



Alaska's Criminal Justice Reforms

Comprehensive law improves pretrial, sentencing, and corrections policies


Overview

On July 11, 2016, Alaska Governor Bill Walker (I) signed into law research-driven legislation that aims to deliver a greater public safety return on the state's spending. The Alaska Criminal Justice Commission, an interbranch task force of state and local officials and practitioners, developed the policy foundations for S.B. 91 with technical assistance from The Pew Charitable Trusts as part of the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, a partnership between Pew and the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance. The pretrial, sentencing, and corrections reforms are expected to reduce the number of inmates by 13 percent. The state estimates that the law will yield savings of \$380 million, and it plans to invest nearly \$100 million of that in victims' services and evidence-based prison alternatives.

Figure 1

Alaska's Criminal Justice Reform Expected to Cut Prison Population 13%

Number of inmates had been projected to rise by 27%



Source: Alaska Department of Corrections

© 2016 The Pew Charitable Trusts



This is an historic moment, a massive realignment of our public safety spending and priorities.”

—Governor Bill Walker, signing S.B. 91 on July 11, 2016

Highlights

Problem

Between 2005 and 2014, the population of Alaska’s unified jail and prison system increased 27 percent, almost three times faster than the state’s resident population.¹ This rapid growth spurred the 2012 opening of a new correctional center at a cost to the state of \$240 million. That capital expenditure came on top of the corrections system’s \$300 million annual operating budget, which itself had risen 60 percent over the previous two decades.² Without policy changes, the state projected that its inmate population would grow by another 27 percent, or 1,416 inmates, by 2024, costing at least another \$169 million at a time when the state was facing a multibillion-dollar revenue shortfall.

Findings

The commission conducted an extensive data review and found that the state’s pretrial population—those who have been arrested and are detained while awaiting court hearings—had increased by 81 percent between 2005 and 2014, driven by longer detention. The post-conviction population had also increased, in part because of longer time served for felony offenses. Three-quarters of newly sentenced prisoners were convicted of nonviolent offenses. On any given day in 2015, roughly 1 in 5 inmates was incarcerated for a technical violation of probation or parole conditions.

Reforms

With instructions from state leaders to identify policy options that would cut the prison population by as much as 25 percent, the commission developed 21 recommendations covering all aspects of the system: Create a new evidence-based pretrial release system; prioritize prison space for individuals convicted of serious, violent offenses; and strengthen probation and parole to reduce recidivism. Specific reforms included eliminating secured money bond—that is, cash bail paid upfront, before release—for certain pretrial defendants, reducing felony sentence ranges, reclassifying drug possession offenses as misdemeanors, and adopting three-, five-, and 10-day limits on revocations to prison for technical violations of probation and parole.

Impact

After more than 50 legislative hearings, S.B. 91 passed with large bipartisan majorities in both chambers and was signed into law by the governor. Alaska officials expect the criminal justice reform measure to avoid all anticipated jail and prison population growth, reduce the number of people incarcerated in the state by 13 percent by 2024, and save \$380 million (\$169 million in avoided costs and \$211 million of net savings). (See Figure 1.) Accompanying fiscal notes reinvest \$98.8 million over six years in substance use disorder and mental health treatment in prison and the community, re-entry supports for those leaving prison, pretrial risk assessments and supervision, violence prevention programming, and crime victim services.

Background

Alaska is one of only six states that operate jails—typically a function of local government—as well as prisons. The state’s incarcerated population, which includes both pretrial and post-conviction inmates in jails and prisons, grew by 27 percent between 2005 and 2014, nearly three times faster than the resident population. The total corrections population—those incarcerated as well as people on community supervision— grew 45 percent over the same 10 years, all at significant state expense. Alaska spent \$327 million on corrections in fiscal year 2014, up from \$184 million in fiscal 2005.³ In addition, corrections growth required significant capital expenditures, including construction of the \$240 million Goose Creek Correctional Center, which opened in 2012.

The state’s growing prison population and increased corrections spending, however, had not produced commensurate improvements in recidivism: Nearly 2 in 3 people released from Alaska prisons returned within three years.

Without a shift in pretrial, sentencing, and corrections policy, the state’s Department of Corrections projected that the average daily prison population would grow by another 1,416 inmates by 2024. This increase would surpass existing capacity by 2017 and force the state to reopen a closed facility and either transfer inmates out of state or build a new prison. The department estimated that accommodating the projected growth would cost at least \$169 million.

Alaska Criminal Justice Commission

In an effort to control prison and jail growth and recalibrate the state’s correctional investments to ensure the best possible public safety returns, the state Legislature in 2014 unanimously passed S.B. 64, establishing the interbranch Alaska Criminal Justice Commission. The 13-member task force includes legislators, judges, law enforcement officials, the state attorney general and public defender, the corrections commissioner, the Mental Health Trust Authority director, and members representing crime victims and Alaska Natives. (See the list of members on Page 22.)

Gov. Walker, Senate President Kevin Meyer (R), Speaker Mike Chenault (R), and then-Chief Justice Dana Fabe directed the commission to conduct a comprehensive review of Alaska’s criminal justice system and develop recommendations for legislative and budgetary changes. From summer 2015 through the end of the calendar year, the commission conducted a rigorous review of Alaska’s pretrial, sentencing, and corrections data, policies, and programs, as well as best practices and models from other states.

