

Transcript

“Global Trends: New Demographics and Their Implications”

Featured Speakers:

Michael Dimock, president of the Pew Research Center

Homi Kharas, senior fellow and deputy director of The Brookings Institution’s Global Economy and Development Program

Philip Jenkins, distinguished professor of history at Baylor University’s Institute for Studies of Religion

Moderator: Susan Urahn, executive vice president and chief program officer of The Pew Charitable Trusts

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Susan Urahn: Welcome, everybody. I’m Sue Urahn, the executive vice president and chief program officer here at The Pew Charitable Trusts. And on behalf of my colleagues, I want to welcome each of you to a discussion we’re having called “Global Trends: New Demographics and Their Implications.” And we’re joined today by three distinguished guests, each of whom has authored a scholarly and enlightening article in our new publication called *Trend*.

Urahn: Now, *Trend* and the panel who I’ll introduce in just a moment continue a long tradition here at Pew of convening scientists and policy experts from a wide range of disciplines and perspectives to share their latest research and share it with a wide audience. As our President and CEO Rebecca Rimel notes in her introduction to *Trend*, at Pew we continuously strive to live up to the spirit of openness and entrepreneurship, and look to a wide range of partners and donors to join us in developing evidence-based policies to solve difficult problems and serve the public interest.

Many of the challenges we face, including ocean governance and antibiotic resistance, cross borders, ignore political boundaries, and cannot be addressed by a single leader or nation. They are transnational problems. And our response must be similarly global, bringing together the best ideas, the most innovative thinking, and the most credible voices from near and far to build a better world.

That’s why we’re calling this issue of *Trend* “Transcending Borders.” We want to emphasize that while our challenges are increasingly international in scope, so is our ability to meet those challenges. The rapid and free flow of information, often with a single keystroke, provides new opportunities to work together, to learn from each other, and to advance the cause of safer, healthier, and more prosperous communities. So these are precisely the opportunities we’re being afforded today thanks to our three guests who, as I mentioned, have each contributed an article to *Trend*.

Michael Dimock is the president of the Pew Research Center, which studies public attitudes, opinions, and behaviors; demographic changes; and trends throughout the world. His article, entitled “Leaving Home,” tracks the number of global migrants – where they’re coming from and going to, and the social, political, economic, and cultural changes that are likely to result from these mass migrations of people.

Homi Kharas is an economist and a senior fellow and a deputy director of the global economy and development program at the Brookings Institution. In “How a Growing Middle Class Could Save the World Economy,” he chronicles the expanding global middle class, including two billion people in developing countries and how the expectations of a burgeoning middle class transcend national borders.

Homi argues that even as expectations rise, the global middle class can thrive if leaders focus on sustainable development, education, and political freedom.

Philip Jenkins is a distinguished professor of history at the Institute for Studies of Religion at Baylor University. His contribution to trend is entitled “African Faith Going Global.” Philip notes that by 2050, the nine most populous countries in Africa will have 1.2 billion people, and that these demographic changes will inevitably have their impact on the world’s religious structures as the strong religiosity of African populations spread beyond our continent.

I thank each of our guests for participating in what I know will be a lively, informative, and, yes, trendsetting discussion. So let’s begin.

Urahn: Mike, let’s start with you. Your *Trend* essay includes Pew Research Center data on a number of global migrants, noting that migrants represent 3.3 percent of people today, and that today, more people worldwide live outside their birth countries than ever before. So we’ve heard a lot about the refugee crisis in Europe, but what are some of the larger trends that we should be aware of?

Michael Dimock: Right, right. Well, thanks, Sue.

Yeah, we’ve seen a pretty significant rise in global migration over the last 50 years or so. Today there are an estimated 244 million people living in a country other than the one that they were born in. That’s roughly a three-fold increase over the past 55 years or so since 1960.

Now, the global population has grown over that period as well. So as a share of the world’s population, as you mentioned, it’s about 3.3 percent of people in the world today are living in a country other than what they were born in. That’s up from about 2.5 percent in 1960.

It would represent, if everybody lived in one place, all those migrants, probably the fifth largest country in the world after Indonesia. But, of course, they don’t all live in the same place. They’re spread out – not evenly, but spread out all over the world.

The refugee movement has gotten a lot of attention. It’s clearly a big political issue and a huge humanitarian issue. But it’s really only a fairly small share of this broader global migration pattern, most of which is happening for a combination of reasons.

