹⁵ Their rationale was consistent with the work of Gerber and Green, who find that phones are far less effective than door-to-door and direct-mail techniques in turning out the vote.¹⁶

The amount of party, interest group, and affiliated money that was spent on this race was unprecedented in Oklahoma politics. As indicated in table 12-3, both parties spent in excess of \$1 million in the Oklahoma Senate contest. The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) spent in excess of \$1.4 million on TV in Oklahoma, while the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) spent just over \$1.2 million on TV. These expenditures do not include expenditures for print advertising, direct mailings, polling, phone-banking, and staff. It is generally accepted that the DSCC funded a professional campaign staff in Oklahoma in support of the Carson campaign, while the Coburn campaign staff was smaller and more typically Oklahoman.

With regard to interest group activity, most of the activity on behalf of Brad Carson came from the group Citizens for a Strong Senate (CSS), which spent just over \$400,000 on TV in Oklahoma. This Democratic issue advocacy group headquartered in Washington, D.C., was funded in part by the Chickasaw nation, located in southern Oklahoma.¹⁷ A six-figure expenditure was also made by the New Democratic Network, a progressive group headed by former Clinton and Dukakis media advisor Simon Rosenberg. Interest group expenditures on behalf of Republican Coburn came mainly from the Club for Growth, which spent \$873,000 on TV according to the CMAG data. Club for Growth also created another, independent organization that was entirely funded by individual moneys, ClubforGrowth.net, which spent substantial money on TV for Tom Coburn within 60-days of the election.¹⁸ Club for Growth spent virtually the same amount of money on Coburn's behalf during the Republican primary. Stephen Moore,

¹⁴ James L. Regens and Ronald Keith Gaddie, *The Economic Realities of Political Reform: Elections and the U.S. Senate*, (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

¹⁵ Brian Treat, staff personnel, Coburn for Senate Campaign, telephone interview by Keith Gaddie, September 15, 2004.

¹⁶ Donald P. Green and Alan S. Gerber, *Get Out the Vote! How to Increase Voter Turnout*, (Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

¹⁷ Center for Public Integrity, "Citizens for a Strong Senate," (store.publicintegrity.org/527/search.aspx?act=com&orgid=753 [December 1 2004]).

¹⁸ Stephen Moore, president, Club for Growth, interview by David Magleby and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004.

president of the Club for Growth, said of the financial support that they gave to Coburn, “we carried Tom Coburn on our back.”¹⁹ The NRA and the AMA, on the other hand, did little in the way of public campaigning. Overall, Republican-affiliated interest groups spent about one-and-one-half times the money that Democratic groups spent on TV, which went a long way toward leveling the TV budgets in support of the major party candidates.

Money Effects

Campaign spending had two major effects: first, spending by Carson and his allies placed Coburn on the defensive through the beginning of October; and second, spending by the Club for Growth helped Coburn in the primary campaign and framed Carson as a national liberal later in the campaign.

Carson’s campaign attempted to define Tom Coburn as being so extreme that he could not effectively represent Oklahoma in the U.S. Senate, while claiming the “conservative” label for its candidate. Coburn’s primary campaign style was to portray himself as a doctor and not a politician. Throughout the primary he emphasized the several thousand children he had delivered. Carson undid the “good doctor” image by first presenting himself as a conservative Democrat, concerned with economic issues of importance to Oklahomans. He also had ads that portrayed Coburn’s legislative record and political views as out of the Oklahoma mainstream. Carson’s allies, CSS, built on the Coburn theme of delivering lots of babies but showed kids of increasingly older ages saying:

Lots of babies have been delivered by Doctor Coburn. But when I was two, he cut off my nutrition program. He cut me out of Head Start. Tom cut my education budget when I was in fourth grade. And when I was in fifth grade ... Tom cut my school lunch program ... my work study ... my summer job program. And when I finally got to college, he cut my grants. Tom Coburn may have delivered thousands of babies. But he’s let down millions of children. Citizens for a Strong Senate is responsible for this message.²⁰

The counterstrategy of the Coburn campaign and their allies, especially the Club for Growth, was to portray Brad Carson as a national liberal who was not in touch with Oklahoma values or priorities. The initial ads were classic comparative ads, which closed with a photograph of opponent Carson and closed with a tagline that he was “too liberal for Oklahoma.” These ads did not make much headway in terms of influencing voters; through the beginning of October, Carson ran ahead of Coburn in most likely-voter polls, and the media coverage was spinning decidedly against the Republican’s campaign.²¹

The Club for Growth changed its advertising strategy in the beginning of October. The effort to pull down Carson and advance Coburn with a classic negative-comparison advertisement had not succeeded. Club for Growth ran a pair of “Dancing Brad” ads which tied the Oklahoma Senate campaign to national issues and national priorities. Using an animated portrayal of a dancing Brad Carson accompanied by a musical calliope organ and a judgmental monkey, the ad noted, “that Brad Carson sure can dance.” The advertisement proceeded to note several roll call votes and issue positions held by Carson that were contrary to his position as an Oklahoma conservative. The ads nationalized the campaign by noting that Carson would not support President Bush in the Senate. In addition, the ads introduced a dancing Ted Kennedy, Hillary Clinton, and later a John Kerry to tie Carson to liberal Democrats and the party.

¹⁹ Moore interview, November 5, 2004.

²⁰ NewsOK.com, “Ad Watch: Citizens for a Strong Senate,” October 20, 2004, (www.newsok.com/electok/article/1342812/ [January 28, 2005]).

²¹ Andrew Ward, “Oklahoman Vote Will Decide Who is More Right for the Senate: Winning the State’s Senate Seat is Crucial to Both Republicans and Democrats, but Their Candidates Have Reversed the Parties’ Usual Policies on the Pharmaceuticals Industry,” *London Financial Times*, October 26, 2004, p. 10.

Tracking polling performed for the Club for Growth revealed the effect of the nationalized message in the advertising by Club for Growth and other Republican campaign organizations. The day before the “Dancing Brad” ads started to air, tracking polls showed Carson barely leading Coburn, 43 percent to 42 percent. The tracks for the first day of the “Dancing Brad” ads showed Carson still nominally up among people who did not see the ad, but trailing by nine points—51 percent to 42 percent among those who saw the advertisement. This difference continued in the tracking polls throughout the coming weeks, until around October 25 when they “saw the ad.” The ad had virtually 100 percent saturation in the last three days of the track.²²

At this point in late October public perception of the candidates changed. Coburn enjoyed an advantage, having a five-point higher positive (43 percent) than negative (38 percent) perception compared to Carson’s almost equal positives (43 percent) and negatives (42 percent). This was a notable change from a few weeks earlier, when Coburn was almost inverted on positive-to-negative (WRS/Channel 9 poll for 10/26). Meanwhile, the Oklahoma-City-based SoonerPoll showed Tom Coburn opening up a significant nine-point lead over Brad Carson, a margin which matched the tracking polls for Club for Growth, while the SurveysUSA poll had Coburn up by eight among certain voters.²³

Conclusion

This very expensive, highly contested Senate campaign in the end demonstrated the limits of negative campaigning for Carson, as opposed the more effective issue-based comparative ads used by Coburn. Starting in 1994, no Oklahoma Democrat running for Governor or U.S. Senate has broken 45 percent of the vote statewide. Running in 2002, then-state senator Brad Henry had slipped into the governor’s chair with 43.7 percent of the vote in a three-candidate race, representing the only Democratic win of the decade. During that campaign, candidate Henry intimated that he “couldn’t break 44 percent of the vote,” so a strong showing by a third-party candidate would be necessary to earn a win.²⁴ In the 2004 Senate race the Brad Carson campaign encountered a similar ceiling. Speaking three weeks before the election, a senior campaign official noted that they “can’t break 47 percent.” It was their ceiling.

Reacting to this ceiling, the Carson campaign sought to disengage swing voters and to throw the election back onto baseline turnout. Another senior campaign aide, when asked “are you trying to explicitly poison public opinion to demobilize the center and throw it back onto your GOTV effort?” answered, without hesitation, “Yes. We have a better GOTV plan, and we have to get [Independent Sheila Bilyeu] over 6 percent to win. If we can sour swing voters on Coburn and hold our own, we win.”²⁵

In part the plan worked; in part it failed. They nearly succeeded in getting Sheila Bilyeu’s numbers above 6 percent (she garnered 86,663 ballots, or 5.99 percent of all ballots cast). Carson, unfortunately, fell back from his estimated polling ceiling of 47 percent and came in with just 41.2 percent of all ballots cast, losing by 11.5 percent of the vote.

Why did Brad Carson fail so badly, despite pronounced advantages in overall campaign spending and a notable effort on his behalf to contact voters and also flood the airwaves with ads?

²² Chris Wilson, CEO, Wilson Research Strategies, interview by Keith Gaddie, Oklahoma City, Okla., November 9, 2004.

²³ All polls referred to are archived at Soonerpolitics.com, (www.soonerpolitics.com [January 28, 2005]).

²⁴ State Senator Brad Henry, Democratic Candidate for Governor of Oklahoma, interview by Keith Gaddie, Oklahoma City, Okla. November 1, 2002.

²⁵ Brad Luna, campaign spokesman, Brad Carson for Senate campaign, telephone interview by Keith Gaddie, October 15, 2004.

We see the effectiveness of the campaign advertising indirectly in the exit poll results from November 2. Voters were more prone to exclusively view Carson as “extreme” (26 percent of responses) than they were Coburn (20 percent of responses). About a quarter of the electorate viewed both as extreme, yet those voters split their ballots 47 percent for Coburn, 33 percent for Carson. Almost all of the support for Bilyeu came from voters who rejected both candidates as centrists, yet even the plurality of those voters preferred Coburn. In a campaign where one candidate was framed as too liberal and the other as just “too far out,” the “too liberal” candidate faltered.²⁶ To that end, in a generally conservative environment, the generally more conservative issue groups were better able to affect the choices of voters.

²⁶ Capital Gang, CNN, October 4, 2004, “Beyond the Beltway Segment.”

Table 12-1
OLS Estimates of Democratic Strength as a Function of Party Development, White-Anglo Population, and Evangelical Population, 2004

	President	US Senate	Straight-Party
Intercept	83.27	87.38	110.35
% Evangelicals	-0.19 (-3.87)**	-0.09 (-1.97)*	-0.15 (-3.14)**
% White Population	-0.35 (-5.13)**	-0.31 (-5.35)**	-0.40 (-6.15)**
%GOP Registration	-0.45 (-8.35)**	-0.51 (-10.85)**	-0.80 (-15.30)**
Adjusted R ²	0.74	0.84	0.90
N = 77	*p <.05 one-tailed	**p < .01 one-tailed	

Table 12-2
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Oklahoma Senate Race, 2003-04

	Brad Carson (D)	Thomas Coburn (R)
From PACs	\$1,015,428	\$1,004,510
From individuals	\$4,599,869	\$3,361,496
From party	\$35,100	\$25,033
From candidate	\$5,883	\$0
Other contributions	\$653,979	\$249,797
Total receipts	\$6,310,259	\$4,640,836
Total expenditures	\$6,050,722	\$3,006,679
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$259,536	\$61,217

Source: Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004, (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 27, 2004]).

Table 12-3
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, Oklahoma Senate Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DSCC	OK Sen	Brad Carson	\$2,301,293	...	\$2,301,293	\$2,301,293
	OK Sen	Thomas Coburn	
NRSC	OK Sen	Brad Carson	...	\$116,159	\$116,159	\$254,121
	OK Sen	Thomas Coburn	\$137,962	...	\$137,962	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (<ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/> [January 5, 2005]).

Table 12-4
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Oklahoma Senate Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b		
<i>Candidates</i>		
Brad Carson for U.S. Senate	\$1,158,317	\$2,500,041
<i>Political parties</i>		
DSCC	\$626,820	\$1,447,310
<i>Interest groups</i>		
Citizens for a Strong Senate	\$133,910	\$416,206
New Democratic Network	...	\$152,146
American Family Voices	...	\$85,780
Republican allies^b		
<i>Candidates</i>		
Tom Coburn for U.S. Senate	\$833,741	\$1,932,304
<i>Political parties</i>		
NRSC	\$462,499	\$1,207,642
<i>Interest groups</i>		
Club for Growth	\$724,351	\$873,609
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	\$84,052
Americans United to Preserve Marriage	...	\$83,997
United Seniors Association	...	\$45,002
Nonpartisan		
<i>Interest groups</i>		
AARP	...	\$40,934

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senatorial, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 12-5.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 12-5
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization, Oklahoma Senate Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	E-mail	Mail	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^b					
<i>Candidates</i>					
Brad Carson for U.S. Senate	7	2	...	16	25
<i>Political parties</i>					
DSCC	...	13 ^c	...	8	21
Oklahoma Democratic Party	...	2	2
<i>Interest groups</i>					
Oklahomans for Sound Leadership	...	3	3
Citizens for a Strong Senate	3	3
New Democrat Network	1	1
Republican allies^b					
<i>Candidates</i>					
Tom Coburn for U.S. Senate	4 ^e	13	17
<i>Political parties</i>					
NRSC	...	4 ^d	...	6	10
<i>Interest groups</i>					
Club for Growth	5	5
Oklahoma Leadership Council	...	2	2
Americans United to Preserve Marriage	2	2
National Right to Life	...	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 12-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^c Achim Bergman, coordinated campaign director, DSCC, personal communication with Betsey Gimbel, January 26, 2005.

^d Mindy Fitzwater Anderson, administrative director, NRSC, personal communication with Betsey Gimbel, January 28, 2005.

^e Radio ads posted on Coburn for U.S. Senate, “Multimedia Section,” (www.coburnforsenate.com/multimedia.shtml [January 28, 2005]).

The Nationalization of Local Politics in South Dakota

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The 2004 South Dakota U.S. Senate election pitted Democrat Tom Daschle, a twenty-six year veteran of both houses of Congress and Senate minority leader, against Republican John Thune, who served three terms in South Dakota's At-large House seat before running for the Senate and losing narrowly to incumbent Tim Johnson in 2002.¹ Both candidates had statewide name recognition and a political base in every county. The election was the most expensive in the nation and the vast majority of the money spent was from out-of-state donors. While the defeat of a powerful Senate leader is rare on a national level (Daschle "was the first Senate leader to be defeated since 1952, when Democratic Majority Leader Ernest W. McFarland of Arizona was unseated by Republican Barry Goldwater."²), South Dakota has a history of tossing out Senators after three terms, including George McGovern in 1980. The election's outcome can only be understood in terms of South Dakota's unique political environment of prairie populism.

The context presented an interesting dilemma for South Dakota voters, either return Daschle with his seniority and reputation for constituency service or support the Bush Administration by electing Republican Thune. Voters that supported the Bush Administration's war on terrorism, the war in Iraq, and generally conservative values were reminded that Daschle had obstructed the Bush agenda, strongly criticized the Iraqi invasion, and filibustered conservative nominees to the federal judiciary.³

Daschle, a proven vote getter, was also known to have secured federal government support for the state and, in his position as minority leader, held the promise to continue to do so. The tension between support for a conservative president who shared the same values of a majority of the electorate and a skilled and effective local politician was a persistent theme of the election.

John Thune had developed his own popular base in the state. In his first successful bid for the U.S. House, Thune promised to serve only three terms. His fulfillment of this pledge resonated well with the populist South Dakota electorate. In his 2002 campaign against Tim Johnson, he ran on a national agenda and lost.⁴ He did not make that mistake in 2004; rather, his dominant emphasis in 2004 was South Dakota values and interests. South Dakotans like a local feel to their electoral politics and expect their representatives not to stray too far from home. The importance of this election brought considerable attention and record-setting resources to the state from national parties and advocacy groups.⁵ National and international press covered the race, and visits from prominent Republican political figures were frequent.

South Dakota's Prairie Populism

South Dakota's political culture is bifurcated by the Missouri River. West River is sparsely populated by ranchers and is deeply conservative with a substantial dose of libertarianism; East River is more densely populated by farms and population centers that hug the I-29 and I-90 corridors and is more likely to elect

¹ John Bart and James Meader, "The More You Spend, the Less They Listen: The South Dakota U.S. Senate Race," in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 159–180.

² Ibid.

³ Many would come to agree with the *Wall Street Journal's* characterization of the "Daschle Dead Zone," meaning his obstruction of the president's agenda.

⁴ Bart and Meader, "The More You Spend, the Less They Listen."

⁵ Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Daschle, Democratic Senate Leader, Is Beaten," *New York Times*, November 3, 2004, ([www.nytimes.com/2004/11/03/politics/campaign/03dakotacnd_.html?ex=1105074000&en=e4ebf16d0a5fc613&ei=5070&pagewanted=print&position=\[January 7, 2005\]](http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/03/politics/campaign/03dakotacnd_.html?ex=1105074000&en=e4ebf16d0a5fc613&ei=5070&pagewanted=print&position=[January 7, 2005])).

Democrats. The state contains nine Native American reservations, which vote overwhelmingly Democratic.

South Dakota has a strong populist tradition. It was the first state in the nation to have an active Populist Party, the first state in the nation to give its citizens the right to initiate and refer laws, and holds true to these traditions in its contemporary politics.⁶ Candidates are expected to roll up their sleeves and work with and for the people.

South Dakota is also a deeply religious community, and this combination of populism and religiosity provides the broad context in which campaign issues, strategies, and politics must be understood. John Thune presented himself as a man of conservative values. He supported a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage while Tom Daschle sidestepped the moral concerns of the issue, stating that it was a matter for states to decide.⁷ In response, bumper stickers were mass-mailed to churches across the state that said “Vote Daschle & Vote for SODOMY” with the Daschle campaign’s headquarters as the return address. An enclosed flyer asked churches to place notices in church bulletins telling parishioners to urge Daschle to support the Federal Marriage Protection Act, the House of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, and the Pledge Protection Act, and to vote for him only if he supported these bills. Daschle had already voiced publicly his opposition to the Federal Marriage Protection Act, making this an all but moot point.

The candidates also took opposite positions on abortion, with Thune taking a strong pro-life stance and Daschle supporting a woman’s right to choose. Pro-life groups played a large role in the campaign, recruiting volunteers, making phone calls, dropping literature, and mailing persuasive literature comparing the candidates’ positions. The abortion issue enjoyed great traction in South Dakota churches, many of which handed out a “Voter’s Guide” put out by the South Dakota Family Policy Council in the weeks leading up to the election. This same guide was handed out door-to-door in many communities as well. The guide detailed candidate positions on abortion, gay marriage, school vouchers, and tax cuts, among other issues. Ministers and priests spoke from the pulpit about the importance of “voting your conscience,” which many parishioners translated as voting pro-life. One member of our reconnaissance network said, “...the homily stated that we could consider it ‘serious sin’ to knowingly vote for candidates that were known to have a pro-choice voting record.” Such homilies were documented in Catholic, Methodist, and Lutheran churches. In one church, a “special collection was taken for election ‘causes,’ especially to promote Amendment B.”⁸ Amendment B would authorize the provision of transportation and food services to children enrolled in private schools. One Democratic leader described it this way: “In 2004, pastors and clergy told people to vote their conscience. Here is what the Bible says; here’s where the candidates stand. In a small town where you’ve known the pastor all your life, this is a compelling message.”⁹ James Dobson, the vice president of government public policy for Focus on the Family, was featured at mass rallies in Rapid City and Sioux Falls.¹⁰

At least some religiously oriented events had a distinctly political cast during 2004. For example, the Lifelight Festival is a Christian music festival that attracts thousands annually. One regular attendee said,

⁶ Richard Braunstein, *Initiative and Referendum Voting: Governing Through Direct Democracy in the United States* (LFB Scholarly Publishing: New York, 2004), p. 1, 38.

⁷ Jennifer Sanderson, “Thune Backs Amendment Banning Gay Marriages,” *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*, July 9, 2004, p. 1B.

⁸ Information mailed in by a member of the project’s reconnaissance network in a mailing dated November 3, 2004.

⁹ Jason Schulte, executive director, South Dakota Democratic Party, interview with Elizabeth T. Smith, Pierre, S.D., November 17, 2004.

¹⁰ Tom Minnery, vice president of government public policy, Focus on the Family, telephone interview by David Magleby, Quin Monson, and Betsey Gimbel, December 16, 2004.

“EVERYTHING was Republican there. I question if they were invited or just showed up, but it was just sickening to see this positive festival turned into a huge Republican showcase. I still enjoyed the festival, but there was a very bitter taste in my mouth as I left. Even some of the bands made references to voting and WHO they were voting for (and it wasn’t Democrat).”¹¹

Bishop Carlson of the Catholic Diocese of Sioux Falls stopped just short of calling a Democratic vote a sin, which, according to Daschle campaign manager Steve Hildebrand was far enough. In an interview with KELO anchor Steve Hemmingsen, Hildebrand noted that while a lot of things contributed to Senator Tom Daschle’s defeat, “the churches pushed it over the edge, and not just one religion, making it plain that abortion was not an issue but the issue.”¹²

When the ten-year-old ban on assault weapons expired, Thune supported ending it, saying that he taught his daughters to fire a semiautomatic handgun for their own protection. In this case, he parted ways with President Bush who said that he favored extending the ban, though he took no steps to urge Republicans in Congress to do so. Daschle, however, was able to use Bush for cover by telling the media that he agreed with the president on this matter and would vote for an extension if given the opportunity, which never came even though polls show that about two-thirds of Americans supported a continuation of the ban.¹³

The Candidates and Their Campaigns

The principal strategy of the Thune campaign was to make the case that Daschle had become more liberal than his constituency, and was out of touch with South Dakotans, especially after he became a Democratic leader. In that role, Thune argued, Daschle had obstructed legislation that South Dakotans would have supported. In contrast, Thune claimed he would vote consistently with South Dakota values in mind.

Daschle ran a classic incumbent’s campaign centered on his clout as Democratic minority leader and his record of producing important projects and programs for South Dakota. Thune delayed the start of his 2004 campaign, in contrast to Daschle, who began running ads on July 5, 2003. These ads were upbeat and positive, presenting an affirmative spin on issues a full year ahead of his opponent. Daschle’s early ads highlighted his support for tax credits for building ethanol plants in the state, claiming “no soldier has to fight overseas to protect it, and no foreign power can turn off the spigot.”¹⁴ He also targeted several localities in the state with large format color postcards and radio ads highlighting his specific contributions to those areas and opportunities for the future. For example, an early postcard to Vermillion area residents highlighted Daschle’s success in providing funding for a local child care center and the local medical school, support for ethanol, and health care benefits for National Guard members.

These early ads established a major theme of the Daschle campaign, but they did not have an appreciable impact on polling numbers. After Thune entered the fray with radio spots and television spots a year later, the heat would increase, as would the pressure for attack ads. Thune’s first radio ad addressed the need for a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage so that liberal judges cannot force South Dakota to recognize them—a popular position in this conservative state and a contrast to Daschle’s position that decisions on gay marriage should be left to the states to decide. Thune’s tried to paint Daschle as an out-

¹¹ Name withheld, personal e-mail communication to Elizabeth T. Smith, October 22, 2004.

¹² Steve Hemmingsen, “My Name is Steve and I’m a Polito-holic,” at Keloland.com (www.keloland.com/News/WeighingIn/NewsDetail4731.cfm?ID=22,36483 [December 9, 2004]).

¹³ *Associated Press CBS News Report*, “Dems Win Shootout on Gun Bill,” March 2, 2004, (www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/25/politics/main602127.shtml [January 11, 2005]).

¹⁴ South Dakota produces over 400 million gallons of ethanol each year.

of-touch liberal who cared more about the Democratic caucus in Washington and special interest issues than South Dakota values. Thune's early ads suggested that Daschle was not as strongly pro-ethanol as he had claimed, pointing to his failure to get Democratic support for the Bush administration's energy bill that included ethanol provisions. Both of these Thune ads cast Daschle as an obstructionist. Thune defined himself as the honest kid from Murdo, South Dakota (a community of just over 600 residents), dedicated to the South Dakota values of family, church and public service.

Thune had a particularly effective ad entitled "Daschle in His Own Words," which appeared toward the end of the campaign. This ad provided three brief video clips of Daschle praising Hillary Clinton, claiming D.C. residency, and promising to protect a woman's right to choose. Ultimately, according to Steve Hildebrand, Daschle's campaign manager, the simple words "I'm a D.C. Resident" were the most effective tool used by the Thune campaign. The fact that Daschle was caught saying this, and that the Thune campaign took good advantage of it, made it difficult for the Daschle campaign to respond. Hildebrand noted "there was no practical way to beat that perception."¹⁵ This is particularly relevant in a state context where politics are distinctly local, allowing the Republican challenger to make the most of the "two Daschles" theme when suggesting that Daschle acted one way in D.C. and another in South Dakota.¹⁶

In addition to the ad war, Republican activists, in an effort to shape the campaign agenda and public opinion, launched a cluster of blogs in an effort to start a "populist prairie fire" that would defeat Daschle.¹⁷ Republicans had long complained about the lack of objectivity of the state's major daily newspaper, the *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*, and especially its political columnist, David Kranz. The blogs aimed to curb the *Argus*' perceived bias by publicizing the newspaper's failure to report negative news about Daschle. The blog, SouthDakotaPolitics.com, initiated a "Kranz Watch" section that focused on news that its creator believed that Kranz wrongfully ignored. Two of the most prominent bloggers, Jon Lauck and Jason Van Beek, were placed on the payroll of the Thune campaign as research consultants. Reporters at a number of news outlets described a pattern that began in the summer of 2004:

First, the blogs would pounce on a particular story, and conservative radio talk shows would pick it up. Thune operatives would then weave the issues into their attacks on Daschle. Wadhams (Thune's campaign manager) even hired the polling firm Public Opinion Strategies to conduct a poll on voters' opinions of the newspaper—a poll that, according to Lauck, found that 55 percent of respondents saw the paper as biased.¹⁸

Many of these themes were also echoed in a paperback book entitled, *The Other Side of Tom Daschle*, which highlighted the Thune campaign's "two Daschles" story line.¹⁹ In the closing days of the campaign, blogs pushed two particular stories, Daschle's wife's lobbying activities in the House and Daschle's claim of D.C. residency in order to claim a special tax credit, which were published in the *Argus*, discussed on conservative radio talk shows, and the subject of Thune campaign ads. This concerted effort permitted Republicans to amplify the Thune campaign's themes according to media sources and bloggers alike.²⁰ In all, the cyber war was extremely important to South Dakota, where low population densities and long distances between population centers present challenges for political organizers.

¹⁵ Steve Hildebrand, quoted in Hemmingsen, "My Name is Steve and I'm a Polito-holic."

¹⁶ See Richard F. Fenno, *Home Style* (New York, N.Y.: Longman, 2003), especially chapter 5 on the relationship between presentation of self, trust, and voting leeway.

¹⁷ John Stanton, "Lobbying and the Law: Bloggers Targeted Daschle and the Press," *National Journal*, November 20, 2004, p. 3540.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Talmage Ekanger, *The Other Side of Tom Daschle*, (Ottawa, Ill.: Green Hill Publishers, 2004).

²⁰ *Ibid.*

Money

The South Dakota Republican Party had a record-breaking fund-raising year and raised approximately \$3 million, more than 500 percent over what had been raised before. Contributions came largely from individual donors with an average contribution of \$35 per person. The party began national fund-raising in July of 2003 when they had only 400 out of state donors. By the end of the campaign, they had over 50,000 out-of-state donors. They rented, bought, and exchanged lists and used Daschle as the focus of telemarketing and direct-mail solicitations. In addition, the Internet was a powerful fund-raising tool that netted the party over \$100,000 with very few associated costs.²¹

Senator George Allen, chairman of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, held a “Daschle Retirement Party” at the Republican National Convention and urged GOP senators to give the maximum amount allowed to the GOP senatorial committee.²² Rudy Giuliani hosted a fund-raising brunch catering to Bush “Pioneers” and “Rangers” during the same week, and members of South Dakota’s convention delegation passed out “Dump Daschle” stickers along with fund-raising pamphlets throughout the convention.²³ Senator Charles Hagel (R-NE) sent \$10,000 from the Sandhills PAC and held a fund-raiser for Thune. Because of Daschle’s status as Senate Democratic leader, fund-raising was nationalized for both candidates, with outside groups like the Club for Growth using the Internet to direct contributions to Thune’s campaign. The Daily Kos, Act Blue, Blog for America, and other liberal Internet sites provided direct links to the Daschle contributions web site and encouraged supporters to give to the campaign.

Thune also received help from a number of GOP stars who traveled to South Dakota to raise money and stump for him. In addition to George Allen, Thune enjoyed visits from Vice President Dick Cheney, Elizabeth Dole, and a highly unusual visit from Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist of Tennessee.²⁴ Senate leaders rarely actively campaign against the other party’s leader. Frist explained that his visit “may be rare, but these are rare times,” noting that it is “rare to have the leader of a party ... not be very strongly supported by the people in their home state.”²⁵ Frist not only sensed Daschle’s vulnerability, he was willing to breach institutional norms and oppose Daschle in his own state.

In part because of his status as Democratic leader, the Daschle campaign was highly successful in fund-raising. In the end, Daschle would raise \$3,167,089 more than the Thune Campaign (see table 13-1). Daschle apparently expected to be able to raise sufficient hard-money contributions to offset any third party assistance Thune would receive. Daschle could not rely on many of his out of state contacts to generate more contributions within South Dakota. Democratic leaders are not viewed positively in the clearly Republican state so, where Thune was able to bring in a host of Republican celebrities, Daschle was unable benefit from visits by nationally prominent Democrats.

Daschle’s funding constituency reached beyond South Dakota to Washington DC and elsewhere. The campaign’s most successful fund-raising strategy was buying national fund-raising lists from other political committees and sending out fund-raising letters signed by nationally prominent Democrats. A direct-mail appeal signed by James Carville brought in \$160,000 over one weekend. Bill Clinton and John

²¹ Jason Glodt, executive director, South Dakota Republican Party, interview by Elizabeth T. Smith, Pierre, S.D., November 16, 2004.

²² Mike Madden, “Thune Attacks Daschle Record at Convention,” *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*, August 31, 2004, p. A1.

²³ *Ibid*; See also Chris Cillizza, “Thune to Get Star Billing This Week” *Roll Call*, August 30, 2004.

²⁴ Stephen Dinan, “South Dakota Becomes Turf War,” *Washington Times*, May 23, 2004, p. A2.

²⁵ Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “The 2004 Campaign: The Senate; Daschle Has Race on His Hands and Interloper on His Turf,” *New York Times*, May 23, 2004, p. A20.

Edwards also wrote fund-raising letters.²⁶ All told, the Daschle campaign spent \$787,000 on direct mail in 2003 alone, much of it for identifying national donors.²⁷ The Internet also proved to be a productive way for the campaign to solicit funds with minimal financial investment and immediate results. Howard Dean sent an e-mail solicitation to his 600,000 member list that yielded impressive results. He also linked his blog directly to Daschle's contributions page. The DSCC did several fund-raising e-mails for the campaign as did the DNC.²⁸ Further, donors through the web were different than the mail list reached. According to Finance Assistant Lindsey Dorneman, "People would wander on to our web site and find out that they could contribute. In the last month, we received about \$250,000 in contributions off the Web, much of it unsolicited."²⁹ The campaign also advertised on blog sites but without notable success. Some contributions, presumably from independent groups directing donations to the campaign, came in clusters of like amounts, for instance, \$20.04. It is likely that such odd contribution amounts originated from the same external fund-raising campaign, but the Daschle campaign was unable to track which groups originated these contribution requests. Daschle also received strong support from the American Indian community, particularly out of state Indian gaming interests. Gaming is an important revenue source for South Dakota Democrats because many South Dakota tribes that typically support Democratic candidates do not have substantial economic resource and tend to go to wealthier out of state Indian communities to support their interests. The state Democratic Party, weakened by persisting debt from the 2002 election, relied on Daschle's national supporters for its own financial support rather than acting as a source of financial support for Daschle.

The Role of Interest Groups

Ads by interest groups seeking to unseat Tom Daschle like the Club for Growth began running in January of 2002, nearly three years before Daschle stood for office in November 2004. The Club's major agenda items are tax cuts and smaller government.³⁰ The early 2002 ad stated that, "Our economy is hurting" and listed a series of presidential initiatives to which Tom Daschle said no, making the case that Daschle and the Democrats were obstructing progress on initiatives important to South Dakotans. While the ad attacked Daschle, its strategic intent was both to soften support for him and to undercut Democratic U.S. Senator Tim Johnson's 2002 reelection campaign by challenging the benefits for South Dakota from Daschle's leadership. The Club for Growth returned in August of 2003 with an ad that incorporated photographs of Daschle's \$2 million home in D.C. with a voiceover noting the Senator's opposition to tax relief.

With this early campaign of outsider groups underway, Daschle challenged Thune to accept a "third party" ad-ban pledge, which Daschle unilaterally signed, asking outside groups to refrain from advertising in the race. This is the same pledge that Thune drafted and signed in his 2002 race. In 2004, Thune declined to sign the pledge, a move which in our view was wise given Daschle's considerable fund-raising capacity and existing resources and the clear indication that groups were eager to defeat Tom Daschle.

Neither campaign dropped the theme of campaign tone on spending. Daschle ran a series of inoculation ads calling on Thune to run a positive campaign because, according to one Daschle ad, "South Dakota

²⁶ Lindsey L. Dorneman, finance assistant, A Lot of People Supporting Tom Daschle, telephone interview by Elizabeth T. Smith, January 6, 2005.

²⁷ Chris Cillizza, "Daschle's Five-Year, \$9.5M Spending Spree," *Roll Call*, February 26, 2004, (www.rollcall.com/issues/49_83/news/4506-1.html [January 18, 2005]).

²⁸ Andrew Golodny, director of Internet operations, A Lot of People Supporting Tom Daschle, telephone interview by Elizabeth T. Smith, January 6, 2005.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Club for Growth, "Why is the Club for Growth Necessary" (www.clubforgrowth.org/why.php [August 3, 2004]).

deserves no less.” Thune challenged Daschle to sign a pledge limiting his campaign spending to \$10 million while Thune would limit himself to \$6 million. This challenge was made well before the election when Daschle had already spent nearly \$9 million and Thune’s campaign was just ramping up. Daschle did not agree to Thune’s proposed spending limit.

The battle of pledges about spending, tone, and outside pledges was more than candidate positioning. Daschle kept his promise and requested that third parties stay out of the election. Daschle, for instance, asked the League of Conservation voters to not run any television ads after LCV placed Thune on its election year list of the “Dirty Dozen” candidates with the worst environmental records. Daschle’s letter to LCV stated that “(t)he 2002 South Dakota Senate race brought national attention and a barrage of advertisements from outside organizations that were often too negative, too personal and lacked any real substance. These ads were far more divisive than constructive and alienated many voters throughout the state.”³¹ In response to Daschle’s 2004 request to stay out, Betsy Loyless, political director at LCV, said the group has no plans to run ads against Thune but did place Thune on the “Dirty Dozen” list to make a point about his environmental record. LCV did not run an ad in South Dakota.³² LCV focused most of its effort in 2004 on the presidential race, although they spent about \$1.1 million in the 2004 Colorado U.S. Senate race.³³ Most groups on the Democratic side stayed out of the Daschle/Thune race.

In contrast, electioneering by groups seeking to defeat Daschle or elect John Thune were an important part of the campaign. The first third-party ad of the general election appeared during the week of July 26, 2004 in the form of television and radio advertisements sponsored by a group called You’re Fired Inc. According to Daschle’s e-mails, “The group, which is called You’re Fired Inc, is run by a major California Businessman and right wing conservative named Robin Arkley II, who also happens to be one of John Thune’s biggest financial supporters. Arkley and his wife Cherie have given John Thune’s Senate campaign the maximum \$8,000 federal contribution this year alone. Beyond that they spent in excess \$200,000 in soft-money to help John Thune beat Tom Daschle.”³⁴ The ad is a parody of the NBC show *The Apprentice* in which a paid actor imitating Donald Trump is “firing” Daschle for spending more time helping other Democrats than helping South Dakotans. A measure of the ad’s success is that it was reported in both print and electronic media. The Daschle campaign used it as the focus of a fund-raising solicitation.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also played an important role in the election. The Chamber made the South Dakota U.S. Senate race its highest priority in 2004. According to an interview with the Chamber’s Political Director, Bill Miller, the Chamber committed \$1,000,000 to unseating Daschle,³⁵ saying that Daschle was “more of an obstacle than an ally.”³⁶ The Chamber noted where Thune was weak,

³¹ Alex Kaplun, “Daschle urges LCV to stay out of S.D. election fight.” 10 *Environment and Energy Daily*, September 13, 2004, (web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=fb7ea62445b282cc177bcd98831cb2d&_docnum=44&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkVA&_md5=515f79b208f4e3aff284660b72013245 [January 18, 2005]).

³² Ibid.

³³ See chapter 9 in this volume.

³⁴ Steve Hildebrand, “Wealthy California conservatives try to ‘Fire’ Daschle,” campaign e-mail (July 26, 2004). Information on contributions and expenditures confirmed on the Internal Revenue Service web site at (forms.irs.gov/politicalOrgsSearch/search/gotoSearchDrillDown.action?pacId=‘22728’&criteriaName=‘YOU%27RE+FIRED’” [December 15, 2004]).

³⁵ Bill Miller, vice president and national field director, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington D.C., November 9, 2004.

³⁶ Brody Mullins, “Chamber Targets Daschle,” *Roll Call*, February 2, 2004, (www.rollcall.com/issues/49_71/vested/4162-1.html [January 18, 2005]).

particularly in the area of television and radio spots and targeted \$410,000³⁷ to ad buys to help the Thune campaign.³⁸ The American Medical Association PAC also invested heavily against Daschle, expending some \$50 million to defeat a Senator leader that had not been supportive of the organization's lobbying. Other help came from Club for Growth, which as noted above came into the race early and stayed throughout, contributing an estimated \$237,000 to the overall effort to unseat Daschle.³⁹ the National Right to Life was also instrumental along with a host of other third party Republican allies (see table 13-3 and 13-4).

It is important to note that table 13-3 represents combined efforts for U.S. House and U.S. Senate elections in the state. In some categories, particularly for political party expenditures (as opposed to advocacy group expenditures) it is hard to disaggregate the ad-buy data to determine the number of spots and expenditures meant specifically for the Herseth-Diedrich race or Daschle-Thune race. In states like South Dakota, with one at-large house member, political parties and independent groups are able to effectively target both election types (i.e., House and Senate). Here, the ads of many could benefit both of a group's candidates. Still, it is clear from a review of the independent groups participating in this election, and our knowledge of what the groups' interests were and who the players were, that the overwhelming support of noncandidate efforts went to the Thune campaign.

Groups supporting Thune or the Republicans outspent those supporting Daschle or the Democrats nine to one with \$927,062 spent by Republican allies and \$103,710 spent by Democratic allies. Table 13-3 provides ad-buy data only, and not total expenditures from groups which are likely greater. Ad buys do not include what was actually spent on the ground war. The expenditures of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce are a good example of this. The Chamber is noted to have dedicated \$1,000,000 to support Thune and is on record as buying \$410,000⁴⁰ of radio and television ads, leaving \$590,000 for ground war and other efforts. This group alone is thought to be responsible for covering over 10 percent of the nearly \$5,000,000 difference in the money raised by the two campaigns. Other groups active for Thune or against Daschle included Families for a Secure America, the Club for Growth, the NRA, the AMA and the National Right To Life. One estimate from late October was that \$9,000,000 of independent expenditures was spent to support Thune,⁴¹ which is substantially more than the gap between the two campaign committees. What Thune lacked in hard contributions to his campaign committee, he more than recouped from spending by outside committees.

In this context, it seems likely that Daschle's call for third parties to stay out of the Senate election may have been a tactical error, unless strategically it is just not viable for a blue candidate to bring in their allies in a red state. We are comfortable concluding that the largely one-sided outside groups' assistance directed to his cause was extremely important to Thune's victory.

Ground War

As in 2002, the Thune campaign relied on the Republican Victory operation to provide grassroots organizing for both state and federal candidates including voter registration, voter identification,

³⁷ We realize that the figure of \$410,000 for ad buys is higher than the \$161,618 noted in table 13-3 and expect that the difference can be explained by either deficiencies in the record keeping system of the stations the data were collected at and/or the data collection methodology employed for this study. In any case, we are confident from the interview given by Bill Miller that his statement of \$410,000 expended in this area is correct.

³⁸ Miller interview, November 9, 2004.

³⁹ Stephen Moore, president, Club for Growth, e-mail communication to members, November 17, 2004.

⁴⁰ U.S. Chamber spend \$410,000 on TV and radio combined. Bill Miller, Chamber vice president, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, interviewed by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2004.

⁴¹ Carl Hulse and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "The 2004 Campaign: Control of Congress; Races for House and Senate Have Been Nasty, Expensive and Focused on Local Issues." *New York Times*, October 31, 2004, p. A31.

persuasion, and get-out-the-vote (GOTV). However, the tactics had to become more proactive, given the nature of the race and changes wrought by BCRA. While Jason Glodt, Executive Director of the South Dakota Republican Party, reported that the BCRA had crippled the state Party's ability to raise money, the party actually increased the number of donors dramatically, due to more aggressive fund-raising and national interest in South Dakota's Senate race. Glodt also said that the state GOP had to fund the grassroots effort in its entirety and was unable to rely on support from the national party committees as in years past. In earlier campaigns, state party ground war efforts were supported largely by contributions from national party organizations. In 2004, this was inhibited by new rules that prohibited the transfer of funds to state party organizations. However, both the Republican Party and the Thune campaign managed to fill the financial void by expanding their donor networks. Finally, party staffers were unable to volunteer for other campaigns and state parties were unable to talk to candidates about mail or ads prior to deployment. In all, these rule changes meant that both the party and the Thune campaign had to change their fund-raising tactics and learn to operate with less coordination among various political entities.

The Republican Party set up twelve Victory field offices around the state and expanded that to seventeen toward the end of the campaign. The offices hired forty full-time staff and 500 to 600 part-time staff who worked up to 30 hours a week on voter registration, voter identification, persuasion, and GOTV. During the final 72 hours, they deployed approximately 6000 volunteers as poll watchers, phone callers, door-to-door canvassers, and drivers.⁴² The Victory program changed its voter identification method and used phone calls, door-to-door contacts, and yard sign acceptance contacts to link voters to issues. They kept meticulous notes on voters and cross-tabulated issues and Bush supporters. Identification data was used to target twelve groups for persuasion including women, pro-life, pro-gun, business, soft Republicans who voted for Johnson in 2002, conservative Democrats, seniors, youth, self-identified Bush-Daschle and Bush-Herseth voters, and the Republican base. Volunteers were assigned to call voters who "matched" their political concerns. For example, pro-life supporters called pro-life voters, veterans called veterans, and women called women. Clearly South Dakota's Republican Party managed to fund and coordinate an aggressive ground war despite concerns about the impact of BCRA.

The Daschle campaign relied on its own operatives to staff its field operation and did not coordinate the campaign with the state party. This is because the state Democratic Party began this election cycle with a \$350,000 debt from 2002 and because Daschle has long been known for the competence and efficiency of his field operations. The 2004 campaign opened twenty-nine field offices across the state including one on every Indian reservation. State party involvement was largely confined to the final two weeks when the Democratic Party spent about \$1 million federal dollars including \$100,000 transferred by Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) to the South Dakota Democratic Party for GOTV operations. They paid canvassers, phone callers, and drivers, and chartered two jets from Dulles to bring a thousand people to South Dakota for the week before Election Day.⁴³

Both sides in this contest recruited a large number of volunteers to the state. This was done on a national basis utilizing the Internet and other means. Often, this was coordinated with state organizations. For instance, we know that Jason Schulte, Executive Director of South Dakota Democratic Party, chartered two commercial jets to bring volunteers from Washington D.C. to South Dakota to help with the GOTV effort in the last week of the election.

The organizational benefit of a coordinated web-based volunteer recruiting and coordinating effort was indicative of the overall relevance of the cyber war in 2004. Supporters could sign up for e-mail updates, volunteer to help, make a contribution, and get information on voter registration and early voting on both campaign web sites. Supporters received regular e-mails requesting contributions. Perhaps the most

⁴² Glodt interview, November 16, 2004.

⁴³ Schulte interview, November 17, 2004.

innovative use of the web was a game on Thune's web site entitled "Dueling Daschles" that allowed players to try to match Daschle contradictory statements in the venue in which he said them—Washington or South Dakota. This effectively made the "two Daschles" argument that was central to Thune's campaign.

The ground war was also aided by numerous communications by organizations active in the state. As we observed earlier in our discussion of third party organizations, Republican allies of the Thune campaign seemed to dominate. When summing total of unique campaign communications for Democratic allies and Republican allies from table 13-4, Republican efforts exceeded Democratic efforts 236 to 152. This includes e-mail, mail, newspaper, magazine, personal contact, phone calls, radio, and television. The greatest difference between the two campaigns is in the level of party communication support, where Republican Party organizations contacted voters at eight times the rate of Democratic party organizations. While Daschle's candidate committee raised and spent more money than Thune's, Thune enjoyed more support from political parties and interest groups. Consider the efforts of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as a case-in-point. In addition to the \$410,000 that the Chamber spent on ad-buys, it dispatched an emissary to meet with local chambers across the state to convince them to support the U.S. Chamber's preferred candidate. Their considerable efforts to minimize defections to the Daschle camp will not show up in FEC reports; however, they cannot be ignored in the larger picture of third party activities in this election.