In addition to its formal meetings and work group sessions, the commission and its staff held five public hearings with a wide range of stakeholders across the state, including outreach in rural hub communities and remote villages, and roundtable discussions with crime victims, survivors, and victim advocates. Commissioners and staff also received input and guidance from prosecutors, defense attorneys, behavioral health experts, and others.

Pew and its partner, the Crime and Justice Institute at Community Resources for Justice, provided the commission with technical assistance, which included analyzing Alaska’s pretrial, sentencing, and corrections data and systems; facilitating policy development discussions; and educating policymakers and the public about the commission’s recommendations. This assistance was provided as part of the Justice Reinvestment Initiative.

Key findings

The commission identified six principle factors that contributed to the growth in Alaska’s incarcerated population.


1. Growth in the pretrial population

The number of pretrial inmates rose by 81 percent between 2005 and 2014, significantly outpacing the growth of the post-conviction population. Seemingly minor increases in pretrial length of stay drove the spike in Alaska’s pretrial detention population. People detained for nonviolent misdemeanors, for example, were held in prison three more days on average in 2014 than those detained for the same charges in 2005. (See Figure 2.) Multiplied across thousands of admissions each year, those extra few days dramatically increased the share of the state’s jail and prison space occupied by pretrial detainees.

Figure 2

Pretrial Length of Stay in Alaska Increased for All Charges

Average days in jail between arrest and conviction by offense type, 2005 and 2014



Source: Alaska Department of Corrections

© 2016 The Pew Charitable Trusts

A significant contributor to pretrial length of stay in Alaska was the use of secured money bond. Although Alaska law presumed that pretrial defendants would be released on personal recognizance—a promise to return to court without having to pay money—a review of bail conditions for a random sample of defendants found that courts departed from this presumption in the vast majority of cases.⁴ Less than half of the defendants sampled were released pretrial. Of those who were, costlier bonds translated into longer initial jail stays. For example, only 38 percent of those with bond amounts between \$1,000 and \$2,500 were able to post that amount and be released, and they still spent an average of seven weeks in detention, eight times as long as those with bonds between \$500 and \$1,000.⁵ Defendants in Alaska were not assessed for risk of pretrial failure, and no supervision was provided for those released while awaiting court hearings.


2. Most post-conviction admissions were for lower-level, nonviolent offenses

In 2014, the majority (62 percent) of people sentenced and admitted to prison in Alaska had been convicted of nonviolent misdemeanor offenses. Including both misdemeanors and felonies, nonviolent offenses comprised three-quarters of all post-conviction admissions. (See Figure 3.) The commission found that alternatives to prison for people whose criminal behavior was related to addiction and mental health disorders were limited and underutilized and that the state's prison system had become the default treatment provider for many people whose needs were not being met in the community.

Figure 3

75% of People Sent to Prison in Alaska Were Convicted of Nonviolent Crimes

Percentage of admissions for sentenced individuals by offense type



Source: Alaska Department of Corrections

© 2016 The Pew Charitable Trusts

“What we saw in the data were many of the same trends we in the law enforcement community see every day: a failure to effectively address mental health issues and curb addiction and addiction-fueled crime, and a revolving prison door.”

—commission members Gary Folger, former Department of Public Safety commissioner, and Juneau police Lt. Kris Sell (op-ed, *Alaska Dispatch News*, Feb. 28, 2016)


3. Longer prison stays for felony offenses

Length of stay for felony convictions increased across all offense types and felony classes. Those who were released in 2014 after serving time for drug and property offenses, for example, spent 30 more days in prison on average than similar inmates released in 2005. Further, length of stay increased by an average of roughly three months for alcohol and public order offenses and 16 months for registerable sex offenses. (See Figure 4.)

Figure 4

Time Served Increased in Alaska for All Felonies

Average post-conviction length of stay by category, 2005 and 2014



Source: Alaska Department of Corrections

© 2016 The Pew Charitable Trusts

4. More people admitted to prison for technical violations of supervision conditions

The commission also examined the growing number of inmates in Alaska entering prison for a technical violation of the conditions of their probation or parole—such as consuming alcohol, missing or failing drug tests, or failing to report to a supervision officer—rather than for a new criminal offense. The number of people who were returned to prison for technical violations increased by 32 percent between 2005 and 2014, with nearly half staying more than a month and 29 percent more than three months. Alaska had no systemwide framework for swift, certain, and proportional jail sanctions for probation and parole violators or other intermediate sanctions short of a revocation to prison.

5. People kept on community supervision past the point of diminishing returns

Over the same decade that Alaska's prison population grew by 27 percent, its probation and parole population rose 62 percent, driven in part by longer terms. Between 2005 and 2014, the average period of supervision increased by 13 percent, from 23.5 months to 26.5, despite the fact that probationers and parolees were found to be at highest risk of reoffending in the first three months after release. This meant that more probation and parole resources were dedicated to supervising people long after the time when they posed the highest risk.

Through its assessment process, the Department of Corrections identified a large portion of those on probation and parole—39 percent on a snapshot day in 2014—as low risk, meaning they were unlikely to engage in new criminal behavior. Even with less intensive supervision levels, these individuals required significant staff time that would otherwise have been focused on those more likely to engage in new criminal activity. The state had no policies that shortened supervision terms for those who comply with their conditions to encourage prosocial behavior and focus limited resources on those with a higher likelihood to reoffend.