If you think about it, some of it is the dislocation element. People are leaving or fleeing something – political violence, discrimination, weather, opportunities that aren’t just limited in the place that they live. That’s often what’s driving refugees. It’s something that gets the most attention in some respects.

A big part of why people move, though, isn’t necessarily dislocation, but just opportunity – people seeing a differential in what’s available to them or their children or their families, and wanting to try to get to a position that will be more beneficial to them – not necessarily fleeing something in particular, but moving toward something better. And the key variable in a lot of that, of course, is the cost of doing that. How hard is it to move from one place to the other?

When you think about some of those push factors, like weather and violence, those things have changed. We’re seeing a peak in refugees right now by most measures. But it sort of ebbs and flows at different times in human history.

What's new, in some respects now, is related to that cost factor. You've seen changes in transportation. You've seen changes in technology. One factor that we're interested in is just changes in communication. It's easier to move from one place in the world to another today, even if it's very far away, and maintain your connections to home country, to family in ways that were very, very difficult even 10 years ago and much, much easier today.

And one of the outcomes of a lot of that is – one of the big changes in global migration is – it's more of a move today from middle income nations to high income nations than it has been in recent history. Some of this reflects that you can move further today more easily. But there's still a cost to it. And some of that movement is coming not just from the lowest income segments of the world, but some of the folks in the middle income countries who are seeing that opportunity differential.

The biggest exporters today are countries like India and China where there's a growing middle class who sees opportunities for themselves or their children, whether it's educational or otherwise. And that's a big part of what's going on in Europe as well. The refugee crisis, deservedly, is gaining a lot of attention and is an important political issue and raises a lot of concerns in countries. But it's, again, only a small share of that overall net migration.

Urahn: Right. So, Homi, Mike's essay and what he was just talking about now talked about migrants moving for economic aspirations to join the middle class. Tell us a little bit about the global middle class. How big is it? And what kind of growth trends are we likely to see?

Homi Kharas: So speaking as a migrant who has come to join the middle class in America –

Jenkins: I'm not the only one, may I add.

[LAUGHTER]

Kharas: In fact, there's almost a majority of the panel.

Urahn: I'm from Minnesota...

[LAUGHTER]

Kharas: We'll add you in.

Urahn: Fleeing the weather, but there you go.

Kharas: So I think that one of the things that we're seeing just now is something which is quite new and quite special, which is that for very long periods of time up until, let's say, 1980, when you talked about the middle class in the world, you were basically talking about people who were living in Western economies and Japan. So it was Europe, North America, and Japan.

Very few people in a real middle class in developing countries. Plenty of rich people in developing countries, especially people who own lots of or control lots of natural resources, but very few in the middle class. Today there are probably about two billion of them.

And that's something which is quite new for those countries. And it's spread. It's in the large economies in Latin America or in places like Brazil and Mexico. It's obviously there in China. Increasingly, although the numbers still quite small, in India because India is still, relatively speaking, quite a poor country.

But lots of Southeast Asian countries, all these countries like Thailand and Indonesia or in the Philippines, these are all countries with sometimes hundreds of millions of people in them. And even if the middle class is a relatively small share of the population, when you start to add them up country by country, you start to get some very big numbers.

The remarkable thing is that because these are the most dynamic economies in the world – so India is probably growing today at somewhere between 6 to 7 percent, population growth of just over 1 percent, so 6 percent in per capita terms, big movements into the cities – most middle class people do actually live in cities. And their incomes increase as they move to cities. That's what makes them middle class.

So that's where all of the growth in the global middle class is happening. And we see a real cleavage in the world today between a middle class in developed countries, which is now stressed. The kinds of polls that Michael does shows that they are feeling much less optimistic, much less confident that hard work will get ahead, much less confident in the future of their children. And the middle class in emerging economies, which is massive, two billion strong now, growing at somewhere around 8 percent per year with this combination of urbanization and income growth in their countries, and seeing the world as a very optimistic place, hugely optimistic.

Life satisfaction booming. Their children are getting educated. Their mortality rates are pretty much identical now for middle class populations in these countries as they would be if they were living in the United States or Europe.

So from many different points of view, they are enjoying exactly the same kind of lifestyles and comforts as people have been used to in the developed economies. And the question, I think, that has come up is a question about, well, is there some causality or connection between the advance of the middle class in emerging economies and the stress of the middle class in developed countries?