A final point about the 2004 ground war concerns the candidates' treatment of American Indian issues and voters. Until 2002, neither party spent very much time in Indian Country. Historically, Republicans have conceded the Native American vote to the Democratic Party and have not spent time campaigning on reservations. Democrats assumed that the Native vote would be overwhelmingly Democratic and generally spent little time on persuasion but always included reservations in the party's get-out-the-vote efforts. Turnout in reservation counties was always strikingly low in a state known for its high voter turnout. All of this changed during the 2002 and 2004 elections.

In 2002, the incumbent U.S. Senator Tim Johnson (D) won over challenger John Thune (R) by a margin of 524 votes. Among the last counties to report results were two reservation counties that provided the final votes necessary for Johnson's win. Republicans charged voter fraud, though these charges were later dismissed. In the wake of the fraud allegations, the Republican controlled state legislature passed a new law requiring voters to show photo identification at the polls or sign an affidavit concerning their identity. The June 1, 2004 special congressional election was the first test of this new voter requirement. In response to the new law, the Four Directions Committee, a non-profit 501(c)(4) organization, was created "to ensure fair treatment for Native American voters."⁴⁴ It was funded by out-of-state Indian tribes with casino profits and staffed by the former executive director of the South Dakota Democratic Party, Brett Healey. The Committee alleged that Native voters were wrongfully prohibited from voting in the special election. They alleged that poll workers who did not inform voters of the affidavit option for voters without photo identification violated the law. During the 2004 general election, the Four Directions Committee worked to educate voters about the process and their rights, ensure that auditors were available for early voting, and help people get to the polls by paying those with vehicles to drive others to the polls. They coordinated their work with tribal chairs and councils to ensure their support. Finally, they trained lawyers and poll watchers prior to Election Day.

Also active in Indian Country was the Northern Plains Tribal Voter Education Project, a nonpartisan 501(c)(3) organization whose purpose is to increase Native American turnout by 10 percent regionally through personal contact. It was funded with a grant from the Center for Community Change in Washington, D.C. The project began in March of 2004 doing voter registration and claimed to have

⁴⁴ David Kranz. "Group: Voter Suit Not Political," *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*, June 30, 2004, p. 1B.

registered 5000 voters on reservations and in Rapid City. The organization also focused on educating voters on reservations in South Dakota about the new voting requirements. They held rallies and “feeds” on reservations and spent time talking face-to-face with people about voting. At the end of September, the group allied with the United Sioux Tribes, another 501(c)(3) with similar aims. Strategies included deploying hundreds of largely Native American canvassers to canvass the reservations and Rapid City, taking people to vote early, and giving rides to the polls on Election Day. As Chas Jewett of the Northern Plains Tribal Voter Education Project said, “When a brown face walks up to a brown face, a different kind of communication takes place.”⁴⁵ The project also targeted women who were eligible to vote in 2002 but failed to do so. Late volunteer recruitment efforts were bolstered by True Majority, a liberal organization that sent information to its extensive national e-mail list on October 29, 2004 asking for volunteers to help on reservations during the last few days of the campaign.

Democrats focused even more attention on the reservations in 2004 than they did in 2002. Daschle had field offices on every reservation and set up a registration office on the populous Pine Ridge reservation eight months before the election. Instead of bringing in political staff from off the reservation, the Daschle campaign hired local Native Americans to canvass, persuade, and get out the vote. Daschle visited each reservation in the state and won the endorsement of all the tribal governments.⁴⁶

Given the closeness of Thune’s 2002 loss, his 2004 campaign and the Republican Party courted American Indian voters. The Republican Party had written off the Indian vote in previous years, and in 2002 Thune received only 8 percent of their vote.⁴⁷ This year would be different. Republicans set up an office in a prime location on Pine Ridge Reservation near the gas station and taco stand where people congregate. Bruce Whelan, a Lakota Sioux who is Chair of the Shannon County Republican Party employed by the Republicans, said that “most” Native Americans are really Republicans because of their belief in limited government, family values and empowerment.⁴⁸ Furthermore, reservations are Catholic and Pro-life. The Republican Party used two messages in Indian Country: pro-life and the need for change after twenty-six years of empty promises from Daschle. The party went to every powwow and sponsored voter registration and other events.⁴⁹ Thune visited Shannon County six times, played basketball in Eagle Butte, and attended the Black Hills Powwow where the state Republican Party sponsored a “chili feed.”⁵⁰ In a post-election interview, Thune’s campaign manager Dick Wadhams noted “Thune always did well on reservations as a House member. Our argument is that Daschle’s been here for twenty-six years. Has your life gotten better? We included this message in our debates, in radio interviews, in ads in Indian publications, and in special brochures for reservations.”⁵¹ The net result was that, although Daschle continued to enjoy a sizable majority of the American Indian vote and high turnout increased his votes in Indian counties significantly over past elections, Thune increased the proportion of his Native vote to 13 percent in 2004. He more than doubled his votes in two important American Indian counties. In Shannon County he increased the number of votes from 248 in 2002 to 564 in 2004 and in Todd County from 464 to 776.⁵²

⁴⁵ Chas Jewett, state director, Northern Plains Tribal Voter Education Project, Rural Ethnic Institute, telephone interview by Elizabeth T. Smith, October 31, 2004.

⁴⁶ Geoff Earle, “Native American Votes Critical in S.D. Contest,” *The Hill*, October 13, 2004, p. 1.

⁴⁷ South Dakota Secretary of State, “United States Senator” (www.sdsos.gov/2004/04ussenate.htm [December 15, 2004]).

⁴⁸ John J. Fialka, “Daschle Works to Get Out the Indian Vote,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 1, 2004, p. A4.

⁴⁹ Glodt interview, November 16, 2004.

⁵⁰ Earle, “Native American Votes Critical in S.D. Contest,” p. 1; Glodt interview, November 16, 2004.

⁵¹ Dick Wadhams, campaign manager, John Thune for U.S. Senate, Sioux Falls, S.D., November 22, 2004.

⁵² Dirk Lammers, “GOP Makes Gains on Reservations, Vote Totals Show,” *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*, November 12, 2004, p. B3.

Impact of BCRA

According to Dick Wadhams, Thune's Campaign Manager, "BCRA has made the process less accountable and more confusing...As a practical matter, BCRA encourages outside activity that's not accountable to campaigns. Groups throw ads up there independent of the campaigns. The 'You're Fired' ads were so poorly done. We hated them...you never knew who would come in and say something for which the campaign would be held accountable by the voters."⁵³ Jason Glodt, Executive Director of South Dakota GOP noted that "(t)he law is too complex. It is hard to know what can be coordinated, what federal money can be spent on. There are two different rulebooks for state and federal campaigns. The National Republican Senatorial Committee had to pay a firm with a blank check and had to trust them. They couldn't see the ad. Campaigns were not allowed to see non-allocable mail. They couldn't coordinate ads."⁵⁴ In all, Glodt felt the law takes power away from the parties and makes it harder to raise money and run ground war efforts because resources go to special interest groups with more radical approaches. He made a point to note that influence and power have "shifted to these more radical groups." This seems to contradict one of the main conclusions of this study, however, as candidates and parties have raised more money than ever before.⁵⁵

In all, it is interesting that Thune's campaign manager and the director of the South Dakota Republican party hold such negative views of BCRA when we estimate that the outside groups had a positive impact for their candidate. Still, the sentiment was continued by the executive director of the South Dakota Democratic Party, Jason Schulte, who felt that under BCRA the state party was "inherently less relevant." He pointed out that "money that used to go to the parties now goes to 527s. 527s are bigger players. The challenge now is to raise money in an off year. It's going to be harder to keep the institution of the party going" and will have to "become more creative in fund-raising."⁵⁶ Brett Healey, Executive Director of the Four Directions Committee and former executive director of the South Dakota Democratic Party, added that BCRA "dammed streams headed toward campaigns and redirected that money elsewhere. Absent public financing or constitutional change, money is hydraulic. Partial solutions are public financing of campaigns as Arizona has done it. It is the only way to get it done."⁵⁷

It is interesting to note that candidate and independent expenditures more than made up for the loss of soft money in this nationally prominent race and total expenditures were the highest in the nation. The concern of state-level party leadership is the perceived marginalization of the political parties in the electoral arena. The fund-raising experience of South Dakota's parties this year is arguably unique to a high profile race and the concerns of party leadership are clearly future oriented.

Conclusion

Given that Thune won the 2004 election with help from outside groups, Daschle's refusal of help from outside groups will likely add to the view that these groups are extremely influential in contemporary elections. The election was a referendum on Daschle's performance in office. The "gone Washington" or "two Daschles" theme stuck and the Daschle campaign's clout argument was not strong enough to counteract the ideological fit. Thune also enjoyed a considerable push from his framing of moral issues. Clearly, he came out on the right side of many in the South Dakota religious community and was aided by the assertive role of state and national church groups. These factors contributed to Thune's improved

⁵³ Wadhams interview, November 22, 2004.

⁵⁴ Glodt interview, November 16, 2004.

⁵⁵ See chapter 1 in this volume.

⁵⁶ Schulte interview, November 17, 2004.

⁵⁷ Brett Healey, executive director, Four Directions Committee, telephone interview by Elizabeth T. Smith, November 19, 2004.

performance in the more liberal East River communities and the maintenance of his large lead in conservative West River communities. Thune did somewhat better among American Indians than in 2002, and held down his losses in the populous Minnehaha County. He also did generally well along the I-29 corridor in the eastern part of the state. These gains were enough to provide the margin of victory that eluded him two years earlier. Daschle was unable to break through the negative role of “chief obstructionist” or the perception he had drifted from being a local South Dakotan as represented by his own words, “I am a D.C. resident.”

It appears that BCRA may serve to make face-to-face voter contact by the state parties more difficult by de-funding that element of the state campaign system that 1) exists from election to election and therefore has institutional memory; 2) is the basic voter mobilization system; 3) has a long-term stake in the electoral system. Either state parties will have to learn new independent funding mechanisms or they will wither and large national nonprofit and 527 organizations will become a primary intermediary system for voters.

A closing thought that should not be ignored in all of this is the increasing nationalization of key federal campaigns. Through the use of blogs, internet sites and coordinated efforts to direct campaign contributions and locate and place volunteer resources, South Dakota’s 2004 Senate race provides plenty of evidence of this, which is a bit ironic given the state electorate’s strong preference for local politics. This election showed that national players using new online technologies to direct resources to key races can and will play the local politics game.

Table 13-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, South Dakota Senate Race, 2003-04

	Tom Daschle (D)	John Thune (R)
From PACs	\$2,807,562	\$1,176,602
From individuals	\$16,008,397	\$14,033,355
From party	\$35,950	\$62,195
From candidate	\$0	\$0
Other contributions	\$356,151	\$768,819
Total receipts	\$19,208,060	\$16,040,971
Total expenditures	\$19,739,259	\$14,132,999
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$883,948	\$1,915,720

Source: Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 23, 2004]).

Table 13-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, South Dakota Senate Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DSCC	SD Sen	Tom Daschle	\$938,098	...	\$938,098	align="right">\$938,098
	SD Sen	John Thune	
NRSC	SD Sen	Tom Daschle	...	\$237,000	\$237,000	align="right">\$334,864
	SD Sen	John Thune	\$97,864	...	\$97,864	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ [January 5, 2005]).

Table 13-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures, South Dakota Senate Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent
Democratic allies^b			
<i>Candidates</i>			
A Lot of People Supporting Tom Daschle	\$2,745,618	\$214,589	\$2,960,207
<i>Political parties</i>			
DSCC ^c	\$623,963	...	\$623,963
DNC	...	\$10,000	\$10,000
<i>Interest groups</i>			
The Media Fund	\$100,542	...	\$100,542
Sierra Club	\$1,887	...	\$1,887
Daschle Democrats	\$1,101	...	\$1,101
American Federation of Government Employees	...	\$180	\$180
Republican allies^b			
<i>Candidates</i>			
Thune for U.S. Senate	\$1,969,523	\$335,769	\$2,305,292
<i>Political parties</i>			
NRSC	\$2,131,073	\$71,565	\$2,202,638
<i>Interest groups</i>			
You're Fired	\$188,362	\$39,564	\$227,926
Families for a Secure America	\$183,876	...	\$183,876
U.S. Chamber of Commerce ^d	\$144,073	\$17,545	\$161,618
Club for Growth ^e	\$121,762	...	\$121,762
NRA Political Victory Fund	\$85,748	\$29,857	\$115,605
United Seniors Association	\$34,595	...	\$34,595
Ave Maria List	...	\$29,081	\$29,081
American Medical Association	...	\$25,111	\$25,111
National Right to Life	...	\$8,128	\$8,128
Family Research Council	...	\$7,200	\$7,200
America's PAC	...	\$6,120	\$6,120
National Right to Work Committee PAC	\$4,310	...	\$4,310
NRA Institute for Legislative Action	...	\$1,730	\$1,730
Nonpartisan			
<i>Interest groups</i>			
Taxpayers for Common Sense	...	\$14,217	\$14,217

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senatorial, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study's sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study's relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 13-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^c The DSCC spent \$800,000 in broadcast advertising. Benjamin Jones, research director, DSCC, interviewed by David Magleby and Quin Monson, November 10, 2004.

^d The U.S. Chamber spent \$410,000 on TV and radio combined. Bill Miller, vice president, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, interviewed by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2004.

^e Club for Growth spent \$200,000 on TV. Stephen Moore, president, Club for Growth, interview by David Magleby and Richard Hawkins, Washington D.C., November 5, 2004.

Table 13-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization, South Dakota Senate Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper / Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^b								
<i>Candidates</i>								
A Lot of People Supporting Tom Daschle	17	37	17	2	14	2	31	120
<i>Political parties</i>								
DCCC	...	4	3	7
South Dakota Democratic Party	1	2	3
<i>Interest groups</i>								
Focus South Dakota	...	5	8	13
MoveOn.org	3	1	4
Hew House PAC	3	3
Sierra Club	1	2	3
Democracy for America	2	2
JustGoVote.org	2	2
Clean Water Action	...	1	1
NARAL Pro-Choice America	...	1	1
National Education Association	...	1	1
South Dakota AFL-CIO	...	1	1
Republican allies^b								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Thune for U.S. Senate	4	20	31	1	4	3	33	96
<i>Political parties</i>								
South Dakota Republican Party	18	13	...	1	4	36
NRSC	...	8	1	3	22	34
<i>Interest groups</i>								
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	13	1	2	1 ^c	17
National Rifle Association	...	3	2	1	4	10
Americans for Job Security	...	2	2	...	2	...	1	7
You're Fired	2	2	4
Club for Growth	1	2	3
National Federation of Independent Business	...	2	1 ^d	...	3
National Right to Life	...	3	3
Susan B. Anthony List	...	1	2	3
60 Plus	...	2	2
Associated Builders and Contractors PAC	...	2	2
Ave Maria List	...	1	1	2
Council for Government Reform	...	2	2
Focus on the Family Action	...	1	1	2
Thanksgiving 2004 Committee	2	2
American Conservative Union	1	1

Type and Organization	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper / Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
BPI Technologies	1	1
Individual Donor: Bud Walling	1	1
Campaign for Working Families	1	1
Christian Voter Project	...	1	1
Heritage Fund	...	1	1
Individual Donor: Mike Assman	1	1
National Right to Work Committee PAC	...	1	1
Progress for America Voter Fund	1	1
Individual Donor: R.L. "Dick" Herman	1	1
South Dakota Mothers, Daughters, and Grandmothers for John Thune	1	1
South Dakota Pro-Life Committee	1	1
Nonpartisan								
<i>Interest groups</i>								
TrueMajority.org	4	4
AARP	1	1
Families for a Secure America	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 13-3.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^c U.S. Chamber did phone banking in South Dakota. Bill Miller, vice president, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, interviewed by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2004.

^d Sharon Wolff Sussin and Andrew Finka, national political director and political programs coordinator, National Federation of Independent Business, interview by Quin Monson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington D.C., December 14, 2004.

Competitive No More: The Arizona First Congressional District Race

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In an environment where congressional elections are typically noncompetitive and election outcomes are known before election season begins, a competitive race draws national attention. Such was the 2004 Arizona First Congressional District election. There was so much promise for an exciting race, and so much national attention focused on the district in the pre-election season. Once election season was underway, however, the First District election moved from the “competitive election” column to the “safe incumbent seat” column. The story of this movement begins with an exploration of the District’s unique features.

Demographics

The defining feature of the Arizona First Congressional District is its enormity. This district covers more than 58,000 square miles of land, about half the size of the entire state of Arizona. Equal in size to the state of Illinois, it is the largest congressional district of any state that includes more than one district. Candidates must travel long distances to meet people, because it takes nine hours to drive across the district, and no single media market reaches the entire district.

The population of the district is quite diverse. When first constituted following the 2000 U.S. Census, the district was 58 percent white, non-Hispanic, 23 percent American Indian, and 16 percent Hispanic.¹ Today the district has a Democratic registration advantage (43 percent), compared to Republicans (34 percent), Independents (23 percent), and Libertarians (0.5 percent).² The district is predominantly rural in nature. The largest city in the district is Flagstaff, with a population of just 61,000.³ The economic base of the district includes tourism and a large service sector, a significant scientific community (geologists, astronomers), a university community (Northern Arizona University in Flagstaff), copper and coal mining interests, and ranching. The population of the district also includes a large number of retirees.

Brief History of the Arizona First Congressional District

Arizona gained two congressional seats after the 2000 census. Republican Rick Renzi defeated Democrat George Cordova in the district’s inaugural election in 2002.⁴ This led the national party committees and political pundits to identify the First District seat as one of the most competitive of the 2004 election.

The Candidates

The congressional election featured three candidates: the incumbent Republican, a Democratic challenger, and a Libertarian candidate. Only the Republican and Democratic candidates ran viable campaigns.

Democrat. The Democrats were left scratching their heads about their loss of the First District race in 2002. The general consensus among Democrats was that too many candidates had run in the 2002

¹ Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, “Final Congressional Plan” (www.azredistricting.org/?page=finalcong) [Nov. 18, 2004].

² Arizona Secretary of State, “Arizona Voter Registration Count (as of 10/25/2004),” (www.azsos.gov/election/) [Nov. 18, 2004].

³ Flagstaff City Government, “Flagstaff Community Profile,” (www.flagstaff.az.gov/index.asp?NID=2) [Nov. 18, 2004].

⁴ Frederic I. Solop and James I. Bowie, “The 2002 Arizona First Congressional Race,” *PS: Political Science and Politics*, vol. 36 (July 2003), p. 3.

primary, splitting the vote seven ways and allowing George Cordova to win with just 22 percent of the vote. Cordova was an unknown candidate who won the primary largely due to grassroots campaigning within Native American and Hispanic communities. Subsequently, he was unable to raise significant money after the primary and was unable to attract much support from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC).⁵

Having learned from the 2002 race, Democratic Party officials determined that the party would be better served if it cleared the primary field. They rallied behind one candidate, concentrating limited resources behind the person they deemed most electable, a decision some later viewed as a strategic error.⁶ The Democrats decided to support the candidacy of Paul Babbitt, despite the fact that several candidates from the 2002 race (George Cordova, Fred DuVal, and Diane Prescott) kept their Federal Election Commission (FEC) files active while they contemplated running again in 2004. Babbitt had many assets. His family had deep roots in Flagstaff; their business interests drove the city's economic development for over a century. His brother, Bruce Babbitt, was a former governor of Arizona and Bill Clinton's Secretary of the Interior. Paul Babbitt was involved in local and county politics for twenty-five years, serving on the Flagstaff City Council and as Mayor of Flagstaff, and he had been serving as a member of the Coconino County Board of Supervisors since 1986.

In November 2003, the Democratic Governor of Arizona, Janet Napolitano, and Jim Pederson, Chair of the State Democratic Party, held a reception for Babbitt.⁷ This reception was widely interpreted as a public endorsement of Babbitt's candidacy. George Cordova and Diane Prescott dropped out of the race soon after the event. Babbitt became the de facto Democratic candidate. He was later opposed by local activist Bob Donahue in the primary, but Donahue ran little more than a symbolic campaign. Babbitt won the Democratic primary with 74 percent of the vote.

Republican. The Bush Administration strongly supported Renzi's candidacy in 2002, and Renzi entered Congress with a firm commitment to the president's agenda. In return, Bush and the Republican Party were determined to help Renzi retain his seat in 2004. They gave him important committee assignments and an unusually large number of federal earmarks for his district. In 2004, Renzi ran unopposed in the Republican primary.

Matthew Ash, Renzi's press secretary, said Renzi's reelection strategy was about "being everywhere at once."⁸ In two years of representing the First District, Renzi had opened eight district offices, held 70 town hall meetings, traveled more than 100,000 miles in the district, answered more than 30,000 letters from constituents, and claimed to have brought more than \$140 million into all parts of the district. The campaign touted Renzi as "Rural Arizona's Workhorse" in its advertising.

The contrast between Renzi and Babbitt could not have been greater. Renzi, a former football star at Northern Arizona University, is gregarious and outgoing. Babbitt, on the other hand, is reserved and soft-spoken, with a demeanor more characteristic of a librarian than a politician. Renzi is one of the most conservative members of Congress, voting with the president 93 percent of the time and with his party 91

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Harriet Young, chairperson, Coconino County Democratic Party, telephone interview by Frederic I. Solop, November 3, 2004.

⁷ Mark Shaffer, "State Dems Touting Paul Babbitt in 1st Congressional District Race," *Arizona Republic*, November 16, 2003, p. B7.

⁸ Matthew Ash, press secretary, Office of Congressman Rick Renzi, interview by Frederic I. Solop, November 10, 2004.

percent of the time.⁹ He received the highest possible rating from the National Right to Life Committee, voted 90 percent of the time with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and received an “A” rating from the National Rifle Association (NRA). Renzi also advocated withdrawing from the United Nations and sponsored a bill to remove Arizona from the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.¹⁰ Babbitt, on the other hand, ran as a relatively liberal candidate. He was pro-choice, supported environmental protection, opposed the Bush tax cuts, and was critical of the U.S. presence in Iraq. On his front porch in Flagstaff, he flew the United Nations flag next to the Stars and Stripes.

Money

The 2002 First District election cost an unprecedented amount of money for a congressional election in rural Arizona, but, the money spent in the 2002 election was easily overshadowed by the general election expenses of the 2004 race.

Candidate

Both major-party candidates were well funded and raised significantly more money in the 2004 election cycle than in 2002. In 2004, Renzi raised \$2.3 million, compared to \$1.7 million in 2002, and Babbitt raised \$1.3 million, compared to the \$665,000 raised by George Cordova in 2002 (see table 14-1).

As is typical for an incumbent, Renzi raised a significant amount of money early in the election cycle and a majority of his money (51 percent) came from PACs (see table 14-1). Sixty percent of his PAC money came from the business community. One-third of his PAC money (31 percent) came from single issue/ideological groups, with most of this money being donated by leadership PACs and candidate committees.¹¹

Babbitt, in contrast, struggled to get on solid ground with a professional campaign organization. After declaring his candidacy in October 2003, Babbitt cycled through two campaign management teams before settling on campaign manager Frank Costanzo, former Arizona state director of the Howard Dean campaign, at the end of June 2004.¹² Consequently, the Babbitt campaign got off to a slow start in raising money.

As of the November 22, 2004 FEC filing, two-thirds of Babbitt’s money (67 percent) came from individuals, and 32 percent came from PACs. Labor PACs contributed \$194,500 to Babbitt’s campaign, or 46 percent of Babbitt’s total PAC money.¹³

Party

The First District race was targeted as a high priority for both Democrats and Republicans. Both parties planned on injecting significant money and star power into this race. Although President Bush did not come to the district for Renzi as he did in 2002, Vice President Cheney held a March fund-raiser for Renzi in Phoenix. Babbitt benefited from John Kerry’s August appearance in Flagstaff and was the

⁹ Project Vote Smart, “Congressman Rick Renzi,” (www.vote-smart.org/bio.php?can_id=MAZ21558 [November 18, 2004]).

¹⁰ Seth Muller, “Renzi Takes a Far Right Turn,” *Arizona Daily Sun*, July 18, 2004, p. A1.

¹¹ Federal Election Commission, “2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info,” November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 21, 2004]).

¹² Frank Costanzo, campaign manager, Paul Babbitt Campaign, interview by Frederic I. Solop, November 10, 2004.

¹³ Federal Election Commission, “Money in Politics Database: Paul J. Babbitt, Jr.,” (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candpg.exe?DoFn=H4AZ01111*2004 [January 5, 2005]).

primary beneficiary of a May Democratic fund-raiser featuring Hillary Rodham Clinton in Phoenix. According to FEC filings, the DCCC invested approximately \$1.1 million in independent expenditures to get Babbitt elected.¹⁴ FEC records indicate that \$888,244 was spent advocating Babbitt's election, and \$244,281 was spent for ads against Renzi (see table 14-2). State Democrats did not directly invest in Babbitt's campaign. The DCCC also lent organizational support to Babbitt, helped him identify capable staff members, and provided him with district data via the National Committee for an Effective Congress.¹⁵ Given that Arizona was initially defined as a battleground state for the presidential election, state Democrats chose to invest in a coordinated campaign that utilized staff personnel and limited resources to mobilize likely Democratic voters in support of a slate of Democratic candidates.¹⁶

The Republican Party, by way of the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), invested more in the First District race than the Democratic Party. FEC records indicate that the national Republicans invested about \$1.6 million in the race.¹⁷ Just \$60,394 of that money was spent advancing a positive message about Renzi (see table 14-2). The rest of the money was spent on negative ads attacking Babbitt. State Republicans also allocated a limited amount of resources to a coordinated campaign that advocated casting votes for a slate of Republican candidates.¹⁸

Interest Groups

The Babbitt campaign was supported by union interests, including an endorsement from the United Steelworkers of America, and environmental interests, such as the Sierra Club and the Arizona League of Conservation Voters. While making public endorsements of Babbitt's candidacy, these groups invested few dollars in the Babbitt race. The 527 organization MoveOn.org chose Babbitt as one of only four House candidates to receive its endorsement and special attention. The organization itself did not donate money to the Babbitt campaign or spend money on behalf of getting Babbitt elected, but MoveOn did provide a link on its web site to the Babbitt campaign web site. According to Frank Costanzo, Babbitt's campaign manager, this effort did yield a small but significant amount of cash for the campaign.¹⁹ Costanzo lamented that some 527 activity may actually have hurt Babbitt. Medical marijuana advocates endorsed Babbitt and spent some money on his behalf, but, according to Costanzo, this activity may have lost more votes than it gained.²⁰

Renzi was supported by a coalition of business interests as represented by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB). The NRA worked on Renzi's behalf as well. The largest expenditures made by an interest group active in the First District race were from the National Association of Realtors (NAR). NAR invested over \$462,000 in the effort to have Renzi reelected, according to FEC records.²¹ They distributed thirteen mail pieces to voter homes and sponsored one newspaper ad and one TV ad (see table 14-4). The NAR ads were largely positive, focusing on Renzi's work to make home ownership more affordable. No mention was made of Babbitt.

¹⁴ Seth Muller, "Babbitt Claims DCCC Didn't Rebut Smear Campaign," *Arizona Daily Sun*, November 4, 2004, p. A1.

¹⁵ Greg Speed, communications director, DCCC, interview by Frederic I. Solop, November 15, 2004.

¹⁶ Sara Rosen, communications director, Arizona State Democratic Party, interview by Frederic I. Solop, November 9, 2004.

¹⁷ Muller, "Babbit Claims DCCC Didn't Rebut Smear Campaign," p. A1.

¹⁸ John Echols, Northern Arizona Field Coordinator, Arizona Republican Party, interview with Frederic I. Solop, November 4, 2004.

¹⁹ Costanzo interview, November 10, 2004.

²⁰ Costanzo interview, November 10, 2004.

²¹ Muller, "Babbit Claims DCCC Didn't Rebut Smear Campaign," p. A1.

Effect of Money

Money is an important resource for all electoral campaigns. The salient question for the First District is “How should money be allocated so as to maximize its usefulness in such a physically large and demographically diverse election district?”

Ground Campaign

Babbitt’s strategy emphasized his work as a local official in Flagstaff and Coconino County, contrasting him with Renzi, who was portrayed as an outsider beholden to special interests.²² This message was also emphasized in Babbitt’s ground campaign. Ultimately, the Babbitt campaign itself placed more hope on a ground campaign than did Renzi’s campaign. This occurred primarily because Babbitt began the election campaign with less name recognition than Renzi and less money to promote name recognition. Also, Babbitt had less media experience and was not an effusive, charismatic figure in front of the camera. His campaign was slow in getting organized, and Babbitt did not immediately receive the media training he needed.²³ Finally, much of the Republican ground campaign was orchestrated by the NRCC, rather than by the Renzi campaign.

Much of the Democratic ground campaign was ceded to others. Democrats were very interested in registering new voters. They hoped that efforts by America Coming Together (ACT), a national 527 organization with staff and resources in Arizona, would benefit their candidates.²⁴ This hope may have been misguided. In the end, ACT could not distinguish between registering Republicans and Democrats. Also, there was no follow-up mechanism by the organization to understand whether newly registered voters actually cast a vote in the election.²⁵

The Babbitt campaign surrendered other aspects of the ground campaign as well. Kerry’s campaign forces initially targeted Arizona as a battleground state. They invested money and staff in the state, hoping to add Arizona to their column. At the same time, state Democrats organized a coordinated campaign to elect Democrats into offices at all levels throughout the state. According to Frank Costanzo, Babbitt’s campaign manager, state Democrats turned over the direction of the coordinated campaign to the Kerry forces who brought money and staff personnel to the state. When Kerry appeared in front of thousands of supporters in Flagstaff in August, Babbitt took his place next to him on the stage, but weeks later, the Kerry campaign pulled out of Arizona in the face of poor poll numbers. As Kerry reallocated resources to other states, the Arizona Democratic Party’s coordinated campaign faltered, and Babbitt’s organization suffered.²⁶

The Babbitt campaign and supporters were active in distributing mail pieces throughout the campaign. Nine mail pieces came out of the Babbitt campaign, while thirteen mail pieces were independently produced and distributed by the DCCC (see table 14-4). Babbitt allies produced another fourteen pieces.

Renzi’s election strategy relied more on an air campaign than did Babbitt’s. Renzi was well organized at an earlier date and had a significant amount of early money to purchase media time in Phoenix and throughout the district. Moreover, Renzi’s camp proved to be very strong in terms of direct mail. Fifty pro-Renzi or anti-Babbitt mail pieces were distributed, compared to the thirty-six pieces distributed by

²² Carlos Viscarra, assistant campaign manager, Paul Babbitt for Congress Campaign, interview by Frederic I. Solop, November 8, 2004.

²³ Costanzo interview, November 10, 2004.

²⁴ Young interview, November 9, 2004.

²⁵ Young interview, November 9, 2004.

²⁶ Costanzo interview, November 10, 2004.

Babbitt and his allies (see table 14-4). Of the fifty Renzi pieces, three came from the Rick Renzi for Congress campaign, four were campaign-like mailings funded by taxpayers under public franking privilege that came out of Renzi's office, seventeen originated from the NRCC, one came from the Arizona Republican Party, and twenty-five were sent by Renzi allies.

The NRCC mailers, in particular, set a negative tone in the election. These pieces hammered Babbitt's record in local politics, painting him as a tax-and-spend liberal. Flagstaff's *Arizona Daily Sun* criticized the NRCC charges as misleading and inaccurate, but other media failed to investigate.²⁷

Renzi made strides to reach out to constituencies he had failed to carry in 2002. He sought to establish a foothold on the Navajo Nation, for example, where he had lost badly to Cordova in 2002. He played up the federal money he was able to bring to the reservation and met frequently with tribal leaders. He was received much more warmly by the Navajo than he had been two years earlier. Renzi was even given an honorary Navajo name meaning, "man with many children" (Renzi has twelve children). The Navajo Nation Council unanimously endorsed Renzi's candidacy, a testament to Renzi's ability to win over a traditional Democratic group. A few days later, however, in an apparent attempt to cover their bases, Navajo leaders also endorsed Babbitt, though not unanimously.

Finally, district residents reported a flurry of push-polling activity that seemingly emerged from allies of both candidates.²⁸ According to the American Association of Public Opinion Research, "A push poll is a form of negative campaigning disguised as a political poll that is designed to change opinions, not measure them."²⁹ Large numbers of Arizona First District voters answered calls disguised as measuring election attitudes and were then treated to invectives about either one candidate or the other. For instance, one automated call from "USA Public Opinion Group" claimed that Renzi was supporting a plan by President Bush for "a new national sales tax on everything." The funding sources behind this push-polling could not be identified.

Air Campaign

Babbitt's air campaign began on the radio with a country jingle that took subtle swipes at Renzi for his alleged Virginia residency. This song was played on stations throughout the large district. Radio is relatively cheap way to reach the more isolated areas of the huge district, and both candidates ran a number of radio ads.

Despite radio's pervasiveness, the big money was ultimately spent on TV ads in the Phoenix market. Although Phoenix is not in the district, its TV stations reach most of the district's population. As in 2002, Renzi and the NRCC both unleashed a TV blitz of negative advertising against the Democratic opponent. While Babbitt was able to buy more TV airtime than George Cordova had in 2002, his campaign was still vastly outspent by the Republicans. The Babbitt campaign and the DCCC combined to spend about \$375,000 to run four unique TV ads, while Renzi, the NRCC, and the NAR combined to spend \$815,000 for ten unique ads (see table 14-3).³⁰

²⁷ Randy Wilson, "Spin Zones Are No Way to Cover Post-debate Reaction," *Arizona Daily Sun*, October 10, 2004, p. A7; See also, "GOP Stuck on Irrelevant Babbitt Tax Votes," *Arizona Daily Sun*, October 11, 2004, p. A1.

²⁸ Seth Muller, "When is a Push Poll a 'Message Test'?" *Arizona Daily Sun*, September 21, 2004, p. A1.

²⁹ American Association of Public Opinion Research, "APOR Statement on Election Year 'Push Polls'," (www.aapor.org [January 5, 2005]).

³⁰ These spending figures account for ad buys on four television stations. The campaigns may have spent additional money for ads on other television stations.

Babbitt's TV ads continued the general theme of his campaign, touting his deep Arizona roots while repeating the charges that Renzi actually lived in Virginia and did not truly represent the district. Renzi bought a house in Flagstaff shortly before his 2002 campaign, but his wife and school-age children continued to reside in the Virginia suburbs of Washington D.C., where they had lived for over a decade. At times, though, the Babbitt campaign's concern with Renzi's place of residency seemed to overshadow Babbitt himself. Renzi responded saying he went to high school in Arizona, was the team captain for Northern Arizona University's football team in the election district, and operated several Arizona businesses. The final vote suggests that the "carpetbagger" attacks did not resonate with district voters.

Renzi's TV campaign began in the summer with positive ads pushing Renzi's "workhorse" image. They emphasized his success in bringing federal money to the district. By October, though, the Republican TV effort turned negative. The ads from the NRCC repeated accusations against Babbitt seen in earlier mail pieces. In the final weeks of the campaign, Renzi himself also went negative, mocking Babbitt's support for wind energy and water conservation projects as concern with "windmills and flowers." The final Renzi ad contained the most negative and emotionally powerful message. In it, a Native American woman choked back tears as she claimed that dust from "Paul Babbitt's mine" had given her breast cancer. The Babbitt campaign responded that he held only a small stake in the gravel mining operation and there was no evidence to support her allegation. Nonetheless, the powerful emotional message of the ad captured the attention of district voters.

Unique Circumstances of Results During Election

There are two unusual situations that dominated the First District race. One situation is the power of incumbency. Renzi entered the 2004 race with a track record of bringing new federal money into all parts of the district. He regularly traveled the district, was more well known than his opponent, and he had the full support of the Republican National Committee (RNC), the NRCC, the White House, and business interests. Most incumbents were reelected to office in 2004, and Renzi's win was not unexpected.

On the strength of his record, Renzi pulled out to an eleven-point lead over Babbitt in April, and he held on to that lead into September. Republican attacks on Babbitt, though, pushed Renzi over the top. October polls, taken in the midst of the negative barrage against Babbitt, showed Renzi with what would prove to be an insurmountable twenty-three-point lead. This margin was built in large part by a drop in support for Babbitt, with little increase in Renzi's numbers. In the end, Renzi overwhelmed Babbitt with a twenty-three-point win. Babbitt was unable to survive the combination of Renzi's service to the district and a barrage of negative advertising.

As the first incumbent representative of the new all-rural district, Renzi had a unique advantage. The people of the district were accustomed to being largely ignored by their previous representatives, who tended to focus on the state's more urban areas. Any attention Renzi gave to his constituents, therefore, was a welcome change, and they were grateful for it. Renzi's image was inevitably bolstered, making it easier to promote the theme that he was the district's "workhorse."

The second unusual situation explains, in part, Renzi's twenty-three-point win. Babbitt did not prove to be an effective candidate. Unlike the 2002 race, State Democrats united behind Babbitt's campaign early in the season. They cleared the field of other candidates and avoided a challenging primary election. However, Babbitt missed an important opportunity to sharpen his message and develop his presentation as a strong candidate. In addition, the Babbitt name was not as well regarded throughout the district as state Democrats had hoped, and it took a long time for Babbitt to pull together an experienced campaign team. Ultimately, Babbitt's message did not resonate throughout the district. Babbitt's weaknesses were highlighted by the fact that Kerry outpolled Bush by 6,700 votes in Coconino County, yet Babbitt, who

resides in the county and represented the area for many years as a county supervisor, won the county by just 112 votes. Babbitt failed to win any of the other counties in the district.

Conclusion

The story of the 2004 First District election was ultimately anticlimactic. The spirited race that both sides expected failed to materialize, as the incumbent Renzi proved to be stronger than anticipated. At the same time, Babbitt fell far short of expectations. When Arizona itself failed to maintain its status as a presidential battleground state, national attention drifted elsewhere, and the Arizona First Congressional District race became an afterthought to national Democrats.

Renzi entered the race with a significant amount of money. He had the freedom to make early media buys and to define his opponent early in the election season. In the end, the Renzi camp relied on the traditional Republican approach of defining his opponent as a tax-and-spend liberal who was out of touch with the politics of the district. This message was most prominent in the NRCC advertising, but the Renzi campaign used this message as well. Renzi's strategy also involved highlighting his track record as a tenacious, hard-working representative who brought money into all parts of the congressional district. Spring 2004 polling by the Social Research Laboratory at Northern Arizona University showed that this message resonated throughout the district. When presented with information about Renzi bringing more than \$130 million of new federal projects into the First District, one-third of likely voters (33 percent) said they were more likely to vote for his reelection.³¹

Babbitt narrowly focused on issues from the 2002 election and centered his campaign on defining Renzi as a "carpetbagger." This was a more difficult claim to make in 2004, given Renzi's two-year track record of service to the district. Babbitt ultimately failed to make a persuasive argument as to why district voters should unseat an incumbent and place their bets on a new representative. Social Research Laboratory polling also showed that the Babbitt name translated into a net loss of votes in many parts of the congressional district, despite state Democratic officials uniting behind his candidacy. Twenty-eight percent of likely voters said that information about the Babbitt family made them less likely to vote for Babbitt while just 20 percent said it made them more likely to vote for Babbitt.³² Ironically, Renzi, the alleged outsider, was better able to project the rugged, independent image that rural Arizonans found appealing while Babbitt, despite his familial roots in the district, failed to connect with the district's voters.

Because so many congressional seats in the nation are noncompetitive, the competitive seats garner significant attention. In the First District, traditional campaign tactics brought a seemingly competitive district into uncompetitive status. What was unique in the First District race was that the original "competitive" label was based on assumptions about district composition rather than actual data about voter attitudes. In the final analysis, freshman Representative Rick Renzi was reelected and, provided he is able to continue bringing money into the district, will likely solidify his hold on a district that Democrats once considered to be rightly theirs.

³¹ Social Research Laboratory, "Renzi Leads Babbitt in Arizona 1st Congressional District Race," (www4.nau.edu/srl/News.aspx?Year=2004 [January 5, 2005]).

³² *Ibid.*

Table 14-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Arizona 1st Congressional District Race, 2003-04

	Paul Babbitt (D)	Rick Renzi (R)
From PACs	\$418,984	\$1,193,645
From individuals	\$867,850	\$836,792
From party	\$9,500	\$10,032
From candidate	\$0	\$0
Other contributions	\$2,196	\$282,924
Total receipts	\$1,298,530	\$2,323,393
Total expenditures	\$1,258,337	\$2,184,925
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$40,193	\$136,847

Source: Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004, (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 21, 2004]).

Table 14-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, Arizona 1st Congressional District Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DCCC	AZ 1	Paul Babbitt	\$888,244	...	\$888,244	\$1,132,525
	AZ 1	Rick Renzi	...	\$244,281	\$244,281	
NRCC	AZ 1	Paul Babbitt	...	\$1,543,878	\$1,543,878	\$1,604,272
	AZ 1	Rick Renzi	\$60,394	...	\$60,394	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (<ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/> [January 5, 2005]).

Table 14-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Arizona 1st Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Paul Babbitt for Congress	\$213,665	\$10,321	\$223,986	\$528,915
<i>Political parties</i>				
DCCC	\$161,639	...	\$161,639	\$1,056,199
Republican allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Rick Renzi for Congress	\$367,351	\$7,994	\$375,345	\$1,368,468
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRCC	\$292,275	...	\$292,275	\$1,487,106
<i>Interest groups</i>				
National Association of Realtors	\$156,250	...	\$156,250	\$497,522
American Hospital Association	...	\$6,668	\$6,668	...
Small Business Survival Committee	...	\$1,260	\$1,260	...
National Right to Life	...	\$470	\$470	...

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study's sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study's relevant House, Senate, or presidential races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 14-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 14-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Arizona 1st Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Paul Babbitt for Congress	9	2	2	3	8	2	26
<i>Political parties</i>							
DCCC	13	2	15
Arizona Democratic Party	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>							
JustGoVote.org	6	2	8
Arizona League of Conservation Voters	1	1	2
National Education Association	2	2
National Right to Work Committee PAC ^d	2	2
New House PAC	2	2
Sierra Club	2	2
We the People	2	2
Arizonans for Medical Marijuana	...	1	1
Democratic Advancement PAC	1	1
ITC Research	1	1
MoveOn.org ^e	1
New Democratic Network ^f	1
USA Public Opinion Group	1	1
Republican allies^c							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Rick Renzi for Congress	3	2	...	2	2	7	16
Congressman Rick Renzi (taxpayer expense)	4	4
<i>Political parties</i>							
NRCC	17	1	...	3	21
Arizona Republican Party	1	1
Yavapai County Republican Committee	...	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>							
National Association of Realtors	13	1	1	15
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	3	...	1	4
The Seniors Coalition	2	1	3
National Federation of Independent Business	2	2
National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund	1	1	...	2
National Right to Life	1	1	...	2
United Seniors Association	1	1	2
Alliance for Quality Nursing Home Care/ American Health Care Association	...	1	1
American Hospital Association	1	...	1
Diné for Renzi	...	1	1
Eagle Forum PAC	1	1
Jim Lamerson – Prescott, AZ	...	1	1
National Association of Home Builders	1	1

Type and Organization ^b	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Small Business Survival Committee	1	...	1
Veterans of Foreign Wars PAC	1	...	1
Nonpartisan							
<i>Interest groups</i>							
AARP ^f	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 14-3.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, Arizona Education Association data have been included in the National Education Association totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, "... " only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^d Organization that attacked Republican Rick Renzi, but did not support Democrat Paul Babbitt either in the Arizona First Congressional District. This organization usually endorses Republican candidates.

^e Endorsed Paul Babbitt and helped raise money for his campaign; See MoveOn.org, "MoveOn Members Endorse: All Candidates," (www.moveonpac.org/ candidates.html [December 21, 2004]).

^f Unspecified race media advertising. Simon Rosenberg, president, New Democratic Network, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., December 15, 2004.

^g Organization released a nonpartisan voters guide. This organization usually endorses Democratic candidates.

The Colorado Seventh Congressional District Race

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In 2002, the Colorado Seventh Congressional District race between Mike Feeley and Bob Beauprez was decided by 121 votes. The contest went through myriad legal challenges and recounts, with both candidates even attending orientation for new members of Congress. It was not until thirty-five days after the election that Bob Beauprez was declared the winner.¹

Going into the election season, by most accounts, the 2004 contest was expected to be just as competitive. As late as mid-September the Cook Political Report claimed that the Seventh District was “one of the truly competitive swing districts in this country, and it should be challenged in every election year.”² Beauprez’s conservative voting record, which many thought was out of step with voters in the district, also contributed to predictions of another close race. Registration trends also pointed toward a tougher race for Beauprez: the district, already marginally Democratic, became even more so since the 2002 election with registered Democrats outnumbering Republicans by nearly 7,000.³ In the end, however, the race was not close, and Bob Beauprez won the election with 55 percent of the vote to opponent Dave Thomas’ 42 percent. The explanation seems to rest with the Beauprez campaign’s success in presenting him as a moderate and with the many advantages of incumbency, including a huge fund-raising edge. In addition, Dave Thomas was not as formidable an opponent as Mike Feeley had been two years earlier.

The Electoral Context

Since the 2002 contest, voter registration in the Seventh District had increased by about 40,000. Going into the election, registered Democrats (134,674) outnumbered registered Republicans (127,779) by about 7,000, but a plurality of voters were unaffiliated (136,660), ensuring that the race would remain competitive.⁴ This stands in contrast with the 110-voter edge Democrats enjoyed in 2002.⁵

Demographic factors also suggest that the Seventh District leans Democratic. The district, for example, is overwhelmingly urban (about 98 percent) with a median income (\$46,149) that is below the state median (\$47,203). Moreover, by Colorado standards the district is racially and ethnically diverse, with Latinos making up 19.6 percent of the population, African Americans 5.8 percent, and Asian Americans 2.9 percent.⁶ Other demographic traits, however, suggest that the district might be receptive to Republican candidates. Nearly 63 percent of the working-age population is employed in white-collar occupations, and one out of every seven residents is a military veteran.⁷

The 2004 electoral context also pointed to advantages for the Democrats. Al Gore carried the district by approximately 2 percent in the 2000 election cycle; 2004 was also a presidential election year, and

¹ For a detailed account of the 2002 race, see Daniel A. Smith, “Strings Attached: Outside Money in Colorado’s Seventh Congressional District,” in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institutional Press, 2004), pp. 180–204.