6. Lack of community-based resources

Although state agencies and stakeholder coalitions had made significant efforts to increase access to treatment and re-entry supports for incarcerated and supervised people, substantial unmet needs persisted. The state had insufficient mental health and substance use disorder treatment, with regional disparities in community-based access and limited capacity in state prisons. People with felony convictions also faced a shortage of affordable housing and extensive barriers to housing and employment after release from prison. In addition, the Legislature cut \$2.7 million from violence prevention programming in 2015, and shelter and supportive services for crime victims in Alaska's rural and bush communities were costly and scarce.

Comprehensive legislative reform package

In December 2015, the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission presented the Legislature with 21 policy recommendations, which were subsequently drafted into legislation and introduced as S.B. 91. After extensive vetting by five legislative committees in over 50 public hearings, the Legislature passed the measure by votes of 16-2 in the Senate, 28-10 in the House, and a 14-5 Senate concurrence vote. Gov. Walker signed S.B. 91 into law on July 11, 2016.

The legislation contains five primary objectives:

Implement evidence-based pretrial practices

To reduce pretrial detention and improve public safety and court appearance rates, the law:

- **Expands officers' discretion to issue citations in lieu of arrest.**
 - Authorizes law enforcement officers to issue citations with a summons to appear in court rather than place people under arrest for nonviolent class C felonies, such as theft or driving under the influence (DUI), expanding an option that was previously limited to nonviolent misdemeanors.
- **Modifies penalties for failure to appear and violation of release conditions.**
 - Reclassifies these offenses as violations in most circumstances rather than misdemeanors or felonies.

- **Shortens time to first court appearance.**
 - Mandates that defendants be brought before a judge within 24 hours of arrest, except when a court finds compelling circumstances for delay, rather than the 48 hours allowed under previous law.
- **Directs the Department of Corrections to develop a pretrial services program.**
 - Requires the commissioner of the Department of Corrections to approve and validate a pretrial risk assessment tool.
 - Authorizes and funds the department to hire its first pretrial services officers and mandates that, before a defendant's first appearance in court, the officers conduct a risk assessment and prepare a report for the judge with recommendations on the appropriateness of release on recognizance, the least restrictive release conditions to reasonably ensure court appearance and public safety, and the appropriateness of pretrial supervision.
- **Restricts the use of secured money bond. (See "Shifting from money bond to risk-based release decisions" on Page 16.)**
 - Establishes a class of pretrial defendants, based on charge and risk level, who must be released on recognizance or on unsecured bond.
 - Requires pretrial services officers to recommend release on recognizance for a broader group of pretrial defendants, based on charge and risk level, and establishes a high evidentiary standard (clear and convincing evidence) for the court to depart from that recommendation.
- **Requires review of release conditions that result in detention.**
 - Mandates that courts review and revise conditions that prevent a defendant from being released, except where clear and convincing evidence indicates that less restrictive conditions cannot reasonably ensure public safety and court appearance.
 - Authorizes one additional bail review hearing for consideration of a defendant's inability to post the required bond, which under previous law was not sufficient to justify a subsequent hearing.
- **Establishes pretrial supervision and court date reminders.**
 - Authorizes pretrial services officers to supervise defendants during the pretrial period provided that the officers impose the least restrictive level of supervision necessary to reasonably ensure public safety and court appearance, and prioritize higher levels of supervision for higher-risk defendants and those accused of serious charges.
 - Prohibits the court from ordering a defendant to be supervised by a third-party custodian when pretrial supervision is available, money bond has been ordered, or other release conditions can reasonably ensure court appearance and public safety.
 - Mandates that courts send reminders to defendants about upcoming hearings at least 48 hours before each required appearance.

Prioritize prison space for those convicted of serious and violent offenses

The law reflects a consensus that for many people in the criminal justice system noncustodial sanctions and shorter prison stays provide sufficient accountability while costing less and working at least as well as extended incarceration to reduce recidivism. Specifically, the law:

- **Establishes a new diversion sentencing option.**
 - Authorizes the courts in some cases to suspend a conviction, allow the defendant to serve time on probation, and dismiss the case upon successful completion of the supervision term.
- **Limits the use of incarceration for low-level misdemeanors.**
 - Reclassifies certain class B misdemeanors, including disregard of highway obstruction and gambling, as noncriminal violations, and reduces the maximum sentence for most other class B misdemeanors from 90 days in jail to 10.
 - Creates a presumptive range of zero to 30 days for most nonsex-offense class A misdemeanors and allows judges to impose sentences of more than 30 days only when specific aggravating factors are established beyond a reasonable doubt.
 - Prohibits the use of incarceration as a sanction for the first two offenses of theft with a value under \$250 and limits the use of incarceration to five days of suspended imprisonment and six months of probation for subsequent shoplifting offenses.
- **Increases the felony theft threshold and adjusts for inflation.**
 - Raises the value at which theft-related offenses qualify as felonies from \$750 to \$1,000.
 - Requires that the threshold value be adjusted every five years to account for inflation.
- **Modifies drug penalties.**
 - Classifies possession of controlled substances except GHB (gamma hydroxybutyrate) as a class A misdemeanor, eliminates the imposition of prison time for the first two such offenses, and allows imprisonment only upon a failure of supervision.
 - Reduces commercial drug offenses relating to less than 1 gram of a Schedule IA controlled substance (e.g., heroin) from class A to class C felonies and those involving more than 1 gram of a IA substance from class A to class B.
 - Reduces commercial drug offenses related to less than 2.5 grams of a Schedule IIA or IIIA controlled substance (e.g., cocaine and methamphetamine) from class B to class C felonies.
- **Modifies penalties for DUI and driving with a suspended license.**
 - Requires that first-time DUI mandatory minimum sentences be served on electronic monitoring rather than in prison.
 - Reclassifies driving with a suspended license as an infraction rather than a misdemeanor when the underlying suspension is not related to a DUI.
 - Reduces the mandatory minimums for first- and second-time driving with a suspended license offenses when the underlying suspension is DUI-related.
- **Modifies presumptive sentencing ranges for felonies. (See Table 1.)**
 - Reduces the ranges for most nonsex-offense felonies.
 - Increases the mandatory minimum sentence for first- and second-degree murder.