And I think it's convenient to paint that as if it were a close causal connection. And so people talk about, where have all the jobs gone? Well, the jobs have been outsourced to China or somewhere else. I think when you look in more detail, you find that that's probably a scapegoat kind of argument. It's the convenient ability to point your finger somewhere else and blame the foreigner. And, actually, these processes are just operating quite independently. So when you look at what's driving the middle class in emerging economies, it's many of the same things that drove the middle class in the West.

It's the movement to cities. It's better education. It's use of technology. It's getting access to power and the internet and things like that. And these people are getting better jobs. But most of their jobs are actually in service industries, not in manufacturing.

And then when you look at what's driven the loss of manufacturing jobs in the West, which is where a lot of the decline of the middle class has happened, you see that it has much more to do with technology than it has to do with globalization or these jobs going abroad. And so, even though manufacturing as a whole in absolute terms in the world is higher today than it has been in the past, the number of people working in manufacturing is much lower and has been declining over the last 10 years or so. So it's not really because the jobs are being taken away, or perhaps it is that the jobs are being taken away, but the jobs are being taken away by robots, not by other people.

Urahn: All right. Philip, so you say in the beginning of your essay, we can be reasonably sure where the bulk of the world's people will be living in 2050, but do we dare make statements about what they will believe? And you did dare to make a statement, correct? So tell us, what can demographics tell us about the growing significance of Africa in the world's religious picture? And what are we seeing today that illustrates this important shift?

Jenkins: I argue that there's a very close relationship between fertility rates and the religious faith of a particular society. Normally if I look at a particular community, and I look at its fertility rate that is the average number of children that a woman will have through her lifetime, I can make reasonable guesstimates about the religious quality of that country, no matter what its religious tradition is, generally speaking.

A stability rate from which the population will neither rise nor fall is about 2.1. Europe since the 1960s has pioneered very low fertility rates. And to oversimplify an argument, low fertility rates correspond closely with secularization and the decline of organized institutional religion. If a country has a rate of 1.4, it's likely to be secularizing. If it's a traditional – what we used to call a third-world rate – of, say, five or six, it is likely to be more traditional minded in terms of religion, in terms of gender attitudes of religiosity.

As I say, I'm not just making those as oracular pronouncements – or I am, in this instance – and I try and explain why this is. But I argue that one of the most important changes in the world – and this relates very closely to what my two colleagues here are saying – is that there is a massive disparity between the fertility rates of much of the world and one continent, which is Africa.

Africa failed to get the memo about lower fertility rates. Fertility rates are collapsing in some of the most surprising countries. And if it's true that it means that low fertility means secularization, this is very intriguing for a country like Iran, which has some of the sharpest falling fertility in the world and is now roughly on the level of a middle-ranking European country.

African rates remain very high. And the consequence of that is an ever larger share of the world's people will live in Africa. By some projections, the figure could be 40 percent by the end of this century.

And it also means that those communities, at least for the foreseeable future, for some decades, are likely to be highly religious. There was a very unfortunate blip some years ago when a Nigerian census showed that 99 percent of the people of Nigeria believed in God. The next survey, of course, showed it was 100 percent.

And whatever religious tradition you look at, we seem to have this growth. If that's true, then, first of all, we see a continuing, very strong religiosity in Africa where countries like Ethiopia, Uganda, Nigeria, Congo continue to have fertility rates of around 5, 5.5 – very, very, very traditional. And of course, that has implications for the style of the religion. It tends to be very, very passionate, very, very devout, whether we're talking about Christian or Muslim.

But also, you look at a country like, for example, Uganda. And you look and see that in 1950, it had a population of 5.5 million. And by 2050, it should have a population of about 80 million. And you think, where are they going to put those people in a country roughly the size of Oregon? And the answer is probably not in Uganda.

But the good news is the countries like Italy and Spain will be in urgent need of people to do the jobs and pay the taxes. As a result, there are a great many African migrants around the world. And very commonly, they take their churches, they take their religious practices with them.

I use many examples of that. The largest Christian congregation in Europe is, of course, in Kiev in Ukraine. And, of course, it was founded by a Nigerian. Any way you look in Europe, you will find Nigerian churches in Anglophone countries and Congolese clergy running the mega churches in France or Belgium.