² Ann Schrader, “Another Seventh District Dogfight,” *Denver Post*, September 15, 2004, p. 4B.

³ Colorado Secretary of State, “October 2004 Voter Registration Numbers: Voter Recap by Congressional District,” (www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/oct2004.htm [November 25, 2004]).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Smith, “Strings Attached,” p. 191.

⁶ Michael Barone and Richard E. Cohen, *The Almanac of American Politics, 2004* (Washington, D.C.: National Journal Group, 2003), p. 327.

⁷ Barone and Cohen, *The Almanac of American Politics, 2004*, p. 327.

Democratic candidate John Kerry was waging an unexpectedly competitive race in the state. In general, the higher turnout in this presidential election cycle was expected to benefit Democratic candidates statewide. Finally, a very competitive U.S. Senate race for the open seat being vacated by Ben Nighthorse Campbell was also expected to increase Democratic turnout.

The Candidates

Before being elected to Congress, Bob Beauprez had been a banker and state Republican Party chair. In 2002 Beauprez had proven to be a disciplined candidate who stayed “on message,” working the phones, pressing the flesh with voters, and diligently following his campaign plan. He showed that he could engage in the rough and tumble of electoral politics, remarking that “I wish this business could be done with nothing but a...’vote for me,’ but that’s about as unrealistic as saying ‘we’re going to play hockey, but you can’t bump into each other.’”⁸ In the aftermath of his razor-thin victory, Beauprez worked hard during his first term to construct an image as a moderate and as a “principled pragmatist.”⁹ His critics argued that Beauprez was anything but moderate and that he lacked a record of accomplishment. A report by *Congressional Quarterly*, for example, found that of the fifty-five votes cast in 2003 by Beauprez on issues in which Bush had clearly staked out a position, Beauprez sided with the president and the Republican majority 98 percent of the time. In fact, no other member of Congress was more in step with the White House.¹⁰

During his two years in Congress, Beauprez utilized many of the tools that incumbents have at their disposal, including mail franking, position taking, and credit claiming. Republican party leaders, mindful of his narrow win, worked to enhance his reelection prospects by giving Beauprez some desirable committee assignments. His position on the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, for example, enabled Beauprez to claim credit for bringing home federal highway funds, public transit projects, and construction jobs to his growing north Denver suburban district.¹¹ As a member of the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Beauprez sponsored the Veterans Health Care Cost Recovery Act of 2003, which added millions of dollars to veterans’ health care funding. Also important to many veteran constituents, Beauprez worked for an expansion of a large Veterans’ Administration (VA) facility in the district, an accomplishment prominently featured in some of his campaign mail. Beauprez was also selected to serve as Deputy Whip for the Republican Caucus and as a member of the House Republican Policy Committee. His loyalty to the party and the expectations of another tight race explain why the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) and the Republican Party were eager to bolster Beauprez’ resume and provide money for his reelection effort.

Dave Thomas, the term-limited Jefferson County district attorney (DA), was making his third run for Congress, his second being an unsuccessful run in the Democratic primary in 2002. Thomas, a former U.S. attorney, argued that his law enforcement background gave him a unique perspective on the issues as well as the knowledge required to confront the challenges facing officials in Washington. His stated rationale for running was that he believed Beauprez was too conservative and was not representing the district “the way it should be.”¹² Thomas’ campaign focused on issues such as universal basic health care, job creation, environmental protection, education funding, and resource allocation to the war on terror.¹³

⁸ Ann Schrader, “New Seat Remains Competitive,” *Denver Post*, October 21, 2004, p. 4B.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Charlie Brennan, “Beauprez Plays Up Life Story for Voters,” *Rocky Mountain News*, October 15, 2004, p. 30A.

¹¹ M.E. Sprengelmeyer, “Beauprez Brings Home Bacon,” *Rocky Mountain News*, March 30, 2004, p. 18A.

¹² Schrader, “New Seat Remains Competitive,” p. 4B.

¹³ *Ibid.*

According to people who knew him, Dave Thomas was a “nice guy” who wanted the campaign to focus on issues rather than personal attacks.¹⁴ When, almost from the outset, his opponent and the NRCC began running attack ads, Thomas expressed his displeasure but shrugged off advice to go negative. This approach was reflected in comments by Kathy Sasack, Thomas’ assistant in the Jefferson County DA’s office, when she said, “He is a great boss, a wonderful man...[But] he is not a very good politician. He doesn’t do what is politically expedient. He does what is the right thing to do.”¹⁵

Any hopes Thomas might have had about running on the issues were dashed in mid-September with the release of a grand jury report about the 1999 Columbine High School shootings. Media coverage centered on Thomas’ role in a private meeting held a few days after the shooting, focusing on charges that Thomas might have helped cover up the existence of an affidavit that might have allowed the sheriff to obtain a search warrant for one of the killer’s homes. The Beauprez campaign and the NRCC immediately seized on the report to launch an offensive from which Thomas never recovered. Thomas trailed in the polls throughout, and he was never able to seize the momentum in the race.

Money

Because it was widely presumed to be among the nation’s most competitive House races, the expectation was that the Seventh District would spur record fund-raising and spending by the candidates, parties, and interest groups.

The Candidates

Federal Election Commission (FEC) reports indicate that Beauprez raised and spent nearly three times as much as his opponent. As indicated in table 15-1, Beauprez raised just under \$3 million, which broke the fund-raising record for freshmen House members.¹⁶ Of this, 41 percent came from PAC contributions, 65 percent of which come from business PACs.¹⁷ During the crucial first two weeks of October, when Beauprez opened up a lead in the polls that he would never lose, he outspent Thomas by a 6–1 margin. In fact, Beauprez even outspent Democratic Senate candidate Ken Salazar during that same period, and Salazar was running statewide for a contested open U.S. Senate seat.¹⁸

Thomas raised \$1.2 million, an impressive amount but short of his goal of \$1.6 million and not nearly enough to compete with Beauprez. As shown in table 15-1, PACs contributed 34 percent of Thomas’ funds, and 65 percent came from individual donors. It is almost certainly the case that Beauprez’s prodigious fund-raising hampered Thomas’s own efforts to solicit contributions, as potential donors weighed his chances of defeating a well-financed incumbent. Moreover, paying for TV time in the costly Denver market resulted in Thomas burning through his cash early, leaving him very little for the campaign’s final weeks. Indeed, with only three weeks before Election Day, Beauprez had more than \$820,000 cash on hand compared to less than \$83,000 for Thomas.¹⁹

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Jack Stansbery, campaign manager, Beauprez for Congress, interview by Robert Duffy, Wheat Ridge, Colo., November 11, 2004.

¹⁷ Center for Responsive Politics, “Total Raised and Spent, 2004: Colorado District 7,” (www.opensecrets.org/politicians/summary.asp?cid=n0002544&cycle=2004 [12 December 2004]).

¹⁸ Mike Soraghan, “Hopeful’s War Chests Bulging,” *Denver Post*, October 22, 2004, p. B4.

¹⁹ M.E. Sprengelmeyer, “GOP Reaps Heaps of Funds in 4th, 7th Races,” *Rocky Mountain News*, October 22, 2004, p. 26A.

The Political Parties

The NRCC spent just over \$500,000 in the Seventh District, virtually all of it on independent expenditures against Dave Thomas (see table 15-2). In 2002, on the other hand, the NRCC spent \$2.4 million in the race.²⁰ The committee almost certainly would have been able to spend more in the Seventh District if it had been needed. Instead, it shifted its resources to other races in the state, spending \$3.6 million in the Third District and just under \$1 million in the Fourth District.

Despite clear signals throughout the summer and early fall that it considered the race to be a priority, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) spent only \$61,850 on the race (see table 15-2). In comparison, the DCCC spent \$1.8 million in the Third District race on behalf of winner John Salazar, the brother of U.S. Senate candidate Ken Salazar.²¹ In the end, the DCCC aired no TV ads and sent only one piece of mail for Thomas. During the summer, the DCCC assisted the Thomas campaign with fund-raising, and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and other House Democrats campaigned in the district for Thomas.²² The committee even reserved four weeks of air time at various Denver TV stations, so by September the Thomas campaign had every reason to expect a considerable investment from the party. The first public signs of the party committee's change of heart came in late September, when newspaper reports noted that the committee had cut its ad buy in half. Just one week later, the DCCC confirmed that it was no longer certain that they would buy any time at all.²³ Coming as it did in the midst of the televised attacks from the NRCC and the stories linking Thomas to a possible Columbine "cover-up," the news conveyed the impression that the party was cutting its losses and abandoning Thomas.

Interest Groups

Despite expectations that the race in the Seventh District would attract considerable independent spending by organized groups, in the end such spending was minimal. Interest groups ran no TV ads and only one radio ad in the district. The League of Conservation Voters (LCV) named Beauprez to its "Dirty Dozen" list and intended to run an integrated/coordinated campaign with the U.S. Senate and Third District House races, but the LCV pulled out of the race in late September when its door-to-door ground campaign showed that Thomas was in trouble.²⁴ As discussed below, a number of organizations sent mail, but it is unlikely that the combined spending by outside groups amounted to more than \$50,000. Several factors, including the high cost of TV advertising in the Denver market and the perception that the Thomas campaign was having problems raising money and gaining traction, accounted for this development. In explaining the lack of activity by conservative groups, Beauprez's campaign manager Jack Stansbery said, "we knew it would be there if we needed it, but we didn't."²⁵

The Effects of Money: The Ground War

The Beauprez campaign did no direct mail of its own; instead, in a coordinated effort, the Colorado Republican Committee distributed 21 pieces of mail, all of it targeted, mostly to unaffiliated women

²⁰ Smith, "Strings Attached," p. 195.

²¹ Burt Hubbard and Tillie Fong, "\$17 Million for Ads," *Rocky Mountain News*, November 6, 2004, p. 4A.

²² Dayna Hanson, communications director, Dave Thomas for Congress, interview by Robert Duffy, Lakewood, Colo., November 6, 2004.

²³ Charlie Brennan, "Dems Downplay Cutting TV Ads Backing Thomas," *Rocky Mountain News*, October 6, 2004, p. 8A.

²⁴ Andy Schultheiss, southwest regional director, League of Conservation Voters, telephone interview by Robert Duffy, November 9, 2004.

²⁵ Jack Stansbery, campaign manager, Beauprez for Congress, interview by Robert Duffy, Wheat Ridge, Colo., November 11, 2004.

identified by the campaign as persuadable (see table 15-4).²⁶ The mail began to go out in late September, a bit earlier than in other states because of Colorado's two-week period of early voting. Republicans were talking with county clerks throughout the campaign to know when ballots were being mailed, which made it easier for the party to know when to send its mail. The strategy relied on repetition, sending as many as three mail pieces to one person. This was thought necessary to break through the clutter, especially in Jefferson County, a swing county targeted by the presidential and Senate races as well.²⁷

Because the party mail was coordinated with the Beauprez campaign, the themes mirrored those expressed in the candidate's TV ads. Several of the positive mailers addressed the cost of health care, Beauprez's role in winning approval for an expansion of the local VA hospital and increased transportation funding in the district, as well as his efforts to protect Social Security and Medicare. These ads also highlighted Beauprez's "mainstream values," "real world experience," and "pragmatism." The negative mail focused on Thomas's "record of failure" as Jefferson County DA, with one asking, "Who would give a job reference to a convicted murderer?" Multiple pieces noted that despite significant increases in budget and staff, Thomas's office still plea-bargained felons about 75 percent of the time and either plea-bargained or dismissed 73 percent of DUI cases, including more than 2,000 such cases in a single year. Several concluded with the tag line that Thomas' "poor judgment has cost Colorado too much already."

In an interesting development and another sign of the benefits of incumbency, Beauprez's congressional office mailed at least ten glossy, full-color pieces of official mail that for all intents and purposes were virtually indistinguishable from campaign mail (see table 15-4). Each piece of mail was apparently sent to 499 broadly targeted recipients in order to comply with franking rules.²⁸ Several of the pieces, mailed to women, noted the representative's efforts to make families more secure. Others were addressed to seniors and discussed Beauprez's support for the recently enacted Medicare prescription drug benefit.

The NRCC also distributed three pieces of direct mail, all of them attacking Thomas and raising questions about his performance as DA. One featured the claim "Dave Thomas Isn't Ready for Congress" in large print and repeated the charge from a *Rocky Mountain News* editorial that "In Columbine Probe, Thomas was a flop." The other two ads also noted the Columbine controversy and concluded by urging recipients to "Vote No on Dave Thomas."

Incumbency was also vital to the Beauprez campaign's ground war, because it allowed them to work the district early. Beginning in late spring and continuing through early October, the campaign began calling "thousands" of unaffiliated voters who had shown a "propensity" to vote Republican. The callers asked voters questions about issues like taxes to gauge their partisan leanings. For those voters deemed to be leaning Republican, the campaign then targeted them for additional contact.²⁹ According to Jack Stansbery, Beauprez's campaign manager, the campaign made more than 400,000 voter identification and advocacy phone calls over six months and hit every Republican door at least once.³⁰

Republican get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts in the Seventh District followed the party trend of handling these tasks in-house with the "96 Hour Campaign," originally a 2002 initiative aimed at mobilizing core

²⁶ Stansbery interview, November 11, 2004; and David Wardrop, executive director, Colorado Republican Party, interview by Kyle Saunders, Denver, Colo., December 10, 2004.

²⁷ Dan Hazelwood, president, Targeted Creative Communications, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2004.

²⁸ Hanson interview, November 6, 2004.

²⁹ Stansbery interview, November 11, 2004.

³⁰ Ibid.

supporters.³¹ In Colorado, the biggest races took the lead, which meant that the Beauprez campaign did most of the heavy lifting in the district, employing its own volunteers, estimated to number between 700 and 800, approximately twice the number from the prior campaign. The campaign checked with voting officials daily to determine who had voted and called those who had not yet done so. The campaign used a mix of live and recorded GOTV calls, including one from former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. As before, the state party covered most of the cost of this coordinated effort, paying for door hangers, rental vehicles, and food for volunteers.³² In another repeat of 2002, more than one hundred students from Oral Roberts University in Oklahoma were bussed in to help with the GOTV effort.³³

The Thomas campaign did three pieces of mail. One, a glossy brochure noting that Thomas was “in our corner,” discussed his concern with affordable health care, local control of schools, and tax cuts for the middle class. The DCCC sent one piece of mail focusing on the race in the Seventh District. The fold-out color brochure included an absentee ballot request and a discussion of Thomas’ stance on key issues, such as domestic job preservation and quality, affordable health care.

For the Democratic side, “Colorado Victory 2004” (CV04), the federal, coordinated campaign, contributed to the GOTV effort, helping with hard money and voter identification. CV04 conducted door-to-door efforts to identify and target base voters. The money for CV04’s phone banks came from their own fund-raising and from money transferred from the Democratic National Committee (DNC), the DSCC, and some transfers of excess funds from the Salazar for Senate campaign.³⁴ The state party organization also did a significant amount of coordination in the area with its office, staff, and volunteers.³⁵ The Thomas campaign also looked to the presidential campaign for help in this regard and counted on Kerry’s competitiveness in October to make a difference.³⁶

Interest Groups

As table 15-4 indicates, interest group activity on the ground, although greater than on the air, was still quite limited. On the conservative side, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) sent two pieces of mail extolling Beauprez’s support of small business owners, while the National Association of Home Builders did one mailing supporting Beauprez, citing his anti-tax record and reputation for “integrity, independence, and leadership.” The U.S. Chamber of Commerce endorsed Beauprez and assigned a staff member to the district in the last few weeks to drum up support among small business owners.³⁷ The National Rifle Association (NRA) also endorsed Beauprez and held a grassroots workshop for Beauprez and Senate candidate Pete Coors. The workshop trained volunteers on registering voters, writing letters, distributing yard signs, doing literature drops, making phone calls, and conducting GOTV efforts.³⁸

Table 15-4 also shows that several 527 organizations affiliated with the pharmaceutical industry sent mail supporting Beauprez’s backing of the Medicare prescription drug program. The United Seniors Association sent three pieces of mail on the issue. Two were issue ads explaining and endorsing the law,

³¹ Wardrop interview, December 10, 2004.

³² Stansbery interview, November 11, 2004.

³³ Smith, “Strings Attached,” p. 199.

³⁴ Chris Gates, chair, Colorado Democratic Party, telephone interview by Kyle Saunders, November 10, 2004 and Jim Carpenter, campaign manager, Salazar for Senate, interview by Kyle Saunders, Denver, Colo., December 13, 2004.

³⁵ Gates interview, November 10, 2004.

³⁶ Hanson interview, November 6, 2004.

³⁷ Stansbery interview, November 11, 2004.

³⁸ Glen Caroline, director, Institute of Legislative Action, National Rifle Association, interview by Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, Fairfax, Va., November 10, 2004.

the other directed recipients to call Beauprez and “urge him to keep leading the fight for seniors....” The Seniors Coalition did two mailings urging recipients to “thank him for fighting for seniors” and to oppose H.R. 3767, a bill seeking to “dismantle” the new drug benefit. In 2002, the 60 Plus Association sent mail, noting that Beauprez had received an “Honorary Guardian of Seniors Award;” this time, the Seniors Coalition noted that he had earned the groups’ “Senior Guardian Medal of Honor” in 2004.³⁹

Several groups participated in the ground war on the liberal side. The LCV had planned to devote considerable time and money to a ground effort targeting Beauprez for defeat. The LCV’s plan included a door-to-door campaign using both paid and volunteer canvassers to identify and then target persuadable voters. In September, though, the LCV withdrew from the race when its canvassers reported voters’ concerns about Thomas and his possible link to a Columbine cover-up. The LCV then turned its attention, and money, to the Third District House race and to the U.S. Senate race. NARAL Pro-Choice Colorado also had people in the district but was focusing on other races, including the U.S. Senate race. The Colorado Education Association endorsed Thomas in mail to its members, as did the AFL-CIO. Local steelworkers, machinists, and boilermakers unions did fund-raisers for Thomas, and the Human Rights Campaign provided a campaign staffer.⁴⁰

The Effects of Money: The Air War

Despite predictions of outside group activity, none appeared (see table 15-3). In part, this is because TV ad spending in the Denver market topped \$40 million, five times the amount spent in 2000.⁴¹ As a result, advertising rates in the Denver market were very high, driven by the many races seeking to buy time. Although this drove up the rates for both candidates in the Seventh District, it posed greater problems for Thomas, who had considerably less money. In addition to driving up the cost, both campaigns noted after the election that the combined effect of the presidential and Senate races had been to “suck the air out of the room” with respect to media coverage, making it much harder to get attention.⁴²

The Beauprez campaign aired six TV ads at a total cost of more than \$1.6 million (see table 15-3). The first featured Beauprez reintroducing himself to voters and asking for their vote. In the ad, Beauprez said “I’ve stuck to some common sense, mainstream principles. Give families some tax relief so they have a little room to breathe. Create more jobs and opportunities so working people can plan for good careers and to guarantee that no senior has to fear medical bankruptcy again.”

The next four ads focused on Thomas “failed record” as DA and repeated many of the same statistics and charges featured in the state party’s mail, including the charges that Thomas was “reckless and wrong” and that his “poor judgment has cost us too much already.” Interestingly, the campaign’s final ad was a nearly identical repeat of the final ad aired in the 2002 campaign. In “That Smell,” a casually dressed Beauprez addressed the camera and noted the many negative things that were said about him during the campaign and how, as an old dairy farmer, “I still recognize that smell.” Beauprez went on to cite his efforts to protect Social Security, create jobs and economic opportunities for families, and his votes in support of troops and veterans. The ad stunned the Feeley campaign in 2002, coming in the wake of what it perceived to be a campaign of “character assassination” by Beauprez.⁴³ One can only imagine what the Thomas campaign thought of the ad.

³⁹ Smith, “Strings Attached,” p. 200.

⁴⁰ Hanson interview, November 6, 2004.

⁴¹ Chris Walsh, “Political Spots fill TV’s Pots,” *Rocky Mountain News*, November 6, 2004, p. 1C.

⁴² Hanson interview, November 6, 2004; and Stansbery interview, November 11, 2004.

⁴³ Smith, *Strings Attached*, p. 202.

The NRCC aired two TV ads with themes very similar to those run by the Beauprez campaign. The NRCC actually went on the air first, with an ad attacking Thomas for advocating the early release from jail of convicted attorney Michael Dice. The ad cited Thomas saying that Dice was a “good man,” and ended by asking, “Can we really trust that kind of judgment?” The second ad also stressed the “poor judgment” theme, repeating the charge about Dice, but also citing statistics about increases in alcohol-related traffic deaths and Thomas’ excessively high plea bargain rates as DA. According to Dayna Hanson, Thomas’ communications director, the NRCC ads “effectively destroyed any credibility Dave Thomas had.”⁴⁴

For its part, the Thomas campaign was severely handicapped by Beauprez’s fund-raising edge as well as by its failure to raise money early. As a result, the campaign played catch-up for the entire race and could never buy as many spots as it would have liked. Thomas aired five unique ads, with a mix of positive and negative messages. The first ad, which aired in early October, featured Thomas sitting on the porch of a home asking, “Why would anyone in their right mind want to run” for Congress, given negative campaigning, special interests, and shallow promises? At the end of the ad Thomas says, “I don’t have all the answers, but I know what work needs to be done.” The next two ads criticized Beauprez for voting to slash military health care and veteran disability benefits. The final two ads sought to rebut the charges that Thomas had failed as DA and was soft on crime, with one featuring a testimonial from the brother of a law enforcement officer killed in the line of duty. In commenting on the combined onslaught of the Beauprez and NRCC TV ads, Thomas claimed “they were difficult to overcome. They spent millions on ads against me.”⁴⁵

Table 15-3 shows that radio advertising in the Seventh District was minimal. Neither the candidates nor the parties aired any radio ads at all. The LCV did one ad early in the race, criticizing Beauprez for supporting the president’s “big energy” bill, which shielded manufacturers of MTBE, a suspected carcinogen, from lawsuits. Jared Polis, a wealthy entrepreneur who helped fund a 527 organization that launched a series of TV ads attacking Fourth District Representative Marilyn Musgrave, paid for an ad titled, “Two Birds of a Feather,” which linked Beauprez to Musgrave and her extreme positions.

Conclusion

Despite expectations of another nail-biter, Bob Beauprez won reelection easily. The outcome is further testimony to the power of incumbency. Beauprez was able to overcome a partisan disadvantage in voter registration and win by a much larger margin than expected. Like most incumbents, Beauprez enjoyed a big fund-raising advantage, nearly tripling the receipts of his challenger. Despite a very conservative voting record, Beauprez was able to use his money to drive home a message of moderation while painting his opponent as unsuitable for office. He also had two years to use the prerogatives of his office to do constituency service, bring money into the district, and establish name recognition.

⁴⁴ Hanson interview, November 6, 2004.

⁴⁵ Ann Schrader, “GOP’S Beauprez Tops Thomas for Second Term after Gritty Race,” *Denver Post*, November 3, 2004, p. A9.

Table 15-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Colorado 7th Congressional District Race, 2003-04

	David Thomas (D)	Bob Beauprez (R)
From PACs	\$391,593	\$1,225,266
From individuals	\$752,377	\$1,537,707
From party	\$7,500	\$9,622
From candidate	\$2,180	\$0
Other contributions	\$1,864	\$185,661
Total receipts	\$1,155,514	\$2,958,256
Total expenditures	\$1,120,636	\$2,898,630
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$53,469	\$82,549

Source: Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 22, 2004]).

Table 15-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, Colorado 7th Congressional District Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DCCC	CO 7	Bob Beauprez	\$61,850
	CO 7	David Thomas	\$61,850	...	\$61,850	
NRCC	CO 7	Bob Beauprez	\$48,004	...	\$48,004	\$535,864
	CO 7	David Thomas	...	\$487,860	\$487,860	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ [January 5, 2005]).

Table 15-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Colorado 7th Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Dave Thomas for Congress	\$379,420	...	\$379,420	\$479,158
<i>Interest groups</i>				
American Federation of Government Employees	...	\$1,265	\$1,265	...
Communication Workers of America	\$4,337
Republican allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Beauprez for Congress	\$1,657,951	...	\$1,693,951	\$1,539,395
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRCC	\$1,255,816	...	\$1,255,816	\$465,028
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Small Business Survival Committee	...	\$36,000	\$36,000	...
Republican Leadership Council	...	\$7,250	\$7,250	...
United Seniors Association	\$4,570	...	\$4,570	\$534,457
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
JustGoVote.org	\$32,275	\$9,350	\$41,625	...
Hispanics Together	...	\$41,440	\$41,440	...
Campaign Money Watch	\$3,320	\$20,000	\$23,320	...
Americans for Better Government, LLC	...	\$17,265	\$17,265	...
AARP	\$130,350

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senatorial, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 15-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 15-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Colorado 7th Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Person	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Dave Thomas for Congress	...	3	...	2	...	5	10
<i>Political parties</i>							
Colorado Democratic Party	...	2	2
Adams County Democratic Party	...	1	1
DCCC	...	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>							
NARAL Pro-Choice Colorado	...	3	3
League of Conservation Voters	...	1	1	...	2
Colorado Education Association	...	1	1
Jared Polis Foundation	1	...	1
Republican allies^c							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Beauprez for Congress	8	3	...	6	17
Congressman Bob Beauprez (taxpayer expense)	...	10	10
<i>Political parties</i>							
Colorado Republican Committee ^d	...	21	21
NRCC	...	3	2	5
<i>Interest groups</i>							
United Seniors Association	...	3	1	4
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	2	1	3
National Federation of Independent Business	...	2	2
The Seniors Coalition	...	2	2
American Medical Association ^e	...	1	1
National Association of Home Builders	...	1	1
Nonpartisan							
<i>Interest groups</i>							
Americans for Better Government, LLC	...	1	...	1	2
JustGoVote.org	...	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 15-3.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, League of Conservation Voters Education Fund data have been included in the League of Conservation Voters totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^d Stansbery interview, November 11, 2004; and David Wardrop, executive director, Colorado Republican Party, interview by Kyle Saunders, Denver, Colo., December 10, 2004.

^e Michael Cys, Director of the AMA Division of Political Action, American Medical Association, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2004.

**A Rare Democratic Gain:
The Georgia Twelfth Congressional District Race**

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In 2004, Democrats collected on what had been billed as a sure thing two years earlier. Had a Republican not exploited the opportunity furnished by a deeply-flawed Democratic nominee in 2002, Georgia's Twelfth District would have attracted little interest in 2004. This was the most Democratic district in the nation represented by a Republican,¹ and that spurred heavy involvement by the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and, to a lesser extent, the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC). By attacking the incumbent's support of a national sales tax and opposition to importation of prescription drugs from Canada, the attractive, well-funded challenger defeated the incumbent who joined Phil Crane (R – IL) as the only GOP members of the House defeated in 2004.

To understand why Georgia's Twelfth District was among the most competitive in the nation requires a bit of history. This district came into being in 2002 when the state's House delegation grew from eleven to thirteen. The district owes its bacon-strip shape to Democrats' effort to transform the delegation's partisan makeup. In 2001 Governor Roy Barnes led an effort to fashion a map that would restore Democrats to a majority in the delegation. The result was a 40 percent black district. The average share of votes for Democratic candidates running statewide in 1998 was just over 61 percent. Al Gore, who lost Georgia by 300,000 votes, won 54 percent of the vote total in the Twelfth District.²

In the 2002 general election, Max Burns, a Screven County farmer who also taught at Georgia Southern University faced Champ Walker, son of the powerful majority leader of the state senate. Walker's campaign began to unravel shortly after he won the nomination as e-mails distributed his mug shot. Although never convicted, Walker had five arrests for offenses such as hit and run and shoplifting. Walker did not help his cause by performing poorly at candidate forums. He displayed so little substantive knowledge that even yellow-dog Democrats had to swallow hard before voting for him.

In the closing days of the 2002 campaign, alarmed that this seat was slipping from its grasp, the DCCC dispatched election professionals to the district and spent \$1,000,000 in an effort to bolster the flailing Walker.³ However, the DCCC consultants lacked an awareness of the local context. For example, they scheduled Representative Martin Frost (TX) to be in Athens on the weekend of the Georgia-Florida football game. This annual event at the Gator Bowl in Jacksonville, Florida, known as the "World's Largest Outdoor Cocktail Party," empties students and many other residents from Athens.

All of the efforts of the DCCC were to no avail. Burns managed to carry even liberal Athens, a rarity for a Republican, on his way to a 55 percent victory. He achieved this even though he was outspent by \$200,000.

Democrats saw Georgia's Twelfth District as "the one that got away." Even though Burns got off to a good start when selected to be the president of the Republican freshman class of the 108th Congress, for Democrats, he was a marked man.

¹ Mike Mikus, southern regional director, DCCC, telephone interview by Charles Bullock, December 22, 2004.

² Michael Barone with Richard E. Cohen, *The Almanac of American Politics, 2004*. (Washington, D.C.: National Journal, 2003), p. 489.

³ Ashley Jones, fund-raiser, Friends of John Barrow, interview by Charles Bullock, Athens, Ga., September 21, 2004.

2004 General Election Outcome

John Barrow, whose father served for decades as a trial court judge in Athens and whose mother was a Democratic Party activist, won 51.5 percent of the vote to defeat three other candidates to win the Democratic nomination. Barrow had previously run unsuccessfully for the state house before serving on the Athens-Clarke County Commission for fourteen years. A Harvard-trained attorney, Barrow was among the most outspoken members of the commission. His moderate-to-liberal positions played well with his academic constituents but frustrated many business leaders who saw him as hostile to entrepreneurs and developers.

Since no public polling was done for this contest, observers had little guidance other than the expectation that the margin would be narrow. Barrow did no polling during the last month of the campaign. That last poll provided troubling results both in terms of the horse race (Barrow was trailing) and Barrow's name recognition.⁴ Campaign manager Roman Levitz opted to spend the money that would be consumed by additional polls to advertise his candidate instead.⁵ A possible downside to more polls was that if they showed Barrow trailing it might depress the staff, Levitz pointed out.⁶

Burns polled weekly during the last month and at four earlier times. According to his campaign manager, Tim Baker, Burns' best showing came in May when he received 53 percent support among voters.⁷ In most of his polls, Burns was in the mid- to upper 40s with Barrow in the low 40s. Two weeks before the election, the vote shares for the two candidates flipped, and in the last survey, Burns and Barrow tied in the low 40s. Although Burns had poll numbers, these were kept even from high-ranking staff. "We just assumed the worst, and that made us work harder," explained Kelley Binion who headed up the Athens operation.⁸

The hard work needed for Burns to retain this solidly Democratic district was compounded by a couple of early missteps. First, the campaign manager left unexpectedly. Then, in an Al Gore moment, a Burns' mailing claimed credit for creating the U.S. Department of Homeland Security—an event that occurred before he got to Congress.⁹

Early miscues probably had little impact on the outcome, and when the final votes were counted, Barrow had scored one of only two victories against an incumbent Republican nationwide. Barrow's 51.8 percent victory rested heavily on the three urban counties. He won the most populous county, Chatham (Savannah), by almost 10,000 votes.¹⁰ His margin in Richmond (Augusta) County was 13,000 votes. Clarke (Athens) County gave its hometown candidate a 6,000-vote advantage over the Republican.

Burns chipped away at the Barrow's 29,000-vote advantage by winning Bulloch County, where he taught at Georgia Southern University, by 6,500 votes. In the other county with substantial population, the Savannah suburb of Effingham County, he scored an 8,500-vote victory. While these successes wiped out

⁴ Mikus interview, December 22, 2004; Charles Renwick, campaign staff, Friends of John Barrow, interview by Charles Bullock, Athens, Ga., November 18, 2004.

⁵ Roman Levitz, campaign manager, Friends of John Barrow, telephone interview by Charles Bullock, December 3, 2004.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Tim Baker, campaign manager, Burns for Congress, telephone interview by Charles Bullock, November 30, 2004.

⁸ Kelley Binion, field representative, Burns for Congress, interview by Charles Bullock, Athens, Ga., November 22, 2004.

⁹ "Burns' Rival Calls Claim 'Dishonest,'" *Athens Banner Herald*, September 4, 2004, p. A6.

¹⁰ All election results, unless otherwise noted, come from the Georgia Secretary of State and can be found at (www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/ [January 17, 2005]).

half of his deficit, the remaining counties provided insufficient votes even though Burns won in six, lost two narrowly, and split the vote in Warren County.

As a result of facing a far more competent opponent than in 2002, Burns lost support in every county. He did best at retaining support in Effingham where he took 77 percent of the 2004 vote, 2.6 points below his earlier performance. In Richmond and Clarke, large urban counties, the incumbent's vote share in 2004 dropped by more than 10 percent. In Chatham, his vote share fell by 4.6 points.

When asked to account for the outcome, representatives of both candidates cited the makeup of the district, which, with a 40 percent black population, tilted heavily toward the Democrats. Burns' staffers also pointed to the unexpectedly large turnout. "If you had told me that we could get 105,000 votes and not win, I wouldn't have believed you," said Tim Baker, Burns' manager.¹¹ In Augusta, efforts by Champ Walker's father to regain a Senate seat he had lost two years earlier pumped up black participation.

Expecting turnout to be around 190,000, Burns pursued two objectives: to win a share of the black vote while dominating the white vote by raising doubts about Barrow. In a 40 percent black district, a Republican must attract an extraordinary share of the white vote if the black vote goes massively to the Democrat, as it typically does.¹² Hoping to reduce the share of the white vote he would need, Burns targeted blacks with several mail pieces. He had the enthusiastic support of a leading black clergyman in both Athens and Savannah and a black school board member in Athens. He attended black churches each Sunday and initially seemed to be making headway with this component of the electorate.¹³ Bennie Mitchell, a black Savannah minister, joined the election eve fly-around. Burns also hired Robert Finch, one of the blacks who sought the Democratic nomination in 2002, to help attract black support.

Perhaps because the black vote is so consistently Democratic, Barrow was slow to reach out to this community. He did not hire a black campaign staffer until after the primary. His early efforts to connect with black churchgoers were neither extensive nor effective. Because Burns was so active in visiting black churches—which is uncommon among Republican candidates—and Barrow was not initially, some black voters assumed that Burns was the Democratic nominee, according to a confidential source. Only after a black staffer from Nancy Pelosi's office joined the effort did Barrow's reception in the black community improve.

Despite Burns' efforts to cut into the black vote, the two campaign managers agree that while Burns succeeded in recruiting some black leaders, the effort translated into few black votes. Preliminary estimates confirm the assessments of the campaign professionals, since it appears that Burns got less than a tenth of the black vote in Chatham and barely over ten percent in Clarke County.¹⁴

¹¹ Baker interview, November 30, 2004.

¹² Democratic nominees in the South can count on at least 80 percent of the black vote and often exceed 90 percent. See Charles S. Bullock, III, and Richard E. Dunn, "The Demise of Racial Districting and the Future of Black Representation," *Emory Law Review* vol. 48 (Fall 1999), pp. 1209–1253. Burns' efforts to attract black support is reminiscent of the unsuccessful attempt of Hayes Dent recounted in James M. Glaser, *Race, Campaign Politics and Realignment in the South*, (Yale University Press, 1996).

¹³ Lauren W. Whittington, "Embattled Burns' Plea: Vote for Max," *Roll Call*, October 6, 2004, pp. 1, 20.

¹⁴ Three techniques are widely used to estimate participation and candidate preferences by racial or ethnic groups from aggregate data for units like precincts or counties. One of these, homogeneous precinct analysis, reports the share of the vote for candidates in precincts that are homogeneously one race with 90 percent black (or Anglo or Hispanic) used as the threshold for a one-race precinct. A second technique regresses vote share on the racial makeup of the precincts to estimate support in precincts that would be wholly composed of voters of one race. The newest approach, Gary King's ecological inference approach is detailed in Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem* (Princeton University Press, 1997). Often, as in the counties examined here, the results of the approaches are similar.

Burns knew from the outset that he faced an uphill struggle to retain his seat. He aggressively sought to expand his base of support by traveling extensively in the district and opening offices in Savannah, Statesboro, and Athens. Since the district is solidly Democratic, Burns downplayed his partisanship and did not campaign with other Republicans such as the Senate nominee Johnny Isakson.¹⁵ Barrow, like many challengers, needed to familiarize voters with his name. Both candidates knew that to win they must aggressively pursue funds with which to boost their candidacies while disparaging their opponents through TV ads, radio ads, and mail pieces.

Funding

Many challengers never raise the funds required to achieve the minimal name recognition that is needed to become credible. Barrow had read articles in *Campaigns and Elections* that emphasized the vital role of adequate funds. His second hire was fund-raiser Ashley Jones, who had previously worked on the 2002 congressional campaign of Buddy Darden. As the funding efforts took off, Jones added an assistant so that two of five full-time staff positions were devoted to raising money.

As table 16-1 shows, both candidates were well funded. Barrow raised \$1.87 million, which compared favorably with Burns' treasury of \$2.77 million. Incumbency helped Burns raise nearly three times as much from PACs as Barrow collected. As is typical, the incumbent had a larger war chest, but with over \$1.75 million, Barrow was fully competitive.

Individual contributions provided more than two-thirds of Barrow's money. His fund-raiser was especially pleased that Barrow raised more money from individuals than did the incumbent.¹⁶ Barrow relied heavily on his professional ties to members of the bar. Many of Barrow's Harvard classmates, now well-paid attorneys, stepped forward to help their southern colleague score a take away for the Democrats. Some sponsored events to which they invited their friends in distant parts of the country. The staff had culled Harvard yearbooks to identify prospects, then ran the names through the Center for Responsive Politics web site (www.opensecrets.com) to see which alumni had histories of supporting Democratic candidates and to get an idea as to how much would be reasonable to request.¹⁷ Barrow called every trial lawyer in Georgia while a former president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America spent two days calling trial lawyers from other states. Ashley Jones, Barrow's fund-raiser, estimated that trial lawyers accounted for as much as a third of all money raised by Barrow.¹⁸

Neither candidate had to dip deeply into his own purse to fund the campaign. Burns made a nominal contribution of \$4,200 while the challenger put up almost \$80,000 of his own money.

While the two candidates raised substantial funds, they received some help from their parties. Especially active was the DCCC, which reportedly allocated \$750,000 for a media buy in the district.¹⁹

Members of the candidates' staffs assessed the impact of McCain-Feingold. Ashley Jones was not happy. "It made us work twice as hard for half the money. If you're doing your job perfectly, you may get \$500,000 from PACs as a challenger. We got about \$400,000, maybe a little bit over. But for every

¹⁵ Marty Klein, communications director, Georgia State Republican Party, telephone interview by Charles Bullock, November 15, 2004.

¹⁶ Ashley Jones, fund-raiser, Friends of John Barrow, interview by Charles Bullock, Athens, Ga., November 23, 2004.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Peter Savodnik, "DCCC Aims \$750K Ad Buy at Burns," *The Hill*, September 29, 2004, pp. 1, 6.

Democratic PAC, there are twenty-two Republican PACs.”²⁰ Jones contrasted the effort needed by the Barrow campaign with the 2002 Walker campaign, which saw \$1,000,000 in soft-money-funded campaigning from the DCCC. A staffer at Georgia’s GOP headquarters echoed Jones’ judgment of McCain-Feingold. “It was a pain in the butt,” said Justin Tomczak. “I would never vote for John McCain; neither would any of the party people here.”²¹ He believed that some county party chairs hesitated to help candidates for fear they might run afoul of the new legislation.

Direct Mail

As reported in table 16-4, sixty-five mail pieces were collected, with Republicans being the source of more items than Democrats. Approximately 71 percent of the mail came from a candidate or his party. Barrow sent out six items while Burns deluged the district with ten. The DCCC distributed nine items while the NRCC sent none. Filling in the gap left by the RNCC, the Georgia Republican Party reported mailing out twenty-four items.²² Georgia’s Democratic Party created only two items. Although different units of the two parties got involved with distributing mail, in each case, the party accounted for more pieces than did the candidate.

All of Burns’ mail pieces were positive and outlined his positions on education, health care, abortion, and traditional marriage. Attacks on Barrow came from the state Republican Party and criticized him for tardiness at commission meetings, hostility toward business, and support of an ordinance directed at limiting student access to housing in single-family areas. Several items identified Barrow as a “liberal trial lawyer.” While nine of the Republican Party pieces attacked Barrow, others praised Burns for securing federal support to bolster the district’s economy, fighting terrorism and taking pro-life and pro-traditional marriage stands. The GOP targeted its mail with distribution ranging between 7,000 and 70,000, although most were between 20,000 and 50,000.²³ Some mail went to all households that had been identified as likely Burns supporters while others were targeted to voters in Savannah, Augusta, Athens, or rural communities. Others were sent to subgroups like rural women, gun owners, or pro-life voters. Three or four pieces were mailed only to black households—a group easily targeted since Georgia registration forms include information on the voter’s race.

Burns campaign manager, working with mail consultant Jay Williams, designed the mailings. The state party absorbed the cost of postage after volunteers stamped each piece as a nonprofit postage item. This constituted a substantial saving for the Burns campaign, which had to pay at the higher pre-sorted rate. The candidate and the party combined sent a million pieces of mail.²⁴

Barrow sent an equal number of positive and negative mail pieces but largely restricted the distribution to the Athens area which lacks its own TV outlets. The Democrats felt that TV ads in Augusta and Savannah largely obviated the need for mailers in these markets.²⁵ The challenger emphasized his desire to hold down health care costs, help working families by closing tax loopholes, and reduce classroom overcrowding. He attacked Burns for blocking the importation of prescription drugs, failing to force corporate polluters to clean up their messes, and supporting a national sales tax. Charges that the

²⁰ Ashley interview, November 23, 2004.

²¹ Justin Tomczak, Georgia grassroots and 72 Hour director, Georgia Republican Party, telephone interview by Charles Bullock, November 30, 2004.

²² *Ibid.* Of the twenty-four items sent by the state GOP, the study’s reconnaissance network retrieved copies of sixteen.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Baker interview, November 30, 2004.

²⁵ Levitz interview, December 2, 2004.

incumbent's ties to big business made him soft on polluters received a boost when the National League of Conservation Voters (LCV) placed Burns on their "Dirty Dozen" list.²⁶

The Georgia Democratic Party did an item identical to the Barrow mail piece criticizing four Burns roll call votes; the only difference was in the line indicating who paid for the mailing. The other mailing from the state party noted that the national sales tax would eliminate the home mortgage deduction while taxing all sales at 23 percent.

Items distributed by the DCCC had as a theme "Burnt by Burns" and in various ways urged recipients to vote for Barrow in order to avoid being burnt again. Pieces attacked the incumbent's record on education, health care costs, opposition to prescription drug importation from Canada, opposition to veterans' benefits, and insufficient support of the troops in Iraq. One oversized postcard criticized the Republican for supporting John Linder's national sales tax proposal, which the DCCC christened as the "Max Tax." This mailing pegged the tax at 30 percent and showed how much it would add to the price of a home, truck, and a tank of gas. The DCCC also created a web site where a visitor could enter the cost of an item and see how much the Max Tax would add.

Groups that emphasize issues of concern to the elderly and those active in the abortion debate sent mail promoting the candidate who agreed with their positions. The United Seniors Association and the Seniors Coalition each did two pieces supportive of Burns. The AARP sent out a voters' guide that showed Barrow agreeing with the organization on nine items; Burns apparently did not return the AARP questionnaire. A Planned Parenthood mail piece endorsed several Democrats including Barrow. National Right to Life sent out a piece endorsing President Bush and Max Burns.

Burns also fared well in the Christian Coalition voter guide, taking positions likely to be favored by Coalition supporters while Barrow did not return the questionnaire. Although not distributed through the mail, the voter guide is widely available at conservative churches and is posted on the Internet.²⁷

Radio and TV Ads

As indicated by advertising expenditures in table 16-3, both candidates, the DCCC, and NRCC advertised heavily on radio and TV. Advertising in Augusta and Savannah relied primarily on TV. In Athens, which gets its TV from Atlanta, radio was the medium of choice.

Burns went up on TV right after Labor Day with positive ads designed to reintroduce himself to the district. In explaining why reintroduction of an incumbent was needed, Burns' campaign manager acknowledged that his boss's victory owed much to the 2002 Democratic nominee's baggage.²⁸ After a couple of weeks of positive ads, Burns went on the attack, reportedly becoming the first incumbent to go negative.²⁹ The decision to run attack ads followed Burns' polling that showed that half the electorate knew nothing about Barrow. Burns sought to define Barrow as an anti-business, liberal trial lawyer before the Democrat could paint a more positive picture of himself. "We had to make the Democrat unacceptable

²⁶ Larry Peterson, "Burns Makes 'Dirty Dozen,'" *Savannah Morning News*, September 15, 2004, (savannahnow.com/stories/091504/2444250.shtml [January 17, 2005]).

²⁷ Christian Coalition of Georgia's 2004 Voter Guide is available at (www.gachristiancoalition.org/docs/2004_Voter_Guide-12thDistrict.pdf. [January 17, 2005]).