Table 1

Alaska Reduced Presumptive Sentence Ranges for Most Felonies

Penalty changes under S.B. 91

Felony class	Prior law penalties (in years)	S.B. 91 penalties (in years)
Unclassified felonies (nonsex offenses)	mandatory minimum - maximum sentence	
Murder I	<u>20</u> -99	<u>30</u> -99
Murder II	<u>10</u> *-99	<u>15</u> *-99
Attempted murder I, misconduct involving a controlled substance I, and kidnaping	5*-99	Unchanged
Class A felonies (nonsex offenses)	(presumptive sentence range) - maximum sentence	
First felony offense	(5-8)-20	(3-6)-20
Exception: Offense committed with a dangerous weapon, offense directed at first responder	(7-11)-20	(5-9)-20
Exception: Manufacture of methamphetamine in the presence of children	(7-11)-20	(3-6)-20
Second felony offense	(10-14)-20	(8-12)-20
Third and subsequent felony offense	15-20	13-20
Class B felonies (nonsex offenses)	(presumptive sentence range) - maximum sentence	
First felony offense	(1-3)-10	(0-2)-10
Exception: Criminally negligent homicide of a child	(2-4)-10	Unchanged
Exception: Criminally negligent homicide of an adult	(1-3)-10	Unchanged
Exception: Attempt or conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine in the presence of children	(2-4)-10	(0-2)-10
Second felony offense	(4-7)-10	(2-5)-10
Third and subsequent felony offense	6-10	4-10
Class C felonies (nonsex offenses)	(presumptive sentence range) - maximum sentence	
First felony offense	(0-2)-5	(0-18 months suspended)-5 years
Exception: Waste of a wild food animal or hunting on the same day airborne by a registered guide	(1-2)-5	Unchanged
Exception: First-time felony DUI	(120-239 days)-5 years	Unchanged
Second felony offense	(2-4)-5	(1-3)-5
Third and subsequent felony offense	3-5	2-5

* Underlined numbers indicate mandatory minimum sentences.

Notes: Under Alaska law, unclassified felonies are the most serious crimes, punishable by the longest prison terms. The state has established statutory maximum terms according to offense class and presumptive sentencing ranges (shown in parentheses) below the maximum term according to the number of a defendant's prior felony convictions. The court must impose a sentence within the presumptive range unless aggravating or mitigating factors have been established.

© 2016 The Pew Charitable Trusts

- **Expands eligibility for discretionary parole and streamlines parole hearings.**

- Extends eligibility for discretionary parole to nearly everyone sentenced to at least 181 days in prison, except those convicted of class A and unclassified sex offenses and those serving a mandatory 99-year term for first-degree murder. (See Table 2.)
- Establishes an administrative process that grants parole release without a hearing for those incarcerated for first-time nonviolent, nonsex misdemeanors and class B and C felonies who have completed a required, individualized course of programming and followed institution rules, unless a victim requests a parole hearing.
- Streamlines the hearing process for inmates who do not qualify for administrative parole by requiring the Parole Board to hold hearings for all parole-eligible inmates, rather than wait for applications.
- Creates a new category of discretionary parole eligibility for inmates over 60 who have served at least 10 years of their sentences and have not been convicted of unclassified or sex-offense felonies.

Table 2
Alaska Expanded Parole Eligibility
 Changes under S.B. 91

Offense class and criminal history	Nonsex-offense convictions		Sex-offense convictions	
	Prior law	S.B. 91	Prior law	S.B. 91
Unclassified felony				
	Parole eligible	Parole eligible	Not eligible	Not eligible
Class A felony				
No prior felony	Not eligible	Parole eligible	Not eligible	Not eligible
1 prior felony	Not eligible	Parole eligible	Not eligible	Not eligible
2 prior felonies	Not eligible	Parole eligible	Not eligible	Not eligible
Class B felony				
No prior felony	Parole eligible	Parole eligible	Not eligible	Parole eligible
1 prior felony	Not eligible	Parole eligible	Not eligible	Parole eligible
2 prior felonies	Not eligible	Parole eligible	Not eligible	Parole eligible
Class C felony				
No prior felony	Parole eligible	Parole eligible	Not eligible	Parole eligible
1 prior felony	Parole eligible	Parole eligible	Not eligible	Parole eligible
2 prior felonies	Not eligible	Parole eligible	Not eligible	Parole eligible

Incorporating Crime Victims' Priorities

The Alaska Criminal Justice Commission hosted roundtables in Fairbanks and Bethel with crime victims, survivors, advocates, community- and system-based victims' service providers, and justice professionals to identify priorities for improving victim safety, services, and support in Alaska. The Bethel event specifically sought to capture the concerns of victims and advocates in the state's remote jurisdictions.