That phenomenon of migrant religion – basically, I suppose my point is what happens in Africa does not stay in Africa. So if I was asked, I suppose, the most important trend in the world today, then obviously I would look at these issues of migration and the growth the middle class – which are absolutely, indissolubly bound with these demographic trends – but I would say the most important one is that African rates are so much higher. And that corresponds to faith.

In 1900, there were three Europeans for every African. By 2050, there will be three Africans for every European. But that figure is misleading because among the Europeans, there comes a lot of African migrants. So by 2050, Christianity, for example, will be a religion of Africa and the African diaspora. And people like myself, non-Hispanic whites, will represent about 16 percent or 18 percent of the world's Christian population.

That's quite a revolution. It has many elements. But I think the demographics, and particularly fertility rates, are a leading element of that.

Urahn: Well, let's talk about the policy implications of some of these trends. Mike, given your research, what can you tell us about public opinion about migration and immigration here in the United States?

Dimock: Yeah, well, it's a deeply tense issue. And you see, obviously, a lot of intense concern about immigration and migration that's not always linked to the actual, let's say, facts on the ground. While net migration from Mexico has zeroed out if not reversed over the last 10 years or so, we're seeing it pop up as a huge touch point in political conversations and concerns that middle class in America has about the economic and cultural impact on themselves.

I think in the U.S., you've seen a general movement toward openness to immigration at a general public level. The share of Americans who see immigration as a net plus to our country culturally and a net plus to our country even economically has been slowly ticking in an upward direction – of seeing diversity and immigrants as a positive to this country. The latest poll we did just earlier this year, 59 percent told us that migrants to the U.S. do more to help the American economy with their hard work and talents. Only 33 percent said that it's a burden on our economy because of their impact on jobs and social safety net and so forth.

That is a very generationally driven phenomenon. But, of course, the generational phenomenon is also a racial and ethnic phenomenon because the youngest generations are the most diverse and the most impacted by the big waves of immigration over the last 20 to 30 years, particularly from Latin America.

I think a lot of these same stresses and strains in the U.S. are apparent in a lot of other developed nations. You see it playing out in Europe. You see the Brexit vote – not to get ahead of the conversation – reflecting a lot of those same concerns and tensions, often linked to a combination of security concerns, concerns about – whether it's potential terrorism or crime which you see resonate with some folks related to migration, whether it's economic concerns about jobs and impact on the national economies, or

whether they are cultural concerns about what it means to be American, what it means to be British. You name it. Those things are hard to pull apart because the people who feel concerned about immigration's impact on their nation tend to express a lot of those concerns mixed together. And it's very hard to piece apart how much of it is economic threat, how much of it is security, how much of it is cultural.

Urahn: Homi, you wrote about the impact of the rising middle class on global climate change. Is it going to create more stress, more global climate change problems? Or is there a silver lining perhaps?

Kharas: Well, I think the immediate thinking is that this will inevitably be more stress. I mean, what does the middle class do? They buy cars. They buy houses. And there's just more power generated, et cetera.

But I think that there's an interesting phenomenon, which is that they also have far fewer children. And it comes straight back to this question about Africa. So, yes, African fertility rates. Now Africa is really the only place in the world where fertility rates are at that kind of really high level, levels of, let's say, above four or five.

Everywhere else, it's come down. And it's come down as a consequence of moving to cities, urbanization. You don't have that much space to have that many more children. Higher income levels, and better education – especially, as it turns out, secondary education of girls.

If girls have more secondary education, they tend to have far, far fewer people. And this is true within every country when you look at the fertility rates broken down by the education of women. And it's true across countries and those that put more emphasis on education.

What's remarkable, I think, is just the size of some of these numbers. So I was looking at the difference between high fertility assumptions and low fertility assumptions – some of which is linked to whether the middle class actually develops or doesn't develop – and you're talking about reasonable differences in demographic projections of 2 billion people by 2100. So the low-fertility projections are 9 billion people and the high fertility projections are 11 billion people by 2100 on our planet.

And most of that is to do with a few large countries. So it's, basically India and Nigeria and Ethiopia – many of them who are in Africa where the range of assumptions about what's going to happen with fertility rates is actually quite high. And then you have to ask yourself this question, do we think that it's going to be easier to get to the level of carbon emissions that we think we need, which is actually close to zero net, in a world of 9 billion people or 11 billion people? And I would argue that it's going to be much easier in a world of 9 billion people.