²⁸ Baker interview, November 30, 2004.

²⁹ Lauren W. Whittington, "Burns Goes on the Attack," *Roll Call*, September 15, 2004, pp. 1, 16.

again like in 2002,” Burns’ campaign manager Baker explained.³⁰ The critical ad prompted Barrow to launch his own TV campaign earlier than he had wanted to.³¹

Burns turned to the gay-marriage issue. Georgia was one of the states that ratified an anti-gay marriage amendment to the state constitution on November 2, an issue that likely mobilizes conservative Christians. Burns’ had TV ads and mail pieces showing Barrow addressing a gay pride rally in Savannah. Echoing a charge that President Bush directed at John Kerry, Burns accused Barrow of flip-flopping on the gay marriage amendment. In a debate during the primary, Barrow opposed both proposed state and federal amendments to ban gay marriage. With the nomination in hand, Barrow announced his support of the U.S. Senate proposal while taking no position on the amendment before Georgia voters. This change came after his consultant warned that appearing to support gay marriage could result in defeat.³² Thereafter, Barrow stressed that he defined marriage as between a man and a woman.³³ While Barrow claimed consistency, the lesbian legislator who led opposition to the Georgia amendment characterized Barrow as guilty of “bait and switch.”³⁴ A Burns’ radio ad quoted an opponent of the Georgia amendment as saying, “I’d rather be stabbed in the belly by an honest enemy than in the back by a deceitful friend.” The NRCC aired an ad criticizing Barrow for calling discrimination against homosexuals the “civil rights issue of our time,” a statement made when trying to mollify angry Young Democrats.³⁵ This attack got Barrow off message for six weeks according to the DCCC southern director.³⁶

The candidates launched radio ads in mid-October. Burns stressed his background as a Fulbright Professor to indicate his support for education. He attacked Barrow as anti-business and often linked Barrow’s profession to rising health care costs pointing to “frivolous lawsuits” that drove Athens’ largest obstetrics practice to stop delivering babies.

Barrow and the DCCC radio and TV ads stressed two charges that they found to be particularly effective. One of these criticized the incumbent for opposing the importation of Canadian prescription drugs. The other hammered away at how the Max Tax would increase the cost of all items purchased. In the Twelfth District, as elsewhere, the national sales tax was one of the most effective issues for Democrats in 2004. Mike Mikus, Southern Regional Coordinator for the DCCC, notes that after running ads attacking Republicans who supported the national sales tax, Democratic candidate’s standing in the polls always increased.³⁷ Burns’ manager acknowledged the effectiveness of the Max Tax ads which prompted some supporters to call seeking reassurance, thereby putting the campaign on the defensive and off its game plan which called for attacking Barrow’s gay marriage stand.³⁸

Barrow used Burns’ support for the flat tax to portray the incumbent as a great favorite of big business, which would pay no income taxes. This was also an effort to refute the Burns’ ad criticizing Barrow for having received an “F” on a report card created by the Athens Chamber of Commerce. The theme that Burns represented the interests of big business to the detriment of the average voter also appeared in ads

³⁰ Baker interview, November 30, 2004.

³¹ Jones interview, November 23, 2004.

³² Renwick interview, November 18, 2004.

³³ Carlos Campos, “12th District Scene of Hard-Core Battle,” *Atlanta Journal Constitution*, October 29, 2004, pp. D1, D7.

³⁴ Joanna Soto Carabello, “Is Barrow’s ‘Non-stance’ a Sign of Things to Come?” *Athens Banner-Herald*, September 19, 2004, p. A10.

³⁵ Mike Lynch, president, University of Georgia Young Democrats, interview by Charles Bullock, Athens, Ga., December 7, 2004.

³⁶ Mikus interview, December 23, 2004.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Baker interview, November 30, 2004.

criticizing the incumbent's support of the Bush Medicare drug law that, according to Barrow, would drive up drug costs and force the elderly into HMOs.

Claiming that he had never supported any tax increase, Burns rejoined bitterly that there was no such thing as a Max Tax.³⁹ In a response radio ad he called himself "Low Tax Max." With Burns running out of money, his colleague Charlie Norwood jumped in and ran radio ads explaining that the national sales tax would eliminate the IRS and allow workers to keep everything they earned since federal withholding would be eliminated.

Burns asked stations to pull what he said was a misleading DCCC ad that asserted that a national sales tax would result in higher taxes for 80 percent of Georgians. Several stations complied with the incumbent's request, but an Augusta station refused. Supporters of the two candidates staged a noisy protest that the station filmed and showed on its newscast.

While Norwood paid for an ad urging voters (some of whom he had once represented) to support Burns, Barrow ran ads in which leading Georgia Democrats gave endorsements. This is significant in light of Zell Miller's best-selling critique that noted that "not a single national [Democratic Party] leader could come to the South to campaign without doing more harm than good."⁴⁰ While Barrow discouraged Nancy Pelosi from campaigning for him, he did broadcast endorsements from two fellow Georgians who many Democrats would shun because of their connections with the left. Civil rights icon Representative John Lewis attested to Barrow's support for school desegregation. Max Cleland, who lost his Senate reelection in 2002 after being painted as being out of touch with Georgia values, commended Barrow for supporting public education, fair trade, and affordable health care. Obviously Barrow judged that in a 40 percent black district a Democrat could adopt stands that would be fatal statewide.

Get-Out-The-Vote

Both candidates and their parties used phone calls in their get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts to encourage likely supporters who had been previously identified to turn out. Popular Representatives Norwood and Jack Kingston who split Augusta and Savannah, respectively, with Burns recorded telephone messages designed to get voters in the parts of the Twelfth District adjacent to their districts to turn out for the imperiled freshman.⁴¹ Kelley Binion, who headed up the Burns effort in the Athens area, questioned the utility of the phone calls because of their number.⁴² She received calls from angry voters who vowed to vote for the candidate from whom they got the fewest calls. So many automated calls had been made that even calls made by live volunteers seemed to have little effect.

Republicans seem to have won the ground war of going door-to-door.⁴³ This, however, was limited almost exclusively to Burns and his supporters since the NRCC did not send in help. Moreover, the

³⁹ Allison Floyd, "Democrats See Chance in 12th District Contest," *Athens Banner Herald*, October 31, 2004, pp. A1, A8.

⁴⁰ Zell Miller, *A National Party No More* (Atlanta: Stroud and Hall, 2004), p. 10.

⁴¹ Rodney Whitlock, legislative assistant, Office of U.S. Representative Charles Norwood, telephone interview by Charles Bullock, November 30, 2004; Righton Johnson, legislative assistant, Office of U.S. Representative Jack Kingston, telephone interview by Charles Bullock, November 15, 2004. Democrats sought to make the Twelfth District safe for their party and therefore split the Augusta and Savannah areas with Republican precincts in the former being retained by Norwood while Republican areas in the latter remained in Kingston's district.

⁴² Binion interview, November 22, 2004.

⁴³ Barrow manager Roman Levitz places greater emphasis on TV than on grassroots efforts like going door-to-door. Moreover because Georgia Democrats have generally not had to do grassroots to win, it may take years for the party to develop those techniques. Mikus interview, December 22, 2004.

Burns' effort was not allied with the GOP 72 Hour Task Force campaign in Georgia.⁴⁴ Helping Burns were home-schooled youngsters from around the country who covered designated neighborhoods, and in Athens the Representative did some door-to-door solicitation. During the last weekend, Burns' volunteers, augmented by Georgia congressional staffers on leave, walked every street that had been identified as promising for the GOP. An effort was made to contact every previously identified undecided voter twice and to provide information on issues of concern to the voter.

Members of Congress who had secure seats sent staffers who took time off from their government jobs to campaign in the Twelfth District. Both Nancy Pelosi and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer took an interest in Barrow's effort, and Pelosi sent a black staffer who played a critical role in mobilizing the black vote. While congressional staffers provided a spark in the Barrow office, some GOP congressional staffers complained that the Burns campaign did not seem to know how to utilize them. Perhaps the reason for this perception is found in assessments made by Burns' staff that they had all the volunteers they could use.⁴⁵

As voters trekked to the polls, sign wavers hired by the DCCC fanned out in urban areas. The busloads of people hired by the DCCC outnumbered the volunteers that Burns mustered although the representative joined those along the street in Savannah urging turnout. The NRCC, unlike its Democratic counterpart, sent no people into the district to help with Election-Day efforts.

Conclusion

Democrats designed Georgia's Twelfth Congressional District to limit a Republican to 42 percent of the vote. The advantages associated with incumbency have been estimated to be worth six to eight percentage points. In losing to John Barrow, Max Burns polled 48 percent, which suggests that as a one-term member of Congress, he reaped an incumbency dividend of about six points. Burns led the GOP ticket in the Twelfth District, running ahead of George Bush and the GOP Senate nominee Johnny Isakson.⁴⁶

To defeat the incumbent, Democrats needed a nominee who could raise plenty of money and present a good image. They had such a candidate in Barrow, whose talented fund-raiser exploited the candidate's connections to get the money needed to disseminate a message. The messenger, with his Harvard education and experience as a county commissioner, effectively articulated reasons why he should be elected by charging that Burns had not represented the concerns of the Twelfth District.

In a district so heavily weighted toward Democrats, Burns sought to make Barrow as unpalatable to the electorate as his 2002 opponent had been. But lightning rarely strikes the same spot twice and despite efforts to raise questions about Barrow's support for business and opposition to gay marriage, Burns failed to drive enough Democrats away from their party's nominee. Burns attracted landslide support among whites but, like most other Republicans, could not pry loose enough minority voters.

Contributing to Burns' uphill struggle were the differences in commitments made by the congressional arms of the two parties. Georgia's Twelfth District was the Democrats' best hope for a pick up and they invested more heavily in the effort than did the GOP. The DCCC's Mike Mikus explained, "This is one we had to win. If we lost this one, there was no way we would gain seats in the House. . . The DCCC

⁴⁴ Amelia Brown, regional coordinator, 72 Hour Task Force, telephone interview by Charles Bullock, November 8, 2004.

⁴⁵ Baker interview, November 30, 2004; Binion interview, November 22, 2004.

⁴⁶ Data on the presidential and Senate races provided by Dan O'Connor, statistician with the Republican Party of Georgia.

threw the kitchen sink at this race.”⁴⁷ As table 16-3 shows, the DCCC spent far more for TV than did the NRCC and, as reported in table 16-4, the DCCC filled voters’ mailboxes while the NRCC did not send a single piece. The DCCC had street corners crowded with supporters waving signs on Election Day; the NRCC sent no one. At a meeting in Washington, D.C. two months before the election, an NRCC leader indicated that because of its partisan orientation, Georgia’s Twelfth District was not one of their top priorities.⁴⁸ The NRCC wrote off the president of the GOP Freshman Class as a fluke.

Having won the seat, Barrow’s vulnerabilities come from two directions. Since most Democratic primary voters in this district are blacks, he could be susceptible to a black challenger. Or, if the Republicans who control Georgia’s legislature and governorship for the first time in 130 years decide to redraw districts, as Texas did in 2003, Barrow could find himself not living in the district and the Twelfth District far less hospitable to his party.

⁴⁷ Mikus interview, December 22, 2004.

⁴⁸ Johnson interview, November 15, 2004.

Table 16-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Georgia 12th Congressional District Race, 2003-04

	John Barrow (D)	Max Burns (R)
From PACs	\$481,517	\$1,331,297
From individuals	\$1,288,526	\$1,220,479
From party	\$15,250	\$20,442
From candidate	\$79,264	\$4,200
Other contributions	\$2,436	\$197,048
Total receipts	\$1,866,993	\$2,773,466
Total expenditures	\$1,846,043	\$2,767,953
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$22,996	\$15,211

Source: Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 5, 2004]).

Table 16-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, Georgia 12th Congressional District Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DCCC	GA 12	John Barrow	\$932,955	...	\$932,955	\$1,143,289
	GA 12	Max Burns	...	\$210,334	\$210,334	
NRCC	GA 12	John Barrow	...	\$602,892	\$602,892	\$680,347
	GA 12	Max Burns	\$77,455	...	\$77,455	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ [January 5, 2005]).

Table 16-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures, Georgia 12th Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Friends of John Barrow	\$539,379	\$58,336	\$597,714	\$479,854
<i>Political parties</i>				
DCCC	\$526,330	...	\$526,330	\$272,046
Georgia Democratic Party	\$6,220
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Fair Tax	...	\$2,251	\$2,251	...
Communication Workers of America	\$5,819
Stronger America Now	\$1,044
Republican allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Burns for Congress	\$559,006	\$118,684	\$677,690	\$387,810
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRCC	\$285,453	...	\$285,453	\$200,179
Chatham County Republican Party	...	\$4,305	\$4,305	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
NRA Political Victory Fund	...	\$2,996	\$2,996	...
National Right to Life	...	\$788	\$788	\$221,742
United Seniors Association	\$637,927
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$193,101
Alliance for Quality Nursing Home Care	\$19,214
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
AARP	\$112,957

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senatorial, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 16-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 16-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Georgia 12th Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	Mail	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^b						
<i>Candidates</i>						
Friends of John Barrow	6	...	2	7	20	35
<i>Political parties</i>						
DCCC	9	1	4	14
DNC	3	3
Democratic Party of Georgia	2	2
<i>Interest groups</i>						
AARP	1	1
New House Tax	1	1
Planned Parenthood Action Fund	1	1
Voices for Working Families ^c	1
Republican allies^b						
<i>Candidates</i>						
Burns for Congress	10	...	7	12	10	39
<i>Political parties</i>						
Georgia Republican Party ^d	24	24
RNC	1	...	8	9
NRCC	3	...	5	8
<i>Interest groups</i>						
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	3	1	4
National Association of Realtors	3	3
National Right to Life	1	2	...	3
The Seniors Coalition	2	2
United Seniors Association	2	2
National Rifle Association	1	...	1
Smile PAC	1	...	1
Nonpartisan						
<i>Interest groups</i>						
Let Us Vote	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 16-3.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^c Arlene Holt Baker, president, Voices for Working Families, interview by Kelly Patterson and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., October 3, 2004.

^d Justin Tomczak, coordinator of congressional campaigns, Georgia Republican Party, telephone interview by Charles Bullock, November 30, 2004.

The 2004 Kansas Third District Congressional Race: Déjà vu All Over Again!

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On November 2, 2004, three-term Democratic incumbent Dennis Moore defeated his Republican challenger, Kris Kobach, by a stunning 55 to 43 percent margin, winning by over 36,000 votes in a district with a substantial Republican registration advantage. To outside observers the margin was especially surprising considering that President Bush overwhelmingly won the district by garnering 61 percent of the vote. To those familiar with the political context, Kobach's defeat was not unanticipated; it simply represented the latest in a series of electoral debacles to befall the district's Republican congressional candidates due to cultural divisions within the party.

The Kansas Third District shares many of the characteristics typically associated with a "safe" Republican House constituency, including a greater than 15 percent party registration advantage.¹ The district is comprised of three counties in eastern Kansas, but dominated by fast-growing Johnson County at its eastern end, a wealthy suburb of Kansas City, Missouri, where Republicans outnumber Democrats by more than 90,000. Two-thirds of all of the district's voters reside in Johnson County. Douglas County anchors the district's western boundary, nominally Republican in terms of registration, but a liberal enclave, due in part to the presence of the University of Kansas. Wyandotte County, which comprises much of the northern and central portions of the district, is a working-class area with the state's largest minority (concentrated among African Americans and Hispanics) and a high poverty rate.

Until Moore defeated first-term, incumbent Republican Vincent Snowbarger in a close 1998 election, Republicans had won all congressional elections rather easily for the previous thirty-four years. From the New Deal until the late 1980s, Republicans throughout the state generally embodied fiscal, not social conservatism.

Snowbarger represented a new breed of Republican, economically conservative, but committed to the pursuit of morality issues. His 1996 victory was one result of an insurgent movement that enabled Christian Right elements to capture the state party organization as well as the county organization in the Third District.² The agenda of Christian Right Republicans reflected a conviction that government actions must reverse the moral decline of the nation, with adherents holding socially conservative views on issues like abortion, gay and lesbian rights, school prayer, sex education, and related issues.

Throughout the state, the Christian Right takeover sparked a counter-mobilization by the moderates: they recaptured the organization in 1998 after a bitter struggle.³ Since then Republicans have experienced a continuing internecine conflict within the party that has altered the style and intensity of the state's electoral politics. And nowhere has the battle been as fierce as it has in the Kansas Third Congressional District.

¹ Thelma Helyar, ed., *Kansas Statistical Abstract 2000* (Lawrence, Kans.: Policy Research Institute, 2001); Michael Barone and Richard Cohen, *The Almanac of American Politics 2004* (Washington, D.C.: Nation Journal Group, 2004), p. 651–658.

² Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, "Kansas: The Christian Right and the New Mainstream of Republican Politics," in *God at the Grassroots, 1996: The Christian Right in American Elections*, edited by Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), pp. 207–222.

³ Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, "After the Flood: The Kansas Christian Right in Retreat," in *Prayers in the Precincts: The Christian Right in the 1998 Elections*, edited by John C. Green, Mark Rozell, and Clyde Wilcox (Georgetown University Press, 2000), pp. 227–242.

Although evangelical churches are found throughout rural Kansas, the politicized Christian Right movement has been largely concentrated in the Kansas City and Wichita “outer-ring suburbs--where the city meets the countryside.”⁴ Many of the new Johnson County residents migrate from the state’s rural areas. The result has been a clash between two cultures, one traditional/religious and the other modernizing/secular. In Johnson County, traditional elements are concentrated in the southern and western sections. Intra-party battles are not just ideological, but leaders of the factions just do not like each other personally as well,⁵ representing, in the words of one Republican consultant/strategist, “the extreme Jihad wings” of the divided party.⁶

The divisions within the party, and the resulting selection of congressional candidates who emerged from their own primaries as representatives of only one wing, enabled a moderate Democrat, Moore, to defeat the incumbent Snowbarger in 1998 and Republican challengers in the next two congressional elections. In each election, the conventional wisdom was that if Republicans “could get their act together” and unite behind a candidate Moore could be defeated. It did not happen. Registration figures appeared to be on the side of Republican optimists as well; Johnson County has been growing by over 10,000 persons a year over the past decade, and the Republican registration over Democrats advantage continues at a nearly two-to-one clip.⁷ Early in 2004 it appeared that the congressional seat would be returned to its rightful Republican home.

The 2004 Republican Primary

One cannot fully understand this year’s general election without understanding the dynamics of the Republican primary. Adam Taff, a physically attractive and articulate moderate, was all but anointed to be the nominee in 2004. Two years earlier, Taff, a former Navy pilot and political unknown, “came out of nowhere” to win a close primary against a candidate endorsed and supported financially by the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) and backed by the district’s social conservatives; Taff then went on to give Moore his closest contest, losing by just 7,000 votes.⁸ Despite being outspent by Moore, and having little national party support, Taff impressed party moderates and at least pacified most social conservatives by modifying his position on abortion to make it somewhat more restrictive. Taff announced he would run again in 2004, never closed his campaign office, and quickly received the preprimary endorsements of establishment Republicans.

But Taff was challenged by two social conservatives in the primary. His most serious challenger was Kris Kobach, a constitutional law professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. Kobach, a Harvard graduate, had a law degree from Yale and a doctorate in political science from Oxford. Kobach, 38, whose only previous elected public office was serving on a city council, had recently been part of the Bush administration, serving as an adviser to Attorney General Ashcroft. While in Washington, Kobach was credited with writing the sections of the Patriot Act dealing with registration and tracking of foreign visitors. Linking immigration to terrorism, and arguing that he was best qualified to protect family security, immigration became his major campaign issue early on. But it was Kobach’s positions on moral issues that made the difference in the primary.

⁴ Peter Beinart, “Battle for the Burbs,” *New Republic*, October 18, 1998, p. 26.

⁵ Jim Sullinger, “Kansas GOP: A Party Divided,” *Kansas City Star*, July 28, 2004, p. B9.

⁶ A Republican consultant/strategist close to the race who requested anonymity, telephone interview by Allan J. Cigler, December 13, 2004.

⁷ For example, between January 2003 and October 2004, Republican registration in Johnson County increased by 14,700, Democratic registration by 7,186, with 7,708 registering independent.

Kansas Secretary of State, Johnson County Kansas Election Office, (www.JOCOelection.org [October 8, 2004]).

⁸ Burdett A. Loomis, “Accentuating the Positive: Personality, Polling and Party in Kansas 3,” in *Running on Empty? Campaign Discourse in Congressional Elections*, edited by L. Sandy Maisel and Darrell West (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), pp. 22–43.

In the spring of 2004 the Kansas legislature had turned down an effort to place an amendment to the state constitution banning gay marriage on the fall ballot. Evangelical ministers throughout the state were outraged; they organized to raise the political consciousness of social conservatives in order to defeat state legislators and candidates for other offices who did not share their views. The evangelical community in the Third District was especially energized and embraced Kobach in the congressional race, working to register members of evangelical churches, getting advanced voting ballots in members' hands, and educating them on candidate issue positions.⁹ Kobach encouraged the relationship, and joint appearances by the candidate and evangelical ministers were commonplace. Kobach attacked Taff for being a liberal, accused him of supporting the gay-rights agenda, easy access to abortion, and amnesty for illegal immigrants. One particularly hard-hitting, direct-mail ad late in the campaign depicted two plastic-figure men, arms locked, atop a wedding cake. The caption read, "I John, take you Larry..." At the bottom of the ad were the words, "Not in Kansas!" The back of the ad outlined Kobach's views on traditional marriage and support for the president's call for an amendment to the Constitution on the matter. Taff opposed the measure. The ad both energized social conservatives and incensed moderates.

Although a poll two weeks before the election gave Taff a healthy lead, the result was not settled on Election Day.¹⁰ Provisional ballots had to be counted and the outcome was not known for six days. In an upset, the final tally gave Kobach the win by only 207 votes in a low-turnout primary.

Candidate Campaign Organizations, Strategies, and Resources in the General Election

The Moore campaign was caught off guard by Kobach's primary victory, but quickly recognized it was a blessing in disguise. In all three previous campaigns, Moore's strategy was identical: make an intense effort to mobilize the district's Democrats, then appeal to moderate Republicans and independents by conveying an image as a bipartisan, political moderate, and more in tune with district values. This time it would even be easier. After three terms Moore had developed a sophisticated constituency service operation, had a reputation as a strong pro-business advocate for district industries, was a member of the Blue Dog caucus in Congress, and was an initial supporter of President Bush's Iraq initiative and tax cuts; claiming to be a moderate running against an opponent who could be portrayed as an extreme social conservative would be relatively easy. Soon after the primary, national political analyst Larry Sabato proclaimed that "the Republicans have severely damaged themselves again. Dennis Moore is the luckiest member of Congress,"¹¹

The Moore and Kobach campaign organizations, strategies and financial resources could not have been more distinct. The Kobach campaign conveyed the feeling of an ideological movement rather than a party operation. There was no consultant hired to coordinate overall activities; decisions on hiring pollsters, media consultants, and fund-raisers were made largely by Kobach himself and his campaign manager, Todd Abrajano, a 2002 graduate of Yale.¹² Volunteers were typically unpaid and often recruited at rallies or church meetings.¹³ The emphasis was on grassroots efforts to register and turn out evangelical voters.

⁹ The close relationship between the Christian Right and candidates like Kobach sparked an effort by the Mainstream Coalition of Johnson County, a group made up mostly of Republican moderates concerned with the separation of church and state, to closely monitor evangelical church services in the weeks immediately preceding the primary election. The group sent nearly 100 volunteers to Sunday services throughout the district to see if clergy were adhering to federal tax code guidelines limiting political activity by nonprofit groups. See John Hanna, "K.C. Group on Lookout for Politics in Pulpits," *Lawrence Journal World*, July 18, 2004, p. B1.

¹⁰ Brad Cooper, "In Primary Field, Taff Leads GOP Rivals," *Kansas City Star*, July 21, 2004, p. A1.

¹¹ Scott Rothschild, "Republicans 'Couldn't Get it Together'," *Lawrence Journal World*, August 9, 2004, p. B1.

¹² Todd Abrajano, campaign manager, Kobach for Congress, telephone interview by Allan J. Cigler, November 8, 2004.

¹³ Sean Hatfield, field volunteer, Kobach for Congress, telephone interview by Allan J. Cigler, November 16, 2004.

The Moore campaign, in contrast, represented the model of the professional campaign organization.¹⁴ Using the same consultants as in his past elections, extensive polling (including tracking and exit polls) was conducted and focus groups were used to design commercials and direct-mail flyers. Volunteers were usually paid. State and local party connections were close and a massive get-out-the-vote (GOTV) effort coordinated with the party was directed at areas with a high concentration of known Democrats, large numbers of independents, and potential Republican defectors.

Moore, who had faced no primary opposition, raised and spent a record amount for a Kansas congressional race. According to Federal Election Commission (FEC) data, the incumbent raised over \$2.3 million and spent a like amount (table 17-1). Kobach, who had depleted much of his money in the primary, still did relatively well for a non-incumbent. He raised nearly \$1.3 million and spent just under \$1.2 million. When it became apparent the challenger was going to lose late in the race, the Kobach campaign virtually stopped spending, and the candidate, who had lent his campaign over \$51,000, took his money back.¹⁵

The sources of both candidates' funds roughly paralleled what one would expect when an incumbent faces a challenger. Moore received over \$1 million from PACs, and a little over \$1.2 million from individuals.¹⁶ The largest individual PAC contributions of \$10,000 came mostly from unions, which contributed nearly \$190,000 to the Moore coffers, but business PACs contributed the largest aggregate amount, slightly over \$418,000. Moore, a former district attorney, got a large portion of his individual contributions from fund-raisers and was generously supported by the trial lawyer community. Kobach received 18 percent of his funds from PACs, the bulk of these contributions coming from ideological PACs, including those advocating immigration reform. Individual contributions to the Kobach campaign, the candidate's main source of funds, were largely the result of fund-raisers, the most successful held in conjunction with visits of prominent Republicans to the district, including one featuring Vice President Cheney in September which raised over \$200,000.¹⁷ Another fund-raiser brought former U.S. Representative J.C. Watts to town. Individuals, including a number who took their cues from a variety of ideological PACs were important contributors as well.

The campaigns used their funds for both air war and ground war activities (see table 17-3 and table 17-4). Overall, Kobach for Congress sent out ten unique pieces of mail, ran five different TV ads, and made five unique phone calls. Moore for Congress, with a financial advantage, was credited with thirty-two unique ads, including nine distinct TV ads, seven different pieces of mail, and eleven different types of phone calls. In terms of TV and radio ads, the Moore campaign nearly doubled the amount spent by Kobach forces. Roughly 31 percent of the Moore for Congress budget was spent on TV; Kobach for Congress spent 39 percent of its budget on TV. Radio advertising by both campaigns was little utilized.

The Kobach campaign started advertising on TV within days of the August primary, with positive ads showing Kobach with his wife and family, conveying the importance of marriage, family values, and his Kansas roots, as well as acquainting viewers with the candidate's resume. Glossy direct mailings from the campaign appeared in short order, emphasizing the campaign's theme of "A stronger Kansas. A safer America." Support for the president's tax cuts was noted, as well as "defending marriage and Kansas

¹⁴ Julie Merz, campaign manager, Moore for Congress, telephone interview by Allan J. Cigler, December 8, 2004.

¹⁵ Brad Cooper, "In the Black," *Kansas City Star*, December 19, 2004, p. B1.

¹⁶ Center for Responsive Politics, "Kansas District 3 Race: 2004 Campaign Money Profile," (www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.asp?cycle=2004&id=KS03 [December 14, 2004]).

¹⁷ The Cheney breakfast gathering attracted 325 supporters who each paid \$250 for the meal and an additional \$2,000 if they wished to have their picture taken with the vice president. See Brad Cooper, "Cheney Lends a Hand to Kobach Campaign," *Kansas City Star*, August 25, 2004, p. B1.

values,” but the emphasis was on the candidate’s “priorities for a safer America,” which included deploying 20,000 National Guard personnel to stop terrorists at the borders and “returning the rule of law to immigration.”

Kobach for Congress quickly turned to attack mode, as the campaign attempted to link national security issues with the security of families in Kansas. Similar TV and direct-mail ads accused Moore of having a “left-wing voting record.” In one particularly hard-hitting ad entitled, “Why is Dennis Moore so...WORRIED?,” Moore was chastised for failing to protect the country from terrorism, Kobach pointing to the representative’s voting against using National Guard troops to protect the borders, voting to weaken the Patriot Act, and co-sponsoring legislation giving amnesty and in-state tuition to illegal aliens. While Moore’s opposition to tort reform and the Federal Marriage Amendment were noted, they were secondary issues.

Moore’s strategy in the early part of the campaign was to avoid being defensive by confronting directly the issues that Kobach was raising, but to nevertheless indicate that his record in the area of building a safe and secure nation and state was quite strong, both in terms of traditional physical security (e.g., more Homeland Security funds for local police) and matters of economic security (especially protecting Social Security). TV ads and direct mailings boasted of leading the fight to bring the “Amber Alert” system to Kansas City (designed to locate kidnapped children quickly), as well as supporting our soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan by sponsoring legislation that directed the Department of Defense to pay all of the travel costs associated with coming home for rest and recuperation. TV ads typically ended with Moore looking in the camera and proclaiming, “I never stopped working for families and never will.” Moore’s support of the 2001 tax cuts and lessening regulations on small business, both good Republican issues in the district, also received attention. Moore stayed away from social issues in his ads, fearful that African American and Hispanic voters, a number of whom would not approve of the representative’s views on abortion and gay marriage, would be offended.¹⁸

It was not until mid-September that the Moore campaign started doing its first “soft” negative ads, attacking Kobach’s free-market positions on Social Security and Medicare and his emphasis on privatization. The Moore campaign soon turned to attack ads that were seen by his opponents (and probably most who viewed the TV and direct-mail ads) as attacking Kobach’s character. The most devastating were designed to undercut Kobach’s credibility on immigration by raising questions about the Republican’s relationship to a number of anti-immigration groups.

Candidates of both parties usually avoid the issue of immigration. Republicans worry that supporting tougher immigration laws might anger their business allies that rely on cheap labor and alienate minorities, such as Hispanics, who they would like to add to their coalition. Democrats typically do not want to remind voters of the connection of minority groups to the party with their support of less restrictive immigration laws. Kobach’s insistence on very restrictive immigration laws and tougher enforcement afforded Moore the opportunity to not-so-subtly label his opponent as an extremist at best, a racist at worst.

In TV ads and direct mailings that hit the district in mid-October, the electorate was asked the questions, “If you can judge a man by the company he keeps, what can we learn about a candidate who accepted seven contributions from groups with ties to white supremacists?” The ads pointed out that Kobach had received seven contributions from groups funded by what a *Wall Street Journal* writer had called “a white-supremacist outfit devoted to racial purity through eugenics.”¹⁹ Of concern was Kobach’s relationship to the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), an organization which reputedly

¹⁸ Merz interview, December 8, 2004.

¹⁹ Jason L. Riley, “GOP Nativists Tarnish Reagan’s ‘Shining City,’” *Wall Street Journal*, March 15, 2004, p. A17.

had received money from another organization that had financed research in eugenics, a controversial science “which seeks to improve the human race by selecting parents based on their hereditary traits.”²⁰ Besides taking campaign funds from FAIR, Kobach was in the employ of the group during the election, on a retainer as their attorney in a law suit against the state of Kansas for granting in-state tuition to children of illegal aliens, in what other Moore ads called “a frivolous lawsuit.”²¹ Kobach’s connection to extremists in the gun lobby had been earlier raised.²²

Along with other controversial positions, such as the desire to make English the national language and to replace the income tax with a “consumption tax,” the immigration issue had become a serious liability. Charging Moore with the “politics of personal destruction,” a direct-mail ad sent throughout the district from Kobach’s wife assured voters that her husband was not a racist. She pointed out how as a college student Kobach had spent four months in South Africa building a school and how one of his best friends (with whom he had shared a house for three years) was an African American, but the damage had been done. The challenger had lost control of the agenda, and he became widely labeled as an extremist. A late mailing of the “I, John, take you Larry...” ad, this time directed at Moore’s opposition to the gay marriage amendment, probably just confirmed the label. A *Kansas City Star* poll conducted during the third week of October showed Kobach losing to Moore 50 to 38 percent; 11 percent of voters were undecided. Eighteen percent of those Republicans polled said they supported Moore, as did 59 percent of independents.²³

Phone banks were important in both of the candidates’ campaigns as well. The Moore campaign made an estimated 400,000 calls.²⁴ Included were over 126,000 paid persuasion calls and nearly 12,000 rapid response calls. The campaign identified nearly 78,000 targets for a GOTV campaign; the campaign paid for nearly 78,000 GOVT live calls and a like number of GOTV auto-calls. On Election Day the 78,000 likely Democratic voters were each called.

The Kobach campaign was not as systematically organized, but did conduct a number of phone banks, most with the intent of both registering and persuading voters. The callers were typically unpaid volunteers; recipients of the calls were often targeted from lists of evangelicals, reputedly gathered from church directories.²⁵ In trying to reach out to social conservatives, phone calls also targeted Catholic voters, focusing on the abortion issue.²⁶ On the Sunday before the election, volunteers put campaign

²⁰ Brad Cooper, “Kobach Attacks His Rivals for Stance on Immigration,” *Kansas City Star*, July 21, 2004, (www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/local/9201880.htm [January 29, 2005]).

²¹ The Moore campaign called attention to a \$3,000 contribution the Kobach campaign had received from Gun Owners of American. The group’s executive director, Larry Pratt, in 1996 had temporarily stepped down as co-chair of Pat Buchanan’s 1996 presidential campaign in the face of reports connecting him to militia and white supremacist groups. He later returned. Brad Cooper, “Kobach Challenged on Campaign Gift,” *Kansas City Star*, September 14, 2004, p. B3.

²² The Moore campaign called attention to a \$3,000 contribution the Kobach campaign had received from Gun Owners of American. The group’s executive director, Larry Pratt, in 1996 had temporarily stepped down as co-chair of Pat Buchanan’s 1996 presidential campaign in the face of reports connecting him to militia and white supremacist groups. He later returned. Brad Cooper, “Kobach Challenged on Campaign Gift,” *Kansas City Star*, September 14, 2004, p. B3.

²³ Brad Cooper, “Voters Prefer Moore, Poll Says,” *Kansas City Star*, October 24, 2004, p. A1.

²⁴ Merz interview, December 8, 2004.

²⁵ While there is no formal way to document this, one Kobach supporter volunteered that a rally he was approach by a member of the Kobach staff. He was first asked if he belonged to a church, and then asked if it was possible for him to provide a list of church members and their addresses and phone numbers. He refused.

²⁶ At times the calls generated controversy. Some recipients were Democrats, who wondered how a recorded message caller, who identified herself as a “fellow Catholic,” then pointed out that Dennis Moore “does not share our values,” would have been able to get their phone number. Abrajano said the campaign bought the calling list

flyers on car windows in church parking lots. Both campaigns took advantage of the free weekend calling option by those subscribing to a cell phone service. Volunteers would typically gather on Saturday mornings and use their cell phones to contact those on a call list provided by the two campaign staffs.

The Kobach campaign was also quite effective in gaining access to the free media. Kobach's expertise on the immigration issue and the fact that he had made it his central issue attracted the media. He appeared at a number of forums dealing with a variety of issues, typically in a non-campaign setting, defending the Patriot Act against charges that the law subverted civil liberties. He was a guest on the *O'Reilly Factor* during the primary season, and was featured on *Lou Dobb's Moneyline* in the midst of the general election. Being a Republican running for Congress, his disagreement with President Bush on immigration legislation garnered special attention, especially his opposition to the plan to give undocumented workers a chance to temporarily legalize their status with guest-worker visas.

The Political Party Battle

The respective political parties were both active in this race, though in different ways. With the state and local Republican Party hampered by intra-party divisions and lack of funds, the advantage went to the fully mobilized Democrats.

The Democratic Party: Ground War and Air War

In Moore's three previous victories, the state Democratic Party's efforts were fundamental to his success, using as a conduit the Kansas Coordinated Campaign (KCC), a quasi-independent political organization set up as an extension of the Kansas Democratic Party.²⁷ The KCC is reconstituted in election years as a statewide organization with a full-time director. In 2004 the KCC also had nine other staff members. The staffers largely focused on the Third District: four had primary responsibility for Wyandotte County, three for Douglas County, and two for Johnson County. With no other competitive congressional race in the state and few competitive state legislative races, almost all attention was directed toward supplementing the Moore campaign. The KCC also employed a variety of campaign service vendors and operated with a budget of "roughly \$500,000." The organization was largely funded by the campaigns it was to aid, with the aim of pooling resources to avoid duplication, especially on ground-war efforts.

The Moore campaign was the driving force behind funding the KCC. Because of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), the Representative himself was forbidden from holding fund-raisers to support a party-coordinated campaign, but campaign operatives could encourage groups and individuals to independently contribute to the party effort. More significantly, the Moore campaign was able to transfer some of its own funds to the KCC (technically it had now lost control of the money).²⁸ Fund-raisers were held by the state Democratic Party, including ones where former vice president Al Gore and former Texas governor Ann Richards came to Kansas to raise funds designated for the KCC.

from a company that sells databases. See David Ranney, "Kobach's Calls to Catholics Anger Some Voters," *Lawrence Journal World*, October 27, 2004, p. B1.

²⁷ Information on the activities of the KCC was gathered in a variety of ways, including interviews with various party and campaign officials both before and after the election, as well as more informal conversations with a number of KCC field volunteers. The bulk of the specific information was provided by two main interviews conducted after the election: A.J. Carrillo, director, KCC, interview by Allan J. Cigler, Lawrence, Kans., November 19, 2004; Mark Simpson, executive director, State Democratic Party, telephone interview by Allan J. Cigler, December 6, 2004.

²⁸ Merz interview, December 8, 2004.

The KCC relied on sophisticated targeting efforts in order to run a precinct-level GOTV campaign. Using a web-based program called Astro 2000, volunteers would either make targeted personal calls or go door-to-door to encourage likely Democratic voters to apply to register and/or “advance” vote.²⁹ Follow-up contacts were made within weeks if applications had not been received by the county clerk. Some potential voters were contacted three or four times. Volunteers were not only paid on an hourly basis but were given an additional dollar “bounty” for every new Democrat registered and advance voting ballot turned into the county clerk’s office.

Although efforts concentrated upon registering and turning out likely Democratic voters in Wyandotte and Douglas counties, for the first time in 2004 KCC volunteers made forays into selected areas in Johnson County, passing out advanced voting applications and dropping off Moore campaign literature.³⁰ The effort focused only upon areas where Moore had gotten at least 55 percent of the vote in the previous election. Efforts also targeted what volunteers referred to as “lazy Republicans,” those who had voted just once in the last four elections, as well as independents. GOTV efforts were also extensive on Election Day; passenger vans filled with volunteers traveled to precincts that had been identified earlier in the day as “under performing” in terms of Democratic turnout. These vans brought those that had not yet voted to the polls.³¹

The state Democratic Party also supplemented Moore direct-mail efforts by sending out seven unique campaign flyers. Most were highly negative toward Kobach on the immigration issue, while others slammed Kobach’s consumption tax plan, claiming that the plan would “increase tax burdens on middle class families by 50%.” Like the ads from the Moore campaign, social issues were avoided. The state party ads enabled Moore to run a largely positive direct-mail campaign touting his accomplishments, while others pounded home the image of Kobach as an extremist.

The DCCC was a factor in the race as well, spending over \$300,000 on two unique TV ads, one designed to tout Moore’s achievements, the other to discredit his Republican challenger. With soft money banned, the DCCC utilized the independent spending route. While the DCCC and the Moore campaign could not officially coordinate efforts, it was easy for the DCCC to monitor communications and design ads that complemented the local Democratic effort.

The Republican Party: An Air War, But No Ground War

State and local Republican Party efforts on behalf of Kobach were virtually nonexistent. The state party had little in the way of funds and was controlled by moderates.³² In Johnson County, a number of moderates worked for both the election of Bush and Moore; yard signs for both candidates were prominently displayed in wealthy parts of the county. During the last week of the campaign, advertisements listing the names of Republicans for Moore appeared in the district’s newspapers; some on the list were precinct committee chairs, and a few were elected Republican officials. Republicans had no

²⁹ Kansas now has a procedure whereby voters may elect to cast their ballot starting 20 days prior to the election. The procedure has increased in popularity, and it was estimated that up to a third of the electorate had cast their vote prior to Election Day. See Melodee Hall Blobaum, “Advance Vote on Fast Track to Hit 100,000,” *Kansas City Star*, October 30, 2004, p. B1.

³⁰ Brent Swenson, coordinator, Johnson County KCC, telephone interview by Allan J. Cigler, December 6, 2004.

³¹ Carrillo interview, November 19, 2004.

³² Prior to the August primary, the Kansas Republican Party, led by the state chair, pursued efforts to open the contests to unaffiliated voters, in what was seen as an effort by moderates to diminish social conservative strength in the primaries. Republican opponents challenged the measure in court and prevailed. The court battle left the state party organization with little funds or credibility for the general election. See Scott Rothschild, “GOP to Ask Judge to OK Open Primary,” *Lawrence Journal World*, July 25, 2004, p. A1.

GOTV organization like the KCC for ground-war activities. Only one generic mailing (listing all Republican candidates) by the state party even carried Kobach's name.

The NRCC, however, aided Kobach with over \$374,000 in TV ads (most ads were anti-Moore in tone), as well as twelve direct-mail flyers. While a few of the flyers were targeted to specific categories of registered voters such as teachers, most were sent to all Republicans and independents in the district. Some were received by registered Democrats. According to FEC data on party independent expenditures, a little over \$600,000 was spent by the NRCC, mostly on negative ads discrediting Moore (see table 17-2).³³ Since the president's position on immigration issues was contrary to Kobach's, the national Republican ads dealing with securing the nation's borders did not parallel the challenger's hard-line message. The gay marriage issue was mentioned in passing. The focus was on standard Republican talking points dealing with the economy and tax cuts, eliminating business regulations, the importance of local control of schools, and how liberals had undermined national morality. Moore was condemned for voting "to continue to allow the sale of violent and sexually explicit video games and movies to underage children," voting to allow the "horrific practice of partial birth abortion," and for thinking flag burning was merely "free speech" and allowable. Positive Kobach flyers noted the challenger's commitment to unleashing "our great American companies to grow, flourish and create jobs and prosperity here at home," his desire as a fellow teacher to do "all that I can in Congress to strengthen our schools," as well as his commitment to "reducing taxes for Kansas families and businesses at every opportunity."

The NRCC ads seemed better designed than the Kobach campaign ads to appeal to moderates. Even the ads dealing with partial birth abortion were sensitive to the notion that the overall issue of abortion is an unsettled debate.

Interest-Group Influences

By traditional measures, interest groups were less active than usual in the race. The BCRA restrictions on broadcast communications and the fact that after the primary the race was not considered very competitive reduced the incentives to participate. Neighboring Missouri's swing state status in the presidential race encouraged some Kansas groups, unions in particular, to send volunteers and resources across the state line where they perceived they might make a difference.³⁴ No 527 committees were active in Kansas.

Other than campaign contributions, most groups' election activity was largely confined to endorsements and perhaps a direct mailing or two (see table 17-4). Negative ads were largely nonexistent; even groups like the National Rifle Association (NRA) or anti-abortion groups on the Republican side and the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) and the Sierra Club on the Democratic side relied more on voter guides than on attack ads. The NRA did conduct a campaign workshop in the district, but did not enter the fray in an active way.³⁵

³³ A summary of party independent spending data can be found on the Campaign Finance Institute website, "Party Independent Spending Soars (table 2)," (www.cfinst.org/pr/110504b.html [December 16, 2004]). According to the FEC derived data, Republicans totaled over \$914,000 in spending against candidate Moore; nearly \$121,000 was spent by the party in messages supporting Kobach.

³⁴ See Scott Rothschild, "Campaigns Drawing Kansans Out of State," *Lawrence Journal World*, October 27, 2004, p. A1.

³⁵ Glen Caroline, director, Institute for Legislative Action Grassroots Division, National Rifle Association, interview by Quin Monson and Richard Hawkins, November 10, 2004. Unconfirmed rumors suggested that the NRA had polled the district and found too many moderate ticket splitters (likely Bush-Moore voters) to get more involved in the race. See Kriswatch Blog at (kriswatch.blogspot.com/ [September 21, 2004]).

The Democratic effort, however, did receive substantial help in a variety of other forms. The International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, based in Kansas City, Kansas, let the KCC use part of its facilities as a base of operation.³⁶ The Sierra Club and the Human Rights Campaign, a gay rights organization, each “lent” Moore for Congress a staff member for the last two weeks of the campaign.³⁷ Various unions, the Kansas National Education Association (KNEA), and Farmland Industries made in-kind contributions in the form of providing facilities for phone bank operations.³⁸ In the case of Farmland Industries, a private business, the campaign was careful that callers were strictly unpaid volunteers using facilities after working hours. The Mainstream Coalition, the local group organized to oppose the political activities of the Christian Right, ran its own phone bank in support of Moore.³⁹ The AFL-CIO, while not operating a separate GOTV operation, contributed heavily financially to the campaign and the KCC, where one of its members sat as a member of the committee designing the KCC budget.⁴⁰ Unions were quite responsive to calls from both the KCC and Moore for Congress for volunteers, especially the United Auto Workers (UAW).⁴¹

On the Republican side, groups were even more crucial to the Kobach for Congress effort. Some of the group connections had costs as well as benefits. With an ineffective party, Kobach utilized the evangelical movement as his equivalent to the KCC; the movement became the driving force in his GOTV efforts, with a strategy almost entirely directed toward activating his base. Unlike the broad public campaign, Kobach’s GOTV efforts emphasized moral issues such as abortion and gay marriage. Evangelical churches, as they had been doing in the primary, were active registering parishioners, getting advanced ballots in their hands, informing them about candidate stances on issues, and encouraging them to vote in accordance with their values.