The top two priorities that emerged from these discussions were strengthening victim-assistance services in remote areas and expanding programs focusing on crime prevention and bystander intervention.* The Legislature provided \$11 million over six years for these programs and services as part of the S.B. 91 reinvestment package. The state will provide the funds each year to the Alaska Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, which will then disburse them as grants to community-based programs.

The legislation included provisions to address several issues identified during and after the roundtables, specifically to:

- Require prosecuting attorneys to confer with victims in felony and domestic violence cases before entering into plea agreements.
- Prohibit law enforcement from disclosing to employers information about sexual assault reports and investigations, and prohibit employer retaliation against workers for making these reports.
- Garnish Permanent Fund Dividend payments for purposes of collecting court-ordered victim restitution.
- Authorize the Parole Board to require perpetrators of domestic violence to participate in rehabilitative programming as a condition of parole.
- Notify victims of the dates of expected release from incarceration and expected discharge from supervision, and provide victims with opportunities to request information and offer input.

* Bystander intervention refers to empowering and equipping members of the public who observe sexual violence, domestic violence, and other forms of victimization, or who witness the conditions that perpetuate violence, to speak up and effectively assist in prevention efforts.



The commission hosted roundtables [and] ... conducted personal interviews with survivors to help identify their most salient needs. ... Even after the commission's recommendations were translated into legislation, the bill's sponsor spent weeks continuing to meet with crime victim advocates to ensure we understood the bill language and we had a chance to negotiate appropriate amendments that would go further to protect individual and public safety."

—commission member Brenda Stanfill, victim advocate and executive director, Interior Alaska Center for Nonviolent Living (op-ed, *Fairbanks Daily News-Miner*, April 1, 2016)



Criminal justice reforms are not just pro-offender or pro-victim. That's a false dichotomy. This rethinking of how we spend money will get much better outcomes for offenders and for victims, meaning improved public safety and also improved personal safety."

—Kara Nelson, director, Haven House Juneau (op-ed, *Juneau Empire*, March 31, 2016)

Strengthen probation and parole

The law incorporates evidence-based practices to reduce recidivism into probation and parole supervision. It:

- **Adopts administrative sanctions and incentives.**
 - Directs the Department of Corrections to establish a program of administrative sanctions and incentives to facilitate prompt and effective responses to compliance with or violations of conditions of probation and parole.
- **Caps prison stays for technical violations.**
 - Limits the maximum prison sentence for technical probation or parole violations to three days for the first revocation, five days for the second, 10 days for the third, and up to the remainder of the suspended sentence for subsequent revocations.
 - Limits the maximum prison sentence for absconding to 30 days.
- **Establishes earned compliance credits.**
 - Requires the commissioner of the Department of Corrections to establish a program that allows probationers and parolees to earn 30 days off their supervision sentence for each 30 days served in compliance.
- **Streamlines early discharge from probation and parole.**
 - Requires probation and parole officers, with some exceptions, to recommend to the court and Parole Board that a supervision period be terminated after one year for class C felonies and after two years for class A and B felonies for those who have complied with the conditions of their supervision and completed required treatment programs.
- **Modifies maximum probation sentences.**
 - Limits probation sentences to 15 years for sex offenses; 10 years for unclassified nonsex-offense felonies; five years for other felonies; three years for misdemeanor assaults, domestic violence, or sex offenses; two years for second-time misdemeanor DUIs; and one year for any other offense. Previously, maximum terms were 25 years for a sex offense and up to 10 years for all other offenses.
- **Strengthens other prison alternatives.**
 - Requires community residential centers to provide treatment, reduce mixing of low- and high-risk individuals, and adopt quality assurance measures.
 - Restricts the state's Alcohol Safety Action Program referrals to people who have been referred by a court for a DUI-related offense, and requires the program to screen for risk of reoffending and monitor participants based on risk level.
 - Extends good time credits—which reward inmates who comply with institutional rules with time off of their prison terms—to include time off of supervision terms for individuals on electronic monitoring.
 - Prohibits converting community work service into a sentence of imprisonment and increases the value of an hour of community work from \$3 to the state minimum wage, currently \$9.75 per hour, for purposes of working off a fine.

Remove barriers to re-entry

To smooth inmates' transition from prison back to the community and promote their long-term success, the law:

- **Mandates re-entry planning.**
 - Directs the Department of Corrections to prepare re-entry plans with inmates, beginning at least 90 days before their discharge dates.
 - Requires coordination with community nonprofit organizations, the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, and the Department of Motor Vehicles to identify re-entry resources in the community, provide job training and employment assistance, and help inmates obtain valid state IDs before release.
- **Removes collateral consequences.**
 - Lifts restrictions on Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program eligibility for those convicted of drug felonies, provided they comply with supervision conditions and treatment requirements.
 - Directs the Department of Motor Vehicles to grant limited driver's licenses to those convicted of DUI offenses who have completed court-ordered treatment and complied with insurance and other requirements.