And we're not going to get to that world by forcible means, should I say? So let's get to that world by voluntary means. And most of those means do have to do with how do we actually create the conditions where people want to have smaller families and then have access to the kind of health care that would enable them to have those smaller families. And that has to do with all of the things we talk about as the middle class in the evolution of the middle class and what a middle class family looks like.

So I think what's interesting to me is that in all of the discussions at COP 21 in Paris about climate change and what's happening, there wasn't a single mention of education, no mention of fertility. All these things are thought of as being trends that are happening as almost exogenous–

Urahn: Written in stone.

Kharas: – exogenous. They're written in stone. They just happen. There's somebody at the U.N. who cranks out these numbers. But we kind of know what's going to happen.

We don't. And once we start to have these relatively longer time perspectives, that's when you need to start to really think about, how do we drive and change demographic changes, including how do we change people's behavior?

Urahn: So back to Africa, the projections that you're looking at, how much do they shift based on how you think about secondary education provision for girls, for women in particular?

Jenkins: You mentioned the high and the low fertility projections. One of the interesting things that's happened in the last decade is that the projections for Africa have veered consistently now to the high. People were hoping that the great shift in fertility rates would happen. And I'm saying, no, not for another couple of decades, which is why we're getting these extremely high rates.

One of the odd things about many African countries is you are getting a lot of real middle class growth. You're getting a lot of real development in a country like Ethiopia, for example. But what's interesting is that you would think as more and more women are drawn into service industries, they're drawn into the workplace, that you would get a very steep fall in birth rates. And you're not. It's not yet managing to overwhelm those deeper, underlying traditions, which is strange because it is in so many parts of the world.

You mentioned India. Half the states of India now have fertility rates which are comparable to that of Denmark, which is extremely strange. And the other half are working very hard to counteract this.

Urahn: Mike, do you want to –

Jenkins: But that is one of the strange things. And I'm sure that in Africa in 20 years, you will get this shift. But by that point, there will be – what's the present estimate – 2.2 billion Africans by 2050.

Oh, and that then also has other implications, which means that we are now living in the greatest ever age of urbanization. And it's going to be in Africa in the next 30 years.

Urahn: Did you want to jump in?

Kharas: Yeah, no, I just wanted to say that, at least for me, one of the big hopes is the progress in infant and child mortality now, including in Africa, has been really dramatic. And that's only really happened in the last five to 10 years. And that is sometimes an early marker of when the demographic transition will happen.

And this is happening incidentally in a pretty much across the board. So it's happening for the first time in very poor countries. And it's associated with things like vaccination rates and bed nets and all of the fairly simple technologies that we now know really work for bringing down mortality rates.

So if that happens, then maybe we'll start to see some of the changes in fertility rates that have long been hoped for. But, of course, it's got to be accompanied by all kinds of other things. And there's been so much focus in the world on basic education, basic needs. But if you really want to affect demographic changes, you've got to talk about secondary education. And, of course, secondary education has to follow from basic education.

But I think that there has to be a little bit of a mindset change in what it is that we are wanting when we talk about development. And it's not just raising people up to some bare minimum threshold. It's really talking about the much broader set of opportunities that they can take advantage of.

Jenkins: I was talking about religion as a topic. And I don't want to present it as almost, oh, yes, there's an incidental byproduct there, which is this religious growth. If you want to affect development, if you want to affect education in any one of these African countries, either you work through religious organizations or you do not work because the states are so inadequate for this. So religious growth, religious organizations, the history of religious institutions is so pivotal to all these factors.

And I would even mention something here which might sound completely bizarre. You've probably seen material about prosperity churches around the world which seem to profit off of these miracles. You give your tithes, and you are driving a Mercedes. And it's so easy to make fun of these.

Those churches in many African countries offer some of the absolute best education in living in cities, in living without going into debt, and they are teaching forms of what you can only call Victorian thrift. And accompanied by that, they preach a revolution in gender attitudes. And I dearly wish I'd invented this phrase, but I did not. In Latin America, they were famous for teaching a reformation of machismo. In other words, if you want a revolution in gender attitudes, you look at the religious organizations.

Urahn: Well, these are huge global trends. Let's talk a little bit about how these trends are shaping people's world views essentially. So, Mike, talk about globally, how are people feeling about globalization?