Since early in the primary season, Kobach had cultivated a relationship with the Reverend Jerry Johnson, pastor of a 3,000 member church in the district and the area’s leader of an effort to encourage pastors to get politically involved. Johnson, activated by the gay marriage issue, believed the “big deal is getting people informed, targeting the 50 percent of the evangelical vote that is not voting.”⁴² He attempted to convince other evangelical ministers that they had every right to be engaged in the electoral process as long as they did not endorse candidates from the pulpit and offered equal opportunities for candidates to express their views in church forums. In late September, Johnson invited the Reverend Jerry Falwell to the district to conduct a series of “pastor policy briefings.”⁴³ Kobach accompanied Johnson and Falwell on their church visits, arguably because of his constitutional law expertise. Organizers of the event later passed out more than a 1,000 DVDs containing information where various candidates stood on issues important to “people of faith.”⁴⁴ During the last weekend before the election, Johnson and Kobach were to appear together in a live infomercial on three cable TV stations sponsored by the Johnson’s church; the appearance was canceled by the stations, which believed they would violate equal time laws.⁴⁵ The close relationship between the Kobach and evangelical churches was an underlying “whisper” issue through the campaign, contributing to the Republican challenger’s extremist image and generating press criticism.

³⁶ Merz interview, December 8, 2004.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰ The phone calls were designed to inform recipients of Kobach’s “extreme” views on immigration.

⁴¹ Merz interview, December 8, 2004.

⁴² Brad Cooper, “‘Pastor Briefings’ to Focus on Political Involvement,” *Kansas City Star*, September 21, 2004, p. A1.

⁴³ Brad Cooper, “Falwell Urges Crowd to ‘Get Involved,’” *Kansas City Star*, September 23, 2004, p. B1.

⁴⁴ Brad Cooper, “‘Pastor Briefings.’”

⁴⁵ Brad Cooper, “Program Featuring Kobach Cancelled,” *Kansas City Star*, October 30, 2004, p. B1. Kobach spent the Sunday morning prior to the election at the First Family Church, where he was introduced by Reverend Johnson as a “friend” and a “brother in Christ.” See “Kansas 3rd Congressional District—What Happened Sunday,” *Kansas City Star*, November 1, 2004, p. A4.

Kobach's image as outside the political mainstream was repeatedly reinforced by other group connections. For example, his focus on immigration rallied a number of groups to his campaign, most of which simply contributed funds. Others such as the Eagle Forum, which had endorsed Kobach and contributed \$3,000 to his campaign, did a bit more; Phyllis Schlafly came to the district to discuss the immigration issue, appearing in a forum with Kobach.⁴⁶ But one group, Project America, a 501(c)(3) "educational" organization, designated the Third District race as one of five races where immigration was a main issue, and put up three billboards in a part of the district where there was a concentration of Hispanic businesses.⁴⁷ The billboards discussed Moore's voting record on a number of immigration issues, including his position against a bill barring federal funding to any state or local government that did not share a person's immigration status with federal authorities. Yard signs supporting Kobach were placed nearby. The president of the local chapter of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) called the billboards "racist." Kobach was asked to repudiate the ad, but he refused. The incident again raised the issue in the press of the kinds of groups which supported Kobach, such as TEAM America, which noted on its website that if borders remain open "our island of productivity and prosperity will soon disappear beneath a flood of Third World squalor."⁴⁸

Conclusion

As a practical matter, the general election was over once Kobach won the primary and continued his strategy designed only to appeal to a relatively narrow base. His positions on virtually all issues put him on the extreme conservative fringe of a divided party. Whether it be taxes, immigration, or social issues like abortion and gay rights, Kobach alienated the kinds of moderates and independents he needed to upend Moore. Kobach's connections to the Christian Right were offensive to mainline Protestants and Jewish voters, raising serious questions about his views on church and state relations.

Kobach's message difficulties should not overshadow what was an impressive Democratic operation. The combination of Moore for Congress, the DCC, and the state party's coordinated campaign had the appearance of a well-oiled machine. The Democratic base was activated, and Moore was convincingly portrayed as a bipartisan moderate with values in tune with the district. The Kobach campaign was forced to rely on a much less professional operation, the loosely organized evangelical movement.

There were aspects of the campaign that reflected some of the changes brought about by BCRA. Broadcast communications restrictions basically keep interest groups out of the air wars. There were few instances where voters could have been confused by who paid for campaign ads – only parties and the campaigns were involved. Nor did the ban on national party soft money restrict party involvement; both parties engaged in relatively high levels of independent spending.⁴⁹ Ground war activities, especially direct mail by both the parties and the campaigns, appeared to be more important than in past years.

⁴⁶ Leonard Zeskind, "Kris Kobach Loads Up with Anti-Immigration Ammo," *The Pitch* (a Kansas City area news and entertainment weekly), (www.pitch.com/issues/2004-09-23/stline.html [September 23, 2004]).

⁴⁷ Brad Cooper, "Latino Object to Billboards Attacking Moore," *Kansas City Star*, October 14, 2004, p. B3.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ The use of national party independent spending was not without its problems. The Moore campaign noted that often its calls to the DCCC's director of incumbent retention became bogged down in legal compliance issues, creating communications problems. Merz interview, December 8, 2004.

Table 17-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Kansas 3rd Congressional District Race, 2003-04

	Dennis Moore (D)	Kris Kobach (R)
From PACs	\$1,057,468	\$226,025
From individuals	\$1,207,837	\$868,105
From party	\$4,385	\$16,000
From candidate	\$0	\$58,470
Other contributions	\$33,110	\$102,799
Total receipts	\$2,302,800	\$1,271,399
Total expenditures	\$2,346,951	\$1,190,766
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$32,422	\$80,624

Source: Federal Election Commission, “2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info,” November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 28, 2004]).

Table 17-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, Kansas 3rd Congressional District Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DCCC	KS 3	Kris Kobach	...	\$324,900	\$324,900	\$694,017
	KS 3	Dennis Moore	\$369,117	...	\$369,117	
NRCC	KS 3	Kris Kobach	\$131,003	...	\$131,003	\$608,959
	KS 3	Dennis Moore	...	\$477,956	\$477,956	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ [January 5, 2005]).

Table 17-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Kansas 3rd Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Dennis Moore for U.S. Congress	\$719,034	\$9,554	\$728,588	\$1,269,693
<i>Political parties</i>				
DCCC ^c	\$855,784	...	\$855,784	\$300,278
Republican allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Kobach for Congress	\$380,226	...	\$380,226	\$391,676
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRCC	\$563,090	...	\$563,090	\$374,072
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Progress for America Voter Fund	\$23,826	...	\$23,826	\$333,723
National Right to Work Committee PAC	\$5,810	...	\$5,810	...

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 17-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

^c It appears that several of the television spots originally purchased by the DCCC were canceled. This comes from looking at the total independent expenditures and CMAG data. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 17-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Kansas 3rd Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^b							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Dennis Moore for U.S. Congress	1	7	3	1	11	9	32
<i>Political parties</i>							
Kansas Democratic Party	...	7	3	...	10
Democratic Coordinated Campaign of Kansas	1	4	...	5
DCCC	2	2
Douglas County Democrats	1	...	1
<i>Interest groups</i>							
Mainstream PAC	...	1	1	...	2
AARP	...	1	1
Human Rights Campaign	...	1	1
Kansas Democratic Victory Fund	...	1	1
Kansas Education Association	...	1	1
League of Conservation Voters	...	1	1
National Association of Home Builders	...	1	1
Sierra Club	...	1	1
Republican allies^b							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Kobach for Congress	...	10	5	5	20
<i>Political parties</i>							
NRCC	...	12	2	7	21
Republican Party of Kansas	...	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>							
Kansans for Life	...	2	1	3
National Right to Work Committee PAC	...	3	3
Project America	3
National Right to Life	...	1	1	...	2
National Pro-Life Alliance	...	1	1
NRA Political Victory Fund	...	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 17-3.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

2004 New Mexico First Congressional District Race: Déjà Vu 2002

Heather Wilson Versus Richard Romero

Lonna Rae Atkeson, Nancy Carrillo, and Mekoce Walker

About 77 percent of New Mexico's First Congressional District resides in the greater Albuquerque metropolitan area. Albuquerque is the center of the state both geographically and economically. It boasts the largest number of residents, approximately 469,000, and economic diversity that includes both an air force base and the Sandia National Laboratories. The district, like the state, is a so-called minority-majority district where no racial group has a majority. Here, whites (46 percent) and Hispanics (43 percent) represent nearly equal proportions of residents and both groups dominate the political arena.¹ In terms of partisanship, registration data indicates an 11 percentage point advantage for Democrats with 174,874 Democratic identifiers (46 percent) and 131,883 Republican Party identifiers (35 percent).² Given the district's urban character and party registration figures, it is somewhat surprising that since 1968 a Republican has held this seat. And, it also helps explain why Democrats continue to pour resources into the district, making it competitive.

The current incumbent and Republican Representative Heather Wilson won the seat in a special election in 1998 in which the Green Party played a spoiler role. In that year, Wilson received a mere plurality (48 percent) of the votes. In the next cycle, she increased her vote share to 50 percent with a still active Green Party candidate. Finally, in what appeared to be a competitive contest against State Senate Pro Tem leader Richard Romero in 2002, she increased her percentage considerably to a clear majority at 55 percent.

The 2004 election was a rematch of 2002 with incumbent Wilson again facing state Senator Romero. Although the ten-point margin between the two in 2002 might usually lead us to consider the First District safe for Wilson, several factors made the 2004 race a potentially competitive and winnable race for Democrats. First, the 2002 race favored higher Republican and lower Democratic turnout due to the fact it was an off-year election with no interesting statewide race to attract voters to the polls. In addition, the 2002 race featured aggressive campaigning in the state by the president and an aggressive absentee voter campaign by the Republicans that helped to turnout Republican voters. Second, Romero's strong name recognition, veteran status and previous campaign experience made him an experienced and strong challenger, able to raise money and put together a strong organization. Third, the 2004 presidential election would automatically boost turnout particularly as New Mexico was a battleground state. Finally, early polling indicated that Wilson was vulnerable. A late August poll showed Representative Wilson leading at 49 percent to 43 percent for Romero with a 5 percent margin of error, suggesting that either candidate had a chance early in the campaign.³ By October, the two were in a statistical dead heat (see figure 18-1). These factors made the New Mexico First Congressional District the number one target for the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC).⁴ However, Wilson's lead widened shortly thereafter, due to Romero's poor performance during debates and a severe strategic blunder caused by a TV commercial and related comment during a radio talk show. In the end, Wilson won the election with nearly the identical margin as in 2002: 54 percent to 46 percent.

¹ U.S. Census Bureau, "Population and Housing Profile: Albuquerque City, Bernalillo County pt., New Mexico," (www.census.gov/acs/www/Products/Profiles/Single/2003/ACS/Narrative/155/NP15500US3502000001.htm, [15 December 2004]; numbers are accurate for Bernalillo County which represents most of the First District.

² New Mexico Secretary of State, "2004 General Election Voter Registration Report," (www.sos.state.nm.us/avrs/CONG.HTM [13 December 2004]).

³ Andy Lenderman, "Wilson Slightly Ahead of Romero," *Albuquerque Journal*, September 6, 2004, p. A1; John Fleck, "Romero 1 Point Behind Wilson in Poll," *Albuquerque Journal*, October 5, 2004, p. A1; Michael Coleman, "Down to the Wire," *Albuquerque Journal*, October 31, 2004, p. A1.

⁴ Vanessa Alarid, executive director, Democratic Party of New Mexico, interview by Nancy Carrillo, Albuquerque, N.M., December 7, 2004.

Money

Compared to the 2002 contest, the 2004 race was much more expensive with both candidates raising and spending more money in a Congressional race than New Mexico had ever seen. Indeed, the First District was the fifth most expensive House race in the country in 2004, with the candidates spending \$5.3 million combined. Compared to 2002, candidate spending increased by over one-third. Wilson increased her spending by about 22 percent to \$3.33 million while Romero increased his spending by about 63 percent to \$1.99 million (see table 18-1). The incumbent thus had a large spending advantage of \$1.34 million. Wilson campaign officials argued that her increase in spending relative to Romero's was necessary to offset the work of 527 political committees who were working to register and turnout voters, essentially using soft money to support Romero's campaign. Jane Altwiez, finance director for Wilson, said, "to compete with that out-of-state money that was coming in, Congresswoman Wilson's campaign was forced to budget, raise, and frankly spend a lot more."⁵

A closer look at these numbers reveals both the power of incumbency and the ideological leanings of the candidates. PACs contributed over three times more money to Wilson than to Romero, comprising 38 percent of Wilson's campaign war chest compared to 20 percent of Romero's receipts. Many of Wilson's PAC donations stem from her committee assignments on the House Armed Services Committee and subcommittee assignments within the Committee on Energy and Commerce, including the Energy and Air Quality; Environment and Hazardous Waste; Health; and Telecommunications and the Internet subcommittees. The biggest Wilson PAC contributor categories were energy and natural resource groups, followed by health care, finance and insurance, and then communication and technology.⁶ Romero, on the other hand, received most of his PAC money from traditionally Democratic PACs, especially organized labor. These patterns are virtually identical to those we observed in the 2002 race. Interestingly, both candidates raised nearly the same amount of money from individuals, with about \$1.6 million for Romero and \$1.8 million for Wilson. For Wilson, individual contributions amounted to only 53 percent of receipts, however, while they comprised 83 percent of Romero's receipts. Interestingly, both candidates received over two-thirds of their individual contributions from New Mexicans. Fully 78 percent of Wilson's individual contributions and 69 percent of Romero's individual contributions came from within New Mexico.⁷

Heather Wilson's campaign spent about 67 percent of her funds on the air war, a combination of TV and radio ads. The organization spent much of the rest on print media, at least two full-page ads in the *Albuquerque Journal*, and six pieces of campaign mail. Most of Romero's funds, over 80 percent, were spent on TV ads. Most of the remainder was spent on telephone calls and canvassing. They purchased one print advertisement that was delivered door-to-door. The other two mailings represented in table 18-4 were invitations to fund-raisers, not mass advertisements.

Funding by party groups differed greatly between the Democrats and Republicans in the First District. In a big change of strategy from the previous election cycle, the Democratic Party of New Mexico (DPNM) assigned its coordinated party expenditure authority for the First District race to the DCCC, allowable under §109.33 of the Federal Election Regulations. The party did send one invitation to a fund-raiser and included Romero's name on one hand-delivered piece of mail and two mailed advertisements. These advertisements either stressed the presidential election or were simply GOTV; they did not emphasize the Congressional election at all. Inactive in the 2002 election, the DCCC, on the other hand, spent

⁵ Barry Massey, "N.M. Congressional Race Among Priciest," *Santa Fe New Mexican*, December 7, 2004, p. B1.

⁶ A variety of single-issue groups topped the list of PAC donors.

⁷ Political Money Line, "2003-04 US House and US Senate Candidate Info for State of New Mexico," (www.tray.com/cgi-win/x_statedis.exe?DoFn=&rb=2004&State=NM [December 20, 2004]).

approximately \$900,000⁸ on five entirely negative TV ads according to our ad buy data and approximately \$321,000⁹ on nine mail advertisements.¹⁰ Relying on the partisan affiliation advantage Democrats have in this district, the ads linked Wilson to Bush and had a single theme: Wilson was only 9 percent independent, voting with Bush 91 percent of the time, and was wrong for New Mexico. This was the same theme Democratic allies used in 2002 as well.¹¹ The organization also contributed just over \$11,000 to the Romero campaign. In contrast, the Republican Party of New Mexico (GOPNM) invested heavily in at least nineteen different mailings, sending out about 1.3 million pieces of mail at a cost of approximately \$600,000.¹² According to Greg Graves, GOPNM executive director, this represented the largest activity by the state party for Wilson and the largest mail campaign for her since she won the seat.¹³ These were paid for by coordinated, non-allocable money that is used on behalf of a candidate, but for party building activities. In this case, candidate mail was defined as “party building” because a volunteer handled each mail piece.¹⁴ The National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) contributed almost \$95,500 (including in-kind contributions, usually satellite leads) to the Wilson campaign, and the Republican National Committee (RNC) contributed another \$4,500. The NRCC also spent over \$967,000 against Romero as part of their independent expenditure campaign. These dollars supported media buys. Finally, the NRCC spent over \$37,500 in independent expenditures on surveys and phone banks in the First District.

Other interest groups were very active in the race through sending mail, making phone calls, and distributing TV, radio and newspaper advertisements. Several groups also engaged in independent expenditure campaigns, including the National Rifle Association (NRA, \$13,817), the National Right to Life group (\$10,539) and the Association of General Contractors (\$601) for Wilson and the Marijuana Policy Project (\$16,900), Humane USA (\$2,987), and New Mexicans for Political Accountability for Romero (\$136).

Immediately following the good-news poll for Romero in early October that had the candidates neck and neck, one TV commercial and one radio interview essentially ruined Romero’s chances. The Romero TV advertisement included an image of Osama Bin Laden and made the claim that Wilson’s vote against the screening of cargo on passenger airplanes was “a favor to terrorists.”¹⁵ Referring to the advertisement the next day during a lighthearted radio talk show,¹⁶ the interviewer asked Romero, “Oh, she’s a friend of Osama Bin Laden?” to which the candidate replied, “You bet! You bet!”

⁸ According to FEC independent expenditure reports, the DCCC spent \$400,609 on ads for Romero. Political Money Line, “Independent Expenditures,” (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_indepexp.exe?DoFn=04H2NM01086 [December 17, 2004]).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ The 10th piece of mail listed in table 18-2 refers to a general fund-raiser letter that did not mention the New Mexico First Congressional District election and was apparently sent nationwide.

¹¹ Interestingly in 2002 the charge was that she was only 6 percent independent; see Lonna Atkeson, Nancy Carrillo, and Margaret C. Toulouse, “The 2002 New Mexico Federal Races,” *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, 2003), pp. 269–290.

¹² Greg Graves, executive director, Republican Party of New Mexico, telephone interview by Lonna Atkeson, December 20, 2004.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Peter Valcarce, Arena Communications, interview by Gary Bryner and Quin Monson, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 5, 2004.

¹⁵ CMAG, “NM1 Romero Cargo Inspections,” October 6, 2004.

¹⁶ KKOB Radio, *Jim Villanucci Show*, Albuquerque, N.M., October 7, 2004.

According to Representative Wilson, this was the watershed event of the campaign, and Republicans were relentless in responding to Romero's unfair campaign blunder.¹⁷ Two of Wilson's mailings and five of her TV ads referred to Romero's attacks on Wilson's patriotism, including one TV ad featuring John McCain and another featuring Kip Nicely, former New Mexico State Representative and retired U.S. Navy Captain.¹⁸ Wilson also took out two full-page newspaper ads on the subject, one with a stinging rejoinder from popular New Mexico U.S. Senator Pete Domenici.¹⁹ One NRCC TV ad, one NRCC mailing, and six GOPNM mailings also referred to the incident. The GOPNM chair even had a news conference demanding that the ad be pulled. The ad itself became a story, spinning off several newspaper articles.

Second, Romero had a difficult time in the three debates he had with Heather Wilson. Wilson noted that his lack of debate preparedness showed and benefited her in the debates and in the election outcome.²⁰ In the first debate, Wilson was able to field Romero's repeated attacks. He questioned the effectiveness of the No Child Left Behind Act, but Wilson could point to a 70 percent increase in federal funds to New Mexico as a result. When Romero pointed out her vote against a bonus for soldiers, she countered with her support for five years of consecutive pay raises for the military. She also countered Romero's accusations of "9 percent independent" with examples of crossing party lines on the issues of education and taxes. Wilson accused Romero of misrepresenting her position on stem cell research.²¹ During the second debate, just three days after the infamous radio talk show, Wilson publicly rebuked Romero.²² She also questioned Romero's foreign policy credentials. The final debate was a replay of the first two, demonstrating a lack of knowledge by Romero that allowed Wilson to repeat her charge that he was too inexperienced for office.

Effects of Money

The candidates and party groups with themes very similar to the 2002 election did most of the air war in this election. On the Democratic side, Richard Romero ran ten TV ads. Positive ads in the beginning of the campaign stressed character traits, his service in the Air Force and his experience in education. By the end of September, Romero's ads became quite negative, claiming Wilson to be "only 9 percent independent" and hitting hard on the fact that she voted against cargo inspections and received a flu shot after the shortage was announced. Five DCCC ads mirrored the independence argument, linking Wilson and Bush on taxes, drug companies, and Iraq. Although Hispanics were one target group, none of the TV ads were in Spanish. Romero's campaign manager Marc Silverman suggested such ads were redundant, since most Hispanic voters watch mainstream English TV.²³

On the Republican side, Heather Wilson ran seventeen TV ads, four in Spanish. Positive ads stressed projects she secured for New Mexico, achievements in education and for seniors, and her support among Democrats. Aside from those mentioned above refuting Romero's campaign tactics, other negative Wilson ads discussed Romero's missing vote record during his state Senate tenure and his support of "social promotion" in education, themes also conveyed in Wilson's radio ads. The four Spanish spots (two negative and two positive) stressed themes similar to the English ads. One positive ad highlighted her support for jobs, education, health care, national security, and emphasized that she was good for the

¹⁷ Miguel Navrot, "Incumbency Benefited Wilson," *Albuquerque Journal*, November 6, 2004, p. A1.

¹⁸ Heather Wilson is the only woman veteran serving in Congress.

¹⁹ These were placed in the *Albuquerque Journal* on October 16 and 17.

²⁰ Navrot, "Incumbency Benefited Heather Wilson," p. A1.

²¹ Leslie Hoffman, "Wilson, Romero Spar Over Education, Government Spending in First Debate," *Albuquerque Journal*, September 12, 2004, (abqjournal.com/elex/apdebat09-12-04.htm [January 19, 2005]).

²² Leslie Hoffman, "Wilson Goes After Romero Ad, Statements About Terrorism," *Albuquerque Journal*, October 11, 2004, (abqjournal.com/elex/apwilson10-11-04.htm [January 19, 2005]).

²³ Marc Silverman, campaign manager, Committee to Elect Richard M. Romero, interview by Nancy Carrillo, Albuquerque, N.M., November 5, 2004.

Hispanic community. The other ad demonstrated with testimonials her support among Democrats. The negative ads emphasized Romero's skipped statehouse votes, his record on education, and his Osama bin Laden comment. The three NRCC TV ads were entirely negative, addressing Romero's policies regarding education, crime, and unfair tactics mentioned above. The only interest group known to participate in the air war in this race was the United Seniors Association, which ran two TV ads and at least one radio ad. Both TV ads featured Art Linkletter praising Congress for passing the Medicare Drug Benefit. No candidates' names were mentioned, but Linkletter was a familiar face to New Mexicans from the 2002 campaign when he supported Wilson.

Here, as in other races, getting citizens in friendly areas registered and voting was stressed much more highly than trying to win over those of the opposite persuasion. According to campaign manager Marc Silverman, Romero's campaign focused on starting the campaign earlier this time around and reaching women and Albuquerque's South Valley, a highly Hispanic and Democratic area. The Romero campaign utilized New Mexican volunteers from the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), and the Sierra Club in a highly organized get-out-the-vote (GOTV) effort.²⁴ Silverman gives much credit to these groups for registering voters. The Romero campaign also sought to bring voters to the polls using both live, positive phone calls and recorded, negative phone calls. These calls targeted all voters except registered Republicans. We the People made at least two different attack phone calls linking Wilson with Tom DeLay and requesting listeners to contact Wilson to demand she rescind the contributions he made to her campaign. The New House PAC also made phone calls on Romero's behalf and put up a billboard encouraging voters to "stop the outsourcing of American jobs vote Democrat for Congress." On the Republican side, the incumbent candidate was mostly responsible for her own canvassing and regularly did precinct walks with GOP state legislative candidates. In addition, the Albuquerque Fire Fighters also made recorded phone calls attacking Romero and supporting Wilson.

The candidates and parties were quite active with mail advertising, though in different ways. Among Republicans, Wilson, the NRCC, and the GOPNM were active mailers. Wilson used her franking privilege to send a legislative update on veteran's issue and a letter informing the reader of casework opportunities. Among her six mass campaign ads, several stressed traditionally Democratic issues in a local context, such as jobs, education, and the environment. Other ads discussed her positions on national security and veteran or military issues. All were mostly positive. The NRCC's four mailings, on the other hand, were almost entirely negative, addressing education, abortion, and taxes. The GOPNM sent nineteen pieces of mail for the Congressional election. On the positive side, these mailings addressed Wilson's accomplishments in veteran affairs, education, employment, national security, seniors, and local environmental issues. One mailing featuring John McCain stressed her independence, a clear response to Romero and the DCCC's ads. On the negative side, they attacked Romero for his lack of character and experience, missing votes in the New Mexico Senate, education policy, and his positions on crime and taxes. One ad makes it known that the "ultra-liberal group that opposed the war in Afghanistan and sought to cut funding from our troops," MoveOn, endorsed Romero. Another negative ad suggested that Romero's attacks on Wilson constituted "patronizing condescension" toward women, calling for "a warning to New Mexico women." Commenting on the large number of veterans in the district, Peter Valcarce, Wilson's direct-mail consultant indicated, "[Veterans are] probably the one group that provides the swing more than any other." In addition to targeting veterans, Wilson's mail was also heavily targeted towards "soft Republicans" (attacking Romero on taxes), independents (on education), "soft Democrats" (on Wilson's environmental work), seniors (on the Republican prescription drug bill), and women (on education).²⁵

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Peter Valcarce, president, Arena Communications, interview by Gary Bryner and Quin Monson, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 5, 2004.

Among Democrats, the DCCC took the lead in mailings, sending out ten ads to voters. The positive ads stressed Democratic issues like health care and education, often featuring endorsements from New Mexico's highly popular Governor Richardson. Negative ads reiterated the similarities between Wilson and Bush. The Romero campaign itself did not focus on mail, printing only one flyer that was distributed when canvassing. Two other mailings invited contributors to fund-raising rallies. The DPNM sent one invitation to a fund-raiser for Romero and included his name on a door hanger. The Democratic Party of Santa Fe included a full-page ad for Romero in a newspaper insert printed the Sunday before the election.

Interest groups took advantage of mail advertising to provide voters with information regarding the policy positions and voting records of candidates. Interestingly, among Wilson allies, almost all the mail advertising avoided Romero's name completely. Two ostensibly senior organizations, the Seniors Coalition and United Seniors Association sent two mailings each, both groups praising Wilson for her work on Medicare prescription drug benefits. The NRA creatively advertised on the plastic bag used for home delivery with the *Albuquerque Journal*. The National Association of Home Builders sent a detailed brochure supporting Wilson's policy positions on tax relief, support of small businesses, and health care. Project Protect published one full-page color ad in the *Albuquerque Journal* praising Wilson for supporting the Healthy Forests Restoration Act.²⁶ The National Right to Life sent two comparison pieces regarding abortion to voters, one bilingual.

Among Romero allies, several environmental, public accountability, citizen rights and labor groups sent mail (often booklets) detailing Romero's and/or Wilson's record for their particular issue, including the LCV, Peace Action, Defenders of Wildlife, Humane USA, Public Citizen, the HRC, Marijuana Policy Project, and the New Mexico Federation of Educational Employees.

On the other hand, some mail merely included Romero's name and picture under the Democratic presidential candidates on GOTV mailings, such as that sent by the Sierra Club. The LCV also canvassed for Romero after an October poll showed him only one point behind Wilson. This canvassing was done the last two weeks of the campaign and was a pro-Romero and anti-Wilson piece that went only to those identified in the canvass as Kerry supporters. When the last pre-election news poll came out showing he had bumped back down, LCV stopped their activity, figuring it would provide little help.²⁷

Conclusion

In the end, the race looked very much like that of 2002. The candidates spent significantly more money in 2004, but the issues for Wilson and Romero remained the same. Wilson talked about her accomplishments in Washington, education, defense, and senior issues. She attacked Romero for missed votes and lack of character. Likewise Romero focused on his experience as an educator, veteran, and state Senate leader. His attacks on Wilson focused on her lack of independence from Bush and Republican leaders. Wilson, as in 2002, had the upper hand. She painted Romero as unprepared for Congress, lacking in both knowledge and character due to Romero's own campaigning mistakes. She also successfully beat down accusations that her ties to Bush were too strong. Also, it is clear there were no coattails for Romero from Kerry's race. While Kerry won the congressional district with 51 percent of the vote, Romero only received 46 percent of the vote.²⁸

Given the character of the New Mexico First Congressional District, it is likely this district will continue to remain a target for Democrats, especially given the very few competitive possibilities in the House of

²⁶ *Albuquerque Journal*, October 17, 2004.

²⁷ Margaret Toulouse, campaign director, LCV New Mexico State, telephone interview by Lonna Atkeson, December 21, 2004.

²⁸ Calculated from precinct data provided by the New Mexico Secretary of State's office.

Representatives nationwide. In addition, mistakes by the candidate are believed to be a major factor for Romero's loss, suggesting that another candidate may be able to compete more effectively. The district has a long history of Republican control, however, and Democrats may need to consider more carefully why district voters are so willing to cross party lines and what that means for candidate recruitment efforts and campaign strategy.

**Table 18-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, 2002 and 2004**

Contributions:	Wilson 2002	Wilson 2004	Percent Change	Romero 2002	Romero 2004	Percent Change
PACs	\$1,122,251	\$1,285,215	14.5	\$342,825	\$412,653	20.1
Individuals	\$1,503,693	\$1,798,989	19.6	\$891,092	\$1,631,912	83.3
National Party Organization	\$76,680	\$99,993	30.4	\$10,652	\$11,193	5.1
Candidate	\$0	\$0	0	\$1,600	\$0	-1600
Other	\$32,854	\$204,042	621.1	\$7,206	\$8,971	-9.5
Total Receipts	\$2,735,478	\$3,388,239	23.9	\$1,253,375	\$2,064,729	64.7
Total Expenditures	\$2,728,165	\$3,328,561	22.0	\$1,209,545	\$1,990,918	62.8
Cash on hand	\$54,435	\$114,112	1560.4	\$43,829	\$143,413	327.2

Source: Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 28, 2004]).

**Table 18-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee,
New Mexico 1st Congressional District Race, 2003-04**

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DCCC	NM 1	Richard Romero	\$1,023,664	...	\$1,023,664	\$1,250,111
	NM 1	Heather Wilson	...	\$226,447	\$226,447	
NRCC	NM 1	Richard Romero	...	\$966,850	\$966,850	\$1,012,390
	NM 1	Heather Wilson	\$45,540	...	\$45,540	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ [January 5, 2005]).

Table 18-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
New Mexico1st Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Romero for Congress	\$772,879	...	\$772,879	\$1,661,226
<i>Political parties</i>				
DCCC	\$899,090	...	\$899,090	\$908,037
<i>Interest groups</i>				
The Media Fund	\$378,324	\$37,235	\$415,559	\$1,034,567
AFSCME	\$215,895	...	\$215,895	...
MoveOn.org	\$136,555	...	\$136,555	\$308,035
American Family Voices	\$98,030	...	\$98,030	\$32,438
American Federation of Teachers	...	\$73,490	\$73,490	...
New Democratic Network	\$66,500	...	\$66,500	\$88,803
National Air Traffic Controllers	\$36,080	...	\$36,080	\$44,417
American Federation of Government Employees	...	\$20,987	\$20,987	...
Heritage Forest Campaign	\$14,800	\$2,415	\$17,215	...
League of Conservation Voters	\$16,590	...	\$16,590	\$49,590
Save Our Environment	\$15,700	...	\$15,700	\$48,656
TrueMajority.org	...	\$14,955	\$14,955	...
Stronger America Now	\$12,505	...	\$12,505	\$13,554
National Resource Defense Council	\$14,650	...	\$14,650	\$32,198
National Progress Fund	\$5,700	...	\$5,700	...
Moving America Forward	...	\$1,120	\$1,120	...
AFL-CIO	\$173,091
People for the American Way	\$1,204
Republican allies^c				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Heather Wilson for Congress	\$1,398,682	\$63,552	\$1,462,234	\$2,270,718
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRCC	\$1,024,705	...	\$1,024,705	\$779,702
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth	\$895,655	...	\$895,655	\$741,055
Progress for America	\$826,015	\$16,215	\$842,230	\$846,117
November Fund	\$206,290	...	\$206,290	...
United Seniors Association	\$149,975	\$7,200	\$157,175	\$225,836
National Rifle Association	...	\$14,409	\$14,409	...
Priests for Life	...	\$9,800	\$9,800	...
American Family Coalition	...	\$3,030	\$3,030	...
National Right to Life	...	\$3,000	\$3,000	...
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$56,591
Alliance for Quality Nursing Home Care	\$54,687
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Compare Decide Vote	\$28,825	...	\$28,825	...
New Mexico Alliance for Legal Reform	\$28,510	...	\$28,510	...
The Latino Coalition	...	\$11,400	\$11,400	...
JustGoVote.org	\$9,628	...	\$9,628	...
American Civil Liberties Union	...	\$2,700	\$2,700	...

Type and Organization ^b	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
People Who Believe the Truth Really Matters	\$1,560	...	\$1,560	...
New Mexico Sees	...	\$1,500	\$1,500	...
AARP	\$84,198

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 18-4.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. For instance, Progress for America Voter Fund data have been included in the Progress for America totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 18-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
New Mexico 1st Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^b								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Committee to Elect Richard M. Romero	3	3	...	1	4	...	10	21
<i>Political parties</i>								
DCCC	...	10	5	15
Democratic Party of New Mexico	...	3	3
Democratic Party of Santa Fe County	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>								
League of Conservation Voters	...	2	2
New Mexico Federation of Education Employees	...	2	2
We the People	2	2
Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund	...	1	1
Human Rights Campaign	...	1	1
Humane USA PAC	...	1	1
Marijuana Policy Project	...	1	1
New House PAC	1	1
New Mexicans for Political Accountability	1							1
Peace Action	...	1	1
Public Citizen	...	1	1
Sierra Club	...	1	1
Republican allies^b								
<i>Candidates</i>								
Heather Wilson for Congress	...	8	2	2	17	29
Congresswoman Heather Wilson (taxpayer expense)	...	2	2
<i>Political parties</i>								
Republican Party of New Mexico	...	19	19
NRCC	...	4	3	7
<i>Interest groups</i>								
United Seniors Association	...	2	1	2	5
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	3	3
National Right to Life	...	2	2
The Seniors Coalition	...	2	2
Albuquerque Area Fire Fighters Union	1	1
National Association of Home Builders	...	1	1
National Pro-Life Alliance	...	1	1
NRA Political Victory Fund	...	1	1
Project Protect	1	1

Type and Organization	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Seniors for America	1	1
Nonpartisan								
<i>Interest groups</i>								
JustGoVote.org	...	2	2
AARP	...	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 18-3.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

The Pennsylvania Thirteenth Congressional District Race

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The contest for the open seat in Pennsylvania's Thirteenth Congressional District was expected to be among the most competitive of the thirty-five or so races being watched nationwide. In the end, Democrat Allyson Schwartz won the seat by a wide margin, 56 percent to 41 percent, over her Republican competitor Melissa Brown. The end result masks a fascinating story, though. This seat is in an area with one of the most moderate electorates in the nation. It was considered an important swing district in the presidential race and, thus, received a significant amount of attention by a variety of candidates, parties and groups. Also, the general election results mask other important dimensions of the race: both candidates weathered expensive and competitive primaries; interest group activity proved critical in the primary and summertime campaign season but less so in the fall; and the decision by another comfortable incumbent member of Congress in an adjacent district not to seek reelection at a late date (the end of July) significantly changed the view of the importance of this race, especially among the Washington-based players.

Demographics

The Thirteenth District is an especially wealthy, educated district. It contains portions of the city of Philadelphia (most of the northeast section) and northern and eastern portions of Montgomery County, the suburban area immediately west of Philadelphia. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the district is more female, older, racially homogeneous (white), educated, and wealthier than the U.S. population overall.¹ The district contains 166,966 registered Republicans and 176,132 registered Democrats.² Still, registration does not mean much in this suburban area, where voters are fond of splitting their tickets.

Brief History of the Pennsylvania Thirteenth Congressional District

The Thirteenth District was represented by Democrat Joe Hoeffel from 1998 to 2004. Hoeffel decided not to seek reelection in 2004 in favor of seeking election to the U.S. Senate against Republican incumbent Arlen Specter. Hoeffel's unsuccessful Senate bid left his House seat open in the 2004 election cycle. Even if Hoeffel had not vacated the seat, all eyes would have been on this race, as Hoeffel's margins had always been extremely thin (1998: 51.5 percent; 2000: 52.7 percent; 2002: 50.9 percent).³ One reason for Hoeffel's bare margins was the historic Republican registration advantage, especially in Montgomery County. After the 2000 election, the district underwent considerable change due to redistricting. Pennsylvania lost two congressional seats, and because of population shifts, the Philadelphia area was destined to lose one seat. The new Thirteenth District did contain Hoeffel's stronghold of Abington but did not include other areas that supported him previously, such as the townships of the Main Line suburbs. Instead, Hoeffel inherited northeast Philadelphia, and he was unfamiliar with much of the area.

¹ U.S. Census Bureau, "U.S. Census Fast Facts for Congress," (fastfacts.census.gov/servlet/CWSFacts?geo_id=50000US4213&_sse=on [December 22, 2004]).

² Brian Reimels, "Too Hot in the Kitchen: Melissa Brown's 2004 Congressional Campaign," Temple University, November 17, 2004.

³ Calculated by author (Kolodny) from "Election Statistics" from the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, (clerk.house.gov/members/electionInfo [January 11, 2005]); see also Michael Barone and Richard E. Cohen, *Almanac of American Politics*, (Washington, D.C.: National Journal Group, 2004) and *CQ's Politics in America 2002* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2001).

In 2002 Ophthalmologist Melissa Brown challenged Hoeffel and garnered an impressive 49 percent of the vote with the help of a significant (\$915,000) donation to her own campaign.⁴ With her impressive showing, Brown and Republicans in the area and in Washington were prepared for her to run again in 2004.

When Hoeffel decided on a Senate bid, the Democratic field opened up, and two significant candidates emerged: Joe Torsella, former deputy mayor to then Mayor (now Governor) Ed Rendell and president and CEO of the National Constitution Center, and fourth-term State Senator Allyson Schwartz. Schwartz did not reside in the Thirteenth District, though she lived in nearby Mt. Airy and her Senate district overlapped with a significant portion of the current Thirteenth District.

The Candidates

The race featured two major party candidates, Democrat Allyson Schwartz and Republican Melissa Brown, and two minor party candidates, the Constitution Party's John McDermott and the Libertarian Party's Chuck Moulton.

Democrat

Schwartz is a textbook liberal Democrat. She was elected to the State Senate in 1990 and is strongly associated with health care and child welfare issues. She was the driving force behind the state's Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Schwartz is also pro-choice and Jewish. These latter two factors made her very attractive for investment from national constituencies. She was one of the feature candidates for EMILY's List, whose involvement in the race ranged from fund-raising to direct campaigning through mailings. The organization's loan of staff alone was both significant and extensive.

In addition, Schwartz made a credible bid for the Democratic nomination for the U.S. Senate in 2000 and from that experience was well known to national party committees and groups. Schwartz's state Senate incumbency and prior U.S. Senate bid gave her valuable experience in understanding how to run a congressional race. She had a large, well-funded, and well-directed electoral organization from early in 2004. Indeed, Schwartz had five full-time paid staff in the fund-raising department and averaged 20 full-time paid canvassers from July to November.⁵ In addition, every single one of these employees received health care benefits from Schwartz. Though this might have been an expensive move, the result was to create a dedicated, motivated, and extremely professional operation. That Schwartz raised over \$4.5 million (the fourth highest among all U.S. House candidates and the most for any non-incumbent as of the pre-election filing) is a testament to the wisdom of this strategy.⁶ The significant win also bears this out.

Republican

Brown is a well-respected physician with deep roots in the district. She is a moderate Republican who is pro-choice, but the fact that she and her husband are both physicians gave her instant credibility and funding from a critical core constituency. Her profession also explains why the American Medical Association (AMA) got involved in this race. Having come close to beating an incumbent member of Congress in 2002, Brown seemed the obvious favorite in the Republican primary election. However State

⁴ Center for Responsive Politics, "Total Raised and Spent, 2002 Race: Pennsylvania District 13," (www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.asp?ID=PA13&Cycle=2002 [December 13, 2004]).

⁵ Valerie Martin, finance director, Allyson Schwartz for Congress, telephone interview by Robin Kolodny, November 17, 2004.

⁶ See Federal Election Commission, "Congressional Campaigns Spend \$711 Million Through Pre-Election Period," (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20041028canstat/20041028canstat.html [October 28, 2004]).

Representative Ellen Bard and businessman Al Taubenberger entered the primary as well, and Brown did not have the easy time gaining the nomination that she thought she would. Brown received 38.8 percent of the vote, Bard received 34.8 percent, and Taubenberger received 26.4 percent.⁷

Once the primary was concluded, it was clear that Brown would face a very different race against Schwartz than she had against Hoeffel. For one thing, Schwartz was prepared for a tough challenge from Brown, learning from Hoeffel's experience in 2002. For another, Brown's early decision not to invest her own money in the race (see below) lessened much of the energy coming out of Brown's campaign organization this time compared to 2002.

Money

While this race was expected to attract considerable spending from all sectors, the candidates' own spending was ultimately more significant than either party or interest group money. The early lead Schwartz managed over Brown as well as the other competitive races in the region accounts for this.

Candidate

The most important story behind the candidate fund-raising in this race was Brown's personal wealth. She contributed \$915,000 to her own race in 2002—the question was whether she would this time.⁸ Obviously, the presence of any millionaire in a race draws attention from the opponent, but this would be the first cycle in which the “Millionaires' Amendment” in the new Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) would apply. Under BCRA, if one candidate decided to use their personal funds in a federal race, the opponent(s) would be entitled to higher donation limits from individuals. The trigger amount for higher limits in a House race is \$350,000. Once a candidate files an intent to spend beyond the threshold (which must be given to the Federal Election Commission within twenty-four hours of such an expenditure), the opposing candidate may accept individual contributions at three times the normal limit (raised from \$2,000 to \$6,000), and the national and state party committees may spend unlimited amounts of coordinated expenditures *provided* that the total fund-raising by the opponent (called the Opposition Personal Funds Amount) does not exceed the total fund-raising (with personal funds) of the millionaire candidate.⁹

After the primary, Brown decided that she would not invest her own money in the campaign as she had in 2002.¹⁰ This was only known to top campaign intimates, and would account for the major reason that this campaign remained questionably competitive (i.e. the “Would she or wouldn't she” aspect of self-financing made all sides uncertain until Election Day when a last-minute “surprise” investment could occur). In the end, Brown raised \$1,938,043, slightly more than she did in 2002 (\$1,606,950). She gave herself only 9 percent of total receipts (\$175,000), raised 52 percent from individuals, and received 33 percent from PACs, with medical professional associations leading her donors. (See table 19-1.) However, Brown spent nearly half of this money just getting through the primary, and thus only had about \$900,000 in the general election. By the end of October, the Brown campaign was so short of funds

⁷ Pennsylvania Department of State, “Official 2004 General Primary Results, Representative in Congress for District 13,” (web.dos.state.pa.us/cgi-bin/ElectionResults/district2.cgi?choice=USC&district=13&eyear=2004&etype=P). [December 13, 2004].

⁸ Center for Responsive Politics, “Total Raised and Spent, 2002 Race: Pennsylvania District 13,” (www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.asp?ID=PA13&Cycle=2002) [December 13, 2004].

⁹ Federal Election Commission 2004, “Millionaires Amendment,” (www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/millionaire.shtml#Introduction) [December 5, 2004].

¹⁰ Matthew Archbold, press secretary, Melissa Brown for Congress Campaign, telephone interview by Robin Kolodny, November 5, 2004.

that they had nothing left to invest in TV advertisements and almost went “dark” the last two weeks before Election Day.¹¹

The Schwartz campaign was prepared for the Millionaire’s Amendment in a variety of ways. First, the possibility of Brown’s self-financing helped Schwartz persuade more donors up front. Since Brown was only required to give twenty-four-hours notice of self-funding, Schwartz could credibly say to potential donors that she had to be ready far in advance of such a decision. Second, the finance staff became extremely familiar with the amendment and drafted fund-raising appeals in case they were needed on extremely short notice. The threat of Brown’s spending contributed to the collection of \$4,561,777 by Schwartz. She raised 85 percent of this amount from individuals, 15 percent from PACs, and loaned no money to her campaign.¹² Indeed, her fund-raising success was so significant that she would probably not have qualified for the increased donor limits given the size of her Opposition Personal Funds. Still, the threat of Brown’s investment explains why the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and outside groups continued to invest in the race, even though poll numbers in September were showing that the race was not tight.

Party

Obviously, both parties were very much aware of the uncertainty regarding Brown’s personal wealth. However, the investment made by the parties depended very much on other important political considerations in the Philadelphia area. Ultimately, the DCCC and the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) both made coordinated expenditures and independent expenditures in this race, but this money included no TV on the Democratic side and only a small buy on the Republican side.