Ensure oversight and accountability

To help policymakers, criminal justice practitioners, and the public evaluate implementation of S.B. 91 and assess the performance of Alaska's corrections system, the law:

- **Establishes an oversight role for the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission.**
 - Extends the term of the commission through June 2021 and requires it to assess the law's implementation; report annually on performance metrics, outcomes, and savings; and make recommendations each year on how savings should be reinvested to further reduce recidivism.
- **Mandates collection and reporting of performance data.**
 - Requires the courts and the Departments of Public Safety and Corrections to report data on key performance measures.

Requires the commission to analyze the data as part of its oversight and recommend additional reforms as appropriate.

Disproportionate Confinement of Alaska Natives

Alaska Natives represent 15 percent of the state's resident population, but they account for 36 percent of its prison population.* (See Figure 5.) To address this overrepresentation, the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission reached out to tribal courts, councils, and communities for help in assessing the pretrial, sentencing, and corrections systems.


* Alaska Department of Corrections and U.S. Census Bureau.

Figure 5


Alaska Natives Make Up a Disproportionate Share of the State's Inmates

Confinement by race and ethnicity

Percent of Alaska resident population, 2013



Percent of Alaska prison population, July 1, 2014



Source: Alaska Department of Corrections and U.S. Census Bureau

© 2016 The Pew Charitable Trusts

The legislation creating the commission required the appointment of at least one member by the Alaska Native Justice Center. In addition, the commission and its staff sought input at the annual convention of the Alaska Federation of Natives and conducted outreach in the rural hub communities of Nome, Kotzebue, and Bethel and in remote villages in the surrounding areas. Alaska Native people and organizations weighed in on the priorities for reform, and hundreds of Alaska Natives later voiced their support for S.B. 91 in endorsements and testimony before legislative committees.



Like so many of those incarcerated, Alaska Native men and women often end up in prison for behavior related to substance abuse, alcoholism or mental illness. Without sufficient behavioral treatment facilities in rural hub communities, these issues escalate and Alaska prisons become de facto rehabilitation centers. As a result, Alaskans pay much more to address these problems with prison beds and get far worse results than if we would have invested in treatment-oriented rehabilitation programs."

—Julie Kitka, president, Alaska Federation of Natives (op-ed, *Alaska Dispatch News*, May 17, 2016)

Shifting from money bond to risk-based release decisions

The Alaska Criminal Justice Commission's recommendation of a new pretrial services program was based on a strong and growing body of evidence suggesting that pretrial detention often may be unnecessary and counterproductive. Specifically:

- Pretrial failure, defined as new criminal activity during the pretrial period or failure to appear for court hearings, is rare.⁶
- Actuarial assessment tools can estimate the risk of pretrial failure and should inform decisions about release conditions.⁷
- Detention can lead to higher rates of pretrial failure.⁸
- In many cases, pretrial risks can be managed with alternatives to detention.⁹
- Restrictive release conditions should be used rarely and primarily on higher-risk defendants.¹⁰

Notably, there is little evidence to suggest that secured money bonds improve public safety and court appearance rates. They do, however, commonly result in detention of lower-risk individuals and enable the release of some high-risk but well-resourced individuals. Because it makes access to money rather than assessed risk of pretrial failure the determining factor for release, money bond is a flawed method for ensuring court appearance and public safety.¹¹

S.B. 91 eliminates the use of secured money bond for many nonviolent misdemeanor and class C felony defendants and strengthens the presumption of release on recognizance for those charged with nonviolent offenses and for low-risk defendants charged with violent crimes.

By placing statutory restrictions on the recommendations pretrial services officers may make to the court as well as on judges' authority to order secured money bond, the law reserves secured money bond for higher-risk defendants with more serious charges. (See Tables 3 and 4.) Although the restrictions on pretrial services officers and those on courts mostly overlap, pretrial services officers must recommend release on recognizance or unsecured bond for misdemeanor defendants assessed as high risk, class C felony defendants assessed at moderate or high risk, and defendants charged with DUI or who refused a chemical test and were assessed as low or moderate risk. However, judges may depart from those recommendations under limited circumstances.

Table 3

Pretrial Services Officers Will Recommend Most Defendants for Release on Recognizance

Statutory framework for pretrial services officers' release recommendations

Risk for pretrial failure	Nonviolent misdemeanors	Nonviolent class C felonies	DUI/refusal to submit to chemical test	Failure to appear/violation of pretrial release condition	Other
Low	Release on recognizance recommended	Release on recognizance recommended	Release on recognizance recommended	Release on recognizance presumptively recommended	Release on recognizance presumptively recommended
Moderate	Release on recognizance recommended	Release on recognizance recommended	Release on recognizance recommended	Release on recognizance presumptively recommended	Secured bond authorized
High	Release on recognizance recommended	Release on recognizance recommended	Release on recognizance presumptively recommended	Secured bond authorized	Secured bond authorized

“Release on recognizance recommended”: The pretrial services officer must recommend to the judge that the defendant be released on recognizance with a promise to appear in court or on unsecured bond—a commitment to pay an agreed-upon amount of money if the defendant fails to appear in court or violates release conditions. No money is paid upfront.

“Release on recognizance presumptively recommended”: The pretrial services officer must recommend that the defendant be released on recognizance or on unsecured bond unless the officer finds substantial evidence that no combination of nonmonetary conditions can reasonably ensure court appearance and public safety, in which case the officer may recommend secured bond.