Dimock: Yeah, I mean, it is interesting because so much of this is a function of this broader trend of globalization, the broader interconnectedness of the world, whether it's migration, whether it's the overall size of the world, the middle class, economic opportunity, and so forth. And globalization is met with these kind of mixed feelings around the world. We hinted at it earlier. There are many people in the developed world who look at this larger interconnected world with great positivity and with great concern. And many of the First World middle classes, let's just say, often see more threat than positive out of this.

One of the most consistent findings we find about trade, for example, in polling in the U.S. and in Europe, is people say, yeah, trade, open trade, free trade is good for the country, but it's probably bad for me. I'm going to lose out in this deal.

And why? Because they do see people in the rest of the world willing to do what they do – that's their perception – for less than they are able to do it or are willing to do it for, and that those opportunities dry up.

I would agree very much with the idea that that may be a distortion of a whole lot of factors that are happening at the same time that are putting pressures on people's lives. And I agree with the technological change as a big factor in a lot of this, that the fundamentals of the economy are changing in ways that are de-stabilizing the middle class of the U.S. and Europe and Japan and elsewhere. And that it looks like that's globalization, and this interchange economically of new workers and that threat, when it's really a broader change in the whole nature of the economy. But it is seen in sort of concerning ways.

When you look at that picture from people in developing and emerging nations, it does feel much more positive. We consistently find in our survey work around the world, the global public seeing very positive

outcomes from more integration with the rest of the world, that it inherently increases opportunity for people in their countries, very positive views of countries like the U.S. and China.

It's not political us versus them to folks in Africa. They love the Chinese coming in and investing and building infrastructure. They love the Americans coming. Take the politics out of it. We just like the lift that it gives our economies, the opportunities that it builds.

And you also see it playing out with the migration story. There is a lot of discussion about the impact of migration on the receiving countries and the political and cultural and economic strains that that can raise. But it's also a very interesting issue from the perspective of the sending countries, the countries that are probably shipping – more people are leaving than coming in, let's just say – because that raises its own political and social tensions. There are concerns in some countries about the so-called brain drain, that people are getting educated up, they finally get to a position where they could afford to go to a place like the U.S. or the U.K., and then that country is losing out on those top earners or that highest potential.

But there's a flip to that. And many countries have embraced immigration as a part of the overall economic development of their countries, and try to find ways to retain those ties with people even if they do emigrate and move to other countries, making it easy, for example, for people who may not live in your country anymore to still vote in your country, to still feel connected to your country.

And one economic story that's received some more attention recently are global remittances, the share of people who leave countries, work in other countries, and are sending money back to usually their family members. These often look like small amounts on an individual level, but they aggregate up to huge amounts of money that's going from largely high-income countries back to middle- and lower-income countries, on the order of an estimated \$600 billion last year in these person-to-person remittances exceeding the amount of money coming from global aid from these first world countries. So you're seeing a lot of dynamics around this from both the sending and receiving side.

Urahn: Homi, in the wake of the Arab Spring, there was a sense that the growing middle class would really drive more openness, more political freedom. What would the data tell us?

Kharas: I think, interestingly, the hope that the middle class would somehow usher in an era of liberal democracies is more a wish than really based on evidence. And you've got as many middle classes – the middle class tends to enjoy stability. They want to have a stable economy. They do take a long-term view of things. They want to be able to save. They want to work hard. They want their children to be educated. All of these things have their impact over long periods of time.

And so what we've seen is, actually, there are quite a few autocracies that promise that stability and deliver that stability over long periods of time. And the middle class can be perfectly happy and content. So there are people who write about the so-called authoritarian bargain where an autocracy basically promises stability and generates conditions where there can be at least some improvement in people's lives, but in return don't grant any additional political freedoms.

That tends to be quite damaging in the long run for economic growth because it squeezes out innovation and inventiveness and entrepreneurship. But for several decades, it can be quite a viable strategy. And I think what you saw in the Arab Spring was, to some extent, exactly that. The middle class in some of these countries like Egypt basically backed off from the revolutions that they helped to instigate and came back saying, oh, my goodness, what we actually really want is stability.

And so they have returned to a situation where you have probably a much more stable, but more autocratic government. And you see that same trade-off of autocratic governments promising stability in many countries across the world, including many countries in Africa where leaders who originally might have been elected on a popular platform are constitutionally extending mandates and terms and things like that, and believing that they are the only people who can deliver the kind of stability that would take them there.

And there are also models where this can be very successful over long periods of time. And some people point to Singapore as a country which has essentially had a fairly tight control, certainly politically, over the country's future, but has delivered extremely well in terms of economics. And, obviously, many people talk about China in exactly the same light.