Brown’s campaign benefited from \$40,322 of coordinated expenditures made by the NRCC and independent expenditures of \$793,956 (that includes 484,422 spent to support Brown and \$309,534 to oppose Schwartz, see table 19-2). The NRCC spent the vast majority of this money on direct mail, but some of it went to TV ads and some may have gone to phone banks. The DCCC spent \$36,236 in coordinated expenditures for Schwartz and \$795,643 in independent expenditures.¹³ According to Schwartz’s finance director, the campaign believed that about a million dollars was spent by the NRCC against them and about a million dollars spent for them from the DCCC. The Schwartz campaign was not aware of any TV time purchased by the DCCC, and, in fact, we could find no evidence of any TV buys.¹⁴ However, we did find radio time and mailers the DCCC purchased for Schwartz.

As detailed below, mail was the major weapon of choice for both party committees. But as in the days of issue advocacy appeals, the NRCC made one important error in its mail which may have hurt Brown. The NRCC designed two negative mailers criticizing Schwartz for her views on abortion. One mailer asked: “Want to hear something scary? Allyson Schwartz has been called the ‘...abortion rights community’s dream candidate...’ (Philadelphia Inquirer, Op-ED by Larry Eichel, 3/29/00.)” The other chastised Schwartz for opposing parental notification requirements for minors saying “It’s clear Allyson Schwartz doesn’t value an unborn life, but why doesn’t she value parents’ rights? Allyson Schwartz—Wrong for

¹¹ Archbold interview, November 5, 2004.

¹² Center for Responsive Politics, “Total Raised and Spent: 2004 Race – Pennsylvania District 13,” (www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.asp?ID=PA13&cycle=2004 [January 4, 2004]); and Martin interview, November 17, 2004.

¹³ Federal Election Commission, “Congressional Campaigns Spend \$912 Million Through Late November,” press release, January 3, 2005, (www.fec.gov [January 4, 2005]).

¹⁴ Martin, finance director, Allyson Schwartz for Congress, telephone interview by Robin Kolodny, November 17, 2004.

Pennsylvania.” The problem was that both candidates were pro-choice. When Planned Parenthood members received the mailing, the organization contacted the Brown campaign, threatening to withdraw its support (they had endorsed both candidates). Once the Brown campaign convinced them that the NRCC, and not Brown, was responsible for the mail, Planned Parenthood kept the endorsement, but made an additional PAC donation to Schwartz.¹⁵

There was a great deal of ambiguity around the party committees’ role in this race because of the expensive media market and the number of competitive congressional races vying for time in it. We found a number of early ad buys made by both the NRCC and the DCCC, but it was often unclear (deliberately, we now understand) what race the time would support. Below, we discuss the reasons for this.

Interest Groups

The number of interest groups involved in this race was fewer than in previous elections in this district. Notable absences included the Human Rights Campaign (they endorsed both candidates), Planned Parenthood (with the exception of the PAC donation noted above), NARAL Pro-Choice America, the Sierra Club and to a lesser extent, AARP.¹⁶ All these groups previously spent significant funds for issue advocacy campaigns (both TV and direct mail) but in this cycle, their contribution was trivial by comparison. Interest group involvement in the 2004 race was primarily a factor of Schwartz’s record in the state Senate, the salience of health and health care issues, and the presidential race. There were a total of twelve groups active on behalf of Schwartz and only three groups on behalf of Brown. While it is difficult to generalize, the support that Schwartz received from groups suggests that they believed she had a greater chance of winning than Brown. Most interest group activity consisted of door-to-door canvassing, door hangers, polls, phone calls, mailings, and in-kind contributions. Though both candidates raised most of their funds from individual contributors, Brown was more dependent on PAC contributions than Schwartz. Brown received \$648,106 (or 33 percent of total funds raised) mostly from health-related PACs. By contrast, Schwartz received \$680,037 (or 15 percent of total funds raised) from a variety of PACs, especially unions, followed by health, children and education-related committees, and trial lawyers.¹⁷

Much was made of EMILY’s List’s (a.k.a. Pennsylvania Women Vote!) endorsement of Schwartz. By all accounts the group was one of the most visible ones during the general election campaign. The level of the group’s involvement seems extreme because both candidates were pro-choice. However, EMILY’s List’s activities during the general campaign must be understood as part of a well thought-out, long-term strategy on behalf of Schwartz that began with the primary campaign. As Karen White, the political director of EMILY’s List indicated, the group got involved in the primary campaign after Hoeffel decided not to run, because Schwartz was the only woman running in the Democratic primary, and the group’s mission is to support pro-choice Democratic women. Schwartz was an especially attractive candidate because of her solid record during her fourteen years in the state Senate, especially her pivotal role in the enactment of Pennsylvania’s Children’s Insurance Program (CHIP) and the requirement that child care providers undergo criminal background checks.¹⁸ Because of the high cost of the Philadelphia TV market which “would keep Schwartz off the air until late in the game” and the largely inconsequential

¹⁵ Archbold interview, November 5, 2004.

¹⁶ Robin Kolodny and Sandra L. Suarez, “Air Wars versus Ground Wars: Pennsylvania’s 13th District,” in *Campaigns and Elections*, edited by Robert P. Watson and Colton C. Campbell (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

¹⁷ Federal Election Commission, “FEC Disclosure Database,” (www.fec.gov [December 2004]).

¹⁸ Karen White, national political director, EMILY’s List, telephone interview by Sandra Suarez, November 18, 2004.

presidential primary which could depress turnout in Schwartz's primary race against Joe Torsella, the group decided that door-to-door canvassing would be the best way to introduce Schwartz to the voters. They knocked on a total of 106,000 doors along with a "targeted mail" (280,000 pieces) and a voter identification canvas to find out those that were sympathetic to Schwartz and then 69,000 phone calls. The group conducted two polls, one in January (a benchmark poll costing between \$20,000 and \$25,000) and a less expensive one in April, to make sure that the preferences of the targeted voters had not changed. Canvassing began on January 29 and ran through Election Day. There were about eighteen people active in the canvassing effort.¹⁹ Newspaper reports suggested that EMILY's List's involvement during the primary was the main reason why Schwartz "outpaced" her Democratic primary challenger in fund-raising. By April, Schwartz had outspent Torsella by \$700,000. Of that, \$358,000 reportedly came from EMILY's List donors.²⁰

EMILY's List was seemingly less involved during the general election campaign because they decided they had "done enough to get the word out about Schwartz" and that what she needed at this point was help with her fund-raising. For this purpose, the group makes use of what they refer to as "finance trackers." These finance trackers are "not really working for the campaign" (i.e. they are not in-kind contributions). They "pop in and out of campaigns" and report back to the Washington office regarding the state of a candidate's finances and alert the group of the need to help raise more funds for their candidates. Finally, the group sent three pieces of mail highlighting Schwartz's work on behalf of children (sent to young voters), crime prevention programs, and the Patient's Bill of Rights. The group estimates that they spent approximately \$580,000 on behalf of Schwartz during both the primary and general campaigns.²¹

Other groups became involved in the campaign as a result of the relationship they had with Schwartz during her state senate years. The League of Conservation Voters (LCV) and Credit Union National Association (CUNA) are two such groups. According to the LCV, Schwartz "had a fantastic track record on state issues, when it came to environmental issues she was a leader."²² It is important to note the close relationship some group officials had with the campaign. For example, the LCV's Pennsylvania Field Officer was a member of Schwartz's candidate's fund-raising committee (as a private citizen). The group's most important concern was the presidential campaign, but the Congressional race was appealing because it was an open seat and the LCV had a successful past record in the district. As they explained, "money is limited, and you don't want a losing record so that your endorsement means nothing."²³ Thus, the group decided to support Schwartz as part of their strategy on behalf of Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry. Though the race seemed secure for Schwartz by October, the group nonetheless produced a door hanger on her behalf at a cost of \$10,000.²⁴ The hanger was also highly negative towards Brown, suggesting that she had engaged in fraudulent activities and reminding the voters that she had received a "Sleazy Award for her racially divisive campaign" by a *Philadelphia Inquirer* columnist. CUNA also got involved in the campaign because "Senator Schwartz was a supporter of credit unions during her years in Harrisburg." They sent out three pieces of mail at a cost of approximately \$75,000. Two pieces highlighted Schwartz's work on behalf of children, and one detailed the ways in which the candidate would help create jobs in Pennsylvania.²⁵

¹⁹ All figures obtained from White interview, November 18, 2004.

²⁰ Quoted in David Davies, "Schwartz-Torsella a Tough Choice for Democrats," *Philadelphia Daily News*, April 20, 2004, Internet Edition; White interview, November 18, 2004.

²¹ White interview, November 18, 2004.

²² Susan Gobreski, Pennsylvania state director, League of Conservation Voters, telephone interview by Sandra Suarez, November 9, 2004.

²³ Gobreski interview, November 9, 2004.

²⁴ Federal Election Commission, "FEC Disclosure Database" (www.fec.gov [December 2004]).

²⁵ Karen Kincer, political director, government affairs department, Credit Union National Association, telephone interview by Sandra Suarez, November 8, 2004.

The four groups involved in the race on behalf of Brown were the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), the American Academy of Ophthalmology (OPHTHPAC), the AMA, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Early in the campaign, the NFIB sent out a questionnaire to both Brown and Schwartz. According to the group, “Brown’s answers came closest to our interests.”²⁶ They presented this information to their members in the district, and Brown received a “solid endorsement.” The group’s strategy on behalf of the candidate included a mailing to their members, a walking tour that sought to introduce Brown to small business owners in the area, and finally a mailing to small business owners, both members and non-members. One of the mailings argued that Brown wanted to reform “unfair medical malpractice laws . . . which can be a major burden to small business.” The second piece dealt with health insurance.²⁷ OPHTHPAC had an independent expenditure of \$8,000.²⁸ It sent out one piece of mail pointing out that “hospitals across southeastern Pennsylvania are now limiting their services” due to runaway lawsuits. Finally, the AMA conducted a poll in mid-September that indicated that the race was neck and neck, that Brown’s negatives were low, and her name recognition was at par with Schwartz’s. The group then decided to enter the race because of Brown’s long-time support for the AMA and her position on medical liability insurance. However, the Thirteenth District was the only race in which the group did not spend any money on TV and radio because it felt that the cost of broadcast advertising in Pennsylvania was prohibitive and because “we are just talking about a House race.”²⁹ Their two mail pieces were targeted to poll respondents who were swing voters and Brown supporters and they spent a total of \$100,000 in this race. The mailings dealt with the high cost of medical insurance in Pennsylvania.³⁰ The U.S. Chamber of Commerce sent three mailers and a door hanger, but the targeted area must have been small as no member of our network received them. Indeed, the Brown campaign seemed unaware of significant Chamber activity when asked about this point specifically. The mailers emphasized medical liability reform, economic growth and job creation, and health care. They were mostly pro-Brown, though some pieces contrasted the two candidates.

Effects of Money

The Thirteenth District story shows how political calculations by candidates, groups and parties can shape the effectiveness of both ground and air wars in political campaigns. Overall Brown’s campaign suffered from a lack of money and support among key allies (interest groups and parties) at critical times, a significant gap in financial resources between the candidates that favored Schwartz, and a lack of momentum by Brown leading up to Election Day. Combined, these factors significantly hampered Brown’s ability to conduct an effective ground and air war.

The Ground War

The most significant dimension of the ground war was the efficient, sizeable, and consistent canvassing operation run by Schwartz. Although other groups hired canvassers at times to help her campaign (specifically EMILY’s List and the LCV), the outside groups largely abandoned their efforts by mid-September since their sense of the race (through polls taken or obtained through others) was that the race had widened and Schwartz’s lead was secure. In addition, the adjacent congressional districts had more

²⁶ Eric Rosedahl, regional political director, Northeast Region, National Federation of Independent Business, telephone interview by Sandra Suarez, November 8, 2004.

²⁷ Rosedahl interview, November 8, 2004.

²⁸ Federal Election Commission, “FEC Disclosure Database” (www.fec.gov [December 2004]).

²⁹ Mike Cys, director of political and legislative grassroots, American Medical Association Political Action Committee (AMPAC), telephone interview by Sandra Suarez, December 9, 2004.

³⁰ Cys interview, December 9, 2004.

pressing needs (see below). Brown's canvassing operation was Spartan in contrast. Also, no other group appears to have done canvassing on her behalf.

The phones were relatively quiet in the Thirteenth District this election, especially for Brown. It appears that there was a minimal amount of phone banking from both Friends of Melissa Brown and the NRCC (one unique call). Moreover, there does not appear to be any significant activity from outside groups for Brown. While the phone tended to be used more by Schwartz's Democratic allies, it still was not heavily used as measured by our reconnaissance network. As evidenced in table 19-4, we recorded seven unique calls for Schwartz, and all of these calls came from Democratic ally interest groups such as New House PAC (a PAC "dedicated to supporting Democratic House candidates") and EMILY's List.³¹ Interestingly there does not appear to be any significant phone activity by either Schwartz for Congress or the DCCC.

Despite the apparent lack of phone banking, there was quite a bit of mail activity from the Brown campaign and the NRCC. As evidenced in table 19-4, the vast majority of mail that was sent either by or for Brown came from the NRCC. Overall, we discovered thirteen unique pieces of mail from the NRCC and seven unique pieces sent by Friends of Melissa Brown. The NRCC consistently claimed that Schwartz was "Wrong for Pennsylvania" and "Pennsylvania families" on the issues of taxes, crime, abortion, and health care. As previously discussed, other groups that were involved in mail were the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (three unique pieces), the AMA (three unique pieces), the NFIB (two unique pieces) and the OPHTHPAC (one unique piece). There was other mail activity outside of these groups, but it was considerably less than that of the NRCC and the candidate.

We also saw strong support from the DCCC for Schwartz in direct mail. Overall we discovered ten unique pieces of mail sent by the DCCC, but only three pieces from Allyson Schwartz for Congress. The DCCC mail linked Brown to the "Bush Agenda," highlighted Brown's involvement in an HMO "that was sued by the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner for fraud and conspiracy" and attacked her stance on prescription drug prices. Several interest groups sent mail including the AFL-CIO (three pieces); the Credit Union Legislative Action Council of CUNA (three pieces); and Pennsylvania Women Vote!, an EMILY's List project (three pieces). Other organizations were involved in get-out-the-vote (GOTV) and advocacy mail, but the majority of mail came from the DCCC and these interest groups. For a more detailed breakdown see table 19-4.

E-mail was also used by both candidates throughout the elections in addition to traditional mail. E-mail communications from both candidates tended to advertise events, seek support (both financial and volunteer), advertise their endorsements and accomplishments, and discuss policy positions. As evidenced in table 19-4, Friends of Melissa Brown sent fourteen unique e-mails between Labor Day and Election Day, while Schwartz sent fifteen e-mails during the same period. Outside of one e-mail sent by the NRCC supporting Brown, the parties were all but absent in advertising for the Thirteenth District.

Air War

The only significant TV presences in this race were the two candidates and the NRCC. However, this does not reveal a lack of support for Schwartz, but rather an acknowledgement that Schwartz had sufficient funds to cover her own TV buys whereas Brown clearly did not. Still, Brown was unable to convince the NRCC to make a major investment in TV. Indeed, the NRCC only bought a total of \$331,180 in network TV ads while Friends of Melissa Brown spent approximately \$708,653 on TV ads. In comparison, Schwartz spent \$1,161,925 on TV while the DCCC did not spend any money on TV ad-buys for this race. (See table 19-3.)

³¹ Center for Responsive Politics, "New House PAC, 2004 Election Cycle," (www.opensecrets.org/527s/527events.asp?orgid=18 [December 14, 2004]).

Interestingly, neither candidate nor the parties spent any money on cable TV as measured by visits to two separate Comcast stations. This finding is interesting given the size and expense of advertising in the Philadelphia broadcast market.³² As noted below, the Philadelphia market was considered a presidential swing state and home to a number of competitive races including a U.S. Senate race, four competitive U.S. House races in Pennsylvania, and three competitive U.S. House races in New Jersey. Because of the high demand for airtime on broadcast TV, it is a surprise that neither candidate purchased cable airtime.

Instead of investing in TV, the DCCC spent approximately \$104,100 on radio ad buys. Outside of the DCCC, no candidate or group spent any money on radio. We did see a significant radio purchase (approximately \$27,000) by Brown scheduled to run from October 27 to November 2, but it was cancelled shortly before the run date.³³ We believe this supports our contention (see below) that Brown severely depleted her funds early in the campaign and failed to gain support from allies such as the NRCC to compensate for this shortcoming.

Taken as a whole, we believe that the ad-buy numbers are somewhat deceiving. By simply examining how much money was spent, one overlooks when the money was spent. According to available data, the majority of Brown's TV ad-buy money was spent early in the campaign (late September to mid October), leaving very little money for the critical late October to early November ad buys. Overall, Brown spent roughly 5 percent of her total ad-buy money between October 24 and November 2, whereas Schwartz spent half of her total ad-buy money during the same period.³⁴ Moreover, although the DCCC did not spend any money on TV for Schwartz, the NRCC did not spend any money on TV for Brown between October 24 and November 2 either. It appears that the NRCC pulled out of the race by mid-October, opting to spend money on more competitive races. For example, according to our data collected from public records and confirmed through conversations with a major Philadelphia network TV station, the NRCC shifted an ad buy of about \$192,000 for the Thirteenth District to the Pennsylvania Sixth Congressional District sometime between October 8 and 13.³⁵

The result of this was a near absence of Brown commercials on TV and radio leading up to the election. Likewise, because Schwartz seemed to be more consistent with ad buys, which can be attributed to the overwhelming differentiation in financial resources between the two campaigns, the effect was a strong presence of Schwartz on the TV airwaves leading up to Election Day. Given the above findings, it appears that Schwartz had a significant advantage and decisive victory in the air war.

Unique Circumstances or Results During the Campaign

Besides Brown's millionaire question, this campaign was influenced by the dynamics in the two adjacent congressional districts. To the west, the Thirteenth District is bordered by the Sixth District, which was newly drawn in 2001. Jim Gerlach was elected to that seat in 2002 by a 51 percent margin, though the voter registration in that district favors Republicans by a larger margin.³⁶ This cycle, Gerlach was opposed

³² This information was gathered from the public political file from Comcast Montgomery County on September 23, 2004 and November 11, 2004 as well as a Comcast Spotlight on November 15, 2004.

³³ This information was gathered from the public political file from KYW News Radio 1060 AM on November 9, 2004.

³⁴ These percentages are intended to highlight the approximate amount of money spent by the candidates during the late October/early November timeframe based on actual/contracted broadcast date ranges falling primarily between October 24 and November 2. Please note that the collected ad-buy data did not always fit neatly into the above date range, therefore these percentages represent approximations only.

³⁵ This information was gathered from the public political file from WCAU NBC Channel 10, November 9, 2004, and December 9, 2004.

³⁶ Leonard N. Fleming, "All Eyes are on House Races in PA," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 30, 2004, p. A5.

by Lois Murphy, an attorney who formerly headed NARAL Pro-Choice Pennsylvania. The contrast between the two candidates was quite stark ideologically, and the incumbent again seemed quite vulnerable in a district which was also considered important for the presidential race. Therefore, both parties and a wider spectrum of groups participated in this race, especially buying TV time. The NRCC spent \$1,946,464 in independent expenditures and the DCCC spent \$1,417,629.³⁷

To the east and north, the Thirteenth District is bordered by the Eighth District. This seat had been held by popular and moderate Republican incumbent Jim Greenwood since 1992. Greenwood was expected to win reelection easily in 2004, but on July 19, Greenwood announced his intention to retire at the end of the 108th Congress.³⁸ His departure set off a fevered search for a Republican nominee and a close examination of the Democratic candidate Ginny Schrader. Thus, what was predicted to be a non-competitive, low-profile race became instantly competitive, especially since the eventual Republican nominee, Mike Fitzpatrick, was a conservative, pro-life Republican waging a campaign in a district that gave Al Gore its vote in 2000. The race became so critical that the NRCC spent \$2,270,296 in independent expenditures and the DCCC spent \$1,418,944.³⁹ As in the Sixth District, the Eighth District now had a pro-life Republican man facing a pro-choice Democratic woman, and groups who align on this issue focused their attention on either side of the Thirteenth District.

According to the Brown campaign, the strategic retirement of Greenwood dealt them a mortal blow. There are two reasons for this. First, campaign money is not infinite, and if the NRCC felt they had to commit several million dollars to the Eighth District, it had to come out of somewhere. It was the Brown campaign's belief that the NRCC invests in incumbents first (i.e. Gerlach in the Sixth District), followed by open seats held by Republicans (the Eighth District), followed by open seats held by Democrats (the Thirteenth District), before considering promising Republican challengers.⁴⁰ The second reason had to do with the special pressure put on the Philadelphia media market. In the month before Election Day, candidates, parties, and groups representing the following campaigns were trying to buy time in the Philadelphia area: both presidential candidates, the candidates for the U.S. Senate race in Pennsylvania, four competitive U.S. House races in Pennsylvania (the Sixth District, the Eighth District, the Thirteenth District, and the Fifteenth District) and three competitive U.S. House races in New Jersey. Given the demand, air time was both scarce and extremely expensive. We found in our first visits to TV stations that both the NRCC and DCCC were buying time in advance without indicating which race it would be used for, as the committees were unsure in August which of the four races would be worthy of investment.⁴¹ Our data now make it clear that both parties declined to spend much if any money on TV ads in the Thirteenth District. The Brown campaign's contention that the presence of a newly competitive race deprived them of the opportunity for NRCC investment, and thus stymied their own fund-raising efforts and hopes of buying more air time is indeed plausible.

³⁷ FEC, news release, January 3, 2005.

³⁸ Ben Pershing and Lauren W. Whittington, "Greenwood Set To Leave House: GOPer May Head Biotech Assoc.," *Roll Call*, July 20, 2004, (www.rollcall.com/issues/50_9/news/6307-1.html [January 28, 2005]).

³⁹ Federal Election Commission, "Congressional Campaigns Spend \$912 Million Through Late November," press release, January 3, 2005, (www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20050103canstat/20050103canstat.html [January 28, 2005]).

⁴⁰ The Brown campaign's assertion is well founded. See Robin Kolodny, *Pursuing Majorities: Congressional Campaign Committees in American Politics* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1998).

⁴¹ Peter Cari, Political Director, DCCC, telephone interview by Quin Monson and Betsey Gimbel, December 14, 2004.

Conclusion

The Thirteenth District has long been competitive, but it may now have an incumbent who can solidify her constituency behind her. We must emphasize how important Schwartz's own abilities were to the outcome of this race. Allyson Schwartz proved to be a prodigious fund-raiser, received important early endorsements from key groups, invested early in a substantial field operation, stressed more positive issues, and proved capable of running a competitive race without the DCCC's help late in the game. Melissa Brown never seemed to get a significant fund-raising operation going, did not develop an extensive field organization, ran a rather negative campaign, and could not convince the NRCC to invest in her campaign when other area races began to look more competitive. Hence, a number of factors lead to the outcome.

Table 19-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Pennsylvania 13th Congressional District Race, 2003-04

	Allyson Schwartz (D)	Melissa Brown (R)
From PACs	\$680,037	\$648,106
From individuals	\$3,880,862	\$1,014,596
From party	\$200	\$13,850
From candidate	\$0	\$175,000
Other contributions	\$678	\$86,491
Total receipts	\$4,561,777	\$1,938,043
Total expenditures	\$4,516,112	\$1,910,353
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$45,666	\$31,793

Source: Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 21, 2004]).

Table 19-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee,
Pennsylvania 13th Congressional District Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DCCC	PA 13	Melissa Brown	\$795,643
	PA 13	Allyson Schwartz	\$795,643	...	\$795,643	
NRCC	PA 13	Melissa Brown	\$484,422	...	\$484,422	\$793,956
	PA 13	Allyson Schwartz	...	\$309,534	\$309,534	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ January 5, 2005)].

Table 19-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Pennsylvania 13th Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Schwartz for Congress	\$1,161,925	...	\$1,161,925	\$2,541,145
<i>Political parties</i>				
DCCC	...	\$104,100	\$104,100	...
Republican allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Friends of Melissa Brown	\$708,653	...	\$708,653	\$1,003,851
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRCC	\$331,180	...	\$331,180	\$209,886

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 19-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 19-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Pennsylvania 13th Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	E-mail	Mail	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Schwartz for Congress	15	3	5	4	27
<i>Political parties</i>							
DCCC	...	10	1	...	11
Abington-Rockledge Democratic Committee	...	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>							
EMILY's List ^d	...	3	1	1	5
AFL-CIO	...	3	3
Credit Union Legislative Action Council of CUNA	...	3	3
ITC Research	2	2
New House PAC	2	2
American Federation of Teachers	...	1	1
Clean Water Action	...	1	1
League of Conservation Voters	1	1
National Organization for Women	...	1	1
The Pennsylvania Gay and Lesbian Alliance	...	1	1
USA Public Opinion Group	1	1
We the People	1	1
Republican allies^c							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Friends of Melissa Brown	14	7	6	1	...	3	31
<i>Political parties</i>							
NRCC	1	13	...	1	...	4	19
Lower Providence Republican Committee	...	1	1
Republican Federal Committee of Pennsylvania	...	1	1
Republican State Committee of Pennsylvania	...	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>							
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	3	1	4
American Medical Association	...	3 ^e	3
National Federation of Independent Business	...	2	2
American Academy of Ophthalmology PAC	...	1	1
Nonpartisan							
<i>Interest groups</i>							
Coalition for Peace Action	...	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray

comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 19-3.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, Pennsylvania AFL-CIO data have been included in the AFL-CIO totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "... " only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^d EMILY's List (also know as Pennsylvania Women Vote!) distributed three unique pieces of mail in the Thirteenth District. They also reported having a field program and doing phone calls in the district. Karen White, national political director, EMILY's List, interview by David Magleby and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 8, 2004.

^e Michael Cys, director of the AMA division of political action, American Medical Association, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2004.

A Blue Candidate Wins in a Red State: South Dakota's 2004 At-large House Race

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The 2004 South Dakota At-large congressional race began in January of 2004, when incumbent William Janklow vacated his House seat after being convicted of vehicular homicide. Soon after Janklow's resignation, Republican Governor Mike Rounds called a special election for June 1, 2004 to choose a successor. The race pitted Democrat Stephanie Herseth, a Georgetown-educated lawyer from a prominent political family who had recently served as executive director of the South Dakota Farmers Union Foundation,¹ against Republican Larry Diedrich, a state legislator, farmer, and former head of the American Soybean Association.² Herseth won the special election and both candidates continued their campaign for the general election to be held five months later.

South Dakota's Political Culture

South Dakota's political culture is bifurcated by the Missouri River. West River is sparsely populated by ranchers and is deeply conservative; East River is more densely populated by farms and population centers that hug the I-29 and I-90 corridors and is more likely to vote Democratic. The state contains nine Native American reservations, all of which vote overwhelmingly Democratic. Notwithstanding pockets of support for the Democratic Party east of the Missouri, Republicans hold a strong majority in the state's legislature and voter registration. Often, Republican candidates for state legislature run unopposed, and the Democratic Party does not have sufficient numbers to inhibit legislative action by the GOP. There are, however, rather strong populist and moralist traditions that unite most communities around what residents refer to as "South Dakota values."

One South Dakota value provided an important context for this campaign: a dislike of negative campaigning. The 2002 gubernatorial and U.S. Senate campaigns in South Dakota were exceedingly negative, and voter backlash against overly negative tactics seemed to reward candidates whose campaigns remained positive.³ In 2002 Herseth stayed positive. Although she lost her 2002 open-seat bid for South Dakota's lone House seat, she gained a fair amount of support for how she handled her race against "Wild Bill" Janklow. As 2004 approached, the *Sioux Falls Argus Leader* published several articles, editorials, and letters to the editor calling for more positive campaigns in the state to match the state's moralistic culture.⁴

General Election

Herseth's performance in the 2002 election earned her significant name recognition after executing a notably positive campaign and secured an inside track for the 2004 Democratic nomination.⁵ Diedrich was chosen by a selection committee after Janklow's resignation. He was selected because of the

¹ Herseth's grandfather was a state governor, and her father was a state legislator.

² Associated Press, "Democrat Wins Election for Janklow's House Seat," *New York Times*, June 2, 2004.

³ David Kranz, "The Good-guy Strategy Pays Off: Voter Backlash May Have Aided Rounds," *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*, June 3, 2002, p. A1; David Kranz, "Backlash Against Negative Primary Ads Helps Rounds Again," *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*, September 25, 2002, p. B1.

⁴ David Kranz, "'Nice' Image Appeals to Many S.D. Voters," *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*, April 29, 2004, p. 1A; Terry Woster, "Pointing Out Differences in Views Isn't Necessarily Negative," *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*, May 16, 2004, p. 1F; Jennifer Sanderson, "S.D. Voters Tire of Relentless Campaigning," *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*, October 31, 2004, p. 1A.

⁵ John Bart and James Meader, "The More You Spend, the Less They Listen: The South Dakota U.S. Senate Race," in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2004) pp. 159-179.

perception that he matched up well against Herseth, who proved to be a formidable candidate in 2002. Unlike Herseth, Diedrich had years of legislative experience; like Herseth, Diedrich had a wealth of knowledge of agricultural issues important to South Dakota voters.⁶

The context for South Dakota's 2004 congressional election was unusual, given that Janklow resigned his House seat midway through his term. The 2004 general election would begin in earnest only after the special election in June of 2004. During the brief special election cycle, Herseth raised over \$1.8 million, and Diedrich raised approximately \$1.5 million. The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) spent \$2.1 million for the June 1 special House election, and the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) spent \$1.7 million.⁷ Further, The DCCC engaged the services of Grassroots Solutions, a left-leaning political consulting firm from Minneapolis, to oversee get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts in the special election.⁸ The organization established a paid canvass and field operation that targeted East River areas of high Democratic support. Grassroots Solutions claimed to canvass 85,000 households and to institute a large-scale volunteer program. The DCCC brought in more than 800 field volunteers from across the nation for the GOTV operation.⁹ Their efforts would be matched by the Republican Party, which organized a comprehensive identification, persuasion, and GOTV campaign through their Victory Office. Both Republican and Democratic House campaign committees spent \$2 million on TV ads and largely negative direct mail. Ultimately, Herseth won the special election with 50.57 percent (132,420 votes) to Diedrich's 49.43 percent (129,415 votes), a slim margin of 3,005 votes.¹⁰

Her narrow victory set the stage for a competitive general election in November. In that race, both candidates ran strong, well-funded campaigns, though Diedrich's campaign manager was inexperienced compared with Herseth's veteran manager with many federal campaigns under her belt.

An important difference between the special and general elections for these two candidates was that, in the latter, Herseth was able to don the mantle of incumbency. She ramped up her Washington office quickly after the special election, choosing Jeff Navin, Tom Daschle's Director of Research and a native South Dakotan, to run her office. Also, Diedrich was unexpectedly sidelined in mid-June by a heart ailment requiring immediate surgery. He was unable to return to the campaign trail until July 20, giving Herseth substantial time to consolidate her slim margin of victory from the special election without notable opposition. In October, Diedrich again experienced a campaigning setback. This time a death in the family took him off the campaign trail. These two setbacks would make it more difficult for Diedrich to prevail in a very competitive race against an extremely energetic and accomplished opponent.

The general election was also different in that a third party candidate joined the race. Libertarian party candidate Terry Begay had the capacity to draw a small but significant number of Native American votes, a potential problem for Herseth who relied on Native American votes to put together her winning coalition. Begay was a retired prison guard and Native American who grew up in Rapid City and on the Pine Ridge Reservation. As a third party candidate in 2002, Begay attracted 3,128 votes, a total greater than Herseth's margin of victory in the special election. However, in the 2004 race, he raised only \$400

⁶ Drake Olson, chair, Clay County Republican Party, and delegate to the South Dakota Republican Party Special Election Candidate Selection Committee, interview by Richard Braunstein, Vermillion, S.D., December 15, 2004.

⁷ Joe Kafka, "House Candidates Seeking Campaign Cash," The Associated Press State & Local Wire, July 13, 2004.

⁸ Tessa Gould, campaign manager, Herseth for Congress, interview by Elizabeth T. Smith, Sioux Falls, S.D., October 31, 2004.

⁹ Grass Roots Solutions web site, "Special Election Victory in South Dakota!" (www.grassrootsolutions.com/special_election_victory_in_south_dakota!.html [December 16, 2004]).

¹⁰ South Dakota Secretary of State, "2005 Special Congressional Election Returns," (www.sdsos.gov/2004/2004specialcongressional.htm [December 6, 2004]).

and did not have a significant campaign presence in the media. Still, he participated in debates sponsored by South Dakota Public Broadcasting on TV and radio and compelled both Herseth and Diedrich to minimize defections to the Libertarian candidate.¹¹ Both would spend significant time on Native American reservations in order to engage the American Indian vote, which is an important constituency in competitive elections in the state. In the end, Begay received only 2,808 votes, and Herseth won the general election with a larger margin than the special election four months earlier.

Strategy

The initial focus of the Herseth campaign was first on her vision and then on her effectiveness in office.¹² Herseth's congressional committee assignments were plums for South Dakota: the Committees on Agriculture, Veterans' Affairs, and Resources, each of which controls issues that are important for a significant part of the population.¹³ Late in September, she made a high-profile trip to Iraq with a bipartisan congressional delegation to see conditions on the ground there, a popular move in a state that supports Bush's policies.¹⁴ Finally, Herseth ran on a culturally conservative platform, taking wedge issues like the flag amendment and gay marriage away from her opponent.

In many respects both candidates agreed on a wide range of issues including support for the war in Iraq and the Patriot Act, protection for family farms, country of origin labeling of meat, tribal sovereignty, gun ownership protection, renewable energy subsidies, and lower taxes. These agreements and Herseth's positive campaign style made it initially difficult for voters to distinguish the candidates. After some time and a series of debates, differences between the campaigns began to emerge, most notably on the extension of middle-class tax cuts but also on prescription drug programs and the abortion issue.

The Herseth campaign took a proactive approach toward issue groups that normally support Republicans. As a self-avowed Blue Dog Democrat, Herseth worked to educate groups about her moderate to conservative positions. For example, she took moderate positions on business matters, leading the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to abstain from airing TV ads against Herseth as they did against Daschle, though they did mail three postcards against her in the special election and two in the general election.¹⁵ The National Rifle Association (NRA) endorsed Herseth with an "A+" rating and contributed \$2,500 during her campaign's final hours, though they concentrated their resources on the Daschle-Thune race and did not help in any other way.¹⁶

Not only did Herseth take conservative positions on issues, she also made clear that, as South Dakota's U.S. Representative, she would "vote South Dakota" rather than vote with the Democratic Party in the House. During the debates she said that if the presidential election were to be decided in the House, she would vote South Dakota's preference, George W. Bush. In response to a hypothetical question about whether she would rule out a Supreme Court nominee because of a pro-life position, she responded, "I'm

¹¹ Terry Begay, Libertarian candidate for U.S. House of Representatives, personal e-mail communication to Elizabeth T. Smith, December 16, 2004.

¹² Gould interview, October 31, 2004.

¹³ Herseth Congressional Web site, "Representative Stephanie Herseth Committee Assignments," (www.house.gov/Herseth/committees.html [December 14, 2004]).

¹⁴ "Rep. Stephanie Herseth to Travel to Iraq with Congressional Delegation," press release, September 22, 2004 (www.house.gov/Herseth/092204_press_iraq_trip.html [December 14, 2004]).

¹⁵ Gould interview, October 31, 2004.

¹⁶ Chuck Cunningham, federal affairs director, National Rifle Association, interview by David Magleby and Kristina Gale, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004; Tessa Gould, campaign manager, Herseth for Congress, interview by Elizabeth T. Smith, Sioux Falls, S.D., November 22, 2004.

not going to have a litmus test.”¹⁷ At every turn, Herseth reinforced her campaign theme of an independent voice for South Dakota.

It was very difficult for the Diedrich campaign to gain attention during the general election. First, the congressional race took place in the shadow of the more high profile Daschle-Thune race. Compounding the problem was Diedrich’s late start and limited campaign schedule due to health and family issues. News coverage of Herseth’s swearing in and early weeks in Congress put her in the spotlight at a time when Diedrich was unable to appear publicly. The thrust of Diedrich’s campaign during the general election was again experience. While this theme worked well in the special election, it became less compelling once Herseth took office and was able to talk about her experiences in Congress.

Money

Herseth raised \$3,982,422 with 32 percent coming from PACs compared with Diedrich’s \$2,527,668 with 39 percent coming from PACs (see table 20-1.) Campaign financing from outside the state accounted for some of the contribution gap. Herseth obtained 58 percent of her contributions from out of state while Diedrich relied on in-state resources, raising just 13 percent of his contributions from out of state (see table 20-2.) One major source of revenue for Herseth that seemed far less accessible to Diedrich was contributions from the Washington, D.C. area. In that community, Herseth raised \$215,371 and Diedrich just \$32,318.¹⁸ This imbalance could very well reflect an incumbency advantage given to Herseth, even though her time in office before the general election was quite limited. Still, it seems some contributors gauged her success in the special election and were more confident of her ability to win in November. On the other hand, Diedrich nearly doubled the amount Herseth raised in the state. Diedrich clearly benefited from his capacity to tap into the South Dakota GOP’s substantial fund-raising network.

Jason Glodt, executive director of the South Dakota Republican Party (SDGOP), reported that the changes brought by BCRA had forced the GOP to find new ways to raise money because the national party committees were no longer permitted to shift funds to the state party. In the past, state party ground war efforts were supported largely by transfers of mostly soft money from national party organizations. With the end of party soft money in 2004, the national parties opted to leave the GOTV operation in non-presidential battleground states mostly to the state parties to fund on their own.¹⁹ Further, party staffers were unable to volunteer for other campaigns and state parties were unable to talk to candidates about mail or ads prior to deployment. In all, these rule changes had a considerable impact on the SDGOP’s finance strategy. The SDGOP made up for these fund-raising shortfalls with aggressive national donor prospecting using direct mail and the Internet to reach prospective donors beyond South Dakota’s borders. At the outset of the election cycle, the party had about 400 out-of-state donors; by its close, the party counted 50,000 such donors.²⁰

Interest groups played a role in both campaigns in terms of direct funding and independent expenditures. Diedrich received \$252,066 from business PACs, \$446,673 from ideological/single issue PACs, and none from labor, which tends to support Democratic candidates. All of his PAC contributions were in the \$10,000 to \$15,000 range. In contrast, Herseth received \$197,299 from business PACs, \$410,700 from

¹⁷ Stephanie Sanderson, “In Tie, Candidates Would Pick Bush,” *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*, October 28, 2004, p. 1B.

¹⁸ Center for Responsive Politics, “In-State vs. Out-of-State, 2004 Rae: South Dakota District 1” (www.opensecrets.org/races/instate.asp?ID=SD01&cycl=2004&special=N [December 16, 2004]).

¹⁹ Jason Glodt, executive director, South Dakota Republican Party, interview with Elizabeth T. Smith, Pierre, S.D., November 16, 2004.

²⁰ Glodt interview, November 16, 2004.

labor PACs, and \$411,405 from ideological or single issue PACs.²¹ Herseth's largest PAC contribution was from EMILY's List in the amount of \$178,718, followed by the DCCC's contribution of \$33,950.²²

However, direct contributions do not tell the entire story. Independent expenditures played a strong role in this election. Because such expenditures cannot be legally coordinated in any way with the campaigns, campaign managers were in the frustrating position of seeing advertisements and brochures disseminated by these groups for the first time when aired or distributed.

Air War

Advertising for the general and special elections between Herseth and Diedrich was rooted in the 2002 campaign between Herseth and Janklow. In that context, the state electorate had grown weary of negative campaigns and defeated two Republican primary gubernatorial candidates who had run negative campaigns.²³ In the wake of 2002, Herseth gained the public's sympathies by running a positive campaign against Bill Janklow, a candidate that created many opportunities to go negative given his controversial public persona developed over a long career of public service.

Given this history it would have been counterproductive for either candidate to wage a negative campaign in 2004—particularly for Diedrich who ran the risk of alienating voters by attacking an appealing and positive female candidate. In fact, when the special election was described, early in the race, a longtime political reporter called it “campaign nice.”²⁴ Later, as the special election polls tightened, Diedrich would go negative, claiming that federal tax cuts should be made permanent and charging that “Stephanie Herseth does not agree.” Herseth responded with an ad saying that Larry Diedrich was misrepresenting her position on taxes. Debates echoed the charges and Herseth's defense. Herseth pushed the issue with two ads against negative campaigning and one on the importance of getting beyond party differences in an attempt to forestall negative attack ads and inoculate voters against later attacks.

Continuing a positive strategy in the general election, the Herseth campaign used its greater financial resources to get on the air earlier and to produce more ads.²⁵ During the general election, the Herseth campaign produced sixteen unique TV ads and the Diedrich campaign produced ten. More important than the number of ads, however, was their content. This was particularly true of negative ads. Setting aside Herseth's responses to Diedrich's negative ads, which are coded as attack ads in this study's database, 53 percent of all of Diedrich's ads were negative ads compared to 8 percent of Herseth's ads.²⁶ If the Herseth ads focused on Diedrich's negative ads are counted as attack ads, her percent of negative ads increases to 21 percent. This shows the commitment of the Herseth campaign to running a generally positive effort in both the general and special elections.

Herseth began with positive commercials focused on the promises she had kept during her brief months in Congress. She talked about veterans, the war in Iraq, health care, prescription drugs, agricultural issues, ethanol and country of origin labeling (COOL). The Herseth campaign began airing radio ads on October 14. They also fielded newspaper ads in areas where turnout would matter most—reservations and weekly

²¹ Center for Responsive Politics, “Business/ Issue/ Ideological Split in PAC Contributions, 2004 Race: South Dakota District 1,” (www.opensecrets.org/races/blio.asp?ID=SD01&cycle=2004&special=N [January 7, 2005]).

²² Center for Responsive Politics, “Top Contributors, 2004 Race: South Dakota District 1,” (www.opensecrets.org/races/contrib.asp?ID=SD01&cycle=2004&special=N [January 7, 2005]).

²³ See chapter 13 for more detail on this point.

²⁴ David Kranz, “Spat Breaks Out in State's Cordial House Campaign,” *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*, May 2, 2004, p. 1B.

²⁵ Herseth was on the air on September 7, with Diedrich making it on the air on September 20th; Gould interview, October 21, 2004.

²⁶ This includes all advertisements in the CSED database, not just the TV ads discussed above.

papers in southeastern South Dakota. A common thread through all campaign communications was the characterization of Herseth as a smart, gifted person with a deep respect for the people of South Dakota who would provide an independent voice for the state; this became a trademark image or “brand” of the candidate.

Comparing the money spent to advocate for both candidates is quite difficult in this election season, due in part to the difficulties in separating out the effects of an extremely expensive and nationally charged Senate race. Tracking ad buys for the Herseth campaign was considerably easier than for the Diedrich campaign because of Tom Daschle’s pledge to keep outside interest groups out of his race. Because of this it is more reasonable to identify outside group spending on the Democratic side advocating for Herseth than it would be to associate the much larger Republican ally spending with Diedrich. This is particularly true when remembering that Herseth positioned herself as a notably more conservative Democrat than Daschle, making it unnecessary and/or unrealistic for many of the independent conservative groups to target her campaign. Instead, many of these groups had Daschle in their sights even though the official record is hard to disaggregate between each of the four candidates running statewide campaigns for federal office.

The Ground War

The field operations of the rival campaigns could not have been more different. During the general election, Herseth’s campaign ran its own field operation, setting up three offices in Aberdeen, Rapid City, and Sioux Falls. The campaign targeted nonvoting Democrats, unaffiliated and Republican women, and ticket splitters, an essential group for any Democrat running in a red state. They used their resources to identify people on both the House and Senate races and targeted ticket splitters and potential ticket splitters for persuasion. In particular, the campaign focused on holding down losses in West River Republican strongholds and wooing Republican women in the Sioux Falls area. The volunteer base from the special election was called upon a second time to make GOTV calls, but the campaign also used automated calls to people living on reservations, nonvoting Democrats, and others.²⁷ Notwithstanding Herseth’s substantial targeted field operation, to a great extent the campaign relied on the Daschle campaign’s near-legendary GOTV operation to bring out traditional Democratic voters.²⁸ After twenty-six years of campaigning in South Dakota, Daschle had built an impressive field capacity. Furthermore, his campaign had raised nearly \$20,000,000 for the 2004 race. The Herseth campaign’s reliance on Daschle’s GOTV operation was largely due to resource limitations on the part of the Herseth campaign. The strategy was to rely on Daschle for traditional Democratic GOTV and to use the Herseth campaign’s resources to target voters who might be willing to split their tickets for Herseth, despite voting Republican for other federal offices.²⁹

The Four Directions Committee, a 501(c)(4) organization that aimed to empower Native American voters and communities, took an active role in both the special and general elections. During the special election, Four Directions Committee staff and volunteers worked on voter registration and turnout on the Pine Ridge, Rosebud, and Yankton Sioux reservations and in Rapid City. Funding for this endeavor came from out-of-state Native American tribes with casino profits.³⁰ Brett Healey, executive director of Four Directions Committee, said the organization signed up 4,025 new Native American voters who cast ballots in the June election.³¹ Concerns arose about Native Americans’ ability to vote because of a new

²⁷ Gould interviews, October 31 and November 22, 2004.

²⁸ See chapter 13 in this volume for detail on the Daschle campaign’s GOTV operation.

²⁹ Gould interview, November 22, 2004.

³⁰ Brett Healey, executive director, Four Directions Committee, telephone interview by Elizabeth T. Smith, November 19, 2004.