“Secured bond authorized”: Permits recommendations of secured bond, though the pretrial services officer may still recommend that the defendant be released on recognizance or unsecured bond.

Notes: “Risk for pretrial failure” is determined using a validated assessment instrument. Exceptions to class C felonies include domestic violence offenses, offenses against a person, DUI/refusal to submit to a chemical test, and failure to appear; misdemeanor exceptions include all of those and violation of a release condition. “Other” includes class B and higher felony charges, as well as all other charges that fall under a misdemeanor or class C felony exception and are not listed in another column.

© 2016 The Pew Charitable Trusts

Table 4

Courts Must Release Certain Defendants on Recognizance

Statutory framework for courts' pretrial release decisions

Risk for pretrial failure	Nonviolent misdemeanors	Nonviolent class C felonies	DUI/refusal to submit to chemical test	Failure to appear/violation of pretrial release condition	Other
Low	Mandatory release on recognizance	Mandatory release on recognizance	Presumptive release on recognizance	Presumptive release on recognizance	Presumptive release on recognizance
Moderate	Mandatory release on recognizance	Presumptive release on recognizance	Presumptive release on recognizance	Presumptive release on recognizance	Secured bond authorized
High	Presumptive release on recognizance	Presumptive release on recognizance	Presumptive release on recognizance	Secured bond authorized	Secured bond authorized

“Mandatory release on recognizance”: Requires release on recognizance or unsecured bond, though the court may also impose appropriate nonmonetary conditions.

“Presumptive release on recognizance”: Requires release on recognizance or unsecured bond unless the judge finds clear and convincing evidence that these terms, even in combination with nonmonetary conditions, cannot reasonably ensure court appearance and public safety, in which case secured money bond is authorized.

“Secured bond authorized”: Permits orders of secured bond, though the court may still release the defendant on recognizance or unsecured bond.

Notes: Exceptions to misdemeanors and class C felonies include offenses against a person, sex offenses, domestic violence offenses, DUI/refusal to submit to a chemical test, failure to appear in court, and violation of a condition of release. “Other” includes class B and higher felony charges, as well as all other charges that fall under a misdemeanor or class C felony exception that are not listed in another column.

© 2016 The Pew Charitable Trusts

“Reducing our state prison population is vital to making conditions inside the facilities safer, both for prison inmates and correctional officers. Senate bill 91 will reduce unnecessary pretrial detention and also strengthen alternatives to prison for those convicted of nonviolent offenses.”

—Department of Corrections Commissioner Dean Williams, from the governor’s news release at bill signing (June 11, 2016)

Reinvestment

Facing a multibillion-dollar budget shortfall, Gov. Walker and legislative leaders advised the commission that investment in substance use disorder and mental health treatment, prison alternatives, and victims’ services would be possible only with a prison population reduction that resulted in significant net savings to the state.

The governor’s Office of Management and Budget and the House and Senate Finance committees reviewed proposals for investment in priority services, and approved fiscal notes for a total of \$98.8 million between 2016 and 2022. (See Table 5.) Much of the funding involves direct reinvestment of savings arising from the pretrial, sentencing, and corrections policy changes in S.B. 91. The state supplemented its reinvestment of these savings by establishing a Recidivism Reduction Fund using 50 percent of the state’s new tax revenue from the sale of marijuana. Grant funds for community-based treatment and re-entry resources and for victims’ services and violence prevention programming in rural and remote communities will pass through the state Department of Health and Social Services and the Alaska Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, respectively. More than half of the reinvestment funding is dedicated to creating the pretrial services program.

Table 5

Alaska Will Direct Nearly \$100 Million to Reduce Recidivism and Support Victims

Reinvestment funds established in S.B. 91 fiscal notes, 2016-22

Services	Amount
Pretrial services and supervision	\$54.2 million
Victims' services and violence prevention	\$11 million
Substance use disorder and behavioral health treatment services in prison	\$11 million
Community-based behavioral health and re-entry services	\$15.5 million*
Implementation costs (database upgrades, Alcohol Safety Action Program resources, and Parole Board and Alaska Judicial Council staffing)	\$7.1 million
Total reinvestment	\$98.8 million

* \$6 million of this reinvestment line item will be reimbursed by the federal government through Medicaid beginning in 2019.

© 2016 The Pew Charitable Trusts



We knew investing in treatment and victims' services was critical. S.B. 91 averts millions in future spending to allow for that reinvestment. This was an enormous achievement that will reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and get the most public safety out of each dollar spent on our criminal justice system."

—Senator John Coghill (R), S.B. 91 sponsor (news release, July 11, 2016)

Supporting organizations

S.B. 91 and the reinvestment package were supported by a broad group of local stakeholders, including:

Aiding Women in Abuse and Rape Emergencies

Alaska Criminal Justice Commission

Alaska Department of Corrections

Alaska Department of Law

Alaska Department of Health and Social Services

Alaska Department of Public Safety

Alaska Federation of Natives

Alaska Mental Health Board—Advisory Board on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse

Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority

Alaska Network on Domestic Violence & Sexual Assault

Alaska Policy Forum

Alaska Public Defender

Alaska Republican Party

Alaska Regional Coalition

Alaska Violent Crimes Compensation Board

Arctic Women in Crisis

Bristol Bay Native Corporation

Cordova Family Resource Center

Fairbanks Diversity Council

Fairbanks Native Association

Greater Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce

Jeffersonian Project

Kawerak Inc.