Dimock: But it does put increasing strain on those autocracies. I mean, that growing middle classes were engaged. They're expecting higher quality –

Kharas: You've got to constantly deliver –

Dimock: – in terms of infrastructure, education –

Kharas: – more and more, and raise your game all the time.

Dimock: The demands are there, right. It causes an evolution of that autocracy.

Kharas: It certainly does.

Dimock: But not necessarily democracy. Yeah.

Urahn: How about people of different faiths? How are they viewing these larger global trends?

Jenkins: Oh, my. Very hard to –

Urahn: Generalize, yeah?

Jenkins: – generalize about that because there are so many different examples.

We talked about the reaction to globalization. I sometimes argue that if you want to understand what we call Islamist terror around the world, you get this wonderful paradox where the movement is so driven by hatred, resentment, resistance against globalization by people who failed in the process. And yet, the way they stake their claim in it is by using the most sophisticated globalized technological forms. Now that's such a classic paradox.

Urahn: Why don't we take a minute or two and maybe see if there are questions from the audience. Could you introduce yourself? And I think we have a mic coming.

Audience Member: The Panama Papers reminded us all about a global set of interlocking, but sometimes a disconnected tax policy. So I wondered if you guys had thought at all about what the implications are at that level. I mean, we see the OECD trying to harmonize things. Where might this take us?

Dimock: I mean, it's interesting. From an economic perspective, that increasing global economics – global integration can create a lot of strange dynamics for countries to play games with taxes or find people to find ways around them.

I guess one thought that comes to my mind is that there is a great deal of resistance in many countries to increasing rules or regulations that are even more distant from their perceived control. I mean, that's what we're seeing a lot in Europe right now is that sense that while there may be a lot of inefficiencies and problems around always nationally driven policies, whether it's tax policy or other policies, the efforts to try to put those under a broader rule to try to even out those collective action problems, let's just say, and create some consistency often can lead to backlashes in the countries who then feel that decisions are being made that are completely outside of their control. And this is linked to this broader concern around a lack of faith in institutions, whether they're political institutions, economic institutions, even religious institutions in many First World developed countries who feel disempowered by the decision-making process, feel that the game is rigged – whether it's the economic game, whether it's the political game. And then are very easily brought to feel very suspicious about those things that are happening in ways that are outside of their control.

So it goes back to the earlier conversation about views about globalization. There is a sense of opportunity associated with globalization and that greater integration, but there's also a sense of a loss of control. I mean, when you survey Americans about their view of the United States, there are the same levels of pride and goodwill toward the United States. But there is really a sense that the United States is not in control of its destiny the way that it was before. And that's because it's now part of a system that is moving with its own momentum in ways that make people feel that their leadership is less empowered. And then that leads to these cycles of concern, distrust, and distancing.

I don't know if anybody else had a thought.

Urahn: Other questions?

Audience Member: Thank you.

Urahn: Yes?

Audience Member: I think I can do it without a mic.

Pew Staff: We have a webcast.

Audience Member: All right. OK. I'm an historical researcher. And I'm getting a lot of feedback my friends in Europe, particularly those in France, Germany, and Sweden, that these countries are apprehensiveness, to put it politely, about losing their cultural identities.

The projections that I've seen, and this goes back all the way to Sarkozy when he was president of France and continues under Hollande, is that the average French family has 1.2 children and the average Muslim family has about 8.1 children. And so, therefore, within about 25 years, France could very well become an Islamic state.

There are concerns with Notre Dame Cathedral. I regard that as a nice landmark. And if it did not honor the prophet Muhammad, perhaps it should be destroyed, and that type of thing. So these are the concerns that I'm hearing. I wonder if you could address that, please.

And also, what efforts, if any, were made in terms of stepping up the birth rate in Europe through in-vitro fertilization, special dispensations, no taxes for three to five years if they have another child, and things like that, please? Thank you.

Urahn: All right. Philip?

Jenkins: --tackle those. One of the most important things that's happened in recent years in Europe – and you get this in all migrant societies – the first generation of migrants always have extremely high fertility rates. There's a reason for that. They tend to be young, active, and the sort of people who move a lot. So they tend to have lots of kids.