³¹ John Fialka, “Daschle Works to Get Out the Indian Vote,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 1, 2004, A4.

law requiring government-issued identification prior to voting, though the same legislation provides that voters without identification may alternatively sign an affidavit. Native American voters reported being turned away during the special election because of not having acceptable identification and not being informed of the option to sign an affidavit. Some polling places posted signs saying that photo identification was required. More than twenty such incidents were documented by affidavits, though the Four Directions Committee leadership suspected that many other voters were discouraged from voting by the requirement.³²

The Four Directions Committee expanded its work during the general election to include the Sisseton-Wahpeton and Crow Creek Reservations. The group passed out a scorecard on candidates that compared Diedrich unfavorably to Herseth, in part because he had supported the state's new law requiring voters to present photo identification at polling places. The law was extremely unpopular in the Native American community and met resistance in the non-Native American community as well. Reaction to the law produced a stronger effort to get voters to the polls and to engage more poll watchers, both of which energized volunteers who helped the Herseth campaign. Herseth also received ground support from the New House PAC, a 501(c)(3) organization affiliated with former DCCC staffer Howard Wolfson. The group made two series of telephone calls on Herseth's behalf during the special election and one round of calls in the general election.³³

Herseth visited all nine reservations twice in the general election and did special events with Tribal Chairs, pow-wows, and "feeds" (public meals, often featuring chili, pancakes, or Indian tacos) on every reservation.³⁴ Her position on the Committee on Resources helped her make a strong case for support to Native American voters as the Committee has jurisdiction over Native American affairs, including land and claims paid out of Native American funds.

The Diedrich campaign relied on the state Republican Victory operation to provide grassroots organizing for both state and federal candidates, including voter registration, voter identification, persuasion, and GOTV. Republicans set up twelve Victory field offices around the state and expanded that to seventeen toward the end of the campaign. The offices hired forty full-time staff and five hundred to six hundred part-time staff who worked up to thirty hours per week on grassroots operations. During the final seventy-two hours, they deployed approximately 6,000 volunteers as poll watchers, phone callers, door-to-door canvassers, and drivers.³⁵ The Victory program changed its voter identification method and used phone calls, door-to-door contacts, and yard sign acceptance contacts to link voters to issues. They kept meticulous notes on voters, cross-tabulated issues, and Bush supporters. Identification data was used to target twelve groups for persuasion, including pro-life, pro-gun, business, soft Republicans who voted for Johnson in 2002, conservative Democrats, seniors, youth, self-identified Bush-Daschle and Bush-Herseth voters, and the Republican base. The program also worked to stem losses among women through persuasion. Volunteers were assigned to call voters who "matched" their political concerns. For example, pro-life supporters called pro-life voters, veterans called veterans, women called women, and so on.

The cyber war was an important element in this race. Both candidates used Internet resources to make their case and raise money. The Diedrich campaign made extensive use of the Internet to build credibility, raise money, attract volunteers, and send e-mails to supporters, internal staff and volunteers.³⁶ In addition, the Club for Growth placed Diedrich on their web site as a candidate worthy of its members' financial support with a link allowing contributions online. The Herseth campaign also used the Internet to attract volunteers, secure contributions, and e-mail regular campaign updates to supporters. In addition, they sent

³² Healey interview, November 19, 2004.

³³ Gould interview, November 22, 2004.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Glodt interview, November 16, 2004.

³⁶ Mark Berg, campaign manager, Diedrich for Congress, interview by E.T. Smith, Sioux Falls, October 5, 2004.

out e-solicitations every two weeks and advertised on blogs with good results. For example, ads on the Daily Kos, a liberal blog, and two other web sites netted over \$30,000 in contributions in less than a week.³⁷ This is reflective of the expanded power of blogs in the 2004 campaign. According to Herseth's campaign manager, "Blogs gain recognition by directing donations to specific campaigns and asking people to give specific odd amounts so the blog-related donations can be tracked."³⁸

Conclusion

The question posed by this election is how did Herseth manage to win the special election and widen her general election margin of victory to over 29,000 votes in a state where Republicans hold a decided advantage? The answer lies in Herseth's positioning herself as an independent voice for South Dakota with a positive image and popular message. Add her incumbent status, her brief but conservative voting record, and the positive free media this allowed, and it becomes clear how Herseth earned a competitive edge despite being a member of the minority party. Of course it did not hurt that she was able to expand fund-raising efforts beyond the state's borders, allowing her to generously fund campaign advertising efforts. In all, it was a well-run campaign, and the fact that she was a "good candidate running a good campaign" accounts for her ultimate success.³⁹

³⁷ Gould interview, October 31, 2004.

³⁸ Gould interview, November 22, 2004.

³⁹ Peter Cari, Political Director, DCCC, telephone interview by Quin Monson and Betsey Gimbel, December 14, 2004.

Table 20-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures,
South Dakota At-large Congressional District Race, 2003-04

	Stephanie Herseth (D)	Larry Diedrich (R)
From PACs	\$1,259,297	\$996,366
From individuals	\$2,648,094	\$1,481,075
From party	\$5,308	\$48,100
From candidate	\$0	\$0
Other contributions	\$69,723	\$2,127
Total receipts	\$3,982,422	\$2,527,668
Total expenditures	\$3,984,681	\$2,512,488
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$10,445	\$52,435

Source: Federal Election Commission, “2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info,” November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 28, 2004]).

Table 20-2
Comparison on In-State vs. Out-of-State Contributions in South Dakota’s
2004 Congressional Race

Candidate	In-State Contributions	Out-of-State Contributions
Hereth	\$543,799 32%	\$1,167,400 68%
Diedrich	\$882,932 81%	\$204,540 19%

Source: Political Money Line “Money in Politics Database,” (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candpg.exe?DoFn=H2SD00092*2004 [January 28, 2004]).

Table 20-3
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee,
South Dakota At-large Congressional District Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DCCC	SD AL	Larry Diedrich	\$3,451,277
	SD AL	Stephanie Herseth	\$3,451,277	...	\$3,451,277	
NRCC	SD AL	Larry Diedrich	\$2,933,668	\$2,933,668	\$4,357,417
	SD AL	Stephanie Herseth	...	\$1,423,739	\$1,423,739	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC [January 5, 2005]).

Table 20-4
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
South Dakota At-large Congressional District Races, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent
Democratic allies^b			
<i>Candidates</i>			
Herseth for Congress	\$425,996	\$24,747	\$450,743
<i>Political parties</i>			
DCCC	\$804,737	\$319	\$805,056
DNC	...	\$10,000	\$10,000
<i>Interest groups</i>			
The Media Fund	\$100,542	...	\$100,542
Sierra Club	\$1,887	...	\$1,887
Daschle Democrats	\$1,101	...	\$1,101
American Federation of Government Employees	...	\$180	\$180
Republican allies^b			
<i>Candidates</i>			
Diedrich 4 Congress	\$319,946	\$19,969	\$339,915
<i>Political parties</i>			
NRCC	\$873,482	...	\$873,482
<i>Interest groups</i>			
Families for a Secure America	\$183,876	...	\$183,876
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$144,073	\$17,545	\$161,618
Club for Growth	\$121,762	...	\$121,762
NRA Political Victory Fund	\$85,748	\$29,857	\$115,605
United Seniors Association	\$34,595	...	\$34,595
Ave Maria List	...	\$29,081	\$29,081
American Medical Association	...	\$25,111	\$25,111
National Right to Life	...	\$8,128	\$8,128
America's PAC	...	\$6,120	\$6,120
National Right to Work Committee PAC	\$4,310	...	\$4,310
NRA Institute for Legislative Action	...	\$1,730	\$1,730
Nonpartisan			
<i>Interest groups</i>			
Taxpayers for Common Sense	...	\$14,217	\$14,217
Family Research Council	...	\$7,200	\$7,200

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senatorial, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study's sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study's relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 20-5.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 20-5
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
South Dakota At-large Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	E-mail	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^b							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Herseith for Congress	10	5	1	1	5	17	39
<i>Political parties</i>							
DCCC	1	9	10
South Dakota Democratic Party	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>							
JustGoVote.org	...	4	2	...	6
New House PAC	4	...	4
MoveOn PAC	3	1	4
Sierra Club	1	2	3
We the People	2	...	2
AFL-CIO	...	1	1
Democracy for America	1	1
NARAL Pro-Choice America	...	1	1
National Education Association	...	1	1
Republican allies^b							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Diedrich 4 Congress	...	3	2	10	15
<i>Political parties</i>							
South Dakota Republican Party	9	18	...	1	3	...	31
NRCC	4	5	9
<i>Interest groups</i>							
National Right to Life	...	2	2
Susan B. Anthony List	...	1	1	...	2
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	...	2	2
Christian Voter Project	...	1	1
National Right to Work Committee PAC	...	1	1
Progress/American Voter Fund	1	1
Nonpartisan							
<i>Interest groups</i>							
TrueMajority.org	4	4
AARP	1	1	2
Families for a Secure America	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 20-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

Clash of the Titans: The Texas Thirty-second District Race¹

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From the moment Martin Frost, in January of 2004, announced his intention to abandon the newly redistricted Twenty-fourth District and challenge incumbent Republican Pete Sessions in the Thirty-second, observers both locally and nationally pointed to this race as the marquee congressional match-up of the 2004 electoral cycle.² It was one of only two races nationally (both in Texas) that pitted incumbents against each other, and as such promised to be a bruising battle. During the spring and summer, the contest was widely predicted to be both extremely expensive and very close. In the end, the first of these predictions proved accurate. —The two candidates together raised and spent more than \$9 million, and the parties and interest groups added several million more, making this the most expensive House race of the electoral cycle, the costliest Texas had ever seen, and one of the five most expensive in U.S. history. When all the votes were tallied, however, this contest was not much of a nail-biter. Sessions prevailed with 54 percent of the vote to Frost's 44 percent, a result consistent with the generally Republican character of the district.

Given the intense national interest surrounding the race and the relative paucity of competitive House contests around the country, one might have expected the candidates' own campaigns to be overwhelmed by outside money and activity. The two political parties and a variety of national interest groups clearly saw this race as one of a handful in which they might be able to make a difference. However, the two political parties and a variety of national interest groups recognized that they could make a difference in this race. Nevertheless, the two candidates exercised a very high degree of message control, and their own strategic and advertising decisions, not those of outside forces, to drive the race. The candidates' own ample war chests and an unusual pact disavowing outside interference combined to keep the locus of activity squarely in the candidates' own campaigns.

The District and the Candidates

The current Thirty-second Congressional District in Texas was created as a result of a very controversial and bitterly partisan redistricting process in 2003. At different times, Democrats in the state House fled to Oklahoma and Democrats in the state Senate fled to New Mexico to break the legislative quorum and prevent votes on Republican-backed electoral maps.³ In the end, however, Republicans in the legislature prevailed, engineering a districting plan that put seven incumbent Democrats at risk. The new arrangement, widely decried by Democrats as a partisan gerrymander orchestrated from Washington by House Majority Leader Tom DeLay⁴, drew Representative Martin Frost out of the Twenty-fourth District he represented and made that district strongly Republican. The only competitive district left in the Dallas-Fort Worth area was the Thirty-second, where Frost promptly moved to launch an uphill battle against incumbent Republican Pete Sessions.

The Thirty-second District, as currently configured, is demographically diverse. Contained entirely within Dallas County, it combines affluent areas of northern Dallas and the suburb of Richardson with blue-collar, ethnically mixed sections of Irving and the heavily Hispanic Oak Cliff area of south Dallas. The

¹ The author would like to thank Kristina Kiik for her excellent and invaluable work in collecting data for this chapter.

² Bob Ray Sanders, "Republicans Must Endure Frost's Bite," *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, January 18, 2004, p. 1B.

³ Gromer Jeffers, Jr., "Democrats to Perry: Back Down; No More Special Sessions, Albuquerque Exiles Tell Governor," *Dallas Morning News*, August 26, 2003, p. 3A.

⁴ Molly Ivins, "The Dirty Deal of Texas Redistricting," *Naples Daily News*, January 9, 2004, (www.naplesnews.com/npdn/pe_columnists [December 14, 2004]).

district is clearly right-leaning, but not dramatically so. Its urban character softens the conservatism, particularly on social issues, that characterizes more rural portions of the state. While the district was clearly drawn to create a Republican advantage (Republican candidates averaged 64 percent of the district's vote in recent statewide elections), its ethnic breakdown gives Democrats some reason for hope.⁵ The district's voting-age population is 55 percent non-Hispanic white, 31 percent Hispanic, 8 percent black, and 6 percent "other" (mostly Asian). Moreover, the white population includes virtually all of Dallas' Jewish community, a traditional Democratic constituency estimated at 5 to 6 percent of the district.⁶ Thus, Democrats faced a difficult, but not hopeless, battle in the Thirty-second District.

Many Democrats felt that Martin Frost had a fighting chance. With twenty-six years of service in the House, Frost was the Dean of the Texas delegation and had represented much of the Dallas-Fort Worth area, including significant parts of the new Thirty-second District, at some time during his congressional career. He had developed a reputation as both a tough campaigner and a tireless worker for local interests,⁷ and had a more moderate voting record in many areas than most House Democrats.⁸ Moreover, as former head of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), he had access to national fund-raising networks that would be the envy of most candidates. Finally, as the only Jewish member of Congress in Texas history, Frost understandably enjoyed considerable support, both electoral and financial, from the district's significant Jewish population.

Pete Sessions, the son of former FBI director William Sessions, presented a contrasting profile in many ways. While also an incumbent member of Congress since 1996, Sessions had not sought leadership positions within the party and, unlike Frost, seldom talked about "pork-barrel" accomplishments. Instead, Sessions emphasized his conservative ideology, did not shy away from the label "extreme," and embraced an almost libertarian philosophy on economic questions.⁹ While Sessions had faced some fairly close contests in the Fifth District (which he left after the 2000 election to run in the more compact and urban Thirty-second District), Frost represented his first serious challenger in the new district.

Money

As mentioned previously, an extraordinary amount of money was raised and spent in this race, mostly by the candidates' campaigns. Each candidate raised and spent approximately \$4.5 million, the clear majority of that coming from individual donations (see table 21-1). While the national party organizations and select interest groups did intervene, especially in the final days of the race, their combined broadcast expenditures of about \$1.5 million were clearly secondary to those of the candidates. The fact that the candidates themselves were directly controlling the vast majority of the expenditures in this race allowed

⁵ These data, from reports compiled as part of the Texas Legislative Council's redistricting analysis (www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/congress.htm), overstate the Republican skew of the district somewhat, as they include some races where the Democrats fielded very weak, non-competitive candidates statewide.

⁶ Martin Frost Campaign, "Fact Sheet: Martin Frost's TX-32 Re-election Campaign," press release, April 20, 2004 (www.martinfrost.com/news/facts [April 20, 2004]).

⁷ Dave Levinthal, "Friend and Foe Alike Marvel at Resilience of Underdog Frost," *Dallas Morning News*, October 30, 2004, p. 1B. On the campaign trail, Frost repeatedly emphasized his role in securing federal funds for local transportation projects and his efforts on behalf of major local employers like American Airlines.

⁸ While Frost is not the consummate centrist that his campaign literature claims, his lifetime voting scores from both liberal and conservative interest groups—74 from Americans for Democratic Action (www.adaction.org [January 7, 2005]) and 16 from the American Conservative Union (www.conservative.org [January 7, 2005])—suggest that he is also far from his party's leftward fringe. To cite one specific example, Frost is a strong supporter of the war in Iraq and of President Bush's Middle East policy generally.

⁹ Dave Levinthal, "Sessions Pushes for Tax Changes and Doesn't Duck the Extreme," *Dallas Morning News*, October 31, 2004, p. 6B. Sessions' interest group ratings (two from ADA and ninety-seven from ACU) reflect his consistently conservative philosophy.

for fairly tight image and message control on both sides; the major arguments made on TV, on the radio, and in direct mail had a remarkable (some might say mind-numbing) consistency. Neither candidate was dependent on outside efforts, largely because both were able to raise nearly unprecedented sums of money. Frost campaign spokesman Justin Kitsch repeatedly emphasized that “Martin Frost has all the money he needs to communicate with voters.”¹⁰ Sessions campaign manager Chris Homan said that their campaign always enjoyed an abundance of financial resources.¹¹ Thus, unlike some other competitive races around the country, the financial dynamics of this contest were overwhelmingly candidate centered.

The Candidates

Both candidates enjoyed tremendous success with fund-raising. Martin Frost’s connections and national profile acquired as DCCC chair gave him a national resource base on which to draw. Moreover, his ties to the Dallas Jewish community helped him to raise significant funds from local sources.¹² Finally, resentment about perceived injustices in the redistricting process—present even in the Republican-leaning district itself¹³—made the election to some extent a referendum on Tom DeLay and the whole re-map fight, spurring contributions to Frost from incensed Democrats around the state and nation.¹⁴ These factors, combined with the relative paucity of Democratic House opportunities around the country, served to funnel money into the Frost campaign.

All of these factors, though, were double-edged swords. Frost’s national prominence and past political activity had earned him as many enemies as friends. Amy Walter, U.S. House editor for the *Cook Political Report*, summed it up well: “The animosity that the Republicans have for Frost is unparalleled because Frost was able to long preserve what Republicans saw as an unfair redistricting advantage for Democrats.”¹⁵ This, combined with Frost’s history as an aggressive partisan and bare-knuckled campaigner, made him Republicans’ top incumbent Democrat target nationwide.¹⁶ The fervent desire among conservatives to “de-Frost Texas,” as President Bush put it during an election-eve stop in the district, combined with Sessions’ status as an incumbent member of the majority party to ensure a steady flow of campaign cash into his coffers.¹⁷

In the end, the Frost campaign slightly out-raised the Sessions campaign for the electoral cycle, netting \$4.62 million to Sessions’ \$4.47 million. In a sense, though, these figures are misleading; Frost raised and spent almost \$900,000 of that during 2003 to fight Republican redistricting proposals, before he had even decided (or been forced) to run in the Thirty-second District.¹⁸ As a result, the Sessions campaign

¹⁰ Dave Levinthal, “Frost Leads Sessions in Cash Raised, Spent,” *Dallas Morning News*, October 16, 2004, p. 7B.

¹¹ Chris Homan, campaign manager, Sessions for Congress, interview with Matthew Wilson, Dallas, Tex., December 9, 2004. This financial security is underscored by the fact that the Sessions campaign ended the race with more than \$500,000 unspent cash on hand (see table 21-1).

¹² Dave Levinthal, “Where the Cash is Coming From for Sessions, Frost Race,” *Dallas Morning News*, October 24, 2004, p. 1B.

¹³ Dave Levinthal, “Voters Split Over New Lines; In Poll, Plurality Say Republican-friendly Boundaries Unfair,” *Dallas Morning News*, October 12, 2004, p. 19A.

¹⁴ Dave Levinthal, “Heated Race Between Frost, Sessions Gets Scorching,” *Dallas Morning News*, September 11, 2004, p. 1A.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Homan interview, December 9, 2004.

¹⁷ Dave Levinthal, “Sessions Gets Boost from Bush During President’s SMU Visit,” *Dallas Morning News*, November 2, 2004, p. 10A.

¹⁸ Todd Gillman, “Setting Up a Showdown; With Sessions-Frost Battle at Forefront, Fight for Congress Begins,” *Dallas Morning News*, March 10, 2004, p. 1B.

maintained a consistent cash-on-hand advantage throughout the race, particularly during the crucial final two weeks.¹⁹

In terms of the sources of their funds, the two campaigns were broadly similar, with a few interesting differences. Both raised the majority of their money from individuals, but Sessions drew a somewhat higher percentage than Frost from PACs (38 percent versus 30 percent—see table 21-1). Based on the categories created by the Center for Responsive Politics, Frost drew the largest share of his contributions from “lawyers and lobbyists,” while Sessions drew his largest share from “finance, insurance, and real estate,” not surprising given the positions of the two men’s political parties.²⁰

Despite the Sessions cash advantage and the differential sources of money for the two campaigns, the real story here is the extraordinary amount of money raised by both candidates and the fact that both acknowledged that money did not play a significant role in the outcome. Each side had the resources to fill the airwaves and mailboxes in the district over the last month of the campaign and to communicate their major themes (sometimes *ad nauseam*) to voters.

Parties and Interest Groups

While the national political parties and their allied interest groups did play some role in this race, it was sharply curtailed by a remarkable development early on in the campaign: a joint pledge by the candidates to discourage any outside intervention, and to publicly disavow any advertising done by outside groups. This unusual commitment came in response to advertisements run in April on most of the major Dallas television stations by a group called the Coalition for the Future American Worker (CFAW), blasting Martin Frost’s purported support for “bills encouraging mass immigration.”²¹ The ads featured grainy black and white images of Hispanics in the background, and were immediately denounced by Frost and his supporters as racially inflammatory. While Sessions denied any knowledge of or involvement with the ads, he refused to specifically denounce them, preferring instead to ignore the controversy. This, in turn, prompted Frost to accuse Sessions of “hiding behind the white sheets of white supremacy,” a charge the Sessions campaign angrily rejected.²²

In response to the controversy over these ads, the two campaigns negotiated a pledge to try to curtail any outside interference in the race. Initially proposed by the Frost campaign²³ and signed by the two candidates in April, the pledge committed them to “publicly disavow any television, radio, direct mail, newspaper ad, e-mail, or telephone calls that are not specifically and publicly authorized by their campaigns; and publicly request the sponsors of any unauthorized communication to cease their communication to voters.”²⁴ While the DCCC quickly agreed to abide by the candidates’ request, the National Republican Campaign Committee (NRCC) was noncommittal, and CFAW, the group whose

¹⁹ Homan interview, December 9, 2004. This advantage is confirmed by Levinthal, “Where the Cash is Coming From for Sessions, Frost Race,” p. 1B.

²⁰ Center for Responsive Politics, “2003–2004 Campaign Reports” (www.opensecrets.org [December 13, 2004]).

²¹ Full text of this advertisement can be found at (www.americanworker.org/dallasads.html [January 7, 2005]).

²² Dave Levinthal, “Frost Says Sessions Should Denounce Immigration Ads,” *Dallas Morning News*, April 7, 2004, p. 8B.

²³ While Frost was first to suggest the no-outside-money pledge, the Sessions campaign was happy to sign on. As Sessions campaign manager Chris Homan indicated, they expected all along to have a cash-on-hand edge and, thus, were more than willing to limit any outside influences that might mitigate that advantage; see Homan interview, December 9, 2004.

²⁴ Dave Levinthal, “Candidates Spar Over Clean Campaign Pledge,” *Dallas Morning News*, October 19, 2004, p. 4B.

efforts had spurred all of the uproar in the first place, professed their intention to ignore it.²⁵ Of course, the pledge was not legally binding for outside groups; nonetheless, it served to sharply curtail the activities of outside groups.²⁶ There was virtually no party or interest group spending in the race until the very end. As late as October 7, party insiders said that they did not expect either the DCCC or the NRCC to run independent expenditure ads in the district.²⁷

The party committees did buy some significant television advertising toward the end of the race, combining to spend about \$1.5 million (significantly less than what the candidates' own campaigns spent—see table 21-3). While they had initially planned only a limited presence in the Texas races (and especially the Thirty-second District, given Frost's ample campaign war chest), the DCCC decided in October to make a major push to save as many embattled incumbents as they could, borrowing \$10 million to cover their expenditures in the races.²⁸ Thus, the DCCC began the influx of national party money, and the NRCC ultimately felt compelled to respond, generating a wave of attack ads during the final days that disproportionately helped the cash-strapped Frost campaign.²⁹ Overall, though, given that this race represented one of only a few hotly contested races around the country, featured two incumbents, and played out in a major media market, both national parties' efforts must be viewed as modest. Whether driven by the candidates' disavowal of outside money, their fell-funded war chests, or a combination of both, the national committees were content to play clearly secondary roles in this contest.

Perhaps in response to the pledge, outside interest groups were even more limited in their activities. After the initial highly publicized advertisements of CFAW, only three other groups mounted any significant effort in the race: Planned Parenthood of North Texas on behalf of Frost, and Americans for Job Security and the Council for Citizens Against Government Waste on behalf of Sessions. In all three cases, the group's activity was limited to targeted mailers attacking one of the candidates (see table 21-4). While some other organizations, most notably labor unions and religious groups, contributed in ways other than advertising, such as canvassing and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts, the overall national interest group effort was remarkably limited for a race of this magnitude.³⁰ Despite the race's intensity, importance, and relatively high national profile, it remained from start to finish a candidate-dominated contest.

Effects of Money

Because the Frost and Sessions campaigns themselves directly controlled the great majority of the money spent in this race, they were able to achieve a high degree of message control in the advertising. From the

²⁵ Dave Levinthal, "Frost, Sessions Vow to Disavow 'Outside' Ads," *Dallas Morning News*, April 28, 2004, p. 12B. Ironically, however, the DCCC became the first outside group to significantly violate the pledge (in October), and Frost refused to denounce their efforts on his behalf. CFAW had attempted to run a second round of anti-immigration ads targeting Frost in August, but this time were denounced by Sessions and rebuffed by all of the Dallas network affiliates. See Dave Levinthal, "Rivals Together On Immigrant Ads," *Dallas Morning News*, August 10, 2004, p. 10B.

²⁶ The actual inhibiting effects of the pledge were probably greater for interest groups than for the national party organizations. Peter Cari of the DCCC suggested that his organization's relatively limited role in the Thirty-second District race, at least until the campaign's closing days, was more a function of the Frost campaign being flush with cash than of the non-intervention pledge; see Peter Cari, political director, DCCC, telephone interview by Quin Monson and Betsey Gimbel, December 14, 2004. Moreover, Frost himself indicated during the summer that the pledge was aimed more at "rogue" advocacy groups than at the party organizations; see Martin Frost, Democratic candidate for U.S. House of Representatives, interview by Matthew Wilson, Coppell, Tex., August 14, 2004.

²⁷ "Veterans to Watch (24D, 18R)—Texas 32: Pull Out the Barf Bags, This One Is Getting Nasty," *House Race Hotline*, October 7, 2004. In the end, this prediction proved incorrect.

²⁸ "National Briefing—Battle for the House: TX-vestment," *House Race Hotline*, November 9, 2004.

²⁹ Dave Levinthal, "National Parties Pour It On In Race," *Dallas Morning News*, October 27, 2004, p. 14B.

³⁰ Homan interview, December 9, 2004.

outset, their respective strategies were relatively straightforward. Sessions adopted a fairly conventional game plan. He sought to portray Frost as a liberal, tie him to national Democratic figures like Senator John Kerry, and emphasize his own connections to President Bush.³¹ Sessions touted his conservative ideology much more than his pork-barrel accomplishments. Early in the race, Sessions chief of staff Guy Harrison admitted that “Pete is not out there waving the flag that he is the number one person on DART [Dallas Area Rapid Transit] or on bridges.”³² Frost, conversely, did emphasize these sorts of local issues and projects, so much so that Sessions campaign manager Chris Homan joked that he sounded like he was running for mayor.³³ This was part of his strategy to de-emphasize national partisan conflict and make the race something other than a straight Democrat-Republican contest, which he would likely lose. From the outset, he faced two difficult tasks: he had to win very high margins in the Hispanic areas and increase turnout there to unprecedented levels, and convince a significant minority of North Dallas Republicans to split their tickets and vote for Bush and Frost.³⁴ At the same time, he hoped to portray himself as an independent centrist and Sessions as a dangerous extremist whose ideology went well beyond being simply “conservative.”³⁵ In both candidates’ cases, their advertising clearly reflected these strategic objectives.

The Air War

After the initial salvo from CFAW, TV advertising in this race became the exclusive province of the two campaigns and, to a lesser extent, the national parties. In the summer and early fall, both sides ran a series of positive ads designed to introduce them to new constituents who might not be familiar with their records. In Frost’s case, these emphasized his sponsorship of the AMBER Alert law and his successful dispute mediation during the American Airlines strike. Sessions’ ads highlighted major national issues like job loss, rising healthcare costs, and taxes before outlining a “Pete Sessions solution” in each case.

As the campaign went on, however, the advertising became both more interesting and more negative. Frost’s ads, in keeping with his desire to blur ideological distinctions in the race, were both extremely creative and unusual for a Democrat. Seizing on Sessions’ opposition to a 2001 aviation security bill that passed 410-9 in the House, Frost denounced his opponent as soft on terror and out of step with President Bush on this important issue. Sessions made things worse for himself during the candidates’ first debate by using Senator Ted Kennedy’s security delays at Logan Airport in Boston as proof that air security had become unnecessarily tight.³⁶ A Frost television ad quickly followed on the topic of air safety, highlighting his support for tougher security measures and chiding Sessions for caring more about Ted Kennedy’s travel schedule than passenger safety. The ad blurred partisan and ideological distinctions in the race, linking Frost with popular Republican measures and pairing Sessions with Ted Kennedy. Ultimately, though, Frost may have pressed this issue a bit too far. His campaign in mid-October aired a controversial advertisement on air safety that attacked Sessions’ vote and showed black-and-white images of the twin towers’ destruction. The ad was quickly denounced by New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani (who filmed an ad for Sessions the next week) and by several victims’ families, and may have cost Frost some of the advantage he had gained with the air safety issue.³⁷

³¹ Sessions was largely successful in these objectives. By the end of the race, his campaign’s internal polling showed that a majority of voters in the district believed that the word “liberal” accurately characterized Martin Frost; see Homan interview, December 9, 2004.

³² Todd J. Gillman and Tony Hartzell, “DART Accusations Open Congressional Campaign,” *Dallas Morning News*, March 11, 2004, p. 1B.

³³ Homan interview, December 9, 2004.

³⁴ Frost interview, August 14, 2004.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Jennifer Arend, “Rivals Frost, Sessions Face Off,” *Dallas Morning News*, September 13, 2004, p. 1B.

³⁷ Dave Levinthal, “Use of Trade Center in Ads Stirs Debate,” *Dallas Morning News*, October 19, 2004, p. 1B.

Sessions' ads were also primarily negative in the closing weeks of the campaign, seeking to paint Frost as a classic tax-and-spend liberal. Highlighting all of the areas in which Frost had previously supported tax increases, they argued that Texas could not afford "the cost of Frost." This theme was also emphasized in all of the late advertising purchased by the NRCC. These ads, while relatively standard fare in Republican congressional campaigns, proved highly effective. By the end of the campaign, Sessions' polling showed that a clear majority of voters identified Frost as a "liberal," a huge albatross in a Republican-leaning district.³⁸ Ultimately, Sessions' ads did not need to be creative for him to win; if he could drive home the tax-and-spend message about Martin Frost (and he had plenty of money with which to do that), he would likely prevail on Election Day.

At the same time that messages about taxes and air safety dominated advertising in the "mainstream" media, the candidates were conducting a parallel campaign for Hispanic votes on *Telemundo* and *Univision*. Clearly, Frost's campaign efforts in the Hispanic community were more aggressive, and he knew that he would win the lion's share of their votes. Sessions, however, did not concede the group entirely to Frost, deploying his Mexican-American wife and a small army of volunteers wearing "Adelante con Pete Sessions" ("Forward with Pete Sessions") tee shirts in an effort to keep Frost from completely running away with the Oak Cliff precincts. These efforts were paying some dividends as well, with Sessions cresting 30 percent of the Hispanic vote, until Frost aired a devastating ad on Spanish-language media. The ad began with footage from a 1996 interview in which Sessions said, of illegal immigrants, that "we run them down, and when we capture them, we do not process them—we put them on a military plane and fly them to the southernmost entry point in Mexico." This was interspersed with images of a Mexican-American family watching with consternation, and followed by their angry comments that "no somos lobos; no somos perros" ("we are not wolves; we are not dogs").³⁹ This, according to Sessions campaign manager Chris Homan, was the most damaging advertisement that the Frost campaign ran during the entire campaign, in Spanish or English. Within a week, Sessions' Hispanic vote share had dropped from over 30 percent to 15 percent.⁴⁰ While those numbers crept back up over 20 percent by Election Day (aided in part by rebuttal advertising featuring Sessions' wife), the ad's effect serves as testimony to the potential efficacy of targeted advertising in Spanish-language media.

The Ground War

Both campaigns, as well as the few interest groups that chose to intervene in the race, saved their most aggressive attacks for direct mail. As reflected in table 21-4, dozens of distinct mailers were produced and sent out during the course of the campaign. Given each side's substantial financial resources and the relatively low cost of direct mail, this form of campaigning was virtually unlimited in this race. Since direct mail can also be targeted more efficiently than either television or radio, it became the medium of choice for both sides to communicate their most incendiary attacks on the other.

Given the volume of mailings sent, it is obviously impossible to catalog them individually, but one key example on each side should give some flavor of the campaign's nastiness. Two of the charges leveled at Sessions by Frost, that he was a stalker (he had been involved in a 1974 college nudity incident) and that he stole his opponent's yard signs (during his 2002 campaign), are encapsulated in one mailer headlined "It's ten o'clock: Do you know where your Congressman is?" It concludes by asserting: "Pete Sessions admits indecent exposure as an 'immature' young man. But he's still lurking around in the dark, acting like one." In addition to a bevy of mailers hitting the key Frost campaign themes of air safety, job outsourcing, and opposition to a national sales tax, these attacks on Sessions' character comprised a large part of the Frost direct-mail campaign.

³⁸ Homan interview, December 9, 2004.

³⁹ "Frost Airs Ad on Sessions, Immigrants," *Al Día*, October 16, 2004, p. 3B.

⁴⁰ Homan interview, December 9, 2004.

The Sessions campaign responded in kind, and then some. Seizing upon an incident earlier in the campaign in which Frost had invited Peter Yarrow of Peter, Paul, and Mary to perform at a campaign fund-raiser, then later cancelled when it came to light that Yarrow was a convicted child molester, Sessions produced a mailer blasting Frost. The mailer, printed in English on one side and Spanish on the other, had “Martin Frost Child Molester” (“Martin Frost Molestador de Ninos”) in large gold block letters, and surrounding words in smaller, white typeface.⁴¹ The full line read “Martin Frost child molester timeline” and chronicled the Yarrow incident, but this was not apparent at first glance. Clearly, the negative tone of Frost’s mailers was reflected in Sessions’ direct-mail campaign as well, along with his standard campaign themes of conservative values and opposition to tax increases.

Conclusion

In the end, after millions of dollars were spent, the redrawn Thirty-second District produced the outcome it was intended to deliver: a win for Sessions that was neither a landslide nor especially close. Both sides had plenty of money with which to pursue their campaign strategies, but Sessions was ultimately more successful. He managed to convince most voters in the district that Martin Frost was a liberal and that a vote for Sessions was an additional measure of support for Bush. Frost, conversely, largely failed in his two key strategic objectives; registration and turnout in Hispanic precincts did not increase by nearly as much as he had hoped, and there was relatively little ticket splitting in North Dallas (Sessions ran within 3 percent of Bush in most precincts).⁴² This, in the end, produced a ten-point margin of victory for Sessions that will likely deter any significant Democratic opposition in the near future. If Frost, with his tremendous financial resources and twenty-six years of experience in Congress, could not win more than 44 percent of the vote in the district, it is difficult to see any other Democrat giving Sessions a run for his money any time soon.

This race provides some interesting lessons in terms of campaign finance. To begin with, it shows that national parties and interest groups do not *have* to be major players even in key, hotly contested races. The candidates’ pledge, combined with their own impressive financial resources, succeeded in deterring outside intervention, especially from interest groups. As a result, both candidates were able to exercise strong message control, instead of being distracted and focusing on the issues important to outside groups, like the illegal immigration issue raised by CFAW. In addition, this race showcased the growing importance of Hispanic outreach in many districts and the utility of Spanish-language media for this purpose. Thus, even though the end result was not quite as close as many predicted, the Frost-Sessions race in Texas’ Thirty-second District highlighted some key issues about money and campaigning in the current political climate.

⁴¹ Dave Levinthal, “Frost Fires Back Over ‘Child Molester’ Mailer,” *Dallas Morning News*, October 21, 2004, p. 1B.

⁴² “Veterans to Watch (24D, 18R)—Texas 32: Back to Your Roots,” *House Race Hotline*, October 1, 2004.

Table 21-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Texas 32nd Congressional District Race, 2003-04

	Martin Frost (D)	Pete Sessions (R)
From PACs	\$1,302,207	\$1,684,071
From individuals	\$3,199,918	\$2,464,349
From party	\$10,000	\$27,150
From candidate	\$50	\$0
Other contributions	\$110,929	\$290,767
Total receipts	\$4,623,104	\$4,466,337
Total expenditures	\$4,641,675	\$4,418,118
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$142,358	\$518,701

Source: Federal Election Commission, “2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info,” November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 23, 2004]).

Table 21-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, Texas 32nd Congressional District Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DCCC	TX 32	Martin Frost	\$671,126	...	\$671,126	\$1,114,511
	TX 32	Pete Sessions	...	\$443,385	\$443,385	
NRCC	TX 32	Martin Frost	...	\$663,833	\$663,833	\$747,483
	TX 32	Pete Sessions	\$83,650	...	\$83,650	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ [January 5, 2005]).

Table 21-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Texas 32nd Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Martin Frost Campaign	\$1,082,932	\$152,150	\$1,235,082	\$1,995,692
<i>Political parties</i>				
DCCC	\$879,410	\$11,500	\$890,910	\$927,502
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Communication Workers of America	\$7,147
Stronger America Now	\$2,387
Republican allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Pete Sessions Campaign	\$1,546,557	\$231,084	\$1,777,641	\$2,137,955
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRCC	\$657,250	...	\$657,250	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
Coalition for the Future American Worker	\$40,750	\$48,000	\$88,750	...
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
AARP	\$300,203

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 21-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 21-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Texas 32nd Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^b							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Martin Frost Campaign	32	1	2	...	5	10	50
Congressman Martin Frost (taxpayer expense)	3	3
<i>Political parties</i>							
DCCC	1	2	3
<i>Interest groups</i>							
Action Fund- Planned Parenthood of North Texas, Inc.	2	2
Republican allies^b							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Pete Sessions Campaign	33	5	11	49
Congressman Pete Sessions (taxpayer expense)	4	4
<i>Political parties</i>							
Texas Victory 2004- A Project of the Republican Party of Texas	5	...	2	7
NRCC	2	2	4
<i>Interest groups</i>							
Americans for Job Security	2	2
Council for Citizens Against Government Waste	1	1
Club for Growth	...	1 ^c	1
John Carona Campaign	1	1
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	1	1
Nonpartisan							
<i>Interest groups</i>							
AARP	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 21-3.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^c Stephen Moore, president, Club for Growth, interview by David Magleby and Richard Hawkins, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2004.

The Rematch: Utah's Second Congressional District

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The Utah Second Congressional District is a perennial candidate for inclusion as one of the nation's most competitive and interesting House races. The 2004 campaign was the latest in a long series of hard-fought and extremely negative races, a rematch of the candidates who ran in 2002. Democratic incumbent Jim Matheson won a third term with a remarkable 55 percent of the vote in a state that also gave George Bush his largest margin of victory in the 2004 election, 71 percent. Despite Matheson's impressive victory, the district will likely remain competitive as Republicans continue to target the only congressional seat in Utah not firmly held by the GOP.

Utah's Second District has, until recently, been predominantly urban, including most of Salt Lake County, while the First and Third districts were largely rural, taking in massive amounts of geography. The Second District has been a revolving door for Democrats and Republicans alike and has had more than its share of political scandals and negative campaigns. One Democratic incumbent lost after serving one term when he was arrested for soliciting sex from an undercover policewoman, a Republican won the seat after a very aggressive and negative campaign, only to lose the primary election two years later after her husband was accused of mishandling campaign and personal finances. Perennial Utah candidate Merrill Cook was elected in 1996, but his service was controversial, and the media focused on his high staff turnover and feuding with the state party. In 2000 Cook was defeated in the Republican primary. In a very nasty and negative campaign, Democrat Jim Matheson took advantage of the Republican infighting and won with a 15 percent margin. By this time, Republican leaders in the legislature had had enough, and in 2002 they radically redrew the district by splitting Salt Lake County, the one area of the state with significant numbers of Democrats, between the three districts. The borders of the new Second District touch five states and the district encompasses more than 50,000 square miles.

In 2002 Matheson ran for reelection in the reshaped district, unopposed by fellow Democrats while the Republicans were divided. John Swallow, a three-term state legislator won a hotly-contested primary over venture capitalist Tim Bridgewater. The general election was hard fought, and Matheson won by a mere 1,641 votes. Swallow spent \$1.2 million compared to Matheson's \$1.4 million, and it appeared that had the Republican Party invested in Swallow's campaign during the last few weeks of the race he might have won.¹ In 2004, Swallow was again challenged by Tim Bridgewater for the Republican nomination. The hard feelings engendered by the close primary in 2002 were only more pronounced in 2004. Each candidate accused the other of negative ads, falsehoods, half-truths, and gross misstatements. Swallow defeated Bridgewater in the 2002 Republican primary by only 4 percent; in 2004, his margin was 6 percent. The divisive GOP primary cost Swallow some support among Republicans, while Matheson again avoided a primary.

Money

In the 2002 race, Matheson and Swallow spent a combined total of \$2,516,012; in the 2004 contest, the candidates spent a total of \$3,432,487, an increase in spending of approximately 27 percent. In contrast, the growth in spending on the presidential election and congressional races by candidates and groups only grew by 30 percent during the four years between 2000 and 2004. Nationwide, the Utah Second Congressional District race was one of the most expensive in the nation in terms of candidate, party, and interest group spending, although not among the top ten congressional races wherein candidates raised between \$4.1 million and \$8.4 million. The amount of money raised in the average House campaign in

¹ For more on the 2002 race, see Kelly D. Patterson, "When Redistricting Means Never Having to Say You're Sorry," in *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections*, edited by David Magleby and J. Quin Monson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 241–257.

2002 and 2004 was approximately \$600,000 and \$675,000, respectively.² The level of spending over the last two cycles in the Second District race has been unprecedented and reflects the competitiveness of the district. This stands in contrast to the other two Utah districts, both of which receive very little attention and funding.

Table 22-1 shows the dramatic differences in the sources of the candidates' funding. Typical of most incumbents, Matheson relied heavily on PAC contributions. Swallow's campaign was primarily funded by contributions from individuals. Matheson outspent Swallow by some \$530,000 in 2004, but the financial advantage Matheson enjoyed was actually about double that amount, since Swallow spent about \$550,000 during the Republican convention and primary.³ In reality, Matheson spent nearly \$2 million on the general election, while Swallow spent about half that amount. Much of that deficit was overcome by spending from the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) and the Republican National Committee (RNC), which together spent \$1.27 million on TV and radio ads for Swallow, while the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) spent \$424,000 on ads in support of Matheson. The increased spending by the Republican Party of nearly \$800,000 over the DCCC helped erase the almost \$1 million advantage in spending of the Matheson campaign (see table 22-3).

Other differences between spending in 2002 and 2004 are also noteworthy. Contributions to the Swallow campaign from the Republican Party fell dramatically in 2004, from \$180,000 to \$20,000, and Swallow's own personal contributions fell from nearly \$150,000 in 2002 to zero in 2004. Matheson received tens of thousands of dollars from dozens of his Democratic colleagues in the House.⁴ The Club for Growth was the only 527 organization involved in the Utah race. It bundled some \$222,000 in checks for Swallow from its members, most of whom live outside of Utah, the third highest level of support it gave to a House candidate.⁵ However, the Club pulled out of the Utah race in August as strong support for Swallow did not materialize.⁶ Repeat challengers tend not to win, and Swallow wasn't doing well in the polls, said Moore, the Club's president. "It broke my heart," he commented.⁷

The Effects of Money

TV ads were the most important form of advertising in the campaign. The Matheson campaign and the DCCC spent nearly \$1.2 million on TV ads; the Republicans (Swallow campaign, NRCC and RNC) outspent the opposition by nearly a half million dollars. Matheson's ads emphasized his political independence and commitment to Utah's interests. His most effective ads focused on his efforts to stop nuclear weapons testing in Nevada and included an emotional endorsement from a woman struggling with cancer, helping cement his reputation for focusing on the concerns of Utahns.⁸ Other ads focused on education, a perennial key issue in Utah politics. Matheson also had the financial resources to shift to aggressive, negative ads against Swallow late in the campaign when his campaign began to be concerned about the pounding they were taking from Swallow's ads.⁹ The DCCC reinforced Matheson's message and played a very effective part by running positive ads touting Matheson's independence and service to Utah.

² David Nather, "The \$4 Billion Campaign: Better, or Just Louder," *CQ Weekly*, October 30, 2004, p. 2549.

³ Bob Bernick, Jr., "Big Leads in 4 Utah Races," *Deseret News*, July 14, 2004, p. A1.

⁴ Bob Bernick, Jr., "2nd District Race Rakes in Big \$\$," *Deseret Morning News*, October 21, 2004, p. B1.

⁵ Bob Bernick, Jr., "Demo Smiling, but Swallow Gets Bundle," *Deseret Morning News*, September 3, 2004, p. B2.

⁶ Stephen Moore, president, Club for Growth, interview by David Magleby and Richard Hawkins, Washington D.C., November 5, 2004.

⁷ Moore interview, November 5, 2004.

⁸ Frank Pignaneli and LaVar Webb, "Kudos and Criticism for Best, Worst of Politics '04," *Deseret Morning News*, December 26, 2004, p. AA1.

⁹ Mike Reburg, campaign staff, Jim Matheson for Congress, telephone interview by Gary Bryner, November 9, 2004; and Jim Matheson, telephone interview by Gary Bryner, November 29, 2004.