Mat-Su Health Foundation

NAACP—Anchorage

Partners for Progress

Supporting Our Loved Ones Group

Tanana Chiefs Conference

Unalaskans Against Sexual Assault & Family Violence

Members of the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission

Gregory Razo (chair), Alaska Native Justice Center designee

Justice Alexander Bryner, Alaska Supreme Court (retired)

Senator John Coghill (R), Alaska State Senate

Commissioner Walt Monegan, Alaska Department of Public Safety

Jeff Jessee, Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority

Representative Wes Keller (R), Alaska House of Representatives

Commissioner Dean Williams, Alaska Department of Corrections

Judge Stephanie Rhoades, Anchorage District Court

Jahna Lindemuth, attorney general

Lt. Kris Sell, Juneau Police Department

Brenda Stanfill, Interior Alaska Center for Nonviolent Living

Quinlan Steiner, Alaska public defender

Judge Trevor Stephens, Ketchikan Superior Court

Craig Richards, former attorney general, Gary Folger, former commissioner of the Department of Public Safety, Terry Vrabec, former deputy commissioner of the Department of Public Safety, and Ron Taylor, former commissioner of the Department of Corrections, were previous members of the commission and participants in the justice reinvestment process.

Full text of the legislation is available at <http://www.akleg.gov/basis/Bill/Text/29?Hsid=SB0091Z>.

Full commission report is available at <http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/commission-recommendations/akjrireportfinal2015-12-15.pdf>.

The commission is staffed by the Alaska Judicial Council.

Acknowledgments

This brief was prepared by Pew public safety performance project staff member Terry Schuster with help from Adam Gelb, Jake Horowitz, Zoe Towns, Emily Levett, and Melissa Threadgill. Pew staff members Jennifer V. Doctors, Katie Melchior, Tom Lalley, Jennifer Peltak, and Liz Visser provided editing, design, and web support.

Endnotes

- 1 Alaska Department of Corrections and U.S. Census Bureau.
- 2 Unless otherwise noted, Pew conducted analyses in this report for the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission using state data provided by the Alaska Department of Corrections.
- 3 Adjusted for inflation to 2014 dollars.
- 4 File review of 310 court case files from Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau, Bethel, and Nome, with analysis by Pew and the Alaska Judicial Council.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Audrey Hickert , Erin B. Worwood, and Kort Prince, *Pretrial Release Risk Study, Validation & Scoring: Final Report*, University of Utah (2013), http://ucjc.utah.edu/wp-content/uploads/PretrialRisk_UpdatedFinalReport_v052013.pdf; and Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Pretrial Risk Assessment 101: Science Provides Guidance on Managing Defendants” (2012), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PJI_PretrialRiskAssessment101.pdf.
- 7 Kristen Bechtel, Christopher Lowenkamp, and Alexander Holsinger, “Identifying the Predictors of Pretrial Failure: A Meta-Analysis—Final Report” (2011), [https://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/Identifying%20the%20Predictors%20of%20Pretrial%20Failure%20-%20A%20Meta%20Analysis%20\(June%202011\).pdf](https://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/Identifying%20the%20Predictors%20of%20Pretrial%20Failure%20-%20A%20Meta%20Analysis%20(June%202011).pdf); Timothy Cadigan and Christopher T. Lowenkamp, “Implementing Risk Assessment in the Federal Pretrial Services System,” *Federal Probation* 75, no. 2 (2011): 30–4, <https://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/Implementing%20Risk%20Assessment%20in%20the%20Federal%20Pretrial%20Services%20System%20-%20Cadigan%20et%20al%202011.pdf>; and Marie VanNostrand and Gena Keebler, *Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court*, U.S. Department of Justice (2009), [https://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment%20in%20the%20Federal%20Court%20Final%20Report%20\(2009\).pdf](https://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment%20in%20the%20Federal%20Court%20Final%20Report%20(2009).pdf).
- 8 Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Marie VanNostrand, and Alexander Holsinger, “The Hidden Cost of Pretrial Detention” Laura and John Arnold Foundation (2013), <https://www.pretrial.org/download/research/The%20Hidden%20Costs%20of%20Pretrial%20Detention%20-%20LJAF%202013.pdf>; and Alexander M. Holsinger, “Research Brief: Exploring the Relationship Between Time in Pretrial Detention and Four Outcomes,” *Crime and Justice Institute* (2016), <http://www.crj.org/page/-/publications/Exploring%20Pretrial%20Detention.pdf>.
- 9 VanNostrand and Keebler, *Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court*.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 See Michael R. Jones, “Unsecured Bonds: The as Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial Release Option” Pretrial Justice Institute (2013), <http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/Unsecured+Bonds,+The+As+Effective+and+Most+Efficient+Pretrial+Release+Option++Jones+2013.pdf>.

Contact: Tom Lalley, communications

Email: tlalley@pewtrusts.org

Project website: pewtrusts.org/publicsafety

The Pew Charitable Trusts is driven by the power of knowledge to solve today's most challenging problems. Pew applies a rigorous, analytical approach to improve public policy, inform the public, and invigorate civic life.