When you look at the second generation, third generation, they always merge with the existing rates. France is now up to an average rate of roundabout replacement. It's roundabout 2.1. All stock French folk have been raising a lot, but so have – but a lot of the growth has been from non-Muslim migrants. There are a ton of Christian Africans. For many years, one of the largest immigrant groups in France was Portuguese. So it's a complex story.

Always be very suspicious about some of these figures about Muslim fertility rates. They are so varied. And the countries that are traditionally the main sources for migration to Europe –Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia – are collapsing in their fertility rates. Their unofficial motto is “Next year in Denmark.”

The country with the lowest fertility rate in the Arab world is Tunisia, which is, of course, where the Arab Spring started. And so much of this is happening not because Europe is becoming Arabized and Islamized, but large parts of the Arab Maghreb are becoming Europeanized. And what you're getting is a homogenization of birth rates.

The likeliest high projection for Islamic populations in Europe by 2050 is roundabout 15 to 20 percent, which is way higher than it was a few years ago. But when you look at the scale of minority populations in a country like the U.S., it's not that high.

So I would always urge a lot of caution with figures about, quote, “Muslim birthrates” because there aren't any. There are some countries with very low Muslim rates. There are some countries with very high Muslim rates. And I would argue that one most important trends in the world today, if you have any interest in Islam, is the collapse in fertility rates in some countries, not others, thus creating a two-tier Muslim world.

And the other issue is countries like France, when they run out of migrants from places like Tunisia, where do they get their migrants? And they have to dig deeper and deeper into Christian Africa. And so France becomes to darker in skin, but not so much Islamized, which is my view.

Urahn: Other question? Yes? Back?

Pew Staff: Pass this down that way.

Audience: I'm an administrator at a Baptist church here in the city. I'm also an Episcopalian. And many of the Anglican bishops in Africa are virulently anti-gay. How does that affect the African clergy who found churches in other countries who are more accepting of gays and lesbians?

Jenkins: If you study religion around the world, that is one of the most significant factors, the division between the churches that are growing very, very fast and those that are declining. If you look at the Anglican community, for example, by 2050, they'll probably have something like 150 million members overwhelmingly in Africa and Asia. By the way, that is true of all denominations. The Anglicans were, unfortunately, the bellwether to this.

I, too, am a Episcopalian. Please save your pity. I know. I know.

And that's a current trend. Arguably more important than that is that is now hitting the Roman Catholic Church in a very big way. If you look at the recent synod on the family, there's a very sharply growing division over issues of family, gender, sexuality.

You also put your finger on a key point when you talk about African churches, for example, or South Asian churches that operate in Europe or North America. Rather as happens with the demographics, inevitably over time, they merge with the larger society. The pressure of living in an American or European culture is so enormous that they come to share that over time even if there are new migrants, new arrivals.

So my short answer would be that your Anglican churches over time, for example, or your Baptist churches, whatever, would increasingly liberalize in the West, but not in Africa.

Urahn: I think we have time for one more question. Anybody? Yeah.

Audience Member: I'm an intern at Stimson Center. So Professor Jenkins mentioned that the fertility rate is proportional to religious belief. And that may mean that the world's population, a larger portion of the world's population will be increasingly religious as time goes by. Can we then reasonably fear that the world will be more susceptible to religious extremism and terrorism from that?

Jenkins: Yeah, that is one outlook. What I would stress is religious fervor comes in many different forms. And over time, what I would suggest is that as, for instance, very new Christianities in Africa become better established, they become more diverse. They develop more of the kind of spectrum that you might find in older societies.

I do not want to exaggerate the religious fervor and religious conflict angle because in so many parts of the world, Christians and Muslims jog around together very happily, particularly in large sections of Africa. There are some countries in the world, some specific countries that do frighten me greatly. The obvious country being Nigeria, a country that by the third quarter of this century could theoretically have 400 million people, not to mention a very large diaspora around the world, and appears to be 50/50 split between Christians and Muslims who traditionally have gotten on very well but in the age of Boko Haram and similar groups, seem to be heading in a very difficult situation.

In some ways, Nigeria is a very good example to draw so many themes together here because that is one of the great diaspora countries. And it's also one of the classic examples of a surging middle class which often expresses its aspirations through new civic institutions and religious institutions. So I hate to end this on a pessimistic note.

Urahn: With that, we will be having a reception downstairs on the ninth floor. You are all welcome to join us, continue the conversation with our panelists and with each other. So let me thank the panelists and thank all of you for coming.

[APPLAUSE]