In contrast to Matheson's ads that largely discussed his efforts as a representative in Congress to protect the state's interests, Swallow's ads were mostly attacks on Matheson for supporting John Kerry, liberal congressional candidates, and abortion. The attacks from both the campaign and the national party committees were a relentless barrage of negative charges that eventually became counterproductive. The media regularly reported on how negative the TV ads were, in contrast to the governor's race, where Matheson's brother Scott and Republican Jon Huntsman (who eventually won) engaged in a polite, policy-oriented discussion. As one newspaper editor summarized the two races, "the congressional race generated headlines such as 'GOP rips Matheson' and 'Demos say GOP breaking the law.' The governor's race, on the other hand, generated headlines such as 'Governor hopefuls make cases.' Bad for newspapers. Good for Utahns."¹⁰ Both sides issued negative ads, but because the Swallow campaign and Republican party ads were more frequently aired and more uniformly negative, Swallow bore the brunt of criticism for the negative tone of the TV ad wars. Disgruntled Republicans eventually called the Matheson campaign to offer their support, and the barrage solidified Matheson's base.¹¹

Mailers from both national congressional campaigns committees were the focus of considerable attention in the race because they reflected the negative tone of TV ads and eventually became a major source of embarrassment for the Republicans. The Swallow campaign sent out four mailers, one that focused on the candidate himself and three that criticized Matheson. Criticisms included what Swallow claimed to be Matheson's opposition to President Bush's tax cuts, his failure to protect the rights of the unborn by supporting taxpayer-funded abortions, and his affiliation with liberal Democrats. These messages, repeated in both TV ads and mailers, were effectively countered by Matheson whose own ads focused on his support for Bush's tax cuts and education policies and Matheson's independent voting record.

The state GOP sent out fourteen flyers, eight of which repeated the charge that Matheson was pro choice; other mailers focused on his support of gay rights, Representative Nancy Pelosi, and Senator John Kerry. The Matheson campaign countered with twelve mailers focusing on his accomplishments in Congress, his service to Utah, his opposition to renewed nuclear weapons testing in Nevada, and his endorsements by the National Rifle Association (NRA) and by Republicans in the state. He also sent out five flyers critical of Swallow for voting in the state legislature against background checks for child care providers, against children's health programs, and for education spending cuts. The DCCC sent out four flyers lauding the incumbent as did four interest groups (see table 22-2).

A key event in the campaign occurred in October when mailers done by the NRCC criticized Matheson for supporting a bill to give in-state tuition to dependents of illegal aliens in the state, a bill co-sponsored by other members of Utah's Republican delegation. State GOP Chairman Joe Cannon denied responsibility for the flyers, complaining that "state parties across the country are acting as conduits for TV and print advertising created and paid for by the national parties, and that is what happened here." NRCC spokesperson Bo Harmon disagreed, arguing that, "That was a Utah Republican Party piece [of mail]. They researched it and printed it. We had nothing to do with it."¹² Another mailer criticized Matheson for siding with drug companies instead of Utah's seniors when he voted for the Medicare prescription drug bill, a Republican bill supported by the White House. The ads were produced for the NRCC by Arena Communications' Peter Valcarce. Once printed, the flyers were taken to Utah GOP headquarters where volunteers stamped them and mailed them under the party's permit; the party spent \$110,000 to mail twelve mailers to 76,000 voters (an example of spending that in the past would have

¹⁰ Jay Evenson, "Easier to Review the Past than to Divine the Future," *Deseret Morning News*, December 26, 2004, p. AA1.

¹¹ Adrien Smith, campaign director, Jim Matheson for Congress, interview by Gary Bryner, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 13, 2004.

¹² Bob Bernick, Jr. "GOP Rips Matheson for Aiding a GOP bill," *Deseret Morning News*, October 26, 2004, p. A1.

been soft money but is now defined as hard money)¹³ Utah GOP executive director Spencer Jenkins said Cannon had misspoken, in light of the complex provisions of the law, and said the NRCC directed the message and provided the research but did not provide the mailer itself. Jenkins, however, emphasized that the state party was greatly pressured by the national party to press forward with the negative ads, receiving a phone call from White House political director Matt Schlap demanding that all the negative mailers be sent out in order to drive up Matheson's negatives.¹⁴ "No one in this office loves [the negative ads,]" said Jenkins, "but the NRCC comes in and says, 'this is how it's going to be done,' and we said, 'fine.'" ¹⁵

The Swallow campaign never recovered from damage the confusion over the mailers did to Swallow's credibility and the perception that he was not in control of his campaign.¹⁶ Republicans had claimed Matheson did not support Bush even though the incumbent had voted for most of the president's initiatives, and had even voted for one that Swallow opposed. Swallow said Matheson favored partial-birth abortion, but Matheson had clearly voted against it. Democrats charged the Republicans with violating the campaign finance laws by claiming that the state party and NRCC coordinated their efforts. Democrats pointed to the fact that Arena Communications did direct mail for Swallow, the Utah GOP, and the NRCC.¹⁷ Five days before the election, there was another story about the Medicare issue and the mailer that criticized Matheson for supporting the Bush-backed bill. By this time, the media had ridiculed the GOP's confusion and it was widely recognized that the negative ads had harmed Swallow's campaign and damaged his credibility beyond repair.¹⁸ But Valcare placed the blame on a lackluster Republican candidate, the failure of state party leaders to explain that most Utahns opposed the immigration bill despite the support by some Republicans, and Matheson's tight-run congressional shop, strong constituent service, and effective positioning as an independent that served him well in the election.¹⁹ Table 22-4 summarizes the campaign's ground war. Table 22-3 summarizes spending on broadcast media in the race.

Conclusion

Matheson's victory was impressive, given Bush's landslide victory in the state. He ran an effective and well-financed campaign. He portrayed himself as an independent member of Congress and an effective advocate for Utah's interests. When he first ran for reelection, he was not well known in many counties, since the district had just been reorganized. By 2004, as a result of careful and effective constituent service, he and his staff knew the district quite well and were able to tailor mailings, phone calls, canvassing, and other efforts to specific areas while campaigning on issues that he had addressed as a representative. Matheson succeeded in building trust, even in a district that is about 60 percent Republican, and is a textbook example of effective constituent service that can be such an important part of incumbents' resources.²⁰ The NRCC and RNC, flush with cash, spent lots of money on the race.

¹³ Rebecca Walsh. "National, State Levels of GOP Blame the Other for Attack Ads," *Salt Lake Tribune*, October 27, 2004, p. C1.

¹⁴ Spencer Jenkins, executive director, Utah Republican Party, telephone interview by Gary Bryner, November 16, 2004.

¹⁵ KBYU Broadcasting, Newsnet Reports, *Election Night 2004*, November 2, 2004.

¹⁶ Salt Lake Tribune, "Ready! Fire! Aim!" *Salt Lake Tribune*, October 27, 2004, p. A16.

¹⁷ Bob Bernick, Jr., "GOP Breaks Campaign Laws, Utah Demos Say." *Deseret Morning News*, 27 October 2004, p. B1.

¹⁸ Bob Bernick, Jr., "2nd District Mudslinging Could Trigger a Backlash," *Deseret Morning News*, October 29, 2004, p. A1; Lee Davidson and Bob Bernick, Jr., "Swallow Ads Hit Matheson for Voting with Republicans," *Deseret Morning News*, October 29, 2004, p. A1.

¹⁹ Peter Valcarce, president, Arena Communications, interview by Gary Bryner and Quin Monson, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 5, 2004.

²⁰ Richard Fenno, *Homestyle: House Members in Their Districts* (New York, N.Y.: Longman, 2002).

Interest groups, on the other hand, balked at the prospect of spending in a race that was never really very close.

A key to Matheson's victory was strong democratic support in Salt Lake County, the largest urban area in the state. Of the votes Matheson received, 70 percent came from Salt Lake County and 30 percent from the rural areas. Nevertheless, it illustrates an important feature of Matheson's victory. In part of Salt Lake County, he received 70 percent of the vote; in the entire county, Bush received 61 percent. In rural areas of the second district, Matheson garnered 41 percent of the vote while Bush received 79 percent of the vote in those counties (see table 22-5).²¹

Swallow's campaign had several problems that prevented him from taking advantage of a strong Bush showing in the state. First, he had lost the 2002 election, a race that, because of redistricting, was arguably as much an open seat as an incumbent running for reelection. In 2004, Swallow could neither convince voters that he had done much in the intervening two years merit reconsideration nor develop a compelling message that could persuade voters to abandon an incumbent. In the KBYU-Utah Colleges Exit Poll, 31 percent of respondents reported a "very unfavorable" impression of Swallow and 8 percent reported a "very favorable" impression; Matheson's figures were almost the reverse: 8 percent of respondents said their impression of him was "very unfavorable" and 21 percent had a "very favorable" impression of him. Second, he was caught in a divisive convention and primary election. Just as in 2002, he spent a great deal of the money he had raised in his primary race. As the 2004 primary turned negative, he alienated some of the Republican base he would need to defeat Representative Matheson. Third, his negative ads in the general election did *not* significantly undermine support for Representative Matheson. The lead Matheson enjoyed in the polls changed little over the course of the campaign. There were some early figures that placed him even further in the lead, but the higher numbers probably were an indication of name identification more than voting intent.²² Even so, the polls showed impressive support for a Democratic incumbent in a largely Republican district (see table 22-6).

Republican consultants argued that the only way to beat incumbents was to drive up their negatives. Swallow TV ads and mailers, therefore, tried to portray Matheson as pro-choice, pro same sex marriage, and part of the Democratic Washington liberal establishment. Any of these charges could seriously damage a candidate in this conservative state. However, by the time the NRCC began running ads lambasting Matheson for supporting an education for immigrants bill and the Bush-backed Medicare prescription drug package that other members of the Utah delegation had also voted for, the media coverage focused on the controversies and blunted any chance of a rally that might have at least brought Swallow a little closer to victory.

Although Matheson's victory in 2004 was surprisingly large, his victory in 2002 was perhaps more impressive because his district had just been redrawn, and he was not, in a practical sense, an incumbent for most of his district. By all accounts, he worked extremely hard to serve his new constituents, traveled widely in his sprawling district, laid out conservative positions on issues like same-sex marriage that inoculated him from possible attacks, and ran a very well-designed, well-managed, and well-funded campaign. Ideology and party affiliation are obviously important, but a smart candidate can use the benefits of incumbency to trump them. The Utah Second Congressional District will likely continue to attract Republican challengers, but they face a daunting task in trying to unseat Representative Matheson.

²¹ The county figures are not strictly comparable, because in the case of the two largest and predominantly urban counties, Salt Lake and Utah, only part of each county is in the Second District; only a very small part of Utah County is in the district, and that part of the county is better characterized as rural than urban. See Utah.gov, "State of Utah Election Returns," (www.electionresults.utah.gov [January 7, 2005]).

²² July 6–10: Dan Jones & Associates; Sep. 6–9: Dan Jones & Associates; Sep. 24–29: Salt Lake Tribune; Sep. 28–Oct. 4: Dan Jones & Associates; Oct. 21–26: Salt Lake Tribune; Oct. 21–28: Dan Jones & Associates.

Table 22-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Utah 2nd Congressional District Race, 2001-04

	Matheson (D)		Swallow (R)	
	2001-2	2003-4	2001-2	2003-4
From PACs	\$641,107	\$1,083,275	\$154,238	\$241,640
From individuals	\$637,117	\$719,561	\$660,283	\$1,111,290
From party	\$155,189	\$107,347	\$180,922	\$19,865
From candidate	\$0	\$0	\$147,000	\$0
Other contributions	\$25,068	\$33,694	\$535	\$94,013
Total receipts	\$1,458,481	\$1,943,877	\$1,142,978	\$1,466,808
Total expenditures	\$1,376,640	\$1,982,502	\$1,139,372	\$1,449,985
Cash on hand (11/22/04)	\$143,265	\$82,212	\$3,603	\$20,793

Source: Federal Election Commission, “2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info,” November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 5, 2004]).

Table 22-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, Utah 2nd Congressional District Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DCCC	UT 2	Jim Matheson	\$661,236	...	\$661,236	\$661,236
	UT 2	John Swallow	
NRCC	UT 2	Jim Matheson	...	\$692,129	\$692,129	\$1,002,823
	UT 2	John Swallow	\$310,694	...	\$310,694	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ [January 5, 2005]).

Table 22-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Utah 2nd Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Jim Matheson for Congress	\$745,884	\$7,180	\$753,065	\$871,999
<i>Political parties</i>				
DCCC	\$439,882	...	\$439,882	\$340,923
Republican allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
John Swallow for Congress	\$421,380	\$2,635	\$424,015	\$536,882
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRCC	\$800,380	\$12,416	\$812,796	\$640,849
RNC	\$454,550	...	\$454,550	...
<i>Interest groups</i>				
United Seniors Association	\$188,431
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	\$45,026
Nonpartisan				
<i>Interest groups</i>				
AARP	\$34,926

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. TV ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 22-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 22-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Utah 2nd Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	E-mail	Mail	Phone Call	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^b					
<i>Candidates</i>					
Jim Matheson for Congress	...	17	17
<i>Political parties</i>					
DCCC	...	4	...	4	8
<i>Interest groups</i>					
U.S. Chamber of Commerce ^c	...	3	3
Republican allies^b					
<i>Candidates</i>					
John Swallow for Congress	1	7	8
<i>Political parties</i>					
Utah Republican Party	...	14	14
NRCC	2	6	8
<i>Interest groups</i>					
American Medical Association	...	3	3
The Seniors Coalition	...	2	2
National Association of Home Builders	...	1	1
United Seniors Association	...	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 22-3.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^c Organization that usually endorses Republican candidates but choose to endorse Matheson in this race.

Table 22-5
Election Results, Utah 2nd Congressional District Race, 2004

	Precints	Reporting	Matheson	Swallow	Bush	Kerry
Totals	733	733	54.55%	43.33%	71.74%	25.81%
			183,800	145,569	655,957	235,991
Salt Lake	420	420	127,861	63,543	209,162	131,057

Notes: The county figures are not strictly comparable, because in the case of the two largest and predominantly urban counties, Salt Lake and Utah, only part of each county is in the Second District; only a very small part of Utah County is in the district, and that part of the county is better characterized as rural than urban.

Source: Utah.gov, "State of Utah Election Returns," (www.electionresults.utah.gov [January 7, 2005]).

Table 22-6
Polling Results, Utah 2nd Congressional District Race, 2004

	July 6–10	Sept 6–9	Sep 24–29	Sept 28–Oct 4	Oct 21–26	Oct 21–28	Election
Matheson	58	61	55	63	44	51	55
Swallow	29	30	30	31	39	41	43
Others	3	2	2	1	2	3	2
Undecided	10	7	13	5	15	6	

Sources: July 6–10: Dan Jones & Associates; Sep. 6–9: Dan Jones & Associates; Sep. 24–29: Salt Lake Tribune; Sep. 28–Oct. 4: Dan Jones & Associates; Oct. 21–26: Salt Lake Tribune; Oct. 21–28: Dan Jones & Associates.

Appendix A Methodology

American campaigns are typically candidate centered.¹ Candidates hire strategists, raise funds, take polls, and generally conduct the campaign with relative freedom. This is true more for congressional races than it often is for presidential races.² However, it is increasingly difficult to ignore the role that noncandidate entities—interest groups, individuals, and political parties—play in congressional and presidential elections. They devote large amounts of money to the campaigns, often receive extensive media coverage, and in some cases assume responsibility for a significant portion of a campaign such as mobilizing voters.³

Studying campaigns and elections presents researchers with a wide variety of challenges. Campaigns are extraordinarily multidimensional events that consist of different actors, institutions, and dynamics. Researchers must choose between different methods when deciding how to examine the various processes at work within a campaign. Our research draws upon a number of different approaches, including case studies and surveys. Case studies of competitive presidential battleground states and congressional races are the core of this monograph. This appendix details the rationale behind the case study methodology as well as a description of case selection, elite interviewing, and our campaign communication database. Other aspects of the overall project are also briefly described, especially the national surveys conducted as part of the larger research program. The case studies enable us to examine the richness and diversity of campaign events. This project has studied enough cases, especially over several election cycles beginning with 1998, that we are also able to make useful comparisons across election cycles and generalizations that go beyond our set of cases to include the overall presidential and congressional campaign environment.

Students of elections have sought ways to study local differences and the ways in which those differences may influence the choices voters make. Context is the term often used to describe the conditions unique to a locale that may affect an individual's choice or reaction to an election. Context also has two important dimensions. First, context can differ over time. An election conducted in one cycle often has different properties from elections in another cycle. The features unique to a particular election will help researchers understand why a voter made the choice she did or felt the way she did. In any case, all voters in a specific election are subject to the unique circumstances, so the context has “global effects.”⁴ Second, context can have “compositional effects.” These effects derive from differences between different locales within the same election. The differences may be due to strength of party organization, socioeconomic composition, or some other independent variable normally associated with vote choice or attitudes. Whether testing for global or compositional effects, it is important that the study have enough cases in each context to make comparisons across the contexts possible.⁵ With enough cases in each particular

¹ Martin P. Wattenberg, *The Rise of Candidate Centered Politics: Presidential Elections in the 1980s* (Harvard University Press, 1991).

² Paul Herrnson, *Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington*, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2004). Gary C. Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, 6th ed. (New York, N.Y.: Pearson Longman, 2004).

³ See David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, eds., *The Last Hurrah? Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); David B. Magleby, ed. *The Other Campaign: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); David B. Magleby, ed. *Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 1998 Congressional Elections* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

⁴ For a discussion of these different sorts of contexts please see Michael Marsh “Electoral Context,” in *The Future of Election Studies*, edited by Mark N. Franklin and Christopher Wlezien (Oxford: Pergamon, 2002).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

context, it is possible to assess the extent to which a particular variable unique to that context may affect attitudes toward the candidates, information about the elections, and ultimately voting choice.

For the most part, students of campaign effects seem to have placed more emphasis on global contextual effects, with an emphasis on survey research and a reliance on social-psychological factors. There are sound reasons for doing so, and we conduct surveys as a part of our overall research. However, in recent years students of elections have also started to look at the compositional effects with their focus on differences across jurisdictions. There are good reasons the two types of studies could be profitably merged. Foremost among those reasons is that the nature of the questions being asked about campaigns really demands some sort of innovative methods and data sets that more completely capture the complex character of context.

Overview of Methodology

It is in the spirit of trying to measure and include some of these “compositional effects” that the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy (CSED) at Brigham Young University organized and implemented a national study of the most competitive contests, where outside group spending was most probable, during the 2004 election cycle.⁶ The research design in 2004 is similar to previous work in 1998, 2000, and 2002. Using a case-study methodology, the research aims to document the largely undocumented aspects of candidate and noncandidate campaigns. Our methodology relies on academic field researchers. By the end of the 2004 cycle, this ongoing research sponsored by CSED will have monitored 105 contests with the help of 110 academics at sixty-nine colleges and universities across the nation. These contests are summarized in table A-1. The participation of these academics has helped CSED obtain data on the involvement of outside groups in some of the nation’s most competitive electoral contests.

The CSED research design is based on three assumptions. First, noncandidate campaign activity is most likely to occur in competitive races. In 2002, CSED studied seventeen noncompetitive races as a control group, in part, to test this assumption. We found overwhelming evidence that the vast majority of outside money is spent in competitive races.⁷ Second, because much of noncandidate campaign activity is not disclosed, it is best uncovered and understood by someone with knowledge of the local context. To understand the full impact and reach of noncandidate activity, academics knowledgeable about the competitive race are recruited to systematically monitor each campaign. The academics in each competitive race oversee the collection of campaign communications, including the extent of mail, telephone, and personal contact; they also collect as much information as possible on broadcast advertising. They monitor voter mobilization efforts conducted by candidates, parties, and interest groups. Data on campaign communications in the contests are enhanced by a network of informants organized by the local academics. The informants agree to collect their political mail and keep a record of other campaign communications they view or receive.⁸ The third assumption is that political professionals would be willing to be interviewed and discuss their decision making and funding allocation strategies. Elite interviewing helps “connect the dots” of our data collection efforts—both by validating what is discovered in the data collection efforts of the academics as well as by providing new information. All interviews for the study are conducted on the record and with few exceptions the information from those interviews is fully attributed.

⁶ The generous support of the Pew Charitable Trusts funded the 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 projects.

⁷ David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, eds., *The Last Hurrah?: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 Congressional Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2004), pp. 8–10.

⁸ We gratefully acknowledge the participation in this data collection effort of local members of the League of Women Voters and Common Cause as well as many others recruited by the local academics.

As mentioned, the CSED methodology relies on academic fieldwork and reconnaissance networks. The academics in each sample race observe the contest and retrieve data on noncandidate campaign communications with voters. They also monitor television and radio advertising buys, direct mail, and telephone contacts, print advertising, and internet communications where possible. The academics supplement these efforts with the standard Federal Election Commission (FEC) data on the candidate campaigns, party, and PAC expenditures and in 2004 with data from the Internal Revenue Service on 527 organizations. They also conduct post-election interviews with campaign managers, consultants, and political reporters involved with the interest groups or parties invested in these races. Using a set of case studies that employ multiple methods of data collection, the CSED methodology seeks to systematically investigate the causes and consequences of campaign spending “within its real-life context.”⁹ This provides the richest, most feasible, and most accurate method of understanding the phenomenon of campaign spending by noncandidate entities in congressional elections.¹⁰

Case Selection

The sampling pool of competitive races CSED monitored in 2004 and other years was developed based on a combination of lists of competitive races published in early spring by the *Cook Political Report*, the *Rothenberg Political Report*, and *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*. This list was enhanced by interviews with current and former party and interest group professionals, reporters, and other political experts who helped identify contests in which outside money was most likely to be present.¹¹ In 2002, early in the election cycle the number of potentially competitive races was high enough that we quantified the input from the contacts and published sources by computing an additive score for each race during the final stages of case selection. Each score was comprised of a combination of the ratings in the published reports together with the likely competitive races named by the Republicans and key allied groups as well those named by the Democrats and key allied groups. Once scored, the list was sorted in rank order, and we used the ranking to aid our selection of competitive races. In 2004, there was broad consensus on the competitive presidential battlegrounds early in the cycle and the number of potentially competitive congressional races was small enough that the quantification was not needed.

While largely based on the potential for a competitive race, the case selections take other considerations into account as well in order to assure a broad range in the number and type of noncandidate groups observed. We make an effort to stratify the sample in terms of incumbent and open-seat races and for contests which would permit us to capture a wide variety of interest group and party communications and strategies. We also select cases so that we have variation in geographic location, level of minority population, and the number and type of interest groups likely to become involved. The last step of the case selection involves finding academics willing to participate in the project. The academics recruited to monitor the contests are selected based on their scholarly reputations and knowledge of state electoral politics.

⁹ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2003). Using multiple methods of data collection helps to enhance the validity of our conclusions. See Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton University Press, 1994).

¹⁰ Our methodology is similar to that followed by other research in congressional elections that uses case studies. See James A. Thurber, “Case Study Framework and Methodology,” in *The Battle for Congress: Consultants, Candidates, and Voters*, edited by James A. Thurber (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 239-246. For another recent example of case-study based research, see L. Sandy Maisel and Darrell M. West, *Running on Empty: Political Discourse in Congressional Elections* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).

¹¹ Among others, we acknowledge the assistance in this effort of Karen Ackerman, Matt Angle, Damon Ansell, Bob Bennenson, Ed Brookover, Bernadette Budde, Martin Burns, Charlie Cook, Chuck Cunningham, Mike McElwain, Greg Giroux, Andy Grossman, John Guzik, Tom Hofeller, Chris LaCivita, Mike Matthews, Bill Miller, Stuart Rothenberg, Scott Stoermer, Deanna White, Derrick Willis, and Sharon Wolff Susin.

In 2002, we added seventeen noncompetitive control races to test some of the assumptions about where noncandidate money is spent, thus establishing a baseline against which to compare the competitive races.¹² Many of the control races were selected because they were adjacent to the competitive races already sampled, as it would be difficult to convince academics to study a race where we expect little if any serious campaign activity. The most cost effective way to add some control races was to ask the academics studying our competitive races to identify an adjacent district to cover in addition to the competitive race. These control races were in the same media markets as the competitive races and thus did not require additional trips to television and radio stations to obtain ad buy data. They also involve elite interviews with many of the same people at the state level. We also selected some control races in states that had competitive races in the 2000 election in order to contrast the role of outside money in the same state or district over time.¹³

In sum, the procedures followed to select the cases for this study achieve an appropriate balance between maximizing the observable variance and minimizing bias while at the same time keeping the research costs at an acceptable level. In addition, non-random case selection in a small-n study helps to ensure that one does not exclude an important case.¹⁴

Voter Reaction to the Campaigns

The project also sought to connect the activities of the candidate and noncandidate groups to the voters targeted by those activities. In both the 2002 and 2004 election cycles, CSED, in cooperation with Washington State University and the University of Wisconsin, developed and executed surveys that seek to measure the reaction of voters to federal campaigns.

The public opinion research in 2004 consisted of a three-wave national panel survey that sought to measure the impact of the immense ground and air-war activities. The survey results in 2004, as in 2002, showed that voters felt overwhelmed by the deluge of information received from candidate and noncandidate groups in an attempt to persuade them to vote a particular way.¹⁵ Furthermore, the 2004 survey placed an emphasis on media markets that will be linked to ad-buy information such as the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG) data coded by Professor Ken Goldstein and his colleagues at the University of Wisconsin. The ad-buy data and the ground war data can then be linked with the individual level data to assess the different effects of the campaigns on the choices and attitudes of voters.

¹² On this point we are especially indebted to Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Richard Fenno, and other panel participants who provided feedback on our methodology as part of a panel titled, "Getting Inside the Outside Campaign: Using Collaborative Fieldwork to Study Soft Money and Issue Advocacy" at the 2002 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

¹³ Because the differences between competitive and control races were so clear in 2002 and because of budget constraints, we did not select control cases in our 2004 study.

¹⁴ See Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton University Press, 1994), especially chapter 4, for a comprehensive discussion of the issues involved in qualitative case selection. They provide an especially good discussion of why a random sample is not always an acceptable method of case selection in small n case study research. Our non-random case selection method uses a key explanatory variable (competitiveness) to drive our case selection of our focus and control races while also using other available prior information to increase the range of values across our dependent variable (noncandidate campaign activity).

¹⁵ David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, "Campaign 2002: 'The Perfect Storm'" (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, Brigham Young University, November 13, 2003).

The project also asked a sample of voters in different states to fill out a log survey documenting the various forms of contact that they received from the candidate and noncandidate campaigns in the three weeks leading up to Election Day. The project then surveyed these voters to register their opinions on the nature of the campaign and the information they were able to glean from the different activities that they observed. In 2002 we found that the average voter received nearly nineteen pieces of political mail during this period in South Dakota and Minnesota—two of the most competitive senate races. One Minnesota voter received eighty pieces of mail in three weeks. This extraordinary volume of information had a numbing effect on voters in those areas. We expect that the results from 2004 will be similar to 2002, but on a much larger scale.

In addition to the panel survey, the research team utilized Knowledge Networks to examine voter reactions to new the disclaimer provisions of BCRA. The “Stand by Your Ad” provisions require candidates, parties, and interest groups to include both an oral and written disclaimer statement with radio and television ads, thereby taking responsibility for the content of the ad.¹⁶ By requiring the candidates, parties, and interest groups to place “Stand by Your Ad” disclaimers in political advertising, legislators hoped to reduce negativity in political campaigns and increase voters’ confidence in the political system. CSED conducted an experiment by which a sample of over 800 voters was shown ads with and without the disclaimers. We will then test reactions to the ads on dimensions of negativity and confidence.

Finally, CSED conducted a disclosure audit of TV and radio broadcast stations located in competitive races across the country. Under BCRA, broadcast stations are required to maintain public political files that document all BCRA-defined electioneering communications purchased and aired by candidates, groups, and individuals. CSED researchers evaluated to what extent these groups chose to run electioneering issue ads before the time periods covered by BCRA in addition to the quality of disclosure of purchased political advertising. Furthermore, researchers assessed how accessible this information is to citizens and what, if any, difficulties prevent full disclosure of information required by law.

Together, the public opinion, log, and “Stand by Your Ad” surveys make it possible to connect what the academics learn in the field with what the voters experience in the campaigns. In this manner, researchers can more fully grapple with the different global and compositional variables that may produce changes in the dependent variables selected for examination.

Challenges

This research design tries to address several of the obstacles currently encountered by students of political campaigns and these obstacles’ effects. It cannot overcome all of these obstacles—no research project reasonably can. However, it is helpful to elaborate on these obstacles in order to develop strategies to overcome them.

The first obstacle is the increasing difficulty of gathering some of the more important contextual data. For example, it is getting increasingly difficult to survey those individuals who can describe, compare, and contrast specific campaigns. Some congressional candidates, mostly members of Congress, now routinely refuse to answer any surveys. Academics situated in those particular races, however, can provide much of the data that surveys used to provide.

Second, there is an increasingly high financial cost of gathering enough information on important institutional variables from the different actors in the various campaigns. Researchers from different projects should explore ways to pool resources to create large, rich data sets. These data sets could

¹⁶ Federal Election Commission, *Federal Register*, Vol. 67, No. 205. (October 23, 2002), pp. 65190-65212.

include variables from the campaigns, such as the tone, strategies, and electoral procedures in the various races. It is often too difficult or too costly for one research project to perform all of these data gathering tasks, but collaborating scholars can create very useful data by monitoring particular races, interviewing elites, and sharing their results.

Finally, it will also be difficult to assemble these large data sets over time. The grants that have funded many of the studies prominent in the field today are unique in because they have often been funded over multiple cycles. However, if we theorize that time is an important dynamic and that many of the factors may shift over time, researchers will need to come to terms with the question of what is an acceptable time horizon. Collaboration across institutions could clearly help alleviate some of the burdens discussed above. But what types of institutions, research and otherwise, would the field need to create in order to facilitate collaboration and the construction of the larger, more useful data sets? We firmly believe that this can be an important innovation in the field and that ways should be constructed to facilitate more cross-institutional collaboration, particularly between the excellent research centers at different universities and colleges. The eventual placement of these research efforts in data archives such as ICPSR should always be a goal.

Conclusion

We hope that this research encourages innovations in gathering data about the factors that affect the dynamics and outcomes of congressional and presidential elections and in constructing data sets sufficient for the types of questions the field would really like to examine. The research design discussed above has specific weaknesses but also holds out the hope of gathering data that can help scholars more fully understand campaigns and their effects. They can also help answer the more popular questions such as why a particular candidate may have won.¹⁷ With further data gathering and more collaboration, efforts like those outlined above should result in more complete data sets and more refined knowledge about the dynamics of campaign effects.

¹⁷ See for example Adam Nagourney, "So What Happened in That Election, Anyhow?" *New York Times*, January 2, 2004, sec. 4, p. 3. The article examines some of the different explanations for the outcome in 2004 and discusses some of the confusion surrounding the conventional explanations.

Table A-1, Case Studies Sponsored by CSED, 1998-2004

	1998	2000	2002	2004
Presidential General				
Florida				x
Iowa				x
Missouri				x
New Mexico				x
Ohio				x
Presidential Primary/Caucus				
California		x		
Iowa		x		x
Missouri		x		
New Hampshire		x		x
South Carolina		x		x
Senate General				
Alaska				x
Arkansas			x	
Colorado				x
Delaware		x	c	
Florida				x
Iowa			x	
Kentucky	x			
Michigan		x	c	
Minnesota			x	
Missouri		x	x	
Montana		x	c	
Nevada	x			
New Hampshire			x	
New Mexico			c	
North Carolina	x			x
Oklahoma				x
South Carolina	x			
South Dakota			x	x
Virginia		x		
House General				
Arizona 1			x	x
Arkansas 1			c	
Arkansas 4		x	x	
California 27		x		
California 29			c	
Colorado 1			c	
Colorado 7			x	x
Connecticut 1			c	
Connecticut 5	x	x	x	
Georgia 12				x

	1998	2000	2002	2004
Idaho 2	x			
Illinois 10		x		
Illinois 17	x			
Indiana 2			x	
Iowa 1			x	
Iowa 2			x	
Iowa 3			x	
Iowa 3	x			
Iowa 4			x	
Kansas 3	x			x
Kentucky 6	x	x		
Maryland 5			c	
Maryland 8		x	x	
Minnesota 2			x	
Mississippi 2			c	
Mississippi 3			x	
Montana AL		x	c	
New Hampshire 1			x	
New Hampshire 2			c	
New Jersey 12		x		
New Mexico 1			x	x
New Mexico 2			x	
New Mexico 3	x			
North Carolina 8			x	
North Carolina 9			c	
Ohio 6	x			
Oklahoma 2		x		
Oregon 1	x			
Pennsylvania 13	x	x		x
Pennsylvania 17			x	
Pennsylvania 4		x	c	
Pennsylvania 6			c	
South Dakota AL			x	x
Texas 32				x
Utah 1			c	
Utah 2	x		x	x
Utah 3			c	
Washington 2		x		
Wisconsin 1	x			

Note: An “x” indicates that the race was considered competitive. A “c” indicates a “control” race (only included in the 2002 study).

Appendix B
List of Interviews Conducted by CSED Researchers

Name	Title	Organization	Date(s) Interviewed
Martin Burns	Manager, State Communications Office; Internal Communications	AARP	11/5/2004, 06/02/04
Beth Berendson	Organizer	ACORN Ohio	10/27/04
Andy Grossman	Director of Research and Technology	ACT	11/12/2004, 06/24/04, 02/12/04
Jess Goode	Ohio state Communications Director	ACT	10/27/04
Karin Johanson	State Director Florida	ACT	11/19/04
Tait Sye	Florida State Communications Director	ACT	07/24/04
Matt Tomey	New York State Volunteer Coordinator	ACT	08/24/04
Norm Ornstein	Resident Scholar	AEI	12/18/03
David Boundy	Deputy Director, Political Department	AFL-CIO	12/16/04
Keith Goodman	Research Analyst, Political Department	AFL-CIO	12/16/2004, 07/08/04
Mike Podhorzer	Assistant Director, Political Department	AFL-CIO	12/16/2004, 07/08/04
Dave Kolbe	Political Director, Community Services and Legislation	AFL-CIO Ohio	10/27/04
Pierrette "Petee" Talley	Secretary-Treasurer	AFL-CIO Ohio	10/27/04
Kim Alfano Doyle	President and CEO	Alfano Leonardo Communications	06/24/04
Jim Kawka	Regional Political Director, Division of Political and Legislative Grassroots	AMA PAC	12/16/04
Mike Cys	Director, Division of Political and Legislative Grassroots	AMA PAC	12/16/04
Steve Rosenthal	CEO	America Coming Together	12/17/04
Cathy Duvall	National Field Director	America Votes	08/18/04
Cecile Richards	President	America Votes	12/28/04
Jim Jordan	Communications Consultant	America Votes	07/06/04
Parag Mehta	Deputy Political Director	America Votes	07/06/04
Angela Manso	Deputy Director and Chief of Staff	America's Families United	08/17/04
Peter Valcarce	Political Consultant	Arena Communications	11/05/04
Ned Monroe	Director of Political Affairs	Associated Builders and Contractors	11/8/2004, 08/19/04
Linda Lipson	Legislative Liaison	Association of Trial Lawyers of America	12/17/2004, 06/03/04
Whit Ayres	President	Ayres, McHenry, and Associates	09/16/04

Name	Title	Organization	Date(s) Interviewed
Kristina Wilfore	Executive Director	Ballot Initiative Strategy Center	11/18/2004, 08/17/04
Lauren McClintock	Campaign Director	Ballot Initiative Strategy Center	11/18/04
Bernadette Budde	Senior Vice President	BIPAC	11/4/2004, 06/22/04, 02/02/04
Tom Mann	Senior Fellow in Governance Studies	Brookings Institute	9/17/2004, 06/21/04
Tony Corrado	Visiting Fellow	Brookings Institute	9/17/2004, 09/24/04
Michael Ellis	Research Analyst	Bush/Cheney '04	11/18/2004, 06/03/04
Nathan Hollifield	Tampa Bay Field Director	Bush/Cheney '04	07/24/04
Sara Taylor	Deputy to the Chief Strategist	Bush/Cheney '04	11/18/2004, 06/03/04
Terry Nelson	Political Director	Bush/Cheney '04	01/05/05
Michael Alvarez	Professor of Political Science	California Institute of Technology	05/20/04
Marianne Holt Viray	Managing Director	Campaign Legal Center	9/17/2004, 11/11/03
David Donnelly	Director	Campaign Money Watch	08/19/04
Trevor Potter	Campaigns and Election lawyer	Caplin and Drysdale	10/28/2004, 04/27/04
Michael Malbin	Executive Director	CFI	03/10/04
Robert G. Boatright	Research Analyst	CFI	03/10/04
Rob Jordan	National Director of Federal and State Campaigns	Citizens for Sound Economy	11/11/2004, 08/20/04
David Keating	Executive Director	Club for Growth	06/22/04
Stephen Moore	President	Club for Growth	11/5/2004, 2/13/04
Michael Petro	Chief of Staff and Vice President, Business and Government Relations	Committee for Economic Development	11/19/04
Curtis Gans	Director	Committee for the Study of the American Electorate	10/29/04
Chellie Pingree	President	Common Cause	03/10/04
Ed Davis	Research Director	Common Cause	12/17/04
Matt Schaffer	Research Analyst	Common Cause	12/17/04
Matt Angle	Chief of Staff	Congressman Martin Frost	06/01/04
Aron Pilhofer	Database editor	CPI	10/28/2004, 06/03/04, 02/02/04
Kori Bernards	Communications Director	DCCC	03/09/04
Peter Cari	Political Director	DCCC	12/14/2004, 04/28/04
Kay Oshel	Chief, Division of Interpretations and Standards	Department of Labor	07/08/04
Larry Yud	Head of the Enforcement Division	Department of Labor	07/08/04
Amy Pritchard	Political Director	DNC	01/13/05, 2/2/2004
Ellen Moran	Director, Independent Expenditure Unit	DNC	12/16/2004, 08/19/04
Gail Stoltz	former Political Director	DNC	02/02/04
Josh Wachs	COO	DNC	01/11/05
Lina Brunton	Voter Contact Director	DNC	8/18/2004, 06/24/04

Name	Title	Organization	Date(s) Interviewed
Marie Terese Dominguez	Independent Consultant on Hispanic Outreach	DNC	12/17/04
Benjamin Jones	Research Director	DSCC	11/10/04
Brad Woodhouse	Communications Director	DSCC	11/11/03
David Hamrick	National Field Director	DSCC	12/16/04
David Rudd	Executive Director	DSCC	03/10/04
Paul Tewes	Political Director	DSCC	02/20/04
Karen White	Political Director	EMILY's List	11/8/2004, 08/17/04
Sheila O'Connell	Senior Advisor	EMILY's List	02/21/04
Chris Murray	Political Director	Environment 2004	08/16/04
Bob Biersack	Deputy Press Officer	FEC	10/29/04
Michael Toner	Commissioner	FEC	10/29/04
Paul Clark	Disclosure Systems Analyst	FEC	06/02/04
Laurie Moskowitz	Partner	FieldWorks	06/02/04
Tom Minnery	Vice President, Public Policy	Focus on the Family	12/16/04
Eddie Mahe	Strategic Communications Counsel	Foley and Lardner LLP	07/07/04
Fred Yang	Partner	Garin, Hart, and Yang Research Group	11/10/04
J. Toscano	Senior Vice President	GMMMB	08/17/04
Pamela Mantis	Vice-President for Communications	GOPAC	07/07/04
Ed Brookover	Chairman of the Political Practice	Greener and Hook	03/09/04
Judith Kindell	Attorney	IRS	11/11/03
Martin Hamburger	Media Consultant	Laguens Hamburger Strategies	06/02/04
Celinda Lake	President	Lake, Snell, Perry, and Associates Inc.	06/22/04
Andy Schultheiss	Southwest Regional Director	LCV	07/16/04
Chuck Porcari	Communications Director	LCV	04/27/04
Mark Longabaugh	Senior Vice President, Political Affairs	LCV	11/10/2004, 06/24/04
Lloyd Leonard	Legislative Director	League of Women Voters	03/09/04
Michael Matthews	Principal	LSG strategies	06/01/04
Erik Smith	Executive Director	The Media Fund	11/10/2004, 06/02/04
Harold Ickes	President	The Media Fund	11/11/2004, 09/16/04
John Hutchins	Owner	Media Strategies and Research	07/16/04
Wes Boyd	Co-founder	MoveOn.org	12/14/04, 9/10/2004
Claude Foster	National Field Director	NAACP Voter Fund	12/15/04
Elizabeth Shipp	Political Director	NARAL Pro-Choice America	11/9/2004, 03/09/04
Tiffany Adams	Vice President, Public Affairs	National Association of Manufacturers	11/5/2004, 04/27/04
David Rehr	President	National Beer Wholesalers Association	11/5/2004, 08/20/04
Linda Auglis	Political Affairs Director	National Beer Wholesalers Association	11/5/2004, 08/20/04

Name	Title	Organization	Date(s) Interviewed
Dennis Friel	East Field Manager Campaign 2004	NEA	11/4/2004, 06/02/04
Lily Eskelson	Secretary-Treasurer	NEA	06/02/04
Simon Rosenberg	President	New Democrat Network	12/16/2004, 07/06/04
Ivan Frishberg	Director	New Voter Project	11/11/04
Andrew Fimka	Coordinator, Political Programs	NFIB	12/15/04
Sharon Wolff Sussin	National Political Director	NFIB	12/15/2004, 03/10/04
Chuck Cunningham	Federal Affairs Director	NRA	11/5/2004, 02/02/04
Glen Caroline	Director, NRA-ILA Grassroots Division	NRA	11/10/04
Jim Landry	Research Analyst	NRSC	11/11/03
Patrick Davis	Political Director	NRSC	11/11/2004, 08/19/04, 11/11/03
Ben Ginsberg	Election Lawyer	Patton Boggs	11/10/2004, 06/23/04
Kimberly Robson	Deputy Field Director for Legislative Election Programs	People for the American Way	11/5/2004, 07/07/04
Mary Jean Collins	Vice President and National Field Director	People for the American Way	12/13/04
Bob Bauer	Election lawyer	Perkins Coie	11/11/2004, 06/03/04
Ken Bowler	Vice President – Federal Government Relations	Pfizer	03/11/04
David Williams	Political Director	Planned Parenthood	11/8/2004, 04/28/04
Kent Cooper	Co-founder	Political Money Line	11/9/2004, 04/27/04
Tony Raymond	Co-founder	Political Money Line	04/27/04
Mike Lux	President	Progressive Strategies	11/12/2004, 02/13/04
Bill McInturff	Partner and Co-Founder	Public Opinion Strategies	09/17/04
Blaise Hazelwood	Political Director	RNC	12/20/04
Charles Spies	Deputy Counsel	RNC	12/15/04
Dan Gurley	Deputy Political Director	RNC	06/01/04
Noe Garcia	Director of Coalitions and Grassroots Outreach	RNC	03/08/04
Raul Damas	National Grassroots Director	RNC	12/13/2004, 08/18/04
Jim Innocenzi	Media Consultant	Sandler and Innocenzi	07/07/04
Andy Stern	President	SEIU	11/08/04
Jack Polidori	Political Director	SEIU	02/19/04
Greg Haegele	Political Director	The Sierra Club	11/11/2004, 06/01/04
Michael Vachon	Communications Director	Soros Political Director	11/08/04
April Schiff	President	Strategic Solutions	07/24/04
Jennifer Bingham	Executive Director	Susan B. Anthony List	09/16/04
Chris LaCivita	Senior Advisor	Swift Boat Veterans for Truth	11/17/04, 6/22/2004, 02/02/04
Dan Hazelwood	President	Targeted Creative Communications	11/9/2004, 06/02/04
Alexander Gage	President	TargetPoint Consulting	12/16/04
Brent Seaborn	Vice President	TargetPoint Consulting	12/16/04
Michael Myers	Vice President	TargetPoint Consulting	12/16/04
Curt Anderson	Independent Consultant; NRSC	The Anderson Group	12/15/04

Name	Title	Organization	Date(s) Interviewed
Derek Willis	Data Specialist	The Center for Public Integrity	06/03/04, 02/12/04, 11/11/2003
Larry Noble	Executive Director	The Center for Responsive Politics	12/18/03
Sheila Krumholz	Research Director	The Center for Responsive Politics	4/27/2004, 12/18/03
Steve Weiss	Communications Director and Editor	The Center for Responsive Politics	12/18/03
Wally Clinton	Chairman	The Clinton Group	06/21/04
Susan Hirshmann	President	The Leadership Forum	11/18/04
Doug Usher	Vice President	The Mellman Group	08/16/04
Mark Mellman	President and CEO	The Mellman Group	11/12/04
Ed Goeas	President, CEO	The Terrance Group	11/5/2004, 06/30/04
Evan Tracey	CEO	TNS Media Intelligence/CMAG	10/28/2004, 04/28/04
Monica Franklin	Assistant General Counsel	Turner Broadcasting	09/17/04
Bill Miller	Vice President, Public Affairs and National Political Director	U.S. Chamber of Commerce	11/9/2004, 06/24/04, 02/01/04
Bob Bennett	U.S. Senator	Utah	11/05/04
Rob Bishop	U.S. Representative	Utah	09/15/04
Arlene Holt Baker	President	Voices for Working Families	11/18/2004, 08/17/04
Kate Snyder	Women's Program Director	Voices for Working Families	11/18/04
Kenny Diggs	National Field Director	Voices for Working Families	11/18/04
John Guzik	Vice President	Williams & Mullen Strategies	12/19/03
Heather Booth	Independent Consultant		11/18/2004, 06/23